Meaning and emotion in Squaresoft\u27s Final Fantasy X: Re-theorising realism and identification in video games by Spoors, Glen R.
Edith Cowan University 
Research Online 
Theses: Doctorates and Masters Theses 
1-1-2005 
Meaning and emotion in Squaresoft's Final Fantasy X: Re-
theorising realism and identification in video games 
Glen R. Spoors 
Edith Cowan University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses 
 Part of the Education Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Spoors, G. R. (2005). Meaning and emotion in Squaresoft's Final Fantasy X: Re-theorising realism and 
identification in video games. https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/619 
This Thesis is posted at Research Online. 
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/theses/619 
Edith Cowan University 
  
Copyright Warning 
  
 
  
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose 
of your own research or study. 
 
The University does not authorize you to copy, communicate or 
otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
 
You are reminded of the following: 
 
 Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons 
who infringe their copyright. 
 
 A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a 
copyright infringement. Where the reproduction of such material is 
done without attribution of authorship, with false attribution of 
authorship or the authorship is treated in a derogatory manner, 
this may be a breach of the author’s moral rights contained in Part 
IX of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
 
 Courts have the power to impose a wide range of civil and criminal 
sanctions for infringement of copyright, infringement of moral 
rights and other offences under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, 
for offences and infringements involving the conversion of material 
into digital or electronic form.
Meaning and Emotion in Squaresoft's FJnal Fantasy X: 
Re-Theorising "Realism" and "Identification'? 
in Video Games 
Glen R. Spoors 
BA (Hons) (Curtin) 
A thesis submiued in fulfilment of the requirements of 
Doctor of Philrsophy, Edith Cowan University 
Facu];y of Communications and Creative Industries 
School of Communications and Multimedia 
Junuary, 2005 
ii 
USE OF THESIS 
The Use of Thesis statement is not included in this version of the thesis. 
Ab5tr�ct 
This thesis takes the position that tradilioual theories of "realism" and "identification" 
misrepresent the relationships between players and videogames. and that � cross·disciplinary 
approach is needed. It uses Ed Tan's (1997) and Toroon Grodal's (1997) analyses ofnarrative, 
cognition. und emotion in film as a basis for interrogating existing research on, and providing 
a working model of, video gameplay. It develops this model through an extended account of 
Squaresoft's advcmulc role-playing game Final Pamusy X (FFXl (2001). whose hybrid 
narrative and game macrostructul<'s foreground many of the problems associated with video 
games. -p,� ei,"pie..,; ,��p",;'ively address; existing research on video games; how perceptual 
q,,:;.iitic" of the interface deter.lline the re"lity·status of gamcplay; how narrutive und game 
codes re£ulatc or retard interest; FFX's henneneutic coding of reality; the dual narrative and 
game coding of �jc�.o game characters; the uses and limits of the psychoanalytic concept of 
identification when analysing video games; how gamcplay promotes empmhetic emotions 
towards characters; how players develop emp�thelie emotions towards themselves; and how 
the disjunctive quality of play may hnve un e�istential quality. 
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Introduction 
Towards Video Game Aesthetlrs 
Since the 1970s, much research on video games has recapitulated pa!<'ntal aml 
governmental concerns about the effects of prim, radio, film :md television on youth. Case 
studies, observation�lfparticipant analyses, controHed experiments, questionnaire-based 
surveys, and correlative analyses have addressed concerns that video games are n "mindless 
addiction" that promote aggression and sexism, impede social skills, reduce school attendance 
and performance, undermine family life, and generally take time away from other social 
activities or responsibilities (Creasey & Myers, 1986; Egli & Meyers, 1984; Funk, 1993; 
Greenfield, 1984; Kubcy & Larson, 1990; Mitchell, 1985; Provenw, 1991). Indeed, Kevin 
Durkln's (!995) review of research on Australian video games was commissioned specifically 
by the Australian Office of Film and Literature Classification to address "cause and effect 
issues relating to the behaviour of children and young people" {1995, iii) (also see Durkin & 
Aisbctt, 1999). 
However, as Durkin (1995) makes clear, early researchers generally disproved the 
nsoumptions that they set out to test. Video games may be distinct from print, film, and other 
media, but they do not produc2 the negative psychological and social effects to the extent that 
critics claim. The recognition that video games nre not necessarily antisocial is evident in 
popular histories of the medium and its culture (Demaria & Wilson, 2004; Hen, 1997; Kent, 
2001; King & Bordland, 2003; Kushner, 2003; Sheff, 1999). In fact, research in Cultural 
Stmlies has turned to the positive psychological and cultural uses of video games, especially 
in relation to issues of identity and community (Baym, 1995; Beaubien, 1996; Curtis, 1992; 
Dibbdl, 1993; Holmes, 1997; Ito, 1997; Kollock & Smith, 1999; Mcl..uughlin, Osborne & 
Smith, 1995; Turklc, 1995; Reid, 1994; Rheingold, 1993; Stone, 1995; Wertheim, 1999). 
Nonetheless, Cultural Studies is a newcomer to video game theory and in 1995 Ted Friedman 
obierved that while game designers and players had long discussed the aesthetics of video 
gamcplay there was ns yet no "software theory" (p. 73). Recently, greater attention has been 
directed to the aesthetics of video games (Aarscth, 1997; Murray, 1998; Poole, 2001; Wolf, 
200!, 2004), and there has been a burgeoning of conferences, and print and online 
publications. However, rcsearehers are still in the early s!agcs of defining video game 
aesthetics compared with print and film. 
This thesis is partly concerned with applying semiotics and structuralist narratology to 
a video game--an nppronch which requires some justification given the shift to 
poststructumlist and ethnographic methodologies in Cultural Studies (Jenkins, 1992; Morley, 
1980, 1992; Morris, 2004; Tulloch & Jenkins, 1995). As Aarseth (!997) has argued, semiotics 
and narratology have already been applied to video games, but u;ual!y as a fonn of 
"theoretical imperialism" (p. 16) in which new media are evaluated in tcnns of theories 
developed for print and film. However, this thesis is not concerned with making claims about 
the exclusive relevance of semiotics or narrative theory; rather it is premised upon the 
assumption that it is preferable to interrogate the usefulness of older theories, such as 
semiotics and namttology, before arguing about the radical newness of video games. This will 
hopefully provide a better perspective when it comes to identifying the distinctiveness of 
video games as new theoretical objects. In the absence of such qualification, the privileging of 
"new" theories of "new media" may naturalise the increased turnover of academic capital, 
pamllcling the ideologies of progress, capitalist innovation, and technological determinism 
which motivate and justify tl1e development of"new media." 
As Frasca (2003) notes: 
Certainly, formal approaches are limited ... but they are probably the easiest 
way lo uncover the structurJl differences between stories and games. I 
personally see this structum! approach as a first, necessary step in video grune 
studies, which we will definitely outgrow once it helps us to beuer grasp the 
chamclcristics of video games. (p. 222) 
This thesis similarly accepts that there is a need for a consideration of structure. The early 
structumlists, of course, elaborated up,;,n Saussure's (1915/1966) argument that meaning is 
produced through differences within a system by analysing the differential structure of texts 
(Barthes, 1966/1988, !972, 1975a). Narratology was a dominant field in this approach, and 
was premised upcn a distinction between what Russian formalists, such as Jakobson (1960), 
called "fabula," the supposedly objective structure of the story in time and space, and 
"syuzhcl," the way in which this story was told. Followir.g Barthes (1966/1988, 1975a), 
narratologlsts considered how the minimal units of narratives, "events," were selected and 
combined in "sequences" accordin!; iu logical/causal relations. Banhes (1966/1988) 
distinguished between "nuclei," the indispensable units in a sequence, and "catalyzcrs," units 
which amplify or fill in a sequence. Indeed, a fairly exhaustive category of terminology was 
developed, especially in regards to temporn! am! spatial anachronisms and points of view, or 
focalisalion (Chatman, 1978; Culler, 1975; GeneUe, 1980; L:inser, 1981; Prince, 1987; Propp, 
1968; Scholes & Kellog, 1966). It was argued thut narratology would reveal a univ�rsal 
grammar of narrative organization across a!l types of media, though narratology was also us,•d 
to distinguish narrative genres (Todorov, 1973) and media (Metz, 1974) on the basis or how 
they limited, or facilitated, this grammar. 
However, the following makes no claims about the structure of video games in and of 
itself, accepting Bordwell's (1986) argument that the fabula is not a structure in the text, but is 
constructed and reconstructed by the audience through ongoing inferences about events 
represented by the syuzhet. This thesis is more concerned with the way "codes" are activated 
by the �yuzhct and how they structure (in the verb sense) players' ongoing inferential �nd 
interpretative activity. Within Cultural Studies, of course, a code is a system of signs 
governed by rules agreed upon by members of a culture, and defines conventional ways of 
making sense of texts (O'Sullivan, Hartley, Saunders, Montgomery & Fiske, 1994, p. 42), 
Without these codes there is no basis for communication or a common culture, yet at the same 
time their existence is no gunrantee of shared meaning or experience. As Barthes (l975a) 
urgues, euch code 
is one of the forces that cnn take over the text {of which the text is the 
network), one of the voices out of which the text is woven. Alongside each 
uncrnnce, one might say that off-stage voices can be heard: they are the codes; 
in their interweaving, these voices (whose origin is "lost" in the vust 
perspective of the already-wri11e11) de-originme the uucranca; the convergence 
of the voices (of the codes) becomes writing; a stereographic space where the • 
. . codes ... intersect. (pp. 20-21) 
Codes, then, may have rdativc autonomy os rules that enuble readers to decode a text, but 
they do not exist apart from the act of reading, they do not inhere in any medium, and they are 
subject to continual transfonnation. They also cannot be neatly separated except in an "ideal" 
te�t. us te�ts arc constructed by their inter-relationship. Indeed, what this thesis takes from 
semiotics and structuralism is the attitude that the subtle permutations of signification-the 
"nickers of meaning" (Barthes, 19750, p. 19) that result from the inter-play of codes-arc 
worthy of considcrntion. lfthis thesis passes through a "structuralist moment," then, it is only 
in the Sllnsc of attending to codes which ca11 structure a reader's reception. 
This thesis makes reference to Barthes' (1975a) distinction between proairetic, 
symbolic, henneneutic, ,emic, reference, and dicgetic codes. These are useful in considering 
how narratives and games organise space, time, characters, plots and settings, and how they 
employ various narrative strategies to produce vraisemblancc and sus�nsc. This thesis also 
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makes reference to technical codes associated with media. Cinema, for example, has codes of 
focus, framing, angle and editing, which contribute to the meaning of a particular shot. Video 
games appropriate technical codes from both print and film texts, but also have their own 
codes which govern players' use of the interface and the aesthetic experience of gamep!ay. 
Drawing from Aarscth's {1997) account of cyhertexts, codes relating to p ennissiblo actions at 
the interface arc referred to as "ergodic." 
Codes arc usually clustered in genres. In Hollywood cinema, for example, genres arc 
usually distinguished in tenns of iconography, structure, theme, character, setting and style 
(sec Neale, 1980, 1990, 2000). Video games often draw from established narrative (print or 
film) genres, but they also draw from game g enres, the most well-known of which are action, 
simulation, strategy, adventure and role-playing (Hen:, 1997). However, video game genres 
were never defined through a rigorous analysis of fonnal aifforenecs, they were defined ad 
hoe and reinforced for marketing purposes. While the industry recognises between five or 
eight genres, with various sub-genres, these genres have always overlapped. Commercial and 
creative imperatives have also led games 10 draw from a variety of genres and other media, 
such that they have become increasingly hybrid {Darley, 2000; Hen:, 1997; Wolf, 2001). 
Having accounted for some or the commcn codes which govern gamep!ay, 
researchers will be in a better position to analyse how players negotiate with them. Of course, 
since any "interpretation" depends upon the person engaging in the act of "reading," this 
thesis is Jess concerned with "a renjing," than wilh probable and potential relationships 
between the lext and its readers: that is, with preferred, ncgotiat�d and oppositional readings 
or reading formations {Eco, 1981; Hall, 1997; Jenkins, 1992; Morley, 1980; Tulloch & 
Jenkins, 1995). In the absence of ethnography, the role of the critic can be loosely identified 
with the writer of hyper-fiction who creates a text or forkins paths, or, rather, several possible 
t exts that arc irreducible to a single text or world. Yet the point of such analysis is not to be as 
exhaustive as Borges' library, but merely to acknowledge lhe plenitude of meaning-making 
and, by implication, privilege a politics based upon difference, diversity, creativity, and 
negotiation. By analysing how codes inter·relate, we become more sensitive to the 
complexities of gamcplay as a context for semiosis. Holding open the possibilities of a "text" 
in this way militates against simplistic evaluations about the "effects" of video games on 
players. 
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Howcv�r. this thesis is concerned wilh codes not simply in tenns of defining the 
"meaning•· or .. values .. of games as "text.'·," ilut also their role in producing the experience of 
gamcplay. In this respect. the i3sue is one of aesthetics. There is, of course, no need to tum to 
idealists. such as Plato, Kant and Hegel. for whom aesthetics refers to supposedly "universal'' 
cri:eria for valne. beauty and taste (sec Cothcy, 1990; Dickie & Sclafani, 1977; Eagleton, 
1990), nor to literary distinctions bct.ween "high'" and "low" culture or an, such as those 
derived from Schiller, Arnold and Coleridge (sec Bourdieu. 1984; Eaglc!On, 1983; Turner, 
1984). In Cultural Studies all human activity is "arti�tic .. in the broad sense of creative 
exr:,nsion. and aesthetic value is seen as socially and historically specific. Within this 
framework, "aesthetics" can be seen as akin to "poetics" in the sense of analysing how certain 
codes may opernte during one•s engagement with a medium to produce aesthetic effects 
(fodorov, 1977, 1981). By extension, just us shared codes arc likely to form the basis of 
discursive fonnatlons, it can be argued that shared aesthetic codes infonn the trajectories of 
aesthetic experience. These may be relative lo a medium ( 'film aesthetics .. ), nurrative genres 
(the "aesthetics of heroic fantasy"). or game genres (the "aesthetics of first person shooters .. ). 
In the following. then, "aesthetics" refers to eitlier: the codes which govern the relationship 
b\:twcen fonnal qualities (of the medium, genres, or individual games); lo some quality of 
aesthetic experience, including uses and gratifications {for e:,;ample, aesthetics of "mastery" 
and "kinaesthesia"); or 10 the discursive representation of an aesthetic (for example, 
Fricdman•s (1995} theory ofan aesthetic of"demystification"). 1 
However, aesthetic codes nre more connot.'.ltivc, subjec:ive and polyscmic than other 
types of communication (Fiske. 1982; Melrose, 1994; Turner, 1990), and their articulation is 
especially subject to the perceptual, cognitive and emotional activity of the individual. The 
effect of aesthetic codes is usually evident only in some quality of experience, and while 
Cultural Studies provides a useful theoretical basis for analysing the "textual" reception of 
aesthetic texts. its account of aesthetic experience tends lo fall hack on psychoanalytic theory 
and phenomenology. Cultural Studies tends to display a prejudice against tile '"natural" or 
"bic!ngical," with the assumption that any reference lo either involves a claim to "innateness" 
or "truth .. (Gibbs, 2002; Grodal, 1997; Sedgwick and Frank. 1995). Yet much of a player's 
experience is only intelligible in terms of perceptual, mo!Or, cognitive and emotional faculties, 
each of which has ils history in the evolution of humans. 
' This thesis is. of course. not a manual on game design. but ii provides ncconms which parallel. or 
implicitly explain tho significance of, some rules of game design, such as 1hose pcrmining to charooler 
mo1lva1ion and emotionally comp le� situ>lions (see Boles. 200!; Freeman. 2003; Kelly. 1998; Kim. 
2000: Lewinski, 2000; Rouse. 2000). 
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This thesis, then, draws from research on cognition and emotion to account for 
players' aesthetic experiences. Theories of cognition generally developed out of Jean Piaget's 
(!929/1973, 1932/1965, 1950/2001, 195!, 1978) analyses of the development of children, and 
hav� given way to the dominant Constructivist model that underlies most (non­
psychoanulytic) models of psychology. This thesis is therefore in dialogue with the cog,1itive 
branch of film theory, characterised by the work of David Uordwell (1986) and Edward 
Branigan (1992}, which c�amines the cognitive structures that govem film comprehension. 
While video games also ha,·e u sensorimotor component and require strategic thinking, Loftus 
and Loftus' (1983) account of the cognitive and sensorimotor work of players provides a 
precedent for the use ofa cognitive model. 
What needs greater qualification is !hat, despite the stated value of cognitive science, 
this thesis makes greater use of structuralist narratology and other methods of textual analysis 
when accounting for the ways that players represent and organise their experience. There are 
three main reasons for this. First, as Grodal argues; 
Cognitive science is compatible with, or has roots in, diffcrem, earlier theoretical 
models in the humanities, and their special variants within film and media studies .••• 
Many aspects of cognitive science are genetically closely related (O structural 
linguistics .•. nnd freely share tenns like 'code' (pp. 13-14) 
More specifically, terms like "code," "type" and "genre" a:c analogous to terms like 
"schemata." the theoretical structures which govern an individual's cognitive activi•.y. Second, 
while cognitive science may seem to offer a more dynamic account of the individual's 
response to a media artefact (Grodal, 1997, p. 14), te�tual-based accounts, including 
structurrllist narratology, have proven extremely sensitive to the subtle possibilities of 
signification. If we set aside the problematic argument that the computational structures of 
video games makes structuralist accounts more relevant, it can be argued thnt the long­
slanding methods of textual analysis are (at this early stage of video game research) more 
useful in suggesting the meaningfulness of vid�o games than cognitive accounts. Third, this 
thesis employs methods of textual analysis as a way of dramatising the /imitatio11s of 
structuralist methodology, in the hope that later research will integrate textual and cognitive 
accounts in more balanced ways . 
.Since cognition has increasingly been seen us insepr.:uble from affect (Tomkins, 1963; 
Nathanson, 1992) and emotions (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991}, this thesis is also aligned with 
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Tan's {1997} and Grodal's {1997) nnempts to combine theories of cognition and em01ion in 
their annlyses of film. However, some more qualifications need to be mnde in this rcgnrd. 
First, Carrol (1990) and Grodal (1997) arc hostile to the psychoanalytic tradition's emphasis 
on sexuality, gender, and the uncomcious, arguing that many aspects of a viewer's 
relationship to a film arc non-sexual, non-gendered, and conscious. This thesis generally 
accepts Carrol's and Grodal's claims, but it follows Bordwell's (1986, p. 30) suggestion that 
psychoanalytic theories are useful when cognitive accounts fail. It argues that psychonnalysis 
is valuable in conjunction with cognitive accounts, especially when analysing some games 
and some types of gumeplny. Precedents in this regard can be found in Kiuder's (1991) and 
Turklc's {1995) use of both cognitive and psychoanalytic theories in their studies of video 
game:,lay. 
Second, while this thesis remains open tc. other research on emotion it does not 
perform experimental research. Following Tan (1997) this thesis argues that there are some 
"homogenous" emotional responses that most viewers {or pluyers) are likely to experience 
and/a; arc comparable (p. 154). In this respect, just as textual analysis often concerns itself 
with dominant codes and preforrcd readings, this thesis is concerned with dominant ways in 
whi�h emotion� are structured and/or arc likely to be experienced. II presumes the existence 
of, not a "Model Reader," but what, fo\fowir.g Tan {1997), ran be called a "natural" player, 
that is, a player who has a preference for the (type of) game under analysis and who freely 
chooses to enter into the experience of play (p. 10). While all players may dislike and resist 
aspects of a game, a "natural" player "genera!ly makes no efforl to escape the attraction of the 
fictional .vorld" (p. 10), preferring to progressively invest in the diegesis. At the same time, 
this thesis rogulnrly indicates potential variations in players' emotional responses, analogous 
to textual analyses of negotiated or oppositional readings. In so ,foing, this thesis makes the 
kinds of qunlilications that will hopefully make future quantitative or ethnographic analyses 
more sensitive to video games and their players. 
However, it must be noted that while the following emphasises textual analysis over 
experimentation, it avoids referring to its human subjects as "readers," as is common in 
Cultural Studies, or "viewers," as is common in the cognitive tradition Jf film theory, 
preferring the term "player." This is not to deny that vi�wing, or playing, is mediated by 
textuality, nor to offer a rhetorical statement t!lat ''readers" nre, and always have, been 
"players" in a textual game. The role of textuality is too well-known to ueed foregrounding, 
and other perceptual, cogni1ive and emotional processes may be of equal or greater impon, so 
1 
always culling video game players "r.:nders" is misleading. That said, this study occasionally 
uses the tenns "reader" and "viewer" to indicate the mode or engagement that is or theoretical 
emphasis, given that a video game player (or a theorist or vidro gameplay) may focus on 
reading morn L)ian viewing, viewing more than reading, or playing more than reading or 
viewing. 
Lastly, the theoretical conjunction this study offers is developed both as an account, 
and 1hro11gh an account, of a single game: Squnrosofl'� single-player, graphical adventure 
role-playing game final Fantasy X (FFX} (2001). The final Fantasy series is notable because 
most early computer role-playing games (CRPGs), including series like Bard's Tale (198Z), 
Ultima (1980), Might and Magic (1986), and Wizardry (1981), were developed for PCs. Since 
the CRPG was a relatively minor genre on game consoles, the Final Fantasy series helped to 
popularise the genre for a broader console market, or at least make it more rocogniseable. 
Unfonunately, the final Fantasy tides .!Y, Y, and VI were not released outside Japan until 
recently, creating some discrepancies between the titles in fopll!I and other countries. If we 
follow the Japanese sequence (recapitulated in the versions recently released for the 
Playstation), FF!, FFII, F},111, FFIV, FF\/, and FF\11 were developed for the Nintendo 
cartridge market. With FFVII (1997) Square moved to the Sony Plnystation, spending three 
yea•s and US$30 miliion hl produce detailed backgrounds, animated sequences, and a 
complex story that took advantage or its three CD-ROMs. FFVIII (1999) and FAX (2000) 
utilised the same graphical capabilities, though FFVIII, with its rmuristic setting and m.-.re 
complicated magic system, deviated more from the existing formula than rans wanted. FFIX 
was a more popular return to the medieval flavour and simpler game play of the earlier titles. 1 
FFX was created for the Playstntion 2 and offers enormous gruphical improvements 
over its predecessors, but similar gameplay. Players navigate panoramic landscapes, collect 
items, light monsters, solve puzzles, and develop characters' physical and magical powers 
while advancing through a complex narrative. The major difference is that, in addition lo the 
traditional Field Screen, Battle Screen, and various Menu Screens, FFX uses the Grid Sphere 
to manage skill development. This is comprised or a network of nodes, each representing n 
panicu!ar skill or skill bonus, which characters traverse and activate as they accrue experience 
points. The story, at its most basic, follows Tidus, Yuna, and Yuna's Guardians (Wakka, 
Lulu, Kimohri, Auron and Rikku) on their pilgrimage to defeat Sin, a mons1rous being who 
'Personally, I have only played FFVI, EEY.!l, EEYlll, fEIX, .!:EX, and El:&2;_, Bolh EEYI! and J:I:K were 
repl,ycd and ,ecorded onto (eight three-hour) vidoo copes during the course of this study to facilitate 
an,ty,;,. 
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has ravaged the world of Spira for a thousand years. Familiarity with FFX's ninety or more 
hours of gaming and narration would cenainly give substance to the following arguments, but 
such familiarity is not presumed. l Appendix One lists key seUings and events: Appendix Two 
is a breakdown of codes in the opening sequence: and Appendix Three is a breakdown o f  
dominant clusters of hennenentic codes. Other relevant aspects of the game are described 
where necessary. 4
The choice to apply several different theories to this single game has its analogy in 
Genct:e's (1980) analysis of Proust's (!934/1970) Remembrance of Thinr; Pnst. Like
Genetic, it would be possible to "put the specific subject at the service of a general aim, and 
critical analysis at the service of theory," such that FFX would be a "reservoir of examples. 
and a flow of illustration" (p. 22) for several theories about gameplay. Alternately, one could 
"tum the concepts, classifications and procedures • into w many ad hoe instruments 
exclusively intended to allow a more precise description" (p. 22) ofFFX. 
However, the complexity ofFFX makes it more useful to take a dual approach: to use 
several theories to better appreciate the experience of playing a popular gnme, and to use a 
popular game as a means to 1est and refine those theories. Early research was largely directed 
towards games oriented around, on the one hand. motor skills or strategic thinking (arcade 
games, first person shooters, war games), or, on the o ther hand, narrative (adventure and rolc­
playing games). Wliile this is changing, the emotional distinctiveness of video games may be 
owed to their peculiar convergence of sensorimotor and cognitive activity, and this has not 
been adequntely theorised. While FFX has few of the kinaesthetic sequence� that characterise 
first person shooters {FPSs) like Doom (1994), it nonetheless combine;, many types of 
�arneplay. Indeed, the final Fantaw series is significant not just because of its consistent 
n:irrative depth or gaming innovation (a few other PC and console games may claim 
equivalent or superior depth and innovation), but its popular integration of both for an 
international market. 
'All the pictures used in this thesis were taken from the Square Centtol (h!lp�/www.,guore-central.coml) 
and the Final Fonlasy Shrine (h!lp://www.ffshrino.org/). Both sites were last checked January I. 2005, 
ond oil pictures token from them ore public donuin. 
• !n addition to the 1wo guides cited in the references ond the Websites noted obovc, tl,e following sites 
ore useful source, of informalion about the game and/or goming culture: Unofficial Final Fantasy Site 
(hnp:llwww.uffil.net/), Fina\ Fanuisy Insider (hllp://www.ffmsider.net/), Final Faotasy Fusion
( hl!p ,lfww w .fffu,ion.coml}, F an1as y Sq uare (hltp�/www. fonto< ysq uare.coml) , NeoMidgor
(hitp:/foeomldgor.coml). Final Fantasy Spiril (http,//www.ffspirit.net/) ond Squ,rc Nation
(hnp,llwww.squ,rcn,tion.<:oml}.
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Chapter Ovel'View 
While the organization of the fol10wing chapters owes something to Tan's (1997) 
analysis or emotion in the traditional feature film, the distinctiveness of video games, and 
FFX, requires some modifications of his slnlcture. Chapter One reviews the relevant theories 
and research on play, cognition, aesthetics, uamuive, and emotion. Chapter Two draws from 
Groda! (1997) to consider the fceling·l·lnes experienced as a consequence of the perceptual 
construction of reality-status at FFX's interface. Chapter Three adapts Tan's (1997) account 
of "interest" as the basic emotion in the traditional feature film to video gameplay, but makes 
greater use of structuralist methodology, and emphasises problems with the regulation and 
transfer of interest across J'FX's narrativo and game macrostructures. Chapter Four looks at 
how FFX's hermem:utic coding of reality r egulotes interest, or, more specifically, how 
analysing the game in terms of the mmvellous, the uncanny and the fantastic suggests that 
curiosity, surprise and suspeme about (dis-) expec!ed events may give way to wonder, fear, 
and/or an;,;iety about events. 
Chapter Five reviews structuralist accounts of character before analysing how interest 
is reinforced through cognitive iden1ificntion of characters in FFX's narrative and game 
macmstructures. Chapter Six addresses some of the criticisms against psychoanalylic 
accounts of idenrification, then considers the relevance of Cowie's (1997) psychoanalytic 
account of three modes of identification-with the ideal ego, ego-ideals, and super-e.QOS-·to 
gameplay. Chapter Seven elaborates upon the empathetic emotions players arc likely to feel 
towards characters as a result or innate releasers and cognitive appraisal of situational 
contexts. On this basis ii discusses some of !he dimensions of happiness, anger, fear and 
sadness, but argues that FFX's tragic macrostructurcs may elicit a dominnnt mood of sadness. 
The chapter concludes by arguing that allegiance with a character's moral type reinforces or 
blocks empathetic emotions towards video game characters. 
Chapter Eight argues that the emotional experience of gruneplay is often charac1erised 
by players' empathy towards themselves in the play-situation. This is addressed in terms of 
how gamep!ay promotes and blocks what Pingel (1951) calls "preoperatory" cognition, with 
its accompanying "ogocentrism." Within a psychoanalytic model, the blocking of players' 
egocentrism might be presumed to give rise to fear or anger. However, a better account of 
how players experience, and self-regulate, such blocking is offered using Silvan Tomkins' 
(!963) and Nathanson's (1992) model of shame, defined as an auxiliary affective response ta 
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a sudden, unexpected loss of interest. The chapter concludes that the tronsfor of empathy 
players feel for themselves to characters, and vice versa, may distinguish the video game as a 
medium. 
Chapter Nine argues that ambivalent reality-status, the dysregulation of interest, the 
blocking of empathy, and other aspects of gameplay, produce an experience of 
"meaninglessness" that is recognised in self-psychology (Erikson, 1950, 1968: Kohut, 1971, 
1977), but which finds its nnalogy in Sartrean (1943/1993) existentialism. However, 
existential feelings of "menninglessncss" may be interpreted ru; part of ffX's meaning and 
aesthetics ancl/or may be covered over when "affect grouping" (Tomkins, 1991) motivates 
players' (re-)evalualions of gamcp!ay. 
II 
Chapter One- Literature Review 
Play and Games 
While romantics like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Friedrich Schiller idealised play as a 
stnte of Nature and innocence, Victorian society tended !o oppose play to productive industry, 
presuming a normal and desirable progression from child's play to adult work (Cohen, 1987). 
Huizinga (1955) and Caillois (1961) established the more modem conception of play as an 
ongoing, positive force in adult life and, more broadly, human civilisation, but their oft-cited 
definitions nonetheless emphasise the border between play and other types of activity, For 
Huizinga (1955), play is: 
a free activity standing quite consciously outside 'ordinary' life as being 'not 
serious', but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an 
activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It 
proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed 
rules and in an orderly manner. (p. 13) 
Caillois (1961) elaborated upon Huizinga's (1955) arguments to provide a more detniled 
definition of play as: 
I. Free: in which playing is not obligatory; if it were, it would at once lose its
attractive and joyous quality as diversion;
2. Separate: circumscribed withia limits of space and time, defined and fixed in
advance;
3. Uncertain: the course of which cannot be determined, nor the result attained
beforehand, and some latitude for innovations being left to the player's
initiative;
4. Unproductive; creating neither goods, nor wealth, nor new elemeats of any
kind; and, except for e�chnnge of property among the players, ending in a 
situation identical to that prevailing at the beginning of the game; 
5. Governed by rules: under conventions that suspend ordinary laws, and for the
moment establish new legislation, which along counts;
6. Make-believe: accompanied by a special awareness of a second reality or of a 
free unreality, as against real-life. (Caillois, 1961, p. 9)
Cail!ois (1961) also divided games into four categories: "agon," "alea," "mimicry" and 
"i!inx." Agonistic games involve players pushing their skills through competition. Aleatory 
games are games of chance in which the play tries to forecast or control chance in some 
degree. Games of mimicry include all fonns of impersonation in which one takes on a pretend 
role. l!inx games involve an altered state, such as making oneself dizzy, thrilled, or terrified. 
For Cnillois, there was a 'progression' within eneh of these types, from the extreme of active 
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exuberance, spontaneity and turbulence, to control, calculation, effort and subordination to 
rules; the former he tcnncd "paidin," the latter "ludus," 
While Huizingn {1955) and Callois {1951) saw play as an end in itself, it is now 
usually seen in terms of its psychological or social funccions (Cohen, 1987; Millar, 1968; 
Yaw key and Pellegrini, 1984). Within the earlier psychoanalytic tradition, play was seen as 1111 
expression of repressed desire that (like dreams) dramatised unconscious content in a way that 
could be useful in a therapeutic context (Klein, 1932; see also Schaefer & Reid, !986). More 
recently, in self psychology, play has come to be seen as central to the development of self, 
notnbly in terms of early interaction between the mother and child (Schore, 1994; Stem, 1977, 
1865}, the use of "transitional objects" (Winnicolt, 1971), and "selfobjccts" (Kohut, 1971, 
1977} (also see Memes, 1992; Mitchell & Black, 1995; Stein, 1991). 
Within the Constructivist tradition derived from Jean Piaget (192911973, 193211965, 
1950/2001, 1951, 1978), play is often seen as a fonn of rehearsal for sensorimotor and 
cognitive skills. Pingel (1951) distinguished between three types of play. "Practice play" is 
associated with the repetition of actions as a means of mastering sensorimotor skills. 
"Symbolic play" is associated with imitation, fantasy and socio-dramatic processes. At this 
stage play is often egocentric, in the sense that it does not involve true co-operation or the 
consistent application of rules. Piaget's third category is "constructional games" with 
prescriptive rules. including hide-and seek, marbles and board games. At this stage, rules arc 
seen as fixed at a point in lime through mutua! consensus and arc changeable through a 
renewed consensus. Piaget's (1951) model therefore describes a developmental progression 
rrom rule-less egocentric play to rule-governed, co·opcrativc games, paralleling Caillois' 
progression from paidia to ludus. 
Taxonomies have been produced which identify the different ways that games 
structure the relationships between players. Avedon (1971), for example, identifies ten 
structural elements of games; purpose, procedures, rules, number of players, roles of 
participants, results or pay off, abilities and skills required, interaction p.iuerns, physical 
setting and environmental requirements, and required equipment. Rcdl, Gump and Sr'.ton­
Smith (1971) go further, providing a taxonomy of thirty dimensions of games, among them 
bodily contact, bodily activity, skill requirements, the role of chance and competition, the use 
of space, time and props, role-taking factors, and role complexity, with subcategories. 
However, within anthropology games arc often seen in relation to rituals as microcosms of 
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social structures and as a site where such structures may be reproduced (Geertz, 1973; Mead, 
1934/1972). Certainly, researchers have become increasingly concerned with the relatio nship 
between video games and learning. It ha� been argued that video games improve spatial and 
cognitive skills (Braun & Giroux, 19P�; Greenfield, 1981; Greenfield et al., 1994; Kinder, 
1991; McClure & Chaille, 1987; Sul-,rahmanyam and Greenfield, 1994), and Seymour Papert 
(1980) has argued that games may function as "microworlds" that facilitate children's 
learning. Indeed, the growing awareness of the relationship btltween cognition and �.motion 
has meant that theories of children's an,\ adult's education now tend emphasise the motivating 
role or the positive emotional states fostered by play (Kafai, 1995, 1996; Molone, 1981). In 
this respect, ploy and games are seen as a socialising force as well as an instrument of 
pedagogy. 
Recently, some researchers of video games have suggested the need for o discipline of 
"ludology," or the fonnal study of games {Eskelin, 2004; Frasca, 1999, 2003). This notion of 
ludology as a discipline is a timely response to the prevalent nmratologica] nnd drrunatic 
models of gnmeplay, and seems logical. After all, play is defined as separalc from other 
aetivilics, and may be experienced as separate from non-play activities. However, one must be 
wary when play's separateness is over-emphasised. If we do not consider every system of 
rules a "game," and almost any activity may be engaged with "playfully," it can be difficult or 
misleading to separate play from other processes. As is evident in Bordwell's (1986) analysis 
of film, and Groda!'s (1998, 2003) analysis of film and video games, the cognitive or affective 
work engaged in an aesthetic experience are not reserved for that experience, they arc 
mediated versions of everyday cognitive and affective activity. 
Cognitive Activity in Art and Games 
In nccounting for the cognitive skills of video game players a useful departure point is 
Bordwcll's (1986) and Bronigan's (1992) analyses of film, which focus on inferential 
perceptual-cognitive activities. For Bordwell (1986): 
Perception [is] a process of active hypothesis testing. The organism is tuned to 
pick up data from the environment. Perception tends to be anticipatory, framing 
more or less likely expectntions about what is out tlicrc. , , • The organism 
interrogates the environment for infonnation which is then checked against the 
perceptual hypothesis. The hypothesis is thus either confinned ordisconfinned; 
in the latter case, o fresh hypothesis temls 10 appear. (p. 31) 
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This inferential activity is organised by ''schemata," relatively constant hypothetical structures 
that c\assiry and organise information, providing a basis for expectation, and Bordwell 
differcntia!es between "prototype," "templnte," nnd "procedural" schemata. Prototype 
schemata "involve identifying individual members of a class according to some posited 
norm," and often involve the identification of "agents, actions, gon!s, and locnles" (p. 34), o r  
"identifiable persons, actions, locales" (p. 49). They arc, then, rendily identifiable as types, or 
stereotypes. Template schemas nre larger structures that "cnn add information when it is 
nbsenl and test for proper c lassification of data" (p. 34). Bordwell argues that the "canonical" 
story is a template schematn comprised of: "introduction of setting and characters­
explnllntion of a state of affairs-complicating action-ensuing events-cutcome---ending" 
(p. 35). Template schematn may, then, be seen as analogous to the codes and conventions of 
particular genres. Procedural schemata, by contrast. are those "operational protocols which 
dynamically acquire and organise information" (p. 36). Bordwell nses the term to refer to 
higher-level cognitive processing. For example, if material in the syuzhet docs not conform to 
canonical schemata the viewer may tum to "compositional," "realistic," or "transtextun!" 
schemata to interpret them. "search[ing] for appropriate motivations and relations of causality, 
time, and space" (p. 49) which make the material intelligible, 
A film, then, "presents cues, patterns, and gaps that shape the viewer's application of 
schemata and the testing of hypotheses" (p. 33). The viewer proceeds by nsing a mixture of 
''bonom-up" processing, making inferences "on the basis of perceptual input," and "top­
down" processing. organising perceptions on the basis of expectations drawn from known 
schemata {p. 31). The viewer thereby organises "chnnks" of film into "more or less 
structurally signilicant episodes" (p. 35). In this respect, the "artwork is necessarily 
incomplete, needing to be unified and fleshed out by the active participation of the perceiver" 
(p.32), but the artwork sets limits on the activity of the spectator, encouraging the application 
of certain schemata. What is significant is that perception when engaging with an artwork 
differs from other forms of perception: 
In ordinary perception •.. perceptual hypotheses tend lo be vague and open­
cnded. In art, however, alternative hypotheses tend to be much more explicitly 
delincd, their set tends to be closed, and they get challenged fairly often •.• 
Narrative art ruthlessly exploits the tentative, probabilistic n ature of mental 
activity. (p. 39) 
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Consequently, Bordwell foregrounds !he hypothetical activity of the viewers in terms of 
curiosity and suspense, arguing that: "narratives arc composed in order to reward, modify, 
frustrate, or de Feat the perceiver's search for coher.,ncc" (p. 38). 
Grodal (1997) argues that, compared with cognitive models, structuralist models arc 
100 "�tatic," presuming structures within texts, while poststructura!ist accounts tend to 
separate meaning from its adaptive foundations in the individual (p. 14). However, language 
provides a sequential way of representing the holistic experience of thought, and remains an 
ongoing determining factor in planning, evaluating, remembering and reasoning (Vygotsky, 
1934/1962). In !his res�I, the accounts of textua!ity in Cultural Studies offer a sensitive 
terminology that can be usefully integrrlted with cognitive models (see Hcmadi, 2002; 
Richardson & Steen, 2002; Spo!sky, 2002; Turner, 2002). Indeed, as Stam (2000) argues, 
cognitivism can be viewed "as a nostalgic move backward" (p. 240) in the sense that "a focus 
on cognitive commonalities across all cultures exists below \he threshold of cultural and 
social difference, nnd therefore discourages rurnlysis of tensions rooted in history and culture" 
(p. 242). Analysing cognition tends to locate meaning within the viewer, making it easy to 
forget that schemata, like codes, arc acquired in a social con!ext and may define an audience's 
shared culture. 
Bordwell's (1986) account is also limited because the cognitive work of video game 
players is bound up in sensorimo!or activlly. Indeed, while Bordwell uses the term 
"procedural schemata" to refer to absLract cognitive work, the term usually refers to the 
distinction between, on the one hand, an episodic or semantic understanding of an ac1ion 
("declarative knuwle!lgc") and, on the other hand, knowledge which is implicit in 
performance, including the rcgis!cring cf sensory cues and responding to the present 
environment ("nondeclarative knowledge") (Squire, 1987). In this respect, procedural 
schemata arc associated less with understanding than behaviour, and are of particular 
relevance to video gameplay, which has a performative component. 
Turkic (1984, 1995) may be seen as accommodating the mQt"'f activity of computer 
users when she differentiates between "abstract" and "concrete" styles of computer use. The 
abstract style, epitomised by structured program design, may be characterised by a 
preponderance of top-down processing, in that users have a model of what !hey want to do ut 
the interface then perform whatever sensorirnotor activity is required to carry it out. The 
concrete style, epitomised by an unstructured, bottom-up approach to program design, may 
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be characterised by a preponderance of bonom-up cognitive processing and ongoing 
sensorimotor activity, in that the user learns through cxpcrimcntmion. However, while Turkic 
acknowledges that these two styles may be mixed, she is more concerned with broad cultural 
styles and aesthetics lhan with the real-time dynamics of motor and cognitive activity. 
Lofms and Loftus (1983) provide a more useful foundation of the dynamic 
relationships between cognitive and motor activity in video games. They observe that the 
mind and body are not unitary sys1cms, but depend upon shared components and processes; 
sensory memory, short- and long-tcnn memory, attention, reaction time, cognition, and the 
motor system. Players constantly monitor an original state, a goal state, and the means for 
achieving the latter, but while several strategies arc often available to achieve a goal each 
strategy has its advantages and disadvantages. Forcxamp!e, a player who relies on their long­
tem, memory of a gamo environment must continually remember where they are in a given 
route, will be disoriented when they take a wrong tum, and will have "less processing 
capability for such things as focusing and switching attention" (p. 71). However, players can 
choose strategies which work for them. A poor memoriser may choose a strategy that requires 
liltle memorisation, while someone who takes too long to retrieve long-tern, memories may 
choose strategies that minimise the requirements of such retrieval. In this respect, gameplay 
may be analysed in tenns of the cognitive and sensorimotor st rategies that players use to 
achieve their goals in tho game. 
The Aesthetics of Video Games 
Game aesthetics can be usefully distinguished by accounting for the cognitive and/or 
scnsorimotar demands they make of players and the extent to which these make play more 
engaging. Malone (1984), building upon Pap<;rt's (!980) work, identified four categories of 
elements which he argued were characteristic of "intrinsically motivating" games: first, the 
existence, clearness, accessibility and meaningfulness of goals; second, the importance of 
unccnul11 outcomes through the use of variable difficulty levels, mulliple goal levels, 
randomness, and hidden infr,nnation; third, an emotionally appealing fantasy that was 
intrinsically related to skills learned and provided a useful metaphor; and, fourth, curiosity, 
both sensory {audio 'and visual effe�ts, ns 1lecoratlon, as enhancing fnmasy, as a reward, and 
as a representation system) and cognitive (s�rpriscs and constructive feedback). 
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Malone's research has been influential, and is useful from both a design point of view 
and as a checklist for analysis, but his ta�onomy is insensitive to players' aestl1etic 
preferences. Myers (1990c), by contrast, developed Malone's work, using questionnaires (Q­
mcthodology) with a sample of 44 gamers, to identify dominant aesthetics in the subjects' 
favourite video games. As the basis for his questions, Myers uses four criteria: challenge, 
curiosity, fantasy and interactivity (and their opposites: ease or play; realism; familiarity; and 
s!ability/constancy). He sons players' responses into five principal "factor arrays": the game 
as a new challenge (skill building); the game as a pleasant, non-threatening social diversion; 
lhe game as meditative withdrawal; the game as an enemy; and the game as a new cha!Ienge 
(skill-proving). He suggests that the three most common aesthetics are: the "game as 
challenge, subcategorised as (a) game providing a challenging opponent (game as referee) and 
(b) game being a challenging opponent (game as enemy)": the "game as meditation"; and the
"game as social activity (more common in video than home computer games)" (p. 385). 
The dominant aesthetic in lhe above accounts are bnsed on skill mastery, and 
certoin!y: 
many investigators bave concluded that the appeal [of video games] rests in 
clrn!Iengcs to improve one's skills, to attain a higher level of game complc�ity, 
to persist in the face of obstacles and setbacks, to exceed one's own or some 
other target or e�ceHencc. (Durkin, 1995, pp. 16-7) 
A sense of development, accumulation nnd mastery is evident in many elements or game 
structure: the use of high scores, levels, quests and bonuses; and step-by-step increases in 
paco, the difficully of opponents and levels, nnd the power of characters. These intrinsically 
motivating aspects of gameplay are amenable to Wallace's (1999) use of "operant 
conditioning," in that the placement, timing and scale of problems and rewards determine the 
continued interest of the player. 
More generally, Turkic (1934) argues that young children quickly develop concerns 
with "'domination, r anking, testing, proving oncselr' (p. 58) whose roots arc "aggressive, 
passionate and eroticized" (p. 59). In this respect, the tendency towards skill development and 
mas!P.ry may be related to the predominantly male demographic of video games (Anderson & 
Ford, 1987; Cacha, 1983; Chambers & Ascione, 1987; Cooper & Mackie, 1986; Dominick, 
1984; Eysenek & Nias, 1978; Graybill, Kirsch & Esselman, 1985; Kaplan, 1983; Kaplan & 
Kaphn, 1981; McClure & Mears, 1984). Indeed, Skirrow (1990) uses Melanie Klein's (1932) 
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psychoanalytic theories about the rclationsh'., between infants and their mother's bodies to 
argue that gameplay is a masculine discourse that indudcs: 
u reactivation of infantile feelings triggered by the g:unes, and, pru-t!y, perhaps, the 
attractions of masochism. , •• Continuing to perfo1111 in the g:ime ... is the same as 
continuing to live. When you stop you die" (p. 331). 
For Skirrow, an internalised anxiety about an unreal danger, understood in te1111� of castration 
anxiety, is externalised with the embodiment of the "pcnis-as-magic"wand" (p. 331). Kinder 
(1991) similarly argues that "the repetitive, segmented, serial nature" (p. !10) of gan1e 
narratives, during which players arc "constantly threntencci by shon circuiting and premature 
deaths" (p. 11 !), "leads to a disavowal of obsolescence, r;astration and death" (p. 110). For 
both Skirrow and Kinder, then, the increa sing mastccy of the typically male protagonist is a 
pre-emptive aUempt to protect the male ego, or phallus, from annihilation or diminution. 
Turkic (1984) argues that young players appreciate the consistency of the strictly 
''role-governed worlds" (p. 77) of games, and in many re.1pccts a game functions as an 
opponent whose strategies are gradually learnt and mastered. Myers (l990a) and Friedman 
(1995). following game designer Chris Crawford (19S4), argue that video games reveal their 
constructedness more than other media. Friedman (1995) observes that: 
Leaming and winning ... a computer game is a process of demystification: 
One succeeds by discovering how the software is put together. The player 
molds his or her strategy through trial-lllld-error oxperimentatlon to see "what 
works"-which actions are rewarded and punished, (p. 32) 
In shon, video games, being "simulated, rule-driven worlds" (Turkic, 1984, p. 74). allow 
players to discover, or demystify, their inner workings, rules, "secrets," and "logic structures" 
and, ultimately, how they are "put together" (Kirksaether, 1998, p. 82). Indeed, Wertheim 
(1999) argues thal: 
ithe adventure game] Adventure may be seen as a metaphor for computing 
itself. During the game, players cracked the code of this vinual world in much 
the same way that a hacker would crack the code of a computer operating 
system. (p. 246) 
Herz (1997) similarly observes that: "chaning out subterranean passages and dead ends is 
pretty much analogous to mapping out a circuit or debugging a piece of code (p. 11). Unlike 
print or film teits, then, a game may be replayed until the structure of the software has been 
apprehended, and manuals, magazines, and other game accessories help players expose this 
structure. 
Nonetheless, Friedman (1995) overstates the importance of"demystification" when he 
argues: "the moment [a game] is no longer interesting is the moment when all its secrets ha ve 
been discovered" (p. 82). He implies one over-riding gaming genre, style or aesthetic of 
(cxplorative) mastery, when games arc inherently repetitive and a llow for replay. Object­
evem sequences, including enemy activities, arc often randomised, and in multi-player games 
the demystification necessarily extends lo the strategies of another player. Unless one is 
capable of plotting in real-time all factors that determine randomisation in a video game, or 
another player's strategy is completely understood and predictable, total mastery is 
impossible. Even Malone (also see Provenzo. 1991 and Wallace, 1999) observes that game 
appeal is influenced by the degree ofrandomn�ss, and Chandler (1994) writes: 
most good games ure not solely a test of skill, but offer an element of chance 
which can encourage those who less confident of their current level of playing 
skill. Children, I would suggest, are well aware of this feature, and many prefer 
games in which they can blame luck for their failures.(':[ 18) 
So while some players like "testing their worth" against an unforgiving machine, others 
dislike the rigidity of strictly rule-governed domains, finding it an "intolerable. , . pressure, . 
• a rnunt, a put-down" (Turkic, 1984, p. 86).
Competition between players may provide a conte�t for challenge and mastery, but 
the social dimensions of video games may constitute a distinctive aesthetic. Provenzo (1991) 
argues that arcade gaming constituted a sub-culture that was one of the "great equalizers of 
youth culture because [they] allow[cd] an eight year-old to approach a fifteen-year-old and 
discuss something as peers" (p. x). Other research (Lepper, 1985: Mitchell, 1985) has 
indicated that video g�mcs may promote filial interaction when youth play within the family 
environment and talk about games with their parents. Unfortunately, early arcade culture was 
lost witll the transformation of arcades into sanitised places where parents were encouraged to 
leave their children in shopping malls (Herz, 1997). However, games still may be played with 
friends or family; shared knowledge of video games still provides a basis for social 
interaction; and Local Arca Network (LAN) parties and game conventions are contempornry 
spaces for collective i;ameplay. The problem is that much of the recent research on computer­
mediated communities has tended to focus on specialised PC-users, notably those who use 
Multi-User Dungeons (or MUDs) (sec Baym, 1995: Deaubien, 1996: Chesebro & Bonsall, 
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1989; Cunis, 1996; Dilry, 1994: Foster, 1997; Jones, 1995, l998a, 1988b; Kim, 2000; Kolko 
& Reid, 1998; Kollock & Smith, 1999; Porlcr, 1997: Slone, 1995; Rbcingold, 1991; Stmtc, 
Jacobson & Gibson, 1996; Wilbur, 1997). 
Video games may also serve a social function willwlll othc· players. Selnow (1984) 
has argued that children may regard the game itselr as "a kind of surror�tc companion and 
their interactions with the games as social interactions" to the extent that the game becomes 
an "electronic friend" (p. 58). Turkic (1984) argues that video games offer a form of useful 
escape for disabled children, and online internccion especially allows disabled children social 
interaction otherwise denied them. Wallace (1999) makes a more general argument that it "is 
hard for �ny humJrum reality to compete with [the worlds of video games], especial!y for 
people whose lives are troubled by low self-esteem, l,oredom, lack of social support, or 
11nsatisfactory 11ersonal relationships" (p. 172). Video games, then, offer a compensatory 
sense of achievement, autonomy and self-esteem (Greenfield, 1984; Nelson & Carlson, 1986; 
Turkic, 1984). However, some children may feel "cut off' when they finish a game (Turkle, 
1984, p. 66), and it is possible that too much control over a game world may lead children to 
be impatient with a less obeisant real wcrlJ (Sheingcld, cited in Greenfield, 1984, p. l 14). 
While mastery and social interaction may play important roles in the aesthetics of 
gamcplay, the e�perience of idcmi:i.cation, immersion and agency is of equal importance. The 
departure point for early theorists concerned with thes� experiences was television (Durkin, 
1995, 1999; Greenfield. 1984; Turkle, 1984). Greenfield (1984) argued that both TV and 
video games have a visual appeal, and that their moving images especially appeal to young 
viewers (p. 88-9()). Indeed, for her, familiarity with TV is one reason why children respond so 
readily to v!:leo games. For St allabrns (1996), by contrast, video games are distinguished from 
othe1 media by !heir use ofimeraclion: "the passivity of cinema and television is displaced by 
an en,1ironmcnt in which the player's actions have a direct, immedialc consequence on the 
virtual world" (p. 85). However, Greenfield (1984), Turkle (1984), Skirrow (199()), and 
Kinder (1991) argue that what is truly distinctive about video games is that they combine a 
passive mode of spcctamrship associated wilh cinema and television with more active modes 
of partlcipntion and imera�tion. For Skirrow (1990), tbe '"audience' disappears as a 
distinction between 'doer' a:id 'viewer"' (p. 33()), and the enigmas iir the perfonncr are of 
the order of"Wherc am I?" rather than "Wlio am 11" 
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Durkin argues thm, compared with TV and film, video game players "do not feel a 
strong sense of identification wllh the charncters" (1999, p. 129), and he leaves open the 
question as to whether there arc less behavioural effects in games. Fuller and Jenkins (1995) 
similarly note tlmt, compared with print and film texts. identification with charnctcrs in video 
games is limi1ed because characters tend not to have psychological depth: 
Characters play a minimal role, displaying trnits that are largely capacities for 
action; fighting skills, modes of transportation, prcestablished goals .•.. 
Activity drains away the character's st!<'ngth, ns measured by an ever shifting 
graph at the top of the screen, but it cannot build character, since these figures 
lack even the most minimal interiority. {p. 61) 
Skirrow (1990) is even more critical, stating that: "for the perfonner of a game !11e first and 
third person are almost totally identified, so there can be no suspense based on knowing more 
(having seen more) than the protagonist who represents you" (p. 330). The major objection to 
such accounts is that the charnclers in many print and film texts do not necessarily offer more 
psychological depth than the average video game character. We cannot judge video games 
solely on the b�sis of their status as a medium, since a video game with a complex narrative 
and detailed characterisation may offer more depth than a poorly wriucn novel. In this respect, 
the above accounts ignore the distinctiveness of video games by evaluating them in tenns of 
other media. 
As Turk le notes, in a video game: "you have to do more than identify with a character 
on tile screen. You must act for it. Identification through nction has a special kind of hold"' 
(1984, p. 79). The issue, then, is how "identific;11ion through action" creates a distinctive hold. 
Friedman (1995) observes that in earlier simulations, like Civilizntion (1991), one identified 
principally with a leader from a particular culture or historical period, such as Genghis Khnn, 
indicating a straightforward identification with the role of a leader. However, in more recent 
simulations like SimCity (1939) there is a "constant shifling of idcntificatory positions 
depending on whether one is buying land, organizing the police force, paving the roads, or 
whatever" (p. 85). Yet simply "attempting to map 'roles' onto the player's on·screcn 
identification misses the point" {p. 85) since; 
overarching these functional shifts .•. is a mo!<' general state of identification; 
with the city as a whole, as a single organism ..•. [or] a process .••• 'Losing 
oneselr in a computer game means, in a sense, identifying with the simulation 
itself. (pp. 84-85) 
Friedman concludes that 1hc player docs not simply identify with a role: 
22 
the player fonns a symbiotic circuit with the computer, a version of the 
cyborgian consciousness described by Donna Haraway (1985) in her influential 
"Manifesto for Cyborgs." The computer comes to feel like an organic 
extension of one's consciousness, and tho player may feel like an extension of 
the computer itself. (1995, p. 83) 
The tenn "cyborg" is, of course, a contmction of "cybernetic organism": a synthesis of the 
technological and biological. This is usually understood in terms of the physical augmentation 
of humans with technology, but in praclicc a cyborg is any being that forms a cybernetic 
relationship-a dynamic, self-regulating, and horneostatic (information) feedback system-­
Ihm incorpomtes both organic and non-organic material (Gray, 1995). This means thnt a 
person need not be physically fused with a computer to be a cyborg-any causal relationship 
with technology, such as the feedback loops that occur during gameplay, suffices for the tenn 
to apply. Therefore Friedman (1995) could be read as simply referring to the psychological 
eiperiencc of this relationship. 
The problem is that Haraway (1985) sees cyborgs as subverting traditional boundaries 
between physical/non-physical, self/body, human/machine, and thei,,by creating post-, proto-, 
amllor non-human beings. On this basis she sees cyborgs as a polemical metaphor for the 
subversion of all binary systems, including male/female, which presume a primary term. 
Theorists of computer-mediated communities, incluJing virtual real ly, sometimes seem to 
conflate the literal and metaphorical mc:inings of the term, implying that cyborgs arc 
inherently subversive or revolutionary (sec Featherstone & Burrows, 1995; Gray, 1995; 
Haraway, 1985; Helsel & Roth, 1991; Reid, 1994; Stone, 1995; Strate, Jacobson & Gibson, 
1996; Wolmark, !999). However, to claim that the cybernetic relationship is inherently 
subversive is lo fall back on essentialism, when lt should be obvious that a cybernetic 
relationship may be read in different ways. Players may simply see the game as a tool and 
experience immersion without any sense tlrnt their lrnmunity, or any other aspect of their 
identity, has been altered. It suflices to suggest that, in either its literal or mernphorica! form, 
the lenn "cyborg" only offers a limited account of the relationships between players and their 
gnmes. 
Turkic (1986) provides a more useful departure point when she argues that what 
players pursue in their interactions with video games is an "altered state," described less ln 
terms ofho,:,ks and TV than by metaphors taken from "sports, sex or meditation" (p. 60): 
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Cal! it 'muscle memory,' call it 'flow,' call it 'trusting your instincts' - the 
experience of feeling a continuity between mind and body is part of the inner 
game of any well-played sport. Skilled video game players experience this 
immediacy of knowing their game with more than their head, and the 
experience is exhilarating. (p. 81) 
An account of such altered smtcs can be found in Csikszcntmihalyi's (1975, 1990, 1993) 
description of"flow." For Csikszcntmihalyi (1975, 1990, 1993), "flow" is "the state in which 
people are so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter; the experience is so 
enjoyable that people will do it even at great cost, for the sheer sake of doing it" (p. 4). 
Csikszcmmihalyi (1993) identifie_s eight dimensions of flow: clear goals and immediate 
feedback; a balance of challenge and skill; the merging between consciousness nnd one's 
activity; a high degree of focus; the loss of self-consciousness; an altered sense of time; and 
an autotelic quality. The flow stale, then, is facilitated when there is sufficient challenge lo 
stimulate the individual beyond their normal level of effort: too much challenge creates 
anxiety, too little creates boredom, and in this respect flow may he seen in terms of an 
nppropriatc schedule of reinforcement (Loftus and Loftus, 1983; Wallace, 1999). It can be 
argued that p!ay has been increasingly identified with-or is seen at its m ost optimal when 
players enter-a state of "flow." In this context, the problem with the term ''play" is that it 
often refers to nn activity which may be characterised ru; an ongoing attempt to (re-)enter the 
ideal of play; a state of flow that is totally absorbing and gratifying to the ego. Furthermore, 
while it is useful to analyse how g:im es produce flow experiences, the fact that there are 
different metaphors for "altered"' or "flow" states suggests that it may be better to tum away 
from generalisations about somt· universal, ineffable state and auempt to distinguish different 
types, or qualities, of immersion. 
As Murray (1997) argues, "immersion" is "a metaphorical term derived from the 
physical experience of being submerged in water" and what people seek from "a 
psychologically immcrsivc experience" is: 
!he sensation of being surrounded by a completely other reality, us different as
water is from air, that takes all ofo1•r auention, our whale perceptual apparatus.
We enjoy !he movement out of our familiar wor ld, the feeling of alertness that
comes from being in lhis new place, and the delight that comes from lcam:ng
to move through it. (pp. 98-99)
Murray traces the distinctive qualities of immersion to the "procedural," "participatory," 
"spatial" and "encyclopaedic" charnctcri.1ics of the computer as a medium. Sh� a.gu�s that 
the computer is procedural in the sense that: "it was designed not to carry static information 
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but to embody complex, contingent bchaviors" (p. 72): in short, it ls nn engine ofcompumtion 
chat operates according to programmable rules. The computer is participatory in the sense thal 
it is "responsive to our input" (p. 74), and, for Murrny, the notion of "interaction," applied to 
computers, refers to nn environment "that is both procedurul and participatory" (p. 74). 
The spatial qualities of the computer are also distinctive because, unlike "linear media 
such as books," the computer does not simply represent spnce in verbal or pictorial fonn: lt 
represents "navigable space" that users can "move through" (Murray, 1997, p. 79). Indeed, 
"the computer's spatial quality is created by the interactive process of navigation" (p. 80), in 
that computers not only calculate spatial representations from a player's perspective, they do 
so dynamically, in real-time. Lastly, Murray argues that computers are encyclopaedic, in the 
seme that they can store so much information, making them more capable of representing a 
procedural, pnrticipatory, and spatial world, not just in terms of visual detail, but also scope 
and dynamics. This encyclopaedic quality provides a basis for "epic-scale narrative" (p. 84), 
evident in online role-playing games (p. 86) that allow multiple players to create and share 
occupancy in a developing game world. For Murray, the combination of the spatial and 
encyclopaedic elements with the procedural nnd panicipatory elements is what provides the 
aesthetic experiences of immersion and the related experience of ·•agency," that is, the sense 
of entering a navigable virtual space and seeing the consequences of one's actions in the 
virtual world. 
It must be emphasised that while full sensory immersion is the ideal of Virtual Reality 
(sec Heim, 1993), video games only offer limited physical immersion. ranging from the 
wrestling. slapping and kicking of the joystick or cabinet with arcade games to the less 
physically taxing interaction with a PC game's kc�board and mouse controls. Darley (2000) 
argues that most video games offer a heightened form of "kinaesthesia": ''the illusion of 
control nnd agency in real time and in a realistic looking (and behaving) environment [italics 
added]" (p. 154). For him: "deliberation is minimal- once the game is under way the player is 
compelled continually and immediately to respond" (p. 156). Skirrow (1986) has similarly 
observed that video games often produce a sense of immediacy and danger that lends to 
"crisis management" (p. 331), and Tnrkle (1984) has emphasised the importance of survival, 
in that, in many games, "one false move [and] you're dead" (p. 79). The low tolerance for 
error in a context of high stakes fosters an increasing level of attention and a more intense or 
immersivc altered state. Jn this respect, the reflexive and frenzied character of int(•raction in 
many video games may compensate for absent sensory channels. However, video games do 
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not necessarily emulate other media and so cannot l>e seen as merely compensatory. As 
Murray (1997) argues, t hey generate their own aesthetics through creative experimentation 
with their constraints. 
Video Game Contenl 
It is perhaps understandable that early researchers wr.re co',�emed about the values, or 
content, of the video games in which players were immersed, itnd acted, Provenzo (1991), 
who reflects these concerns, argues that video games are gen�rally sexist and violent. He 
argues that females, when they are represented at all, are usually ridiculous stereotypes of 
femininity and serve as objects to be looked at or rescued (sec also Cassel & Jenkins, 1998; 
Consalvo, 2003; Herz, 1997; Poole, 2000; Turkle 1984). Not only are males the dominant 
demographic, video games appeal to their aggressive instincts. For Provenzo, the "message 
communicated by the rules of [video games] is tlrnt violence is not only acceptable, it is 
necessary to win" (p. 124). Stallabras (1996) makes a similar claim, observing that video 
games do not show the consequences or violence: bodies disappear after a period of time; no 
mauer how they die, the corpses or each type of monster look the same; aggression nnd 
murder are seen as merely an expenditure of energy that lowers one's health bar; and injuries 
arc regenerated by eating food or camping for a night's sleep. 
What Provenzo (199l) finds especially alarming is that runny games d raw their 
scennrios from historical events, such as World War I and II, Vietnam, the Cold War, and the 
Gulf War. That is. when video games do hlstoricizo violent conflict, it is uiually to harness or 
reinforce r�cial or national stereotypes, such as the notion that Chinese or Japanese arc 
different, might wnnt to fight us, and therefore must be regart!ed as !he enemy. There is, 
certainly, a strong relationship between video gamr.s and the military-industrial complex 
(Herz, 1997; Stallabras, 1996; Toles, 1985), and muny games draw !heir iconography from 
warfare: arsenal, field armour, ammunition, health kits, and military-style missions, maps and 
strategy. 
More recently, Fuller and Jenkins (19'15) have argued that mastery of the game world 
gains symbolic value from the Now World narratives of Renaissance explorers (1995, p. 58). 
Players expand their wealth nnd power, and bring space "under symbolic control" (p. 69) by 
continually pus�ing back ,;,r eot;iblishing such frontiers as the edge of the screen, save poims 
and levels (p. 67). Using Michel de Ccneuu's (1984) argument tliat narrative involves the 
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transfonnation of space into place, Fuller and Jenkins (1995) suggest that the rhetoric of 
games as new frontiers or New Worlds is driven by: 
the desire to recreate 1he Renaissance encounter with America without guilt: 
This time, if there arc others present, they really won't be human .•• or, if they 
ure, they will be other players like ourselves, whose bodies are not jeopardized 
by the virtual weapons we wield (p. 59) 
Kinder (1991) and Stnllabras (1996) link gameplny to the conservative values of 
capitalist exchnnge. Kinder (1991) draws from Pia get (1978) nnd Lacan (197712001) to argue 
!hat video games prepare children for consumer culture by fostering interactivity in the
context of mulli-mcdia merchandising networks. Stallabras (1996), who is more polemical, 
argues that video games: 
obsequiously reflect the operation of consumer capitul for they are based on 
exchange, an incessant trading of money, munitions or energy, a shuttling back 
and forth of goods ruid blows. (p. 90) 
For Stallabrns, video games are a debased "culture industry" that dis1ract the "masses" from 
larger soda! issues such as global inequality. 
However, there has been a trend in the industry to design games for girls, reflected in 
Laurel's ill-fated Purple Moon company and the Grrlz Games Movement (sec Cassel & 
Jenkins, 1998). There have also always been a few games, including Final Fantasy, 1hat have 
dealt with social issues such as feminism, economics, ecology, science and religion. More to 
the point, setting aside critics' evaluaLion of the moral or political values of games, players' 
perception and acceptance of a game's v1,.lues is not a simple issue. 
Subjectificallon and the Play or Meaning 
For both conservatives like Provenzo (1991) und polemicists like Stallabras (1996), 
what distinguishes video games is not merely their undesirable values, but the e�tent to which 
players participate in them, Their arguments therefore may be said to rest on the assumption 
that interaction increases nat only identification and immersion, but also subjectilication. 
There is, it must be acknowledged, a rudimentary logic to this. As Andrew Darley (2000) 
observes, video games are increa!!ingly characterised hy "the impression of being enabled to 
act within and upon the world one gazes upon [italics added]" (p. 161). Tiiat is, while video 
games arc dejitJed by their use of interactivity, !hey offer "a kind of relative or regulated 
agency: !he constraints of the game allow the player to choose between a limited number of 
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options [italics added]" {p. 164). This hecomes significant when the choices players are forced 
to make require them to act out cert:tin types of values. As Herz (1997) obseives, Will Wright 
built cerrnin values into SimCity (1989) in the sense tlrnt th!l rules oft he game promote certain 
types of actions, such as the nse of public transpon. Winning the game is easier when one 
confonns ro those rules, and such confonnity could be interpreted as acceptance. 
However, despite its seeming common-sense, the assumption that interaction 
facilitates identification recapitulates an outmoded notion of identification. Within early film 
theory, which drew from Althussurian Man.ism and Lucanian psychoanalysis, the more one 
identified with a film or a character the more vulnerable one was lo the film's ideological 
position (sec Lewis, 1984; McGree, 1997; Me12, 1975, 1982; Nichols, 1981; Palmer, 1989; 
Penley, 1989; Staiger, 1992). Cultural Studies no longer accepts this position, but it 
nonetheless persists. For e.immp!e, Stallabms (l996) has claimed that interaction in video 
games is so routine and mechanical that players subjectify themselves as mindless object­
machines heneath the malevolent forces of late capitalism. In a less polemical account, Taylor 
(2003) draws on psychoanalytic film theory to argue that breaks in point of view fracture 
identification, thereby recnpitufating the notion of the cinematic apparatus as the basis for 
identification at the very moment she sees the video game as offering a different kind of 
apparatus. 
While the rclatillnship between "interactivity" nnd "subjcctification" is still open to 
debate, recent research has begun to address the issue in more subtle ways. Frasca (2003) 
identifies four levels of ideological operation in "simulations," including computer games. 
The first level, shared with film and narrative in general, occurs at the level of representation, 
and involves the signification of the "objects and characters, backgrounds, seuings, and cut 
scenes" (J>. 232). The second level relates to "manipulation rules: what the player is able to do 
within the model" (p. 232). As Consalvo (2003) has obseived, the provision for certain types 
of actions mDy naturalise or promote an ideology of sexism in FFVII: skills such ns "Protect 
Girl" reinstate traditional gender relations as part of the tut. Third, there arc "goal rules," 
which define actions that arc not merely possible, but which the player 11ws1 pcrfonn ifs/he is 
to win. The fourth level deals with "meta-rules," when the player is able to change the rules. 
We might include the use of hints, spoilers, and cheats in this category. 
Theorists could distinguish more complex causal conditions across the spectrum of 
possible and necessary actions, for example in the manner suggested by Eselinen and 
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Tronstad (2003). However, this thesis takes the position that performance of an ac!io11 in a 
video game docs not necessarily cnrnil endorsement of that action, and that players have the 
capacity to play not only in the sense of making physical choices, but also in the sense of 
playing with the meanings of those choices. This position renects the changing ways that 
Cultural Studies has appropriated !he tcnns "play" and "game" to describe the act of reading. 
Within everyday discourse, as in the phrase "to play a game," "play" is a verb that refers to an 
activity, or a way of doing something, while "game" is a noun that refers to a system of rules. 
This usage parallels !he distinction between parole and /n11g11c, as ls evident in Lapsley and 
Westlnke's (1988) summary or structuralist theory; 
The system, known as longr,e, and actual or potential utterances, parole, may 
be compared to the rule system of chess ruid Lo the set of moves that may be 
actually or potentially played. L,mgue defines both what are permissible or 
impermissible utterances (as do the rules of chess in relation to moves) '1!ld 
what their significance is (again, as in chess) •••• If the meruiing of a signifier 
is analogous to !he value of a piece on a chessboard, then it becomes evident 
that meaning will change according to the context in the same way that the 
value of, sny. u pawn will depend upon what stage of the game has been 
reached, where it is in relation to other pawns, how mruiy pieces are left on the 
board, and so on. (p. 33-4) 
In a structuralist approach, of course, a text's structure is ruialysed to identiry the possible 
permutations or meaning, such that the "play" of meaning is seen as an "effect" of the text's 
structure. This constitutes poetics in the tradi1ional sense in that it emphasises the ways in 
which the reader .1/wuld read the text (or play the game) and/or the effects that s/iau/d be 
produced {such as surprise). Hutchinson (1983) provides a valuable example of this tradition, 
identifying how authors "signal" a game, arouse readers' expectations, and challenge their 
deductive a11d renexive powers by exploiting a game-text as an "enigma," a "parallel," or by 
utilising such narrJtive techniques us allegory, allusion and symbolism. 
However, in more recent poststructuralist accounts the reader's parole (read: piny) 
potentially di�torts and/or transforms the la11g1Je (read: game) in and by which it ls expressed 
(and constrained). While this kind of usage is evident in some of Barthcs' work (1975a, 
1975b), it is consolidated in reader response theory (Holland, 1975; Iser, 1974, 1978), 
psychoanalytic accounts of the speaking subject (Kristevn. 1980), and deconstructio11ism 
(Derrida, 1970), all of which emphasise the open-endedness of signification. Most recently, 
the subversive quality of "play" characterises much writing on metafiction, the fantastic, and 
postmodemism (Hutcheon, 1988; Jackson, 1988; McHale, 1987), with a sense th�t rnedia­
savvy producers and audiences exploit semiosis through the manipulation of conventions (sec 
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also Bolter, 1991; Landow, 1992). Within Cultut�l Studies' psychoanalytic framework such 
playfulness is readily seen as indcxical of the subject's desire, which is privileged us a 
liberating force of resistance against imposed meanings and subject positions. That is, since 
subjectivity is provisional upon the "rules" of!anguage, our "real" identities (as subjects) may 
be seen as a form of"role-playing," as merely a "game." The term "p!ay" therefore connotes 
not only the freedom to interpret texts in countless ways, but a changeable state of affairs in 
which one can "play" a different role in the world beyond the text, and, by breaking the rules, 
come up with new roles. 
Unfortunately, such metaphorical, and often rhetorical, usage is problematic. Even if 
ploy is road as indcxica! of desire, desire is not inherently resistant. As Foucault (1979) 
nrgues, desire is never simply repressed by social forces, but ls produced within discourses. 
An analogous conclusion has been reached in the psychoanalytic revision of fantasy as the 
"misc en scene of desire" (l..aplanche & Pontalis, 1988, p. 318). Donald (1989) summarises: 
What is evident in fantasies is not just the wish, but the setting out of the wish 
in a way that always also incorpnrates the prohibitions, censoring, and defences 
that surrounded the wish. (p. 140) 
That is, desire always operates within a social context, and its expression may roinscribe the 
prohibitions which gave rise to it. By analogy to play and games, sometimes the point of a 
game is not to win, but simply to prolong the experience of play. Even when one desires to 
win, and cheats, this may legitimate winning us worthwhile, since cheating is usually an 
oxprcssion of a desire for the ideal subject position offered by a game. In short, the desire 
expressed when cheating may sometimes be less a violation of the game itself than a violation 
of the rules which govern one's position i11 the game. 
Nonetheless, the notion ofo playful reading usefully foregrounds the freedom players' 
have in producing negotiated and oppositional readings of whatever actions they choose or arc 
forced to perform in a game. Indeed, Jenkins (1992) has argued that individuals can 
recuperate their existing values by poaching, and reworking. the resource� of cultural 
artefacts. Ultimately there is no reason why players cannot approach the meaning or 
experience of gameplay in the same ironic or kitsch way that viewers watch B-grade horror 
films, in which case submission to the limited rules of a game is little different from 
submitting to a elichcd plat. The problem is that lo understand the "interactive" qualities that 
distinguish video games from other media, nnd, by implication, ta appreciate their distin�tive 
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aesthetics, il is necessary to interrogate the border between narratives and games in a literal 
sense. 
From "Interactive Narrntives" to "CybHlext.�" 
Herz (1997) observes that in early video games namuive content functioned as a 
backdrop for the action or was limited to introductory text and "canned" (pre-filmed) 
sequences, usually at the start and end of each level (also Juul, 1999; Poole, 2001). These 
sequences could be seen as "cute or funny but [were] basically irrelevant to their play" 
[furkle, 1984, p. 66). However, more recent researchers have begun to identify the tensions, 
or relatiomhips, between mmatives and games in more detail (Buckles, 1985; Juul, 1999; 
Kirksaether, 199&; Kuckllck, 2003; Poole, 2000; Ryan, 2001; Wolf, 2001). Juul (1999), 
notably, has argued that games and narrntives nrc "two separate phenomena that in many 
situations are mutually exclusive" ( p. I), concluding that the temporal emphasis on the past 
con!HcL� wilh lhe emphasis on the present in video games, that the linearity or narrative 
con!Hcts with the non-linearity of video games, and that the position of the narrator conflicts 
with the position of the player. 
Nonetheless, Juul (1999) expects that fumre games will better integrate narratives and 
games, and Aarseth (1997) has already argued that while there may be differences between 
the categories of narrative and gaming: "the difference is not clear-cut, and lhere is significant 
overlap between the two" (p. 5). This is evident in Darlcy's (2000) argument that the events of 
gamcplay-----opcning doors, crossing the scre en,  picking np objects and so on---cijn be 
recounted to construct narratives of "near-epic proportions" (p. 152); or, as Herz contends: 
•'the choreography of an arcade game is its plot" (19\17, p. 140). Of course, as Darley (2001) 
observes, the events which constitu!C narratives of this sort arc impoverished and fragmented 
when compared with 01her narrative forms in that they are repetitive, lack closure, have liule 
psychological or narrative depth, and are interrupted by frequent saving, death, and replay (p. 
152). In respect to the events of gameplay; •·codes that are central to narrutive - codes that 
produce a certain plenitude, a depth of richness and meaning - are largely absent" (p. 153). 
Darley concludes that "what counts far more [than narrative] is the actual playing, and this 
involves a certain kind of kinaesthetic performance that becomes almost an end in itself' (p. 
IS l). For him, "narrative in vid�o games is "de-cm,lred ... in a subordinate posici on within 
the overall formal hierarchy !hat constitutes the game aesthetic" (2000, p.151). 
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Yet Darlcy's (2000) account is true of some games more than others. Some 
researchers have redeemed adventure and role-playing gnmes in literary or anistic terms, 
arguing that video sames may have the structural or narrative complexity or print and film 
texts (Buckles, 1985; Kelley, 1993; Randall, 1988; Zieglicld, 1989). The problem is that, as 
Aarsclh {1997) contends, whether or not adventure games make good novels or not is 
irrelevant, since adventure games are 1101 novels, they arc acstheticnlly distinctive and must be 
played, and studied, on their own tenns (p. 107). Darley (2000) himself acknowledges that 
"the panicular character of interactivity" means that reseait:hers still need to address "what is 
happening to familiar fonns or uarrativc nod [if] other modes and genres [arc) involved" (p. 
195). In many games, notably interactive numitives, adventure games, and role-playing 
games, narrative is 1101 necessarily de-centred bnt central to the aesthetic experience (al least 
during ccnain sequences), having been inco1pora1ed or reworked in varied, complex ways. 
In accounting for the complexity of "interactive nurratives" some researchers have 
used hypertext a,, a model (see Barret, !989; Delany & l.:mdow, 1991; Kirksaether, 1998; 
l.:mdow, 1992; Snyder, 1996). As Ted Friedman (1995) summarises, hypenext: 
conncct[s] the oppositions of "reader" end "text," of "readiug" and "writing," 
together in feedback loops lhat make it impossible to distinguish precisely 
where one begins and the other ends •• , calling into question the very 
categories of anthor, reader, nnd text. (p. 73) 
That is, whereas a traditional narrative is characterised by II beginning, mid�lc an� end, and a 
predctcnnined relationship between a writer and reader, those who navigate hypertext and 
other "intcrnctive" narratives construct their own texts iu a non-linear fashion. This has been 
seen iu positive terms as providing a useful metaphor for paststructuraHst notions of 
intcnextuality, in that, instead of offering one dominant narrative, voice, or truth, hypertext 
allows for multiple uarrativcs, voices and truths (Barret, 1989; Delany & Lnndow, 1991: 
Jones & Spiro, 1995; Lnndow, 1992). lndecd, Laurel (1991) has argued that the problem with 
"interactive narratives" is precisely that players may choose from multiple paths, but tht 
some or these paths may not lead to a dramatically satisfying conclusion. For her, then, the 
issue is how to program a story that is dramatic in Aristotle's (trans. 1965) sense, However, 
Aarseth (!997) urgues that placing the programmer/computer as a "playwright" simply 
constructs the user as "both as an agent without a will and as II watcher without a say" (p. 
140); that is, Laurel (1991) reduces interactivity to a player's submission to the dramatic 
decisions of the "plc�wright." For Aarscth (1997), t11e user is never simply an author, and, as 
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Friedman (1995) argues: "the constant feedback between player and computer in computer 
games is far more comp!ci. than [a] simple networking model" (p. 74). 
Consequently, after reviewing existing theories of "interactive" media (Anderson, 
1990; Anderson, Holmqvist & Jensen, 1993: Eco, 1981; Ziegfeld, 1989), Aaneth (1997) 
offers his own model. To begin with, he distinguishes between potential sign sequences in a 
medium, which he calls "textons," and the signs that actually appear at the surface of a 
medium, which he calls "scriptons." He then argues that media can be distinguished in terms 
of how scriptons detennine the textons. In a book the lei.tons and scriptons are identical {the 
words on the page), whereas with film the tcxtons (the images on celluloid) highly detennine 
the scriptons {the images projected on a film screen). With computers, the textons (registers 
that store data) arc mediated by the layers of hardware and software as well as by the choices 
of the user before being represented as scriptons (words and images at the interface). 
Anrseth (1997) uses the term "ergodic," derived from the Greek word� ergo11 (work) 
and hodos (path), to refer to any text in which the activity of a ''reader'' (partly) determines 
which signs appear on the surface of the medium. That is, an ergodic text allows the reader to 
physically select from, alter, or input text, producing a different text !hat is  rcad/rom. Aarseth 
(1997) offers seven variables as a means of classifying !he mode of traversal, or ergodic 
distinctiveness, of texts: dynamics; detenninabllity; transience; perspective: access; linking: 
and user-functions. Upon this basis, Aarseth difforcmiatcs h)IJlerfiction, adventure games, 
cyborg-authored texts, and MUDs as examples of ergodic literature. However, Aarseth docs 
not see new or digital media as inherently more ergodic than other media, since so-called 
"linear" media may allow for as much random access as so-called "non-linear'' media. The 
render of a book may skip sections, read the end first, or consult the index before referring to 
an earlier section. Ccnain print texts, such as Choose Your Own Adventure, take advantage of 
!his by making readers choose from multiple nanativc sequences, moving back and fonh 
through the physical text. A work of hypcrfiction that only allows !he user to click forward 
through a fixed sequence of linked pages is, by contrast, more "linear," Indeed, to speak of a 
"text" (reading) as a linear sequence of signs forgets that all nonlinearities arc subsumed to 
the supposed "linearity" of the act of reading (or may be mentally reordered after the "text" is 
read). 
Aarseth's (1997) notion or "text" "is closer to the philological (or observable) work 
than to the poststructural (or metaphysical) galaxy ofsignifiers" {p. 20). While readers of such 
33 
non-ergodic texts as traditional film and print fiction perform the work of reading "in their 
heads,'' the user of ergodic texts: 
pcrfonns in an cxtranoematic sense. During the cybertextual process, the user 
will have effectuated a semiotic sequence, and this selective movement is a 
work or physical construction that the various concepts of "reading" do not 
account for. (p. 21) 
For Aarseth, early writers on hypertexts confused the playfulness of reading the "text" with 
the physical playfulness or physica!ly altering the "work," but in correcting this emphasis he 
necessarily over-emphasises the "work." Consequently, while Aarseth's model of the textual­
machine specifics a human operator, it is useful to distinguish this from textual-machines that 
operate themselves and textual-machines with a human reader (see Figure 1.1) . 
m,,,h;n, 
(c001pu1>tioo) 
sign("'"' o) m ,um w,w) 
<>p<rat (i=lerJ 
"" 
"P""'"" (u,er) 
(e,lml>ch;oo 
(cyberlc,I) 
Figure I.I. Anrseth's (1997, p. 2!) model of the textual-machine, adapted to include: (a) 
computation, (b) reading and (b) interaction. [Note: hlw= "hardware": s/w="software") 
With textual-machines that operate themselves the "work" stands by itself without any 
nccompan)'ing "text." In the case of textual-machines with a human reader any attempt to 
understand the internal working of the computer requires that the computational processes 
("works") be accompanied by a "text" dynamically (re-) constructed by !lie operator. This 
may include not only a textual model of the computational proce sses, but a text in the more 
convr.ntional sense of nn interpretation of the ''meaning" of the text that appears at the 
interface. In the case of textual-machines with n human user the "work" is accompanied by a 
"text" of the "work" ns well as a "text" of the cybertext's "meaning," and both determine the 
choices the player makes, and how, as a result, s/he alters the "work." 
The relationships between the "work" and the player's model or "text" of this work is 
implicit in Aarscth's (1997) distinction between "aporia" and "epiphany" in hypertext fiction: 
In contrast to the aporins experienced in codex literature, where we arc not able 
to make sense of a particular part even though we have access to the whole 
text, the hypertext aporia prevents us from making sense of t�e whole because 
we may not have access to a particular part.()', 91) 
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That is. hypcncxt readers may have a sense Lhat they cannot make sense of the whole "text" 
because of absent parts of the "work." With epiphany. by contrast. "sudden revelation . , • 
replaces the aporia, a ,eeming detail with a n  unexpected, salvaging effee1: lhe link out" {p. 
91). For Aa.-seth: 
this pai: or master tropes constitutes the dynamic of hypencxt discourse: the 
dialectic. between searching and finding typical of gamcs in general. The 
apotfa·epiphaI'y pair is thus not a narrative structure hue constitutes a 
fundamental layer of human experience, from which narratives arc spun. (pp. 
91-2) 
So while the "text" constructed from the "work" may be experienced as incomplete because 
of absent aspects of the "work," closure may be experienced through an "epiphany .. which 
seems to unite the "text." 
Jn fact, relationships between guided spcculatinn1 (the multiple "texts" cued by the 
"work'') and lhe actual outcome (the subsequent "text°) are central to the dramatic experience 
of narratives and games in general. The pleasure of reading u detective novel, for example, is 
dependant upon a disparity between the reader•s "1eory ("te�t") about what happened and !he 
actual explanation that is finally offered (the completed "work"). This disparity is continually 
exploite<.I and redressed !/:rough the dissemination of clues, red herrings, dead cnds, 
rcvelalions, n�w events, and so on, which deliberately mislead the reader about "what 
happened" until the entirely of the "work" is complete. In gameplay, of courn,, players arc not 
usually concerned wilh 1he entire "computntional work." merely those elements that arc 
functionnlly relevant to play. and different players utilise different aesthetics to determine 
what is functionally rc!cvunl. The frustration consequent upon disparities between 
"computational work .. and "compurntionul text .. is only n problem wl1en it exceeds the 
frustration deemed aeceplable according to th\: aesthetic by which gameplay is evaluated. 
That is, plnyers do not demystify the computation�! or algorithmic entirety of the code, darn, 
or m\:dium, they only produce a "computation�] text" that is adequate for the task of playing 
the game according to their chosen aesthetic. 
Aarscth's (1997) tenns allow for a more subtle and sensitive appreciation or video 
games. but Aar.eth is less concerned with elaborating his taxonomy than he is with discussing 
existing genres. This provides for some useful insights into the structural differences between 
commonly accepted genres, but a det.�iled map of all the ergodic features of a genre or text is 
less important tha:i the player's model or its sign system, or, rnther, the tensions between a 
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player's expectations about feedback and the feedback they actual receive. Given that this 
study is largely concerned with players' experiences, it avoids refeniug lo erf;Jdics in 
/\aoseth's sense or the game ''work," inste�d refening to "ergodic codes" that defin� 
admissible choices for interaction nt the interface. This allows us to separate out conventions 
of an interface that may characterise a genre, but which are portable between genres. Like all 
codes, ergodic cod�s are usually invisible when the user is familiar with the interface, but arc 
visible while being learnt (during in-game tutorials and easier levels), customized (when a 
player changes game command keys), or blocked (because of unexpected events and/or a 
player's lack ofmast�.ry). 
However, it is still necessary to emphasise the distinction between the player's 
c omputational text and the player's interpretative text, since thei;e may function either 
independently or in close conjunction. For example, n render of a hypertext narrative may 
have a mental map of the links between each page of text, but this may have no bearing on 
their interpretation of the text. Conversely, there may be instances when the structure of the 
links in a hypertext resonate with the text. Murray (1997) addresses this issue when she argues 
that the structure of games may complement their meaning. For example, navigatiug complex, 
closed and/or repetllive environments may give rise to "suspense, fear of abandonment, fear 
of lurking attactrers, and fear of loss of selr' (p . 135). A game, then, may produce a type of 
immersion and agency tlmt complements its intended meanings or aesthetics by manipulating 
its procedural, participatory, spatial and encyclopaedic qualities. Murray describes the 
significance of several structures of navig�tion in this sense; story mazes, the rhizome, the 
journey story, problem-solving, "losing" and ''winning" stories, games as symbolic drrunns, 
the game as contest (agon), and world construction in MUDs. 
The corollary of an analysis of "interactive narratives," or, more appropriately, 
"ergodic texts," is an awareness of not only th� collapse between narrative and game, but also 
the inter-relationship between hyp01hesis-making about future events (cognitive-oriented 
interpretation of the "text") and the performance of physical tasks (sensorimotor--oriented 
interaction with the "work"). In practice, narrative..uricnted games require nt least minimal 
sensorimotor nction, and semorimotor-oriented games require strategic cognition. 
Consequently, despite the theoretical attention it may have received, the tenninological 
distinction between "story" and '"game" ls less important than the processes of engagement 
that give rise to the aesthetic experience of gameplay. The issue that emerges from this is how 
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sensorimotor action and cognition are cued lo work in conjunction during gamcplay, and how 
this produces an aesthetic, emotional experience. 
Emolion in Video Games: Early Models nnd Research 
The research on emo tions in video games has largely been confined to experimental 
attempts to prove the ag gressive effects of gnmcplay upon players (Anderson & Morrow, 
1995: Ballard & Wiest, 1996; Cooper & Mackie, 1986; Dominick, 1984: Ring, Smith, 
Rodriguez, Thornton, Atkins, & Nixon, 1992; Funk & Buchman, 1996; Griffiths & Dancaster, 
1995: Irwin & Gross, 1995; Kubcy & Larson, 1990; McClure & Mears, 1984: Nelson & 
Carlson, 1985; Schutte, Malouf, Post-garden & Rodman, 1988; Scott, 1994; Silvcm, 1987). 
The methodology of these experiments may be seen, with some variation {and qualification), 
as taking the following general form. first, n group of players are measured for an aggressive 
stale. Second, some players are given a so-ca!led "violent" game, while other players are 
given a so-called "non-violent" game. Third, a fter a measured period of play, the aggressive 
states of both groups are re-measured. Founh, the subsequent difference in the level of 
aggression is found to be either shon-lived, minimal, or non-existent. 
There arc many proh!ems with this experimental methodology. Aside from Jenkins' 
(1990) observation that early research tended to abstract "violence" from its context of 
reception, the experimental conditions of these types of research produce an anificiul context 
for producing and expressing aggre ssive tendencies, and tend to confuse correfotion with 
causation (Durkin, 1995, 1999). Ceriainly, there are broad, historically specific correlmions 
between the male demographic and the aesthetics associated with challenge, competition, and 
aggressive mastery. However, aggressive personality types often choose to engage with media 
that reflect and reinforce their existing tendencies, making the measurements correlative, not 
causal. 
A more obvious criticism is thnt such research does not adequatdy account for the 
calhanic experience of games, that is, the extent to which emotions are aroused and purged 
and thereby nullified, reduced, or redirected into a socially acceptable fonn. Catharsis is an 
aesthetic evident in Malone's (1981), Myers' (199{)(:) and Turkle's (1984) analysis of players' 
preferences, but assumptions about catharsis in gameplay need qualification. First, like 
aggression, th� catharsis players c�pecl from games is less likely IQ be mcasurnblc in an 
unfomiliar e�perimental context; the everyday routines one seeks relief from are attenuated or 
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disrupted by the experimenm! conditions. Second, it is simplistic to see the reduction of 
aggression as evidence of beneficial catharsis. To presume that aggression felt in relation lo a 
video game is 1iecessarily negative and anti-social, and 1/,erefore undesirable, is the same as 
evaluating a person's anger at their football team losing without refere,nce to the 
psychological, srn:iological, and ideological functions of fandom. Some players may find it 
useful to induce manageable anger at a g ame rather than deal with anger, or other emotion, 
resulting from some unmanageable social situation. 
Third, measuring a purged emotion after its purging ignores or misrepresents the 
desired aesthetic experience of playing a video game. Detcnnining whether or not some 
players end up with a {temporary) higher level of stress or aggression afierplay may be beside 
the point if what players seek from a game is what they experience whifr playing it, not the 
state they expect to be in afterwards. In this respect, a "black box" experimental approach 
draws auention away from the actual processes of gameplay, especially the real-time 
regulation of emotions. Video games may produce stress relief that is measurable by 
comparing the "before" and "after'' levels of physiological arousal. However, uot only may 
this purging be episodic, significant emotional moments of play may occur early on in, or 
before the end of, a gaming sessiou, and the actual closure may be poorly defined or arbilrary. 
The underlying problem here is that the catharsis hypothesis was developed for traditional 
dramatic fonns-stuge plays, print novels and feature films--which have an aesthetic formula 
organised around discrete emotion-episodes polarised around centrul concerns, in which 
elements are drawn together and resolved in something that subsequently resembles a total, 
organic text. Video games have been played for the last three decades not as ineffective 
dramatic fonns but as a different kind of dramatic form, or, more precisely, as a different kind 
of emotion·regulator. 
Within the bulk of the research addressed in this chapter there has, it should be noted, 
been a tendency to consider a range of emotional stmes in video games. However, those 
emotions tends to be addressed indirectly and/or are seen as debased, compared with prim and 
film. The "altered states" of "meditation," "kinaesthesia," "immersion," "agency," and "flow" 
may be positive, but they are generalised from cenain genres or aesthetics, principally first 
person shooters, and refer to general s tates. They therefore provide u limited basis for 
analysing the dynamic regulation of emotions in any particular game, and it remains necessary 
to provide a more systematic theoretical account of the regulation of meaning and emotion in 
gamcplay. 
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Frijdo's Model of Emotion 
While Bordwell's (1986) account does not address the emotional experience of film 
viewing, researchers such as Smith (1995), Tan (1997), and Grodal (1997) see emotional 
responses as or equal or primary significance. For Tan (1997), while there may be many 
motives for watching films, "what all nnturnl viewers of the traditionnl feature film have in 
common is their desire lO experience emotion as intensoly and abundantly as possible, within 
the safe margins of guided fantasy and a closed episode" (1997, p. 39). In an analysis of video 
games, in which the player's sensorimotor system is engaged and emotional responses arc not 
merely v irtual, it becomes even more necessary to appreciate the motivating role of emotion. 
Following Tan, we can tum to Frijda's definition (1986, 1988, 1989) of emotions as 
changes in action readiness through the appraisal of a situation. "Action readiness" refers to 
how emotions activate the nervous system, giving way to rapid physiological changes, such as 
heart rate, bronchial dilation, and inhibition of the digestive system. These not only prepare an 
individual for physical action in a gencrnl sense, they are tied to specific "action tendencies" 
(f,rijda, 1986, p. 70); to run, atlack, seek intimacy, kiss, and so on. Some theorists, such as 
Izard (1984), argue that each emotion has its own neurophysiological substrate, such that a 
basic set or emotions can be identified. Most of these "basic" or "elementary" emotions-­
notably interest, happiness, surprise, anger, fear, sadness, and disgust-are g enerally 
accepted. However, cognitive (Kagan, 1984), structural-developmental (Sroufe, 1996), 
functlonnlist (Campos & Barret, 1984; Frijda, 1986), and socio-cultural (Abu-Loghod & Lutz, 
1992) traditions in the study of emotion argue that the quantity and/or quality of emotions is 
seen as depending upon the stage of development, cognitive appraisal, and/or the cultural 
context (see Mascolo & Griffin, 1998, pp. 4-14). 
The functionalist position is privileged here, following Frijda (1986), Lazarus (1991), 
and Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988), who sec emotion as having a control precedence. That 
is, "emotion is functional in that it takes control, precluding extended reasoning: a decision to 
take action-any action-is better than failing to act in time" (Tan, 1997, p. 43). Emotion, 
then, influences one's attentiveness and motivation towards a pmticular problem, and, by 
extension, one's ability to deal with this problem. However, a key difference between 
theorists is the extent 10 which emphasis is placed upon associated physiological and 
cognitive processes. Without minimising the extent to which the different traditions offer 
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conflicting intclJ)retntions, it is possible to take the moderate position !hat each tradition 
principally emphasises different aspects of processes that cross the biological and psycho­
social. 
Upon this basis we can appreciate Tan's (1997) distinction between "primary" and 
"secondary" appraisal. For Tan, following Frijda (1986), "primary appraisal" is an advanced, 
automated, and immediate process directly related to the stimulus, premised upon such basic 
elements as intensity, match-mismatch, hedonic quality, agency and causality. This evaluation 
is limited to "immediately observable affordances" (fan, 1997, p. 47), that is, those fonns of 
action which arc obviously associated with the object or situation, such as fight or flight 
(Gibson, 1979; see also Baron, 1980). Indeed, the tcnn "affect" can be usefully reserved for 
the biological component of arousal consequent upon primary appraisal (Basch, 1976). 
Tomkins' (1962, 1963, 1991) classic analyses of the complc� assemblies of nine innate 
affects is paradigmatic of this type of usage. While the fccling·states that Grodal (1997) refers 
to are more general than Tomkins' (1962) affects, they may also be seen as affeclivc in the 
limited sense !hat they are premised upon primary nppraisal. "Secondary appraisal," by 
contrast, is a continued cognitive elaboration accompanied by "emotional significance that is 
not directly evident rrom the situation ilselr' (fan, !997, p. 47) (sec Frijda, 1986; l.azarus, 
1966). In Frijda's (1986) tenns it is only when secondary appraisal occurs that we can speak 
of true emotion, and this study reserves the tcnn "emotion" for !his usage. Indeed, for Frijda, 
each emotion has a distinctive situational meaning struc\ure, or cognitive evaluation. For 
unmple, foar is not merely a physiological response, it is a stutc of arousal combined with a 
cognitive evaluation of an imminent threat. 
A central question for the study of emotion in lilm is if tl1e viewer experiences true 
emotions. Tan (1997), following Frijda, is aligned with !he cognitive branch of film theory 
(Allen, 1997; Carrol, 1990; Grodal, 1998), which critiques !he assumption that viewers 
mistake the screen for reality. Tan (1997) differentiates between an involuntary "illusion of 
motion," based upon the physiological phenomena of"flicker fusion" and "apparent motion," 
as well as a series of voluntary illusions; the "illusion of the dicgetic effect," "the illusion of 
the controlled witness," and "the illusion of the observational attitude," These "illusions" 
comprise a sequence which most viewers voluntarily and progressively accept and invest in. 
The viewer thereby takes up a voluntary observational position as an invisible witness and 
enters into !he dicgetic effect. Being in the position of witness the viewer knows that events 
do not affect his/her welfare directly, but is still able to form an emotional relationship with 
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the film and its charncters. This relationship is not one of habitation or straightforward 
identification, but of cmputhecic concern from the position of spectator. This finds its 
annloguc in other situations in which we find ourselves spectators, such as watching sport. 
Even if the events being watched arc not real, our relationship 10 situations and charnclcrs as a 
spcccator is genuine, such that we may feel genuine, albeit inhibited, emotions. As Frijda 
(1989) argues: "film does not elicit emotions by products known to be imaginary, but allows 
inhibition ofcmotir,n,J because the products are known to be imaginary"('![ 4). 
Tan (1997) claborntes upon this by distinguishing between "Artefact-emotions," or 
"A-emotions," which are responses to the film's non-dicgetic elements, from "fiction­
emotions," or "F-emotions," which arc responses to situations within the film's diegesis. In 
the classical feature film, A-emotions are minimal (or minimised). Tun consequently focuses 
on F--emotions, arguing that interest is the key emotion produced while watching a feature 
film, and that this is oriented around the production and confirmation of expectations about 
events in the dicgcsis. These expectations are governed by "thematic structures," such as 
viewers' expectations nbout l�e course ofa story about "Revenge," and "character structures," 
that is, how characters' goals and motives lead viewers to privilege and expect cenain 
outcomes on behalf of those characters (p. 179). The action tendency of interest is a desire to 
keep watching, but more comple� emotions, such as admirntion, pity, and sadness, may be 
reinforced by, and reinforce, interest. These more complex emotional responses are likely to 
be inhibited because they penain ton fiction, and the action tendencies associated with them 
are vinual, or imagined. Someone watching n film may be cued to dislike a particular 
character on the screen, but s/he is not obliged to net upon that emotion by abandoning their 
scat and assaulting the screen; s/he merely imagines and fears or hopes for certain outcomes. 
Frijda's (1986) model of emotion, and Tan's (1997) application ofit to film, provides 
a basis for some valuable questions and departure points. In video games, the cognitive 
response to Lhe aesthetic object gives way to some form of sensorimotor-ergodic action, such 
that video games produce both virtual and actual action tendencies. This being the case, how 
does the player's position as both invisible witness (Lo narrntive sequences) m,d active 
participam affect hisllicr emotional responses? Should we see participation as giving rise to a 
different son of interest, and docs the connuence of vinual and action tendencies affect the 
course of this interest? Should we expect video game characters to elicit the same kind of 
empathy felt towards fi!mic characters? And doe� a player's concern with his/her own 
interests as a player interfere with his/her ability to empathise with characters? 
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Conclusion 
The above issues will be addressed in the rest of this thesis. Each chapter focuses on a 
different theoretical concern andfor aspect of gameplay, drawing from various theories of 
narrative, cognition and emotion. The ongoing concern is to redress vulgar notions of 
"reality" and "identification" which have characterised popular opinions and early research 
about gamcplay. The general argument in this respect is that the construction of reality may be 
seen in terms of aesthetics rather than ideology. and that what needs more attention is the 
reality of players' relationships to the games they play. These relationships cannot be reduced 
to assumptions about increased identification through interaction; they are better seen as 
aesthetic, emotional relationships which result from interest in the game and empathetic 
emotions directed towards characters and players from the positio� of witness or player. 
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Chapter Two • The Reality-Status Of The Interface 
Reality-Status and Stages of Audiovisual Processing 
Cultural Studies rnkcs the position that, while there is a material reality, knowledge is 
empirically derived and governed by social convention, such that the "realism" of a fictional 
text is evaluated with reference not to the object world, but to codes of vraisemblnnr;e 
(Banhes, l975n; Culler, 1975; Neale, 2000). This position is, in a broad sense, in accord with 
Constructivists like Tan {1997) and Grodal (1997) who argue that "reality" is evaluated 
through inferences based upon schemata drawn from physics, psychology, magic, and 
religion. 
However, whereas Cultural Studies theorises "realism" in tenns of the naturalisation 
of ideological content (see Chapter Six), Frijda's (1986, 1988, 1989) account of emotion, 
specifically his Law of Apparent Reality, sees "reality" in functional tenns. For Frijda, a 
concern must be interpreted as "real" if there is to be an emotional response to it. Obviously, 
if we have evaluated somelhing as rmrca!-in the limited sense of imagined, illusory, or 
representational-then we have deeided that it cannot affeet us (except psychologically) and 
that no physiological arousal or action is needed {except to self-regulate any psychological or 
psychosomatic effects). For example, being shown an image of a crocodile (which we 
recognise as such) does not elicit the same motor-activity as discovering one is in pro�imity to 
on actual crocodile. This is not to say that we do not have feelings, or an affective response, to 
something that we decide is "unreal," merely that there is no action tendency, and therefore no 
emolion, according to Frijda's definition. 
Within this framework, the paradox of fiction is that audiences have emotional 
responses to events they know nre unreal. While Sartre (!93811948) simply denied that film 
viewers feel genuine emotions, Carro! (1990), Grodal (1997), and Ton {1997) resolve the 
paradox by arguing that the 1/i,mg/1r of a concern posits a hyputhetical or possible reality 
which produces an anticipatory simulated response with an emotional component. As Tan 
(1997) observes, this response is inhibited by a viewer's observational auitnde. That is, while 
it is possible that one may share some characters' emotions, nny Jmotional response is 
governed by one's position as a viewer or player. 
What concerns us in this chapter, however, is that the processing of sensory input 
43 
usually occurs outside of conscious awareness and only becomes conscious under certain 
conditions. That is, the apprnisul of, and affective response to, a stimulus-including its 
reality,status-bcgins at a perceptual level prior to conscious and deliberate cognitive activity 
(Frijda, 1998, p. 281). ll might initially be presumed that this early, perceptual evaluation of 
rcality·status is especially bound to the intensity or salience or a particular stimulus, that is, 
the extent to which it is presented forcefully to one's senses as worthy of attention nnd 
response. By implication, it might be presumed that high affect is associated with reality, nod 
low (or the absence of) affect is associated with unrcalily (Grodal, 1998, p. 34). However, 
primary appraisal inco1pomtcs many dimensions of a stimulus, and Grodal identifies several 
other fundamental parameters of reality-status: nonnnl perceptual qualities, external (dislal) 
stimulus source, temporal immediacy, concretion (as opposed to abstraction), intentional 
behaviour, and modality synthesis. 
Since there is constant feedback between perceptual, cognicive and affective domains, 
in practice it is impossible to isolate these lower-level evaluations of reality-status. However, 
by using Grodal's (!997) four stage-model of the audiovisual processing of fiction (Figure 
2.1) it is possible lo differentiate key perceptual qualities of the interface which produce 
impressions of unreality. Grodal's model identifies five modes or types of affect on the ba.sis 
of what part of audiovisual processing one's mental focus is directed towards, and ii can be 
argued that different parameters of reality-status focus a viewer's, or player's, attention onto 
particular stages of this processing. 
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Figure 2.!. Adapted version ofGrodal's (1997) model of stages or audiovisual processing (p. 
59} with refo!<'nce to his model of aesthetic fields (p. 57). 
Grodal's (1997) four stages may generally be seen in tcnns of response over time, 
though neurological processing and feedback mean that the processes involved arc not linear. 
The first stage involves basic sensory perception, such as the stimulation of rods and cones in 
the retina, �nd the brain's initial processing of "colours, contrll5t, ond so forth, [to] find 
figures, ground and spatial dimensions" (p. 59). A "mental focus" on these "non-figurative 
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perceptual processes" (p. 57), or, more broadly, the experiences located within our sensory 
systems, produces what Grodnl calls "intensities," The second stage involves a general shape 
identified in the first stage orprocesslng being checked and matched against earlier memories, 
"aided by feelings of familiarity or unfamiliarity," followed by the activation of"nctworks of 
association" (p. 60). This includes the atlribution of labels and affective values, such that a 
shape identified as a snake "will surface in consciousness with its visual features and with its 
affective value" (p. 60). By Frijda's (1986, 1988) definition, the absenco of secondary 
(cognitive) appraisal of reality in these initial stages means that there is no emotion, but 
intensities and saturations constitute nn affective quality of e:,;perience, 
At the third and fourth stages of processing, Groda!'s (1997) account overlaps with 
Tan's (1997). The third stage is the "cognitive-emotional appraisal and motivation phase," 
and involves the objects identified in stage two being "put into the framework of a 
hypothetical narrative scenario" (p. 60), For e:,;ample, the Chocobo Eater may be labelled as  
"lethal danger" for Tidus, with whom a player identifies and/or sympathises. This allows for 
the labelling of the situation and its associated affect (fear), as well as the production of 
arousal, which motivates "telic-arousal-reduction procedures" {p. 61), or what Frijda {1986) 
and Tan (1997) call action tendencies. The founh stage involves the reactive component, that 
is, the operation of arousal-reduction procedures, or action tendencies, while in a state of 
arousal (fight or night). Grodal {1997) identifies three general types of response that can 
occur at this stage. When the mental focus is on (semi-) voluntary responses to goal-oriented 
activities or representations, one experiences the "tensities" (p. 57) associated with suspense, 
but which may take the more extreme forms of distress or terror. This is the case in most 
!incur, plot- or chornctcr- driven canonical narratives in which we willingly invest in, and feel 
concern for, the fate of a protagonist undertaking some activity. Grodal refers to as "emo­
tensllies" (p. 61) those experiences when the mental focus is on repetitive or rhythmic scmi­
voluntary pnratelic activity, as when one is lost in the (actual or represented) process of 
singing or dancing. Lastly, he refers to as "emotivities" (p. 61) those experiences when the 
mental focus is on involuntary autonomic reactions, ns when one cries, laughs, or shivers 
uncontrollably. 
The following, then, argues that deviations from normal perception and shifts between 
proximal and distal perceptions (Grodal, 1997, pp. 30-31) may be produced by formal 
qualities of FFX's interface, fracturing modality synthesis. These processes, which can be 
interpreted as part of the primary appraisal of impression of unreality in .ID, guide players' 
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mental focus onto intcnsilics and saturations, wilich constitute a feeling-tone that may occur 
prior to and/or alongside secondary appraisals of reality-status. 
Pen:eptual Deviation asa Consequence ofDigltnl Articulation 
As Grodal (1997) observes, when stimuli imprint upon our senses, one experiences 
"perceptual intensities [for example, paltems of light in the retina] without any meaning iu the 
ordinary sense of the word" {p. 59). This ellperience encompasses not just the sensory organs, 
but the sensory conexes involved in initial sensory processing. If our mental focus rests upon 
this clement of audiovisual processing we experience intensities associated with aesthetics in 
the limited sense of defomiliarised sensory experiences. Everyday examples of this include 
watching the play of light on water, listening to the quality of a singer's voice wash over 
oneself, and repeatedly running sand through one's fingers to feel its coarseness. 
lfwc limit the present discussion to visual qualities of video game interfaces it can be 
argued that a similar mental focus on intensities may emerge as a consequence of digital 
signs. As Grodal notes: 
The visual system is presct to transform local intensity-values into a primal 
sketch (of objects and major features of objects), and, further, to produce n 2\1,­
D sketch; nnd the directedness of these processes is mentally felt as a search for 
meaningfulness, far what it looks like. (p. 54) 
This process was the focus of Gestalt psychologists such as MllJ! Wertheimer (1958), Kurt 
Koffkn {1963), and Wolfgang Kohler (1975), who argued that visual percepts are g rouped on 
the basi� of physical proximity, perceived similarity, and continuity of broken lines, until one 
perceives n discrete and/or familiar form and thereby experiences closure. What is significant 
is that fonns of representation without obvious structure undermine the capability to render a 
primal sketch, or perceive a Gestalt impression. This is often elaborated by way of blotchy 
sketches or trick drJwings, which only make sense when a p11rticular focal point is identified. 
A more dynamic analogy is the experience when one moves closer to an exprcssionist, 
impressionist or oil painting, or when an out-of-focus image is focused, and an image emerges 
from the seeming chaos of perception (or vice versa). This effect is identical lo that produced 
in games which include a playcr-contro!lcd in-game ''zoom" option. Whereas "zooming" in 
on a photographic image may emphasise hidden details, "zooming" in on a digital image 
emphasises that image's compound nature. Since each "zoom" maximises !lie desree of 
pixelation, it motivates increased attentiveness to the gap between the image and iis composite 
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pixels. until at a ccnain point the lauer possess a perceptual salience that blocks Gestalt 
impression of the former. 
This effect of zooming in on a digital image is exemplary of how digital signs in 
general may block a Gestalt impression of an image, as is evident when we consider !lie 
"articulation" of digital signs (sec Eco, 1976). At low levels o f  resolution the pixel becomes a 
minimal or fundamental signifying unit which possesses u distinctive triple articulation. The 
first articulation of1he digital sign refers 10 the way that pixels are combined in a seemingly 
infinite variety of syntagmatic relationships governed by screen resolution. Using a 1:0.75 
ratio, game screen resolutions r.inge from 320x240, 640x480, 800x600, to 1024x678 and 
higher. The second articulation refers to the way that each pixel is comprised from 
parndigmatic increments within a predefined range of hue (0-360), saturation (0-100%) and 
brightness (0-100%}. 1 The third articulation refers to the way that at higher levels of 
resolution pixels, like film images, resolve into "conditions of perception. , , . such as angles, 
curves. textures. effects of light and shade, and so on" (Eco, 1976. p. 45). At this point the 
pixel is indistinguishable from a visual continuum. Many monitors now produce a range of 
values that have no verbal equivalent and/or are unab!e to be perceived by the human eye in 
this sense. 
In earlier games, of course, low resolution. the use of sprites, and interlaced scanlines 
meant that 1he digital articulation or computational ohjects was obvious in every image. 
Indeed, despite the stylistic shift towards "cinematic realism" (Darley, 2001; Friedman, 1995; 
Sta!labras, 1996) and the recent use of anti-aliasing to smooth 30 images, the resolution or 
games is still oflen low enough that digital articulation. When individual pixels are visible in 
this way they may function like phonemes that double as morphemes. That is, just as "a" is 
both a minima! signifying unit and a meaningrul word. a pixel may be a minimal signifying 
unit thut also represents a "glint" in a character's eye. a "sparkle" on a metal surface, or a 
"bullet." However. since pixels may be comprised of multip!e percepts of hue. saturation and 
hrightncss, a highly saturated, dark red pixel could signify not just a "glint" but "insanity," as 
distinguished from "spirited enthusiasm." Players may also exploit the double articulation of 
language when interpreting digital signs. For example, a player may perceive a phonemic 
correlation between "glint" and "flint" {reinforcing connotations of a character's fiery 
' Hue m""sures 1he wavclonglh of rcflocted light from or tmnsmilled by on objoc1. measured as n location 
(0.360) on a standard colour wheel. Saturation measures the strength or purity of lhe colour and is 
represented o, o percenwgc of hue in relation to g,:cy (0· l00%). Brightness mcosures the relative Ughtness 
or dorknes,. independent of its hue nnd soturotion, represented by o percentogc from block to white (0-
100%). 
47 
disposition), "sparkle'' and "buckle" (indcxical of powerful armour and/or the power of a 
character who wears it), or "bullet" and "billet" (in FFX a Tent item may be used to heal 
injured characters). Alternately, a player may perceive a morphemic correlation between 
"glint" and "sparkle," seeing both as indexical of life (the light in the eye of someone who is 
in a lively state) and/or wealth {the typical representation o f  gold as shiny). Indeed, since 
video game curreiicy is often spent on items (like potions) that increase health, and since the 
longer characters live the more items and wealth they accumulate, any pa.<lsing equivalence of 
life and wealth would would have a meaningful resonance. 
or course, in Eco's (1976) terms, such manipulation of the continuum of the 
expression-plane generally pro duces "aesthetic ovcrcoding" (pp. 262-270), in that the viewer 
perceives a surplus of expression that may not be consciously grasped. Indeed, the sheer 
enormity of combinatory elements at the digital level camwl be made meaningful in all its 
particularity, and perceptual awareness of this surplus may gesture towards an impression of 
either excessive meaning or meaninglessness. Yet the recognition of these signs :l.'l 
(potentially) meaningful may be evaded precisely because of the "threshold of functional 
relevance" (Culler, !975, p. 143), in that the player's mental focus operates at a certain level 
of functional generality, In other words, digital signs are not meaningful when the player is 
not observing them. 
For e�ample, in FFX tl1e in-game graphics engine of the Navigation and Combat 
Screens are of� low enough resolution to perceive digital articulation, but not in such detail 
that they are likely to be perceived as individrmlly meaningful. Pixels are most visibfo. at the 
edges of objects, including character models, and at some fovel this will be reflected in eye 
movements which periodically track these edges (see Figure 2.2a). In earlier 30 engines, 
vector lines which stepped across scan lines were visible :l.'l two or more adjacent lines, and 
when an imprecise calculation of vectors resulted in a dark or white line or area between two 
filled polygons, such staggered Jines were effectively highlighted. While FFX has no 
problems calculating its polygons, long border l ines in the Navigation or Combat screens are 
still visibly subdivided across scanlines, foregrounding their digital articulation. The edges of 
narrow objects, such as the branches or trees, have insufficient texture space to provide a 
well-defined fonn, and produce this effect of highlighted digital articulation. 
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Figur e 2.2. (a) Close·up t he oigitnl nrticu!ulion along Yuna's shoulder and b!urry texture mnp 
in the background. (b) Close-up of the textured polygons that comprfoe Tidus' hnir fllld (cl a 
supposedly round blitzbnll. 
While the number of polygons used in creating video game characters and objects is 
increasing, and their u�e is disguised by the use uf detailed textures, there arc instanccs in 
FFX where the polygons ore obvious {sec Figures 2.2b and 2.2�). Generally, grophicnl 
textures have also become more delailcd, and therefore less visible, whereas in e11rly 30 
games, su�IJ a:i in Quake (1996) and Goldeneye (1997), a slightly bluny, scmi-rcnlistic face 
wr.s mapped onto the misshapen head of un angular charucter model comprising of a smllll 
number of po'.ygons. This inconrruity is less noticeable in FFX, in lhnt its character and 
object mode!s have fairly �ongruent polygons and textures, but textured bitmaps are produced 
for a �cnain level ofopticnl perspective and extrapolated onto surfaces and so they only look 
realistic at certain distance. Wh'm nn enlarged texture is shown c\osc·up it usually betrays ils 
construction (see Figure 2.2a). While this effect was especially pronounced in the first 
generation FPSs like Wolfcns1cin 3-D (1992) and Doom (1994), i1 can be observed in FFX 
w.�en Tidus wnlks close up ,o the w alls during the Trial of the Fayth in Besa id. Al such 
momenb the textures which comprise lhe walls tnke on nn artificial, bluny or b!ocky quality. 
Similarly, whenever pla yer.; llrll presented with a close-up of Tidus and other clmmcters 
attention is directed to the digital texture of skin, hnir, an d clothing (see Figure 2.2c). Even if 
these devintions from normal perception are not always observed during gmmplay the FFX 
manual and gnmc mngazines offer.; close-ups or cnlaigements of digiw! images which provide 
a comparative basis for tlie eminence of digital articulation in lhe game. 
The disparity between n Gestalt impression of nn image and its compound digital 
composition is nlso evident in the different degrees of ic onic abstraction across FFX. Firs� 
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there arc the ch8fllcter portraits in the menu screens, which partake of n cartoon style of 
representation and exploit the rich, opaque colours of the CRT (see Figure 2.3n). Second, 
there is the in-game engine, which is not much different from thnt ofcontemporane(IUS games, 
in 1hat characters 1111d environments nre visibly angular textured models, and pixels arc visible 
at the borders of game objects ns they move (see Figure 2.3b). Third, there arc tlic most 
detailed, near-cinematic quality cut-scenes. These include skin imperfectioru, subtle lighting 
and 1hndows, detailed textures of clothes and hnir, and fluid physics for character movement 
and the environment (sec Figure 2.3c}. 
Figure 2.3. Degrees o f  abstraction in FFX: the Aeon Valefor as represented (a) in the menu 
screen, (b} in the game engine, and (c) in a cut-scene. 
These levels ofvisunl abstraction, or iconism, create a hiemrohy of nbstmction, in that 
the pre-rendered cut-scenes nnd gnme sequences which confonn to objective spntinl and 
temporal logic nre seen as having the highest reality-stutus. This hierarchy is, of course, 
subordinate to the concreteness of everyday perception in the sense thnt players will likely 
attend to the degree of realism. That is, during both high-resolution, cinematic cut-scenes and 
lower-resolution but smoothlr animated game sequences players may specifically attend to 
how rcEllistic the images seem. This apprnisnl is predicated on n perception thnt the images arc 
merely representations, oat real objects, and this may lead to a focus on the degree of 
abstraction, or, rother, pcrceplllnl qualities over and above Ges!nlt qualities. 
Different levels of abstraction are also produced through differences between the 
representational qualities within the gwne and lhe representational qualities (packaged as part 
of the product but) cutside the game. Most gwncrs are familinr with the (often comical) 
disparity between the (semi-)renlistic pictures on nJcnde machines, posters nnd boxes, and the 
crude, abstract graphics of the gwnes themselves. fil's graphics are more de!nlled than 
earlier generatiOM of games, bot attention may nonetheless tum to the disparity between: 011 
the one hand, the pre-processed, digitally rendered photos or paintings p rinted on the cover, in 
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!he manual, and in the play guides: nnd, on 1hc other hand, the real-time, lower-level
resolution images generated for the bulk of the game. These differences nrc reinforced by !he 
distinctive qualities of the respective media. The raster- or vector-based video interface 
possesses a distinctive "chrome" quality (Stallnbras, 1996, p. 8) in which the cold. smooth 
glass separates lhe viewer from the untouchable and pristine image. When images appear on 
glossy paper, as with the _EEX CD cover, manual, and the Playsrntion Solutions (Pattison, 
2002) play guide, they minimally resemble the chromo effect. However, when the images arc 
printed from a digital source, as when one prints pictures or maps from a Website, they have a
blurry, sketchy quality as a consequence of re-sizing to a diffcrcm resolution. Words and
images printed in paper or cardboard manuals, including printed FAQs, hints and cheats
which a player may use while playing FFX, have a coarseness which lends greater salience to
tactile qualities, such that the entire in-game hierarchy of abstraction gains a relative quality 
of abstraction.
It is possible thm, like pixels. the use of lines, polygons and differing levels of 
abstraction may be perceived as meaningful. Just as wooden acting m�y help to code a 
character as nervous or awkward, u character whose fonn is comprised by clear lines or 
polygons may be perceived as "simple" or "hard-edged." When interactive sequences arc 
represented in a lower resolution than non-imeractive sequences, the blocky lower resolution 
may signify that experiences are unclear (subjective) when one is acting in the midst of things, 
but come into focus when one steps back to witness them from an external (objective) 
perspective. Alternately, the "chrome" effect of an iconic image onscrccn may connote an 
idealised fantasy world, compared with the gritty reality connoted by a poor quality printout 
of a puzzle solution downloaded from the Internet. 
However, the demands on a player's attention usually mean that the visibility of 
digital qualities is not meaningful in the semiotic sense, but primarily serves to create the 
effect of a digital zoom. We can restate the phenomenon in the following tenns. During 
gameplay, low-resolution sequences, vector miscalculntion, in-game close ups, out-of-focus 
bitmaps, the edges of object models, :rad inconsistent abstraction may make visible the 
distinclivc digital articulation of the interface. This visibility may give way to perceptual 
attentiveness, manifested by way of unfocused eye movements andfor the visual tracking of 
the borders or lcxtured q110lities of the objects onscrecn. This may defor lhe Gestalt 
experience of closure, preventing the im�ge from being processed al a higher stage of 
cognition, thereby maintaining a player's mental focus on perceptual intensities. 
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lntrojcctivc and Projective TrnnsncUons as II Consequence or Enaction and Enactivc 
Subtraction 
Grodal (1997) argues that renlity-stutus is also affected by whether a phenomenon "is 
experienced as located in exterior space, on the corporeal rim, or in the body-mind interior" 
(p. 130). He elaborates: 
The technical tenn for a stimulus as a transmission From objects in the exterior 
world is distal stimulus, as opposed to the tenn pra,imal stimulus, which 
describes it as a process in the perceptual system. (p. 131) 
When digital articulation blocks Gestult perception it places emphasis on perceptual pauems, 
or intensities, which are seen US located within the mind-body, such that players will 
experience iotrojcction. and, by implication, an impression of unreality. It is, of course, 
impossible to be aware of certain proximal stimuli because organisms have no sensation of 
many of the processes that occur inside their bodies. For example, humans have no se11sation 
of the process whereby images saturate the retina, thay only experience the post-processing of 
the image. Consequently, the labelling of events as proximal or disml is oflen retrospective. 
ForGrodal: 
the process by which a phenomenon is relocated from being experienced as an 
aspect of the body-mind to being experienced as an aspect of the exterior world 
[is called] a projec1io11, the reverse process being an imrojeclion. An example 
of a projection is a situation in which we 5ee something that we first believe to 
be a dream or a hallucination, but that we then discover to really exist. An 
example of an introjection would be �ccing afi/111 ,wir and feeling that the wet 
streets are not 'real', but represent mental srntes. (p. 130) 
Jntrojcction is produced not only through a mental focus on perceptual intensities, but also 
through a mental focus on Grodal's second stage in the processing of audiovisual input. When 
stimuli pass from the sensory organs lo their respective scmory regions in the conex, 
memories {or "networks of association") are searched for familiar labels and affective values. 
When the mental focus falls on this part of processing it gives rise to what Grodal calls 
"�aturrltions." These: 
arc the results of emotionally toned and memorized pcrccpcions which have not 
been transfonned inco 'motor" tension, and therefore scnsution, input­
processing, and memory-functions become visible as distinct phenomena. In 
52 
memories this saturation is a trace of not-enacted excitation that is cut off from 
its original context ofenaction. {p. 56) 
This is the characteristic focus of attention during dreaming or daydreaming, and when the 
mental focus ls on this stage or processing it gives rise to a dream-like or "lyrical" style often 
characterised by "dynamic repetition" (p. 60). 
Intensities may, by promoting lntrojective experience of sensation, promote 
associational thinking, and therefore a shlfi to saturations. For example, if a player stares at 
the image of the burning campfirc in the opening sequence of FFX s/he may initially be 
focused on the perceptual intensities associated with its rhythmic yet dynamic movement. 
However, networks or association may be activated: campfire storytelling: reading stories by 
a hearth: the romance or the book: the romance of Tidus and Yun a: Tidus playing blitzball 
underwa1er: the pre-eminence of water in the game: the extinguishing of fire: characters 
resuming their journey. The mental focus here is displaced onto the sensory, cognitive and 
affective content and qualities in one's memory, and this displacement will likely be 
experienced as a displacement of one's attention away from the screen, as an inward turning. 
Certainly, in Allen's (1997), Tan's (1997) and Grodal's (1997) accounis, watching a 
film is in some respects simllar to daydreaming, and evokes the experience of a dream. 
However, while dream content is not yet transformed into n distal, motor attitude, our 
aesthetic response to films (and, potenlially, daydreams) usually is. In daydreams there is a 
potential for conscious fomasising, whereas during film viewing one's consciousness is 
di reeled less towards one's own associational networks than to active inferences about what is 
disclosed by a linear sequence of s/rucmred associations, such that viewing is usually focused 
on tclic, distal sequences which produce tensitles. That is, viewers feel suspense (tensities) 
directed at (distal) evenlS that befall characters as they try to achieve their (telic) goals. Tiie 
focus of both Tan's and Grodal's accounts is that the action tendencies or motor attitudes in 
film are i11/1ibited as a consequence of an observational attitude (Frijda, 1986), in llrnt viewers 
do not act upon them, and emotions arc manifested psychosomatically. 
However, Grodal (1997) argues that: 
By switching between active and passive modes of representations the different 
modes and genres of fiction can produce transactions between distal and 
proximal modes or experience. Subjective experiences and sensations may by 
the use of active narrative schemata, be projected onto the object world; 
objective phenomena may, by the use of passive narrative schemata, be 
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refocused, lntrojectcd into being experienced in !heir subjective form as 
qualities (intensities, snturations, nnd emotivities} of the body-mind. (p. 132) 
Forexnmpfo, !he roprcsen\mion of a sequence without nny clear subjcct-nclant, or without any 
particular goal or narra1ive schemata, produces passive-introjection (Grodal, 1997, p. 159). 
Art-house films often emphasise paratclic sequences in this sense, producing 11 '"dreamy" 
quality because, like dream-states, they involve some subtraction of control (of intention), and 
emphasise networks of association. Groclal's example of the loss of cnactive participation in 
film is the experience when one views a tape in slow motion. Such n !:eqUence will be 
perceived as: 
'shallow', 'lyrical', 'timeless', 'saturatr.d' •.•. We no longer have full en active 
identification with the fictive phenomena. The acts and charoctcrs become 
objects controlled by an invisible subject. {p. 47} 
This experience of slow motion as transforming the telic-orientcd charucter of most fiction 
"into a mood of pastncss, memory, or abstraction" (p. 47) may be described as physical and 
cognitive detachment from the event, and it may also be seen as paradigmatic of one's 
experience of partial (or suspended) enactive capacity in film and during certain sequences in 
video games. The viewer watches the screen, motivated by the paratelic rhythm of repetition 
and variation ra1hcr than tension (suspense) about !be expected achievement of n represented 
goal. Consequently, within the position of passive witness the most extreme proximal 
impressions of cnactive subtraction arc specifically produced during special (dreamy, 
"artistic") sequences. 
Nonetheless, as Grodal (1997) ncknowleJg��· 
ln a video game, the connection between the screen and the viewer is 
established both as the visual perception of what is taking pfoce and as a 
capacity to influence the action by intellectually controlled motor response via 
the joystick. (p. 48) 
The implication is that, in video games, shirts between proximal and distal foci arc not 
confined to active or passive representations of narrative schemata: the p!nycr periodically has 
a scnsorimo!or relationship with the game itself, and !his creates a telic, distal focus on 
whatever is being controlled. Indeed, since narratives sequences in games define and organise 
the goals played out in the gume schemata they provide n b11.1i; for enactive projection, or, 
rather, they provide the telic, distal emphasis that is acted out when the player shifts into an 
enactivc mode. 
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Newman (2002) bas discussed this issue by observing that some sequences have "an 
ergodic pore11tial that demands and fosters a greater degree of player engagement than a 
standard cut -scene or introduction" (p. 6). Tbis is most evident in cut-scenes which explicitly 
state or demonstrate goals and thereby function as both a period for preparation and a cue for 
action. In FFX, the cut-scene representations or the appearance of key monsters, the 
kidnapping of the Summoners, the attack on the Al Bhed home, and Tidus' confrontation with 
Jech!, provide simple goals like "fight Sinspawn," "find Yun a" or "go to Bevelle" that players 
can accomplish using previously acquired skHls. However, diegetic and non-dicgetic planning 
and preparation are often combined in more explicitly instructional cut-scenes. Such cut­
scencs may be seen as having their origin, or parallel, in military, e�-pianage, and heist films, 
such as Ronin (1998), in which a plan is broken down into its component steps. Perhaps the 
best example of this is not in fJ:K but FFVIII, when the characters meet and discuss their plan 
for kidnapping the Garabadian president from his private train. The leader of the 
revolutionary movement goes over the plan step-by-step with the characters using a map, 
indirectly addressing the player (who can choose to hear the plan repeated if s/he did not 
follow it the first time), However, FFX includes in-game tutorials and instructional text boxes 
that appear prior to the mini-games, and these perfonn the same function. These tutorials or 
instructions are more explicitly denotativc and direct in their mode of address, and do not 
panake of the kinaesthetic and tclic qualities of the game-sequences for which they provide 
instructions. Yet they position the player in the same way as instructional cut-scenes by 
preparing them for enactive access. 
When a goal is understood prior to the end of the cut-scene which demonmates it, 
players will likely disregard the implicit position of passive witness to the remaining content 
through impa!lent or cager tension about the shift itself. That is, players may watch many of 
the cul-scenes with a degree of anticipatory arousal whose telos is directed less towards a 
specific represe/1/ed goal thnn towards the (anticipated) perfonnance of the shift into a 
scnsorimotor mode. Tbis may be seen as analogous 10 the nervous anticipation that is felt at 
the start of a race, which is followed by a momentary excitement us the race begins, and !lien 
the tension of tho race itself. 
However, given that instructional cut-scenes prepare the player for enactive access, it 
is important not to underestimate the distinctive and unusual quality of cxperie11ce when 
players enter a state of motor activity. The experience of this shift may be described by 
analogy to 1he moment when one wakos from a dream, or moves from being a mere 
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{day)dreamer or specllltor to an acting subject, and has to re-0rienl oneself to the physical 
world. This int.-usion of the "'reality principle" upon the comparative "pleasure principle" of 
escape illlo one's associations means that the shift from enactivc subtraction to enactivc 
access has a quality of physical exertion or fatigue, a resignation, or energetic leap into, a 
sensorimotor paradigm (Freud, 190011953). It is not merely tliat players have a shift in mental 
focus: rather, the sensorimotor components of the nervous system arc suddenly distally 
rcoricmcd, so that players experience a shift into greater immediacy, concretion, salience, nnd, 
therefore, reality-status. 
At the same time, the shifts into cnactive mode in a video game cannot be held as a 
move from a stale of complete en active subtraction to a stale of complete freedom. Interfaces 
offer a mediated, highly removed and abstract mode of imcraction, and enactivc limitations 
arc placed on the player for the sake of providing a challenging game. As Poole (2001) 
argues, players do not want complete reality of immersion, and gameplay edits out the 
unimeresting aspects of whatever activity the game is simulating: 
You don't want to actually be there, performing the dynamicaHy exaggerated 
and physically perilous moves yourself; it would be exhausting and painful. .. 
You don't want it to be too real. The purpose of a vidcogame .. is never 10 
simulate real life, but to offer the gift of play. (p.63) 
So there is a difference between, on the one hand, the complete subtraction of physical 
cnactive access when players are positioned us a witness during u cut-scene, and, on the other 
hand, when a game cues an enactive atlitnde in the sense of a lelic-orientation towards the 
game world, but blocks certain actions. 
This blocking of en action can be addressed in terms of 1he construction of space, or 
more appropriately, the blocking of movement through this space. Of course, space has been 
radically re-theorised in the last few decades, but the audience of n fictional text draws from 
schemata of objective space as physical, stntic nnd linear when consl!Ucting the relationship 
between events und objects in the fabula. Like deviations from normal perception, deviations 
from these '"objective" schemata of space and time nre often '"perceived as an expression of a 
subjective factor'' (Grodal, 1997, p. 134). That is, the "'scaling, iize, and isolation of details 
from a complex-composite totality" {p. 134), as well as the use of unusual camera nngles, 
ediling, and lighting effects, ls experienced as a subjective distonion "because of an 
underlying viewer-assumption of a normal, unmediatcd and objective access to the object­
world" (p. 134). As Grodal observes: 
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If u sini;le piclure is constructed by mixini; two or several pictur<:5 from 
different point.> in time or space there is nonnally no possible external source 
for the frames and they will therefore 00 interpreted as expressions of a mental 
association. Correspondingly, fost sequences of different shots or stills will 00 
interpreted ns mental associations. (p. 135) 
In this respect, we tend lo perceive as mental associations dream or anhouse sequences which 
abstract and combine spaces or objects in wnys which are unusual or impossible in everyday 
experience. This includes the spatial paradoxes in M. C. Escher's (1992) paintings, the living 
but separate body parts in Salvador Dali's surrealist paintings (Descharnes, 1984), and fantasy 
novels and films which represent hybrid or talking animals and miniaturised or gigantic 
people, as in Lewis Carrol's (l86511988)Through the Looking Glass. 
In FFX there arc many such associational qualities in the onscrccn representations 
within the diegesis. Most obvious is 1he constant mismatch of size and scale between the 
player-chamcters, the environment, and opponents. In the Navigation screens, lhc size of the 
image of Tidus is often not on the same scale as the landscape. For example, in Besaid the 
scale seems roughly l :!, but when Tidus wnlks or rides a Chocobo across the Calm L:mds the 
scale may be perceived ns anything from up to 1:1000, depending upon how the player 
interprets the depth cues in the cxpositional cut-scene about the Calm Lands. During 
encounters with many of the game's monsters, the difference in size OOtwecn Tidus and Sin, 
Yu11alesca and Braska"s Finul Aeon beggars rational comprehension. That Tidus opposes such 
monstrous beings completely suspends real-world logic. Many of the settings in FFX are also 
spatially associationu]. The Trial of the Fayth in Bevelle involves conveyer belts and 
levitating platforms represented by electric signals reminiscent of the non-space inside a 
computer. The spaces inside Sin are swathed i n  mists which not only obscure distance bUI are 
traditionally coded in film as ussociated with a dream-state, or the foggy stale of drug­
addiclion, delusion or semi-consciousness. Squnrcsoft's Final Fantasy X: The Official 
Strategy Guide (2002) specifically notes: "Your surroundings are rather surreal, with 
constantly changing perspectives; no wonder you feel disoriented!" (p. 133). When Tidus 
confronts Braska's Final Aeon the background reinforces the qualll)I of spatial abstraction 
through the tumbling pagodas, suspended mid-air, and the floating stones of ruined 
Zanarkand. Inasmuch as these representations violate objective space, they may � perceived 
as mental abstractions, cueing passive-inlrojection. 
Of course, since video games involve not merely representation, but nlso nnvigation of 
space (Aarsclh, 1998; Fuller and Jenkins, 1995; Murray, 1997), it is useful to draw from 
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Lerebvre's (199!) categories of space: the physical space ''perceived" during interaction with 
the world; the fonnal, or "conceived," representation of space: and !he spatial practice itself. 
During game play the spatial practice emerges from the way the perceived spaces on screen are 
navigated by the player and conceived of as a spatial representation (a spatial logic or 
schemata) that sets up expectations about enactive possibilities. 
The physical, non-diegetic spaces of FFX include tl1c space of the hardware (screen, 
comole and game controller) and the space of the environment (the floor, couch and other 
furniture), and the relational space between them, governed by the length of cables and the 
proximlly required to tum the console on and off or change disks. Given that the interface is 
not merely observed, but interacted with, its spatial representations are bound up in the spatial 
pmctice of gameplay. However, since navigation requires an understanding of the spatial logic 
governing the game, the interface may be seen primarily as a spatial representation, Compared 
with film, in which the environment is so dark that it usually foils from context, in video 
games like ID there is a greater disjunction between the mundane physical spacc(s) 
occupied by the player and the spatial representations perceived onscrccn as a consequence of 
depth cues. This is the distinctive experience, also found with television, in which one seems 
to look through a window at another physical space. 
This general disjunction between physical non-dlegctic space and the non-physical 
space on screen is amplified by the non-physical (represented) non-diegetic space of Che 
interface. As Per Persson (2001) argues of the typical point-and-click, menu-based graphical­
user interface (GUI), the layers of menu boxes may be seen as either physically above or 
below each other, or as insubs tantial, in that they appear from, and disappear inco, a non­
visible space, Persson's argument may be extended lo the accessing of menus and submenus, 
and the use of ergodic symbols and indexes, in FFX, which similarly appear und disappear 
over the diegetic spaces. However, it may apply in another sense, since menus are not
organised by any natural relationship between the content of menus and their spatial 
arrangement. Rather, menus (and screens) arc organised around such functional categories as 
"weapons," "annour," "use," "son," "equipment," and "key items." Since these menus utilise 
conventional categories of objects and functions within adventure games, most players arc 
likely co perceive their congruence between idea and space as fairly nonnaL By contrast, a list 
of inventory items organised by such categories as "material," "colour," "shape," or 
"fashion," which are non-functional in the game as its stands, would be perceived as arbitmry, 
or relatively associational. It can be argued, then, that Che interface may evoke the 
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associational quality of internal, mental processes through the co-existence of a general 
perception of the menus as insubstantial {thereby violating nonnal space) and of the 
organization of physical space by abstract, functional categories. 
These generally non-diegctic constructions of space frame the way players navigate 
the diegetic space of the game world. Mark Wolf (2001) identifies elementary spatial 
structures which rework spatial conventions of print and cinema, and his ca!Cgories are useful 
in identifying inconsistencies in the diegctic space of FFX. The setting of every attack with 
the Combat Screen is a contained, single-screen space (p. 55), but such spaces exist in the 
Field Screen, such as the clearing in the forest in Macalania. Tidus can move through this 
space to talk to the people, and may exit by leaving the front oftbe screen, but the perspective 
remains static. 
Of course, the clearing is part of the rest ofMacalania Forest, and most spaces in FFX, 
while finite and bounded, are larger than the screen but only displayed one screen at a time 
(Wolf, 2001, p. 59), That is, Tidus simply walks to the edge of the screen and the next, 
adjacent screen appears, with Tidus accordingly repositioned onscreen-an effect analogous 
to switching between the views of security cameras located in a sequence of rooms as a 
character passes through them. This is a spatial convention common to many adventure 
games, like Quest for Glory (!98012001), and demands the same understanding of spatial 
convention as cinematic editing, in which continuity is perceived during a cut between two 
shots. In FFX, when Tidus passes through parts or the forest in Macalania or Thunder Plains, 
players presume a spatial logic in which travelling upwards, to the top of the screen, leads to a 
(not necessarily adjacent) northerly space. Players may perceive gnps between such spaces as 
dilations of space to conserve geographic credibility. After all, while Macalania Forest, the 
Thunder Plains, and tbe Calm Lmd.s may take up large portions of Spira they are represented 
by just a few onscreen spaces. 
This jumping between (relatively) adjacent spaces is orten combined with scrolling 
{Wolf, 2001, pp. 57-59). For example, when Tidus moves through the paths 1hnt lead to 
Besaid he moves within the frnme until he comes close to the edge of the screen, whereupon 
the screen scrolls; eventually, he reaches the edge of this continuous space, and the screen 
jumps to an adjacent continuous space. This scrolling often occurs on two axes, most nowb!y 
in the vast expanse of the Calm Lands. Whal is significant is that, in such spaces, players wiU 
perceive movement into the z·a,;is (the depth of field) even if all that is actually occurring is 
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the scrolling of a fixed background on a vertical axis (p. 63). However, during sequenc�s such 
as exploring the Submerged Ruins or the Trials of the Fayth, there is actual movement into the 
z-axis, as a result of the continuous, dynamic reconstruction of the perspective around Tidus' 
changing co-odinates; in short, through Tidus' movement in an immcrsive 3-D space (p. 65). 
The importance of these mixed spatial conventions is that the physical surface of the 
nat screen is inconsistent with the perception of its spatial depth, and the spatial logic across 
these spaces may not always be properly differentiated. There are several instances across the 
Final Fanla.sy series during which cuts between adjacent spaces is accompanied by a shift of 
direction which violates the continuity of movement. When players guide Tidus through, .e 
corridors of the Al Bhed home in Sanubia Sands the perspective sometimes changes between 
screens. If the player pauses to look nround, then absently resumes moving the analogue 
joystick in the same direction, Tidus walks back into the previous screen. There are also 
inconsistencies between onscreen spaces and mapped spaces (Wolf, 2001, p. 67), such as the 
minimap in the comer of the Navigation screen and the full-screen map of Spira (see Figure 
2.4). These provide global information about the game world which help the player make 
decisions about where to go and what to do on a local scale. However, even if players simply 
accept that items are not perceived on the mini-map, the borders of the mini-map do not 
always map clearly onto the contours of the diegesis, showing space s that cannot be accessed, 
or 1io1 showing spaces that ca,1 be accessed. 
A more general problem is that depth cues provide an ongoing, mislcadingperceprua/ 
impression of enactive capacity. FFX has few problems representing object overlap, 
foreshortening, apparent size, and changes in perspective, drawing from such conventions as 
changing object sizes, altering texture and/or colour gradients, and the use of parallax 
backgrounds, which were used to compensate for problems producing depth cues in early 
video games (Wolf, 2001, p. 72). However, lts realistic depth cues hold open the promise of 
potential enactivc capacities within the virtual environment. Players constantly se� spaces that 
seem accessible, and objects that look like they can be manipulated, yet any attempt to access 
those spaces, or to manipulate those objects, is blocked. In Figure 2.4a, for example, Tidus is 
unable to climb up the ruins, and in Figure 2.4b he is unable to examine, pick up, or u,;e, any 
of the many objects that surround him. 
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Figure 2.4. (a) Tidus walks under an old Mnchina. {b) Tidus in a cluttered hut in Bes.aid. 
Players mny become adept nt spotting, and accepting, such spntinl conventions, but as 
players move between these different representational spaces there may be moments of spatial 
confusion. This kind of cnactive blocking may lead to the same kind of drnstic awarenes� of 
dislnl stimulus thnt occurs when one attempts to walk into a trompe l'oeil or n glass door only 
10 discover that what one thought wns distal physical space was merely proximal perceptual or 
conceptual space. In eve,yday, public situations, the sudden projective shift to a distal focus 
as a consequence of misunderstood spatial cues is likely to lead to n proximal experience of 
embarrassment, readily displaced as anger at the offending architecture. During solitary 
gnmeplay, however, there arc no witnesses, and sclfhood is displaced into a sensorimotor 
parodigm that is not central to one's sense of�r:sonn! maste,y. Any lack of grace or mnste,y 
in gameplny is simply likely to renect upon one's ability to play thnt particular gnmc. 
Consequently, blocked enaction cues a distal transaction: an nnwelcome reality principle thnt 
is imposed upon the pleasure principle of the play esperience. This may be experienced as 
merely a moment's confusion, nnger or frustration directed at the limitations of the gnme, or n 
resigned, fatigued, or automatic redirection of one's mental and virtual steps around the 
obslacle. 
Even if a player comes to learn nnd accept these frequent blrn:kings and suppressions 
as part of the game's spntinl codes they nonetheless represent an en active capacity which is 
imagined and desired but not offered. Even a miulmnl perception ofcnnctive subtraction, such 
as the realisation that punching the screen will not help Tidus to defeat Bmsku's Final Aeon, 
produces a gcncm!ised tension directed at the gap between imagined nnd nctunl nlfordnnces. It 
is not merely that enactive capacity is frustrated, since one experiences a disjunction between 
the proximal abstraction of space and the distal construction of concrete space. Even lf the 
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distal f ocus on what hos blocked one's movement is followed by a proximal focus on one's 
spatial schcmata--as when one discovers that a previously accepted fact is wrong, and pauses 
to reflect upon it-the disparity betwcr,n tl1e two may itself produce a temporary impression 
of unreality. 
It is not simply the case, then, that passive modes of representation encourage 
proximal experiences (saturations), and active modes of representation encourage distal 
experiences (tensities). In video games, shifts to emu:tive (game) sequences also usually 
encourage a distal, telic emphasis, while shifts to enactive subtraction (narrative sequences) 
encourage a pro:<imul, paratdic emphasis. However, it is also possible for ennctive sequences 
to become parn!elic, promoting i ntrojcction. For example, many goa!s in f!2,; take so long to 
complete, or arc interfered with by other goals, that they lose salience. The goal to achieve the 
Celestial Weapons requires the achievement of countless intermediate goals, and in many 
cases these goals can only be achieved when one is lucky enough to wander into the 
appropriate area and find the next clue. The rhythm of movement, fighting wandering 
monsters, healing, developing characters, buying and selling acquired items and so on, may 
mean that the goal loses all relevance. More than this, these sub-goals may lose salience 
through their habituation. The waning of goals in this way may cause ena ction to become 
increasingly pratdic. oriented around the rhythmic or associational proccs.s of combat, 
na vigation, and oth�r recurring game macrostructures. 
Conclusion 
[n everyday experience, sensory modalities "co-operate lo provide a holistic 
experience" (Grodal, 1997, p. 31), but deviations and other effects may cause these modalities 
to be split up, as when one perceives: 
sound without image, whether motivated by darkness or unmotivated; image 
without sound; represented acts in which 'solid' phenomena lack their rnctile 
qualities (such os ghosts, and mirror-images); Jack of s ynchronization, and so 
forth. (p. 31) 
[ncomplc!c modality synthesis in video games is often a consequence of technical limitations 
of graphical and sound hardware, in that the delay in processing of one or more sensory 
modalities in relation to enactive capacity lends lo a perceived violation of Gestalt all-in­
oneness. However, while the processing power of the PS2 means that fil hos few technical 
problems synchronising sensory modalities in high-levc! CUI-scenes, a sense nf disjunctive 
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sensory integration results fiom inconsistencies between parameters of reulity-status, such as 
those discussed above. 
We cannot conclude that qualities of the interface produce an impression of low 
reality-status, leading lo ,1 decreased level, defenncnt, or subtraction of the immediate state of 
arousal. Rather, deviations from normal perception and from objective representations of 
space may guide attention to intensities and suturations, and shifts between proximal and 
distal c�pcricncc through the affordance of cnaction, may reinforce a sense of ambivalence 
about the game's reality-status. Indeed: even if a player completes secondary appraisal and 
nominuics a sequence us "real" it is possible that there may be a persistent quality or feeling 
of unrenlity. Later chapters argue that FFX may recuperate these ambivalent or disjunctive 
impressions of unreality as aesthclic�11y meaningful through a henncneutic concern with 
reality and tragedy. However, before addressing these issues it is necessary to nddress the 
foundations of basic emotions in gnmcplay. 
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Chn11terThree • The Regulation of Interest 
Most theories of emotion accept that interest is a "basic emotion, that is, one that 
cannot be reduced to one or more other emotions" (Tan, 1997, p. 85). Unlike auentlon, which 
is principally a cognitive state without an ac1ion tendency (Onony, Clare & Collins, 1988), 
interest has an action tendency "to sec what happens next, and to fonnulatc active 
expectations" (fan, 1997, p. 203). It makes us employ our cognitive focultics "for the 
elaboration of n stimulus, under the innuencc of the promises which are inherent in the 
present situation with respect to expected situations" (p. 86) (see also Frijda, 1986; Izard, 
l 984; Lazarus, 1969; Schore, 1994; Tomkins, 1962). 
This action tendency calls on resources "from a limited capacity" (fan, 1997, p. 86), 
such Lhal interest in one thing requires a lowering of perceptual, cognitive or motor attention 
to other things. In regards Lo lilm, the "inclination to devote one's full auenlian tQ \he 
stimulus, [comes] at the cost of all other mauers, including the completion of motor 
programs" (p. 90). That is, the viewer's increasing interest produces increasing 
motionlessness, to the extent 1hat boredom may be moasnred according to !he degree of a 
viewer's lidgeting, with the exception thnt when "behavioral activity brings the desired object 
[of auention] closer, interest, or at any mle anticipatory eagerness, may be accompanied by 
excitement and excessive movement" (p. 89). This reLardati<;>n of sensorimotor action 
reinforces the observational allitude of lilm, in that the viewer does not vacate his or her seat 
to enact action tendencies towards Lhe screen, hut remains in a vinual mode, merely hoping or 
wishing for certain outcomes. 
For Tan (]997), interest is the fundamcmal emotion produced while watching the 
traditional feature lilm, and its real-time regulntion is detennined by the prospect of return (p. 
101). That is, interest at a pm1icular poinl in time depends upon a player's '"investment" of 
time and effon in a sequence, relative to the "anticipated return" (AR) on that interest in the 
Future, and, the "'actual not return" (NR) 011 that investment. Tl:ls return may be cognitive, 
such as appreciating the artifice of a film, or affective, such as experiencing the triumph of a 
pro1agonis1 (p. 96). Interest is a!so self-enhancing, al least up until its concern has been 
clabor.ucd or resolved. As Tan argues: 
the action tendency inherent in interest raises the investment [because we have 
spent more time and energy renccting upon the concern,] and this increase, in 
mm, has a positive effect on interest by incrcnsing the contras\ between NR 
already gained and the maximum future return that can be expected. (p. 11 !) 
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As a consequence, a viewer may reach a point of no return in regards lo the act of watching. 
Furthermor�. by raising the significance of a concern, and promoting inferences and valanccd 
expectations about its outcome, interest provides a basis for other emotions (p. 203). For 
example, interest may reinforce one's fear or hope for a certain outcome, and this hope and 
fear may reinforce one's sense that the concern is worthy of our interest. 
While some situations in narratives may cue the same expectations directed towards 
everyday events, most questions operate at the level of generic vraisemblance by drawing 
upon hermeneutic codes of setting, character, iconography and plot from known genres (see 
Neale, 1980, 1990, 2000), In Barthes' (!975a) terms, hermeneutic codes guide players' 
anticipation about the expected sequence and outcome of events. While some of these codes 
may operate in relation to a single event's outcome, they may define an en lire seque11ce, or, in 
narratological terms, a "macroscquence." At the highest level of organimtion, the 
narratologica! term "macrostructure" can be used to refer to a sequence of events that 
develops (usually linearly) towards some anticipated (but uncertain) resolution (Cohen & 
Shires, 1991. p. 60). In Bordwel]'s (1986) tenru, we would say chat these generic codes arc 
templnte schemata activated by a narrative, which guide the individual's construction of an 
anticipatory fabula, but arc constanLly tested againsl the unfolding syuzhet, leading to periodic 
reconstruccion of the fabula through the subversion ofcxpcclations. 
Given Lhat hcrmencuLic codes govern how questions and enigmas are posed, delayed 
and disclosed (Barthes, 1975a, pp. 17, 85) il is useful to dist inguish the three hermeneutic 
slra!egics of suspense, surprise and mystery/curiosity (sec Brewer and Lichtenstein, 1981; 
Chacman, 1978; Culler, 1975; Jose & Brewer, 1984; Sternberg. 1978; Tan, 1997; Vordcrer, 
1996; Zillman. Hay & Bryant. 1975). Each of Lhcsc general hcm1eneutic strategics may lit, 
produced through the manipulation of any specific hermeneutic code by altering the 
represented order of events in the diegesis (sec Figure 3.1). Suspense is a consequence of the 
deferral of an outcome suggested by a prior initiating event and which is of concern to a 
Gharacter a viewer sympathises with. Surprise is characterised by the sudden representation of 
an unexpected outcome, though its intelligibility is usually retrospectively linked (if only by 
inference) to an initiating event. Mystery. or curiosity, is characcerised by the representation 
of an outcome without any, or an adequate, initiating event, giving rise to ongoing 
hypothesises about causes. The cognitive component of all three strategics may lit, seen as 
different fonns of what Grodal (1997) calls "lcnsitics" in that they arc characterised by 
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mtcntivcne�s towards a distal, tclic event, or, in other words, a tense ell.pccmtion about future 
events. 
Prescnlatinn time P,cscntolion time Pre.scntalion time 
Figure 3.1. Tan's (1997, p. 208) model of the three narrative strategics of interest regulation. 
IE is the initiating event and O the outcome; the thin and heavy lines refer to the exrccted net 
return {ENR) and attained net TC\um (ANR), respectively, and interest (i) = ENR-ANR. 
To identify some of the hermeneutic codes in �·s nll!Tative macrosequences and 
macroslructurcs the following analysis uses Barthcs' (1975a) approach, breaking down the 
game into key events or event sequences. It focuses on the title and opening sequences of 
FFX, as detailed in Appendices One, Two and Three to indicate the rnnge of its hermeneutic 
codes. 
Hermeneutic Codes in !!X's Narrative MacroSC<juences 
After a player of FFX chooses "New Garn�·· from the opening menu, the\ title 
:;equence appears and begins with a slow zoom towards a sword and other weapons against 
the background of a wasteland of ruins (l.l.2) (sec Figure J.2a). This may be coded with 
reference to the use of swords in !he fantasy genre, as in the opening sequence of Diablo 
(1996). thereby defining !he genre of the game. Such coding would likely reinforce 
ell.[)CCtations, also drawn from nd,,�nturc and role-playing games in general, of a journey 
through � series of :;euings, fighting miscellaneous monsters, developing each charactcr"s 
powers, und collecting items, culminating in a final battle (Fine, 1983: Herz. 1977; Mackey, 
2000: Schick, 1991). The sword may also activate a more srccific code of the sword, or 
weapon, as a symbol of power, and of triumph by might of arms. In this context it could 
connntc thr spoils of conquest, the weapons surrendered to a conqueror, or the courngc of a 
hero who ensures that "goodness" will be victorious. Indeed, the "sword"' might connote not 
just "right" of force, but !he force of good. This might be coded with reference to the 
Arthurian legend of the sword in the stone, to be drawn and wielded, realising one's power 
�nd birthright. This might create un CX[)CCtation !hat a character will reveal some innate right 
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to lead or rule, or some innate virtue thnt distinguishes him/her as heroic, which previously 
has been hidden. 
Figure 3.2. (a) The odd assortment ofweopons in the opening sequence at Zanerkand. (b) The 
subdued companions camp by a finl. 
However, the weapons in clude what seem to be a beach ball and a teddy bear. 
Presuming that tl1e player recognises these as weapons they may be seen as indcxknl of the 
personalities of their owners, as marking the qualities ofth� heroes, creating curiosity about 
whnt heroes can be identified with beach balls or teddy bears in a heroic fantasy. This 
curiosity is partly nn swered 115 the camera pans to lhc groJp camped by the fire in the ruined 
city (Ll.2) (see Figure 3.2b). Most players mny code 1his in tcnns of any fnntusy adventure in 
which U1ere is a "group" of adventurers on a quest, or in tcnns of the "party" in any role· 
playing game or video role·plnying game, such 115 Wizardry (1981), The Bard's Tale (1982), 
Baldur'.s Gnte (1997), or enrlicr Fina! Fantasy titles. 
Of course, players who have read the manual will know that these chR111cters are on an 
"epic" "quest to destroy Sin." An epic, in its strirtcst sense, is n long narrntivc "on a great and 
serious subject, told in 11r1 elevated style, and centred on a heroic or quasi-divine figure on 
whose actions depend,; the fote ofn trihe, a nation , or the human race" (Abrams, 1988, p. 51). 
FFX is certainly a !englhy narrntive covering the range of human drama, with a predominantly 
serious tone, centred on magically-gifted characters who commune with "divine" spirits 
(Aeons), and seek to save not only their o\\11 races (lhe Al Bhed, the Ronso, the Guado) but 
the life of all those in Spira. lfowever, whereas lhc classical epics did not differentiate myth 
from history nor fact from fiction (Scholes & Kellog, 1966, p. 58), ffX is a fational narrative 
written for a secular audience and appropriates mythical content w ithout much of its original 
symbolic meaning (see Hume, 1984). Without dcb�ting the theoretical appropriateness of the 
tcnn ",ipic," its use in the gnme manual may produce the expectnlion of lhemntic coherence 
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across m, otheiwise picaresque game that incorporates countless, repetitive, randomised 
battles. 
The player may see the fatigued nnd depressed nature of the party as reinforcing the 
"great and serious" danger posed by Sin. Yet lhe player may also recognise that, inll!lmuch ns 
most epics and heroic fantasies are linear, the game seems to begin ill media res. If this is lhe 
case then there may be curiosity about where in the sequence this respite is, as well as what 
struggles preceded it and what the characters may have lost to make them so subdued. Indeed, 
if one remembers that mnny modem heroic-fantasies, of which J. R. R. Tolkein's Lord oflhe 
filnru (1954/1984) is archetypal, are characterised by the difficulties of keeping a party 
together, then lhe odd congregation of characters not only reinforces curiosity about who they 
are and what brought them together, but may also cue uncertainly about the stability of lheir 
bonds. This holds open the possibility that one ofthe party is gone, or dead, and in this respect 
the weapons may be cross·coded, with reference to the ruins in the background, as marking 
the grave ofa follcn comrade. 
Figure 3.3. (u) Tidus touches Yunu's shoulder. (b) Tidus wnlks off by himself lo look at 
ruined ZIIDarknnd ("Listen to my story''), 
Tidus' touching ofYunn's shnulder, 1111d the gaze she turns to him {1.1.3) (see Figure 
3.3a), activates an henneneutic code of rom1111ce, specifically the question of their {possible) 
romantic relationship and nt what sl!lge in their romance this scene occurs (prior to, or after, 
its fulfilment) {see Mod!eski, 1984; Radway, !984). More than this, Tidus' black gloves, his 
wandering away from the party, and Ywrn's restrained (or tired) expression, may be coded as 
a sign of some romantic barrier, nnd/or unrequited love. The drawn out close-up of Tidus' 
isolation (l.1.4) reinforces a sense of some unrevcaled emotion and the possibilities of 
rom1111tic separation, which may resonate with the potcntiol separation of group members or 
the loss of the group entirely (see Figure 3.3b). There might also be curiosity about lhe 
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existence of an intervening force thnt prevents Tidus nnd Yuna's union. A fonnulnic 
ussumption might be Lhat there is some social pressure-family, class or religion-with the 
implication that Tidus and Yuna belong to different social spheres. 
As Tidus walks away the motes of light behind him connole nlmospheric effects, 
cosmic events, and/or some supernatural-religious event, such as a leakage or eruption of 
masiculfdivine forces. This might be perceived in relation to the ruins, but it may also be read 
as metonymic of some disaster that needs to be averted. In this respect it might he eva!unted in 
terms of some higher duty or responsibility, Tidus' subsequent voice-over: "Listen to my 
story. This may be our last chance" (l.1.4) likely confirms some sense of his responsibility for 
the fote of others, of some higher duty to prevent some dis.aster, and of their sacrifices in this 
respect. The voluntary suppression of romance might be seen as part of Lhis duty. This may 
link Lo earlier curiosity through an e�pectation Lhat FFX is a retelling of the events thnt 
brought the companions, and Tidus and Yun a, together, but what also keeps them apart. 
The title "Final Fantasy X," which is then superimposed over the scene, i� unlikely !o 
be registered by most players as anything other than a marker of one in a series of Final 
Fantasy titles. However, it may activate or reinforce hermeneutic codes drawn from earlier 
titles: the possibility of personal tragedy {Aeris' death in FFVUl, of love confirmed (Cloud 
and Tifn), of unrequited love (Cloud and Aeris), nnd of some event of cosmic importance (Lhe 
meteor threatening to destroy the world) on an epic scale (companions forced to traverse all 
the continents of the planet). The word "fantasy," of course, mny connote wishful dreaming 
and escapism, or the more purposive role-playing of a character in a world where one has the 
opponunity to experience the extreir.es of life (love. ha!e, moral indecision, defeat, victory) 
and one's actions matter (we change the fo!e of things) (sec Hume, 1984). More specifically, 
we might identify u link between Tidus' mention of a "last chance" and "Final." The "X" is 
significant in that, prior to the relcuse of other titles in the series, it could have been rend as 
marking !he last single-player Fin·,1 Fnntusy title. For some experienced players, then, the title 
therefore could have polarised suspense and curiosity through an�iety ubout the possible end 
of a much-loved series and excitement about the beginning of FFX: the pinnacle and climactic 
finale of a tradition. l11c poignancy of this moment for the player could hve resonated with 
the situation of the characters as on the verge of losing something. 
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Figure 3.4. (n) Tidus talks to his fans before the blitzball game at Zannrkand {"Teach us how 
to blit1J"J. {b) Tidus walks along the Causeway and looks up at the image of his father. 
Through the sequence in Zanarkand, up to the Submerged Ruins (see Appendix Two), 
we can observe the development of these and other hermeneutic codes. Tidus' companions ore 
absent, with the implication thnt this is the true beginning of the narrative, perhaps eliciting 
curiosity ns to when an::I how Tidus' company will be formed. More importantly, Tidus' 
sporting prowess and celebrity status (Ll.2-1.4.5) prefigures his role as hero (see Figure 
3.4a). This may be linked to his suggested importance or destiny, given that Tidus has already 
spoken ns the voice of a collective in the introductory sequence (1.1.S: "this may be our Inst 
chance") and because Auron is waiting for him (!.5.2). Anticipation about the blitzball 
game's outcome (1.3.4) parallels Tidus' adolescent anxieties about the rite of passage from 
childhood to adulthood/manhood, living in the shndow of his fnlher, holding open the 
possibility of failure in both the game nnd as an aduHJman, with the necessity for a 
confrontation with (and taking over of} his father's authority (see Figure 3.4b). 
Tidus' movement from celebrity to hero (l.S.S) may be seen in relation to the water 
door/mirror at the blitzball stadium (l.S.l), prefiguring a movement from reality to fontnsy, in 
general tenns (entry into the world of the imagination), generic tenns (exploration ofa sulTClll 
fantasy world), and psychological terms (nn exploration of Tidus' latent desires and fears) 
(see Fignre 3.5a). The suspension of time when the ghost-boy appears (1.5.3), as well as the 
surreal night-sky-floating sequence (l.6), and the whltcout when Tidus is teleported, similarly 
suggests the relevance of fantasy and drcam-statc3 ("I think I had a dream"). Yet despite this 
emphasis on fantasy the narrative movement from nrbnn-futnrisl Zanarkand ta pastornl­
nostalgic Besaid (and the later disclosure of Yevon's ban on Mnchinn) activates hermenentic 
codes drawn from science fiction: anxieties about the hr1bris of excessive fnith in science and 
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a loss of contact witli nature (see Kuhn, 1990; Sobchack, 1987). Given thnt the monster is 
named Sin (1.5.4: "We called it 'Sin'") the attack mny be analogous to the attack of Godzilla: 
a consequence of man's lllTOgant tampering with the natural order through technology (sec 
Figure 3.5b). 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3.5. (a) Tidus enters the blitzbn!l stadium through the water door/mirror ("Make way, 
make way!") (b) Futuristic Zanarkand, with Sin approaching in the background. 
As Tidus appears in the Submerged Ruins, several new hermeneutic questions 
emerge: Why has he teleported? Can he get home? What happened to Jech!? How can Sin be 
defeated? Where nre his quest companions? Certainly, the earlier presence ofYuun in the title 
sequence suggests a search for her, but, more than this, Tidus' absent parents, his isolation as 
a celebrity (1.3), and his abandonment through telcportation ( l.2.1), prefigure the potential 
importance of an intimate loving relationship with Yuna. Yet the portents, devastation, and 
isolation {1.1.3; l.4.4; 1.5) may cue not just epic devastation, but tragic lo5s and emptiness 
(sec Aristotle, trans. 1965; Kaufmann, 1969; Leech, 1969; Lucas, 1966). Given both Tidus' 
emotional disturbance and the supernatural connotations this may suggest some cosmic 
disturbance in the order of the world. That is, Tidus' adolescent anxiety mny be linked to 
metnphysicnl or existential concerns nboUI how to make sense of one's place in a world whose 
order has been disturbed. 
It is likely that players progressively or periodically organiso the narrative around the 
macrostructure that seems to have the highest (or simplest) structural significance, cultivating 
a tonic interest whose nclion tendency is to continue watching the shared journey ofcharaetrn 
and the defent of Sin. Nonetheless, even these enrly r.eguences activate henueneutic codes 
drawn from heroic fantasy, adventure/role-playing (video) games, the eplc, romance, science 
fiction, and tragedy, regulating interest through curiosity, surprise and suspense about their 
71 
course. Furthermore, the player is likely to welcome the mixing of these hermeneutic codes. 
As Tan (1997) notes: 
Surprise is a fixed component or the pragmatic contact between viewer and 
filmmaker. The viewer acquiesces in the fact that many developments cannot 
be guessed al in advance, although a really good film will entice the audience 
into trying to do just that. Each ingenious twist turns the viewer into a good 
loser, who does not mind admining that he or she appreciates the ultimate 
result. (pp. 210.11) 
,EEX's narrative increasingly complicates, reverses, und connects its hermeneutic codes, 
progressively diminishing any assurance of rhe game's generic purity. This is likely to 
cultivate n growing realisation that .EEX is not a formulaic heroic fantasy or romance, but a 
unique tragic epic which players cannot accurately predict and resolve in their imagination. 
That is, the paniculariry or the narrative not only personalises the act of investment in 
viewing the game, it functions as an index of concretion that raises the game's reality status 
and fosters a desire to watch 1/Jis narrative to its resolution. 
Reinforcement in FFX's Game Macroscquenccs 
It has been argued �hove that interest in narrative sequences depends upon au action 
tendency to keep watihing and hypothesising about the (anticipated but uncertain) resolution 
ofhetmencutic codes. B) contrast, game sequences have an enactive component that requires 
physical engagement. We can redress Tan's silence on the matter or physical actions as a 
source of interest by emphasising his passing reference to Csikszentmihalyi's (1975, 1988, 
1992) notion of "flow." For Csikszentmihalyi, flow is not merely cerebral, but occurs in 
physical activities, such as sports (indeed, he discusses flow in activities priar to flow in 
mental activities). We may take •·now" as the ideal or optimal form of interest, where a 
balance of challenge and skill staves off anxiety and boredom and leads to total involvement 
in an activity. Furthermore, we may sec the acquisition and performance or procedural 
schr.mata as not merely a basis for flow, but a potential source of interest 
Compared with the r:ognitive interest in narrative events, physical activity facilitates 
distal impressions that maximise reality-status and constitute a greater investment of 
physiological expenditure. or labour. This requires a greater net return, or rewards, if interest 
(and flow) is to be maintained. It is here that Tan's model of "net return" and 
Cslkszcntmihalyi's model of"f\ow" overlap with oper:mtconditioning, in which motivation is 
intrinsically determined by the magnitude, delay and number of rewards (Skinner, 1971, 
72 
1974), Of course, the model of opcmnt conditioning marginalizes both the cognitive activity 
of individuals and the ability of individuals to self-regulate their emotional states. 
Nonetheless, Loftus and Loftus {1983) have convincingly argued that schedules of 
reinforcement arc important to player mocivation, and in this context a considemtion of 
positive reinforcements, or rewards, provides a way of analysing the regulation of interest. 
Table 3.1. The three control modes in FFX, from the game mll!lual {2001, p. 5). 
BA TILE SCREEN 
Direction buttons 
HO 
Left on,Jogy stick 
0 
x ' 
0 
u " " " 
SELECT 
FIELD SCREEN 
Dire<tional buuons 
Leh analogy ,tick 
0 
x ' 
0 
START 
MENU SCREEN 
Dire<tion"l buuons 
J.cfl analog stick 
0 
x
u"""
Move Cursor 
Change pages 
Move cursor/change pages 
Cancel 
Confirm 
Defond (skip turn) 
Used in Auron"s Overdrives 
Display switch window/select character 10 swi1ch 
Select character to switch 
Scroll CTB window up 
Scroll CTB window down 
Di,pfaylhidchelp window 
Move charoeter (running) 
Move character (running) 
Cancel/walk (hold down) 
Confirm/1nlkle.amine 
Display menu 
Talk lO blitzbatl player 10 discover thcirsta(u.s 
Pause• 
Move cursor 
Move cursor 
Cancel 
Confirm 
Switch characters 
Scroll menu lis!S backwards 
Swi1ch characters 
Scroll menu lim forwords 
P,c,. the Ll, L2. R!, R2, ST ART and SELECT bullons simultaneously 10 perform o Soft Rest and rclurn l<> 
the start up sequence• 
• Pause and Soft Reset are di>ablcd during certain scenes. 
Jn FFX, the Field Screen, the Battle Screen, the various Menus, the Sphere Grid, and 
the Trials of the Fayth mako up the basic game system, though there arc three main control 
modes {Table 3.1). Each of these has its own ergodic codes that determine both possible 
actions for the player and related ex:p<:ctations about future game-events and reward�, In n 
combat sequence, for eltrurtple, the player is constantly prompted lo anticipate: "Will I hit it?" 
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and "How much damage did ( do?" with each tum. At the level of the macrosequence, there 
may be expectations such as: "Will I win?" or "Will I lose." In this respect, each game 
interface may function as a relatively autonomons game macrosequence governed by an 
operation of mixed hermeneutic-ergodic codes, ultimately subsumed to the total game 
macrostructure of FFX. At lhis level of organization players might evaluate victory in battle 
ns n failure if they have taken so much damage that they have diminished the chance of 
surviving subsequent battles. 
FFX's Combat Screen offers, first, the aesthetic, audiovisual reinforcement of 
animated attacks: the kinetic dymunism of the !eap and strike, the grunts or cries of effort, the 
visceral impact (sec Figure 3.6a). However, FFX's combat may be distinguished in this regard 
from most first person shooters (FPSs) in which kinetic reinforcement is bound up in the time· 
pressured real-time interaction. As noted in Chapter One, secondary appraisal, or cognitive 
elaboration, is a precondition for lruc emotion. In action-based games, such as shoot 'em ups 
or first person shooters, cognitive elaboration may be deferred or blocked l,y the Jack of time 
available before the next stimulus appears such that primmy appraisal and affective arousal 
may predominate over emotion. FFX, by contras! uses as Conditional Tum-Based (CTB) 
combnt system in which actions are mediated by a menu, those actions are strategic rather 
than kinetic, nod time only passes when players choose nn option. 
Figure 3.6. (a) The tum-based combat screen during option selection. The menu is in the 
bottom left hand comer; character statistics are in the bottom right hand corner; the battle 
queue i� in the upper right hand comer. (b) The kinaesthetic representation of the 
consequences of o selected attack. 
Nonetheless, if the procedural schematll. required to navigate the combat menn is 
habituated-such that there is no discernible pause between one's tum, selecting an RCtion, 
and the animated outCQmc-lhere may be an impre�slon of immediate feedback. This is mo�t 
likely to occur with swift physical attacks using the default menu option, in which case there 
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ls no need lO navigate Cho menu at all: one merely keeps pressing "X" and Tidus keeps 
attacking. Furthermore, 1he use or Overdrive auacks provides brier duracio ns of high uff�ct, 
during which players must press a sequence of buuons within a time limit, with immediacc 
repercussions. These nllacks also amplify tbo normal rewards of success in combat by 
inflicting more damage, providing greater spectacles or damage, and sometimes including an 
on screen congratulation (for e�amp!e: "Great!"), 
A second, and greater, degree ofreinforccmenc is 1hc damage inflicted on opponents, 
represented numerically in the style of arcade games (sec Figure 3.6b). As Loftus and Loftus 
(1983) note. the magnitude or the reward affects the intensity of tbe reinforcement, but in 
video games the perceived magnitude of the reward is also important. Game designers often 
choose a magnitude on the basis of a psychological difference between different evems. For 
example, at the beginning or FFX the damage that Tidus inflicts enters into three digits rather 
than \�e customary two in some other Final FDntasy titles (including FFX-2}. This provides an 
immediate impression of prowess, uv�n if monsters' statistics arc similarly high and therefore 
victory is no easier. However, at a certain point the psychological value of magnitude is 
diminished: 10,000 or 20,000 points may bo1h be surticicntly large to impress upon a player 
the sense or ''huge numbers of points" (p. 24), Consequently, the points (lllld other rewards) 
awarded to players are usually kept within n range of magnitude with a progression of 
balanced increments. When damage hits a higher range chan anticipnted-----as when a new 
weapon or spell increases damage-this provides the new relative basis for m�gnitudc. This is 
an ongoing case with Overdrive Mode and when we att.lck using Yuna's Aeons. The 
intermittent nature of these high magnitude auacks preserves their value, since they remain 
relatively high even later in the game, when the magnitude orTidus' normal attacks extends 
to over 3,000 and AUTor,'s extends 10 over 6,000. However, this effect diminishes when 
damage reaches 9,999, which marks the absolute magnitude for characters (until they acquire 
the No Limit Ability). 
A third reinforcement is the success which follows from the formulation or a strategy 
to defeat certain monster types or particular boss monsters {fiicdman, 1995: Myers, l990a}. 
While randomisation determines the appearance, number nnd type or wandering monsters, 
and the chance of hiuing an opponent and the amount of damage innictcd, the acquisition of 
strategy involves a clear facility for dcmyscillcation, in that we can repeatedly confront the 
same monsters with increasing confidence. The option to "Ace" may constitute a winning 
strategy, in that one may learn to avoid unnecessary or undesirable conflict, so as to maintain 
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one's strength for later fights. A fourth reinforcement is the actual defeat ofopponents, which 
is dramatised, and reinforced, by the victory dance. This defeat is reinforced by a fifth 
reinforcement: the accumulation of Gil, items, nnd Ability Spheres, and the periodic 
indication that characters have increased one or more levels (sec Reid, 1999; Wallace, 1999). 
Lastly, sixth, since narrative-releted encounters-Evrne, Seymour, Zu, Defender X, Sin, and 
so on---:nnnot be retreated from, and are live-or-die affairs, they offer the odditiomtl reward 
of� discrete advancement through the game, usually through the provision of cut-scenes. A 
strategy, then, functions 115 a kind ofpnzzle, or key, which allows players to unlock the rest of 
the game. 
Figure 3.7. (a) Close up of the Grid Sphere. (b) The Field screen. 
The menus in FFX include; the Main Menu, the Sphere Grid, nnd the menus for 
checking, organising or customising Characters, h�ms, Abilities, Overdrives, Aeons, and 
chnructer Formation {sec Figure 3.70). These oil offer reinforcements aosocieted with 
inventories nnd character development common to most role-playing games (see Fine, 1983; 
Herz, 1997; King & Borland, 2003; Mackey, 2000). First, browsing through new items and 
abilities poses the hypothetical scennrio ofo character augmented in a particular way and the 
anticipntion of overcoming opponents in the Battle Screen. Second, there is the reward of 
seeing a numerical increase of stats and the acquisition of new Abilities, and of progressing 
through the Grid Sphere: a glowing sparkle of lights and metallic clink that ore indexical of 
not merely an economic exchange, but some qu11Si·mysticnl imbuement of power. Third, there 
is the gradual demystification of the blanks on the list, of possible Abilities on each Chonicter 
screen and the Grid Sphere, with an ideal state ofu,�steiy represented by all nodes being 
activated, or each character activating all the nodes. Fourth, there is the pleasure of readiness 
that comes through the customising nnd orgnnisiug of characters, or the party. Indeed, players 
may spend an inordinate amount of time trying out minor adjustments to maximise their 
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eff,:ctiveness. However. the pleasure of developing �.,araclcrs' abilities and organising their 
inventories to maximise their effectiveness occurs through feedback between menus and the 
Battle Screen, since the effect of increasing a character's capabilities is only revealed through 
a player"s improved ability to defeat opponents. 
A great deal cf the game is also spent in the Field Screen {see Figure 3.7b). The first 
reinforcement oi"navigalion is the immedia1e feedback (or agency) i::onsequcnt upon using the 
am,logue control to 1nove Tidus, accompanied by the forced scrolling of the landscape. This is 
ar i1s most notable whenever one pauses to simply run Tidus back and fonh by rotating the 
left analogue stick. The second reinforcement of navigation is an ongoing sensory and 
cognitive curiosity (Malone, 1980) about successive landscapes. with occasional SU!priSC at 
their panOmmic scale, graphical detail, and fan1a:;tic invention (Herz, 1997). This navlgmlon 
is. ln itself, a leisurely process. but it may lead to a rhird reinforcement: the demystification of 
Spim (Friedman, 1995). One con traverse the entire gam1, world and render its darn structure 
entirely visib;e. This pleasure is most notable when we gain retrospective access to pl�ces that 
were initially innccessible, such as the chest beneath the waterfall in Besaid, which can only 
be accessed after th� charncters have acquired 1he Airship. However, unless one llas the 
official guidebook or has downloaded a walkthrough, the task of finding hidden locations on 
the map by pointing and clicking holds open the possibility that one has missed something, an 
experience which is analogous to Aarseth's (1997) description of"aporio." 
TI!c Trials of the Fayth offer a distinctive system of reinforcement. Each Trial requires 
the player !o guide Tidus through a simple maze, touching glyphs, picking up spheres, and 
placing cuch s:ihcre in the appropriate slots in the walls and (moveable) altars {sec Figure 
3.8). Given that they function as puzzles, the reinforcement might be seen as completing each 
step. and apprehending the puzzle as a totality. However, there is a gap between � player's 
abstract reasoning (thinking of a iogical possibility or solution) and the process of 
implcmenrntiou (the time required to test lt by moving the player into position and performing 
the required activity). That is, one might presume lhat, being puzzles, the Trials arc abstract 
(c,c,gnilive) problems, but in practice they arc n.are reminiscent of platform games and early 
advcnturr. games in which one picks up every ilcm and tries it out. Here trial and error wins 
out over slrnlegy, and there is not necessarily n rcai sense ofmaslering the puzzle's logic since 
plnyLrs may be unable to repeal il. Consequently, reinforcement in the Trials is more likely to 
extend to: iim, moments of insight into possible solut!ons; second, the gratification when a 
po�siblc solut:on is tested und found lo work; :md, third, the physi�al relief �l having 
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performed the required (cognitive and sensorimotor) labour, and being able to continue with 
the glllll�. 
Figure 3.S. (o) Tidus touches a glyph in the Besaid Trial of the Fayth {"A strange glyph 
glows"). (b) One of the altars in the Besaid Trial of the Fayth. 
There arc also four mini-gl!llles in FFX: Blit:ball, Butterfly catching, Lightning 
Dodging, nnd Chocobo Racing. While these nre part of FFX as a total gllllle, it suffices to say 
that these games genemlly offer more immediate kinaesthetic feedback {Darley, 2000). More 
thnn this, the player may decide to set aside the main narrative and game macmsequenccs of 
FFX and play these gllllles in and of themselves. Thi� may regulate interest in FFX by helping 
to keep a player in phatic con1act witl; the game, and, by constituting ongoing investment in 
the game, raising the stakes '.°Jr pursuing the resl oflhc game. Conve�e!;-, Uley may be played 
as a challenge that must be overcome. For example, one must win the fourth Chocobo Rnce
(Catcher Ch�cobo} with zero lime to acquire the Sun Sizil nccesslll)' for Tidus to acquire his 
Celestial Weapon: Colndbolg. Acquiring this may be part of ,m aesthetic of demystification, 
or mastery, of the game's secrets, or os part of a strategy to maximise one's ability to defeat 
opponC!lts ;,,.a·, .n. 
Emotion Episodes 
Hcrm�neutic codes in narrative sequences and schedules of reinforcement in game 
sequences arc, then, distinctive modes of interest in terms of th� degree ofinveslment and 
reinforcement: mentai nnd v'rtunl versus physical and actual. These two modes parallel the 
distinction between observation and enoction, nnd so are affected by the experience of 
blocked enaction, as addressed in Chapter Two. The implication is that, in a game like ffK, 
shifts bc!wcen 1hesc different mod�� may affec: Ille r�gulation of interest. This con be 
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addressed in tenns of th� ime.5ri1y of the "emotion episodes" which define the course of 
interest. 
Frijda, Mesquia, Sonne1m111s, and van Goozcn (1991) define an "emotion episode" as 
"a continuous emotion sequence resulting from the more or less continuous impact of one 
given event or a series of events" (p. 20!). Tan (1997) identifies a close correspondence 
between emotion episodes and the scenes in the traditionnl feature film, following Frijda's 
(1986, pp. 204-214) understanding of the courn: ofemotionnl episodes in film (Tan, 1997, pp. 
59-61). From a "dtuation of balance," our appraisal of some "Complication" in the situational
conte�t constitutes a "Disturbance of the Balance": the onset of the emotion. This produces an 
a�tion tendency which, in Tan's account, remains virtual: a wishing or hoping that n r.ertain 
outcome will be realised. Thero may then be a rising and falling of emotional valence through 
a ''Complication pl1ase" in which the film suggests various possible positive and negative 
outcomes. However, the "Disturbance" is undone through the virtual renlisation of the action 
tendency through the representation of a pankular (usually positive) outcome leading to the 
"Rcstormion of Balance." This type of account is iu accord with Aristotle's (trans. 1965) 
model of catharsis organised around a beginning, middle and end; with Freytag's (1863/1968) 
dramatic triangle ofdeisis, pcripcteia, nnd denouement: with Propp's (1968) model of a hero's 
quest to redress some lack; with Todorov's (1981) model of equilibrium and disequilibrium; 
nnd with other models of narrntivc disturbance and restoration (Dordwcll, 1986; Greim:i.s, 
1966, 1987; H eath, l981; Neale, 1980). 
For Tua (1997) there is a close relationship between sc:eneg and emotion episodes 
within the traditional feature film (p. 62), in that scenes are usually coherent situational 
meaning structures that elicit and sustain an emotion episode. In feature films, each scene may 
be said to have ils relative autonomy, though there may be divergent narrative threads, each of 
which pursues a panicular henneneutic mdc, such that scenes develop in relation to one 
another. Tan describes the process whereby viewers shift their auention across scenes in tenns 
of "foreground" and "backg1ound" interest. Tan defines foreground interest as the antidpated 
return and net rernrn ofa currcn: scene, dcfi11cd by the past and future that constitute the scope 
of this scene. He defines background interest as the anticipated return and net return 
e�perienced in regards to sequences outside the tempor�I scope of the present sequence (p. 
l06). Foreground interest cued by n present scene is relative to the background interest 
produced (or anticip,1tcd) in scenes prior to und after the present scene. However, limits on 
ancntion and cognition, as wr.11 as the urgency parameter of the situational context (Frijda, 
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1986, p. 206), ensure Lhat "!he foreground rclum always weighs more heavily 1han the 
background return" (p. !06), to the extent that most viewers do no! immediately connect 
foreground to background events, �xcepl when specifically cued (Grodal, 1998, pp. 68-70; 
Tan, 1997, p. 105). 
Tan (1997) uses Frijda's (1986) distinction between "phasic emotions," which are 
"relatively brief responses to a panicular event" (Tan, 1997, p. 199), and "ionic emotions," 
which arc "based on prospecls and retrospects [and] have a longer life span" {p. 199). For 
Tan, interest is � pennancnt, episodic emotion while watching the trnditional feature film, in 
that players experience aphasic interest relative to particular sequences, but this reinforces the 
tonic interest to keep watching by contributing to the net investment. The willingness to shift 
auen1ion, such that phasic interest continues to reinforce 1011ic interest, is influenced by Lhe 
presumption of anticipaled coherence, that is, !he expected convergence of divergent narrutive 
sequences. For example, a divergent action and a romance line sometimes converge through a 
male hero being united with his romantic interest ihrough some final heroic acl, such that the 
respective emotion-episodes find a common resolution (Tan, 1997, p. 58). 
Some of1he scenes in video games like FFX may be similar to those in films in tenns 
of their dura1ion and pacing. The opening sequence, after the title sequence , may be broken 
into the relatively discrete scenes summarised in Appendix Two. Each of 1hese has its own 
coherence: {l-1) imroduction to Tidu.s; (1.2) watching Tidus-os-cclehrity; (l.3) bearing 
witness to Tidus' inner .struggle; (1.4) wolching Tidus' skilful perfonnance of the kick which 
lifts him above Lhc swdium and puts him ln the privileged perspective of seeing Sin's auack; 
(1.5) watching Lhe spectacle of Zanarkand's destruction: (l.6} watching Tidus deal with 
inexplicable events ho cannot comrol. These scenes may be subsumed to a macro-.�ccnc: bi.ling 
imroduced lo Tidus-lhc-hero and perceiving his heroic qualities as he copes with Sin's arrival. 
This may constitute an emotion-episode, and is followed by the relutive quiet and safely of the 
Submcr!;ed Ruins, und o new scene organised the question: How w,JI Tidus deal with his 
disorientating isolation? 
However, FFX does no! simply have scenes, it also has clearly defined settings, sub­
scnlngs, and Savo Spllcres whict. may regulate the course of players' interest. Firsl of all, FFX 
is clearly broken into scnings such as Zanarkand. Submerged Ruins, Salvage Ship, am! Be said 
{sec Appcndi� One}. Players' 1.�ovcmcm Lhrough these may function like the prugrcssion 
1hrough the chapter,; in a novd, or the acl.s in a drama or film, with each selling up o new 
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interest episode. Yet since these settings arc e;,;tremely large, they are unlikely to be traversed 
in a single session of p!ay. Sub-seUings, by contra.st, are more easily compartmentalised as 
discrete scenes. For c;,;ample, players may e;,;plore Bcsaid Village, or Besaid Temple, in one 
session, but not leave the broader selling of Besaid. Furthunnore, sessions are highly 
delineated by the placement of Save Spheres, which detennine the minima! unit of traversal 
before players can put aside the game without having to re-play a section. Many of these Save 
points occur after major narrative developments and conflicts, .rnch as Pftcr the battle at 
Mi'ihen crossroads, after fighting Seymour, after traversing Gagazct Mountains, and after 
acquiring the Airship. Th ese Save points may be more "natural" markers of {ideal) interest 
episodes, or session, but players may use a Save point as a base of operations for short game 
sessions. For exnmplc, a player may kill monsters for an hour, periodically returning to the 
same point to save any "progress." In this respect they are free to define a scene in an 
arbitrary fashion by choosing to pause or quit at any time, with the option lo un-pause a game 
or return to on old save. 
Of course, mapping emotion-episodes onto scenes presumes a Mociel Player and a 
Model Text/Game, when different players may seek and experience different gratifications, 
may find different things of interest, and may interpret the situation differently, emphasising 
different henneneutic codes {"How will Tidus get homeT instead of; "How will Tidus 
survive?"), So while it is poss ible to identify discrete narrative and game structures in FFX 
that might functions as scenes, the activity of the player detennines whether or not they are 
e;,;perienced us interest episodes. 
The (Dys)Regulatlon of Interest Across Narrative and Gnme Macrose9uences 
It is not merely thnt the scenes that regulate emotion episodes \.re variable; shifts 
between narrative and game macro.sequences may disrupt these episodes. Chapter twC> argued 
that there may be n disjunction as players shift from obscrvationul to enactive sequences, and 
thnt a narrative or game sequences may elicit an cnactive attitude in a context of limited 
enactive possibilities. We might restntc this by saying that the hypothetical, and desired, 
possibilities set up by the game may not be provided for in ei1Jier subsequent narrative 
sequences or in the options of ergodic sequences, and this blocking may create nn increased 
nnention to non-dicgctic factors (such as the game's design) and thereby disrupt interest. 
While Chnplcr Two linked cnactive blocking to space, it is productive to sec the 
dysrcgulatioa of interest in tenns of temporal contraction or dilation. For Juul {1999) the main 
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problem with "int�ractive narratives" is that the past of narrated sequences conflicts with the 
present of player's interaction, and vice versa, creating a radical temporal disjunction when 
there arc shifts between "narrntive" and "game sequences," However, Juul connntes the 
structure of time in the nll!Talive/game with the player's experience of time, and over-sta!!:s 
the importimcc of tense as u distinction between ''narratives" and "games." It is more likely 
that the regulation of interest is affected less by the tense of events than their duration or pace. 
Ir distinguishing the pace of different macrosequenccs it is useful to tum to Barthes' 
(1975a) proairetic code, which ''provides the bi.sis of events and sequences, proliferating 
linearly and irreversibly" (Cohen and Shires, 1988, p. 119). At this level of coding, the player 
simply names actions nnd their effects (Barthes, l975a, p. 18), marking signifiers of action 
and grouping them in a sequence according lo the signifieds of their effect (p. 120); for 
example: '1oumey," "conversation," or "fight." Since all narratives produce more events than 
arc necessary. the hermeneutic code is applied to the proairctic code to distinguish nuclei from 
cnl!llyzcrs. While nuclei arc key e1·ems that initiate, increase, or conclude a sequence of 
transformations, catalyzers prolong or retard they nuclei they accompany, and may: create 
suspense by prolonging an event; direct emphnsis, providing grounds for curiosity or surprise; 
keep phatic contact with the reader; produce an effect of verisimilimde; and/or deepen 
characterisation (Barthes, 197511). 
Complll'Cd with print and film narratives the proairetic code in game macrosequences 
is hyperactive in ils production of catalyzcrs. As Darley (2000) and Herz (1997) argue, the 
plot of many video games is the story of player actions, and in ID these actions arc 
constituted by navigation and combat. These may be broken up into smaller, discrete units: 
Titlus moves forward; Tidus moves forward a second time; Tidus tnms to the left; Tidus tums 
to the right; Tidus moves forward and to the left; Tidus auacks with his sword: Yuna attacks 
wllh her staff: Wakka throws his blitzball; the Bomb dives down 10 bounce Tidns; Tidus 
attacks with his sword, and so on. There arc, of course, analogous stcp·by-step or blow-by­
blow descriptions of travel or combat in film and prim fiction, for example, the fighting 
sequences in Mortal Knmhat (1995) and the Pod Racing scene in Star Wars; The Phantom 
Menace (2000). However, minimal cvcnt·units mapped to player keystrokes and mouse clicks 
may proliferate ad nnuseam (and, potentially, ad infinitum) leading to the extended enchaining 
of minimal event-units. Upon the completion of n sequence, these events may be 
retrospectively described as a single event of the generality found in the opening nll!Tation 
(Tidus walks a�ros.s the room), but by virtue of the process of interacting at key points, video 
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games continuously produce discrete event units below this level of generality (Tidus walks 
forwnrd; Tidus walks forward; Tidus walks forward). 
In this respect, FFX may produ�e extended sequences of events lhat continually 
violate the •'threshold of functional rclevnnce, that which divides the namllable below the 
non-narratnble, sequences below which are token-for-granted" (Heath, cited in Culler, 1975, 
p. !43). Since this proairctic hypcMetivity may produce catalyzers whkh violate the pnce of 
a dominant hcnneneutic structure, they may be seen as potentially diminishing or 
extin guishing (Frijda, J9g6, p. 314) an interest-episode. 
Of course, the proliferation of dctnil below the threshold of functional relevance is 
relative to the degree of consciousness attributed to each constitutive "event" of the ergodic 
relationship, and this depends upon the degree of sensorimotor mastery which the player has 
over the controls of the interface. A player who has internalised the controls of the interface 
such that its use is a mailer of procedural schemata-that is, s/he can pcrfonn an ergodic 
action as a mauer of sensorimotor memory with minimal cognitive renectian----may be nble to 
maintain their perception of "event" generality in a manner analogous to the present-tense 
verbal description. For c;rnmplc, by reducing n sequence to the description: "Tidus is moving 
across the room," one minimises any sense ofproairetic hyper-activity. 
However, the pacing of events in FFX is rarely dependant on the speed of player's 
response or mastery. For example, players cannot speed up ;h11 time it takes Tidus to walk 
across the Field Screen. Generally, the perception of whether or not events disrupt interest 
depends upon the intemlcd level of generality at which a plnyer is already decoding the events 
in the game. If player is become bound up in the storyline to the extent that they wish events 
to be realised at n consistent pnce and concretion, the interruptions of baule may be a 
devastating intrusion, since crossing what seems a mere hundred feet of landscape may lead to 
half a dozen encounters. The Trials of the Fayth may be seen as especially intrusive, since 
they prevent both story and character development, to the extent that the tcnn "Trial" may fee! 
warranted. So while film viewing may allow for a simple transfer between foreground and 
bnckground interest as scenes end and resume, the en active, spatial, and temporal disjunctions 
that may resalt from forced shifts between game and narrative macrosequcnces may block or 
complicate such transfer. 
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Nonetheless, !hero are several reasons why the experience of these shifts may be 
auenuated, at least to !he extent chm they do not reduco one's tonic interest in the game. Just 
like fcaiure films which utilise divergent nmative threads, henneneutic clu11.ers in video 
game narrntivcs may be staggered with game sequences. The most notable hermeneutic 
clusters in FFX pcrtnin to Tidus' nnd Yuna's romance, the search for Jech\, \he understanding 
of what Sin is, nnd the revelations about (Yu) Yevon {see Appendix Three). The onset, 
deferral, confinnation, reworking, and reversnl of these key hermeneutic clusters persists 
throughout lhe 90-hour (odd) nrnra!ive, both game and narrative. The staggering of these 
clusters may be seen in terms of Friedman's (1995) argument that when tasks overlap, such 
that tasks begin before other \asks end, there is no moment of closure, and players find it 
difficult to ex1ricate themselves from play. A:; noted above, in FFX, the reinforcements of 
game macrosequences are governed by a �chedule of both narrative progression (navigating 
areas, defoacing !loss monsters) and characLCr development (acquiring items, spells, Overdrive 
modes, Spheres, by advancing through the Grid Sphere) which provide an ongoing intrinsic 
reinforcement across game macroscquences. If, for Friedman, the staggering of different game 
activities prevents closure and prolongs play, then the stai:;gering of both nmmtive and game 
rein"Jrcemems may nmplify this effect. 
Indeed, narrative and game sequences may function ns mutual, partial reinforcement 
for each other. With partial reinforcement, it should be remembered, people persist in 
behaviour in the absence of immediate positive reinforcement (Skinner, 1971, 1974). Since 
the effort expended witholll immediate reward is added to the net investment, the scakes are 
rnised for a future pay-off, and there is an accompanying rationalisation of !he prior 
investment and of the likelihood of the nett pay-off (see Reith, 1999; sec also Chapter Eight). 
The corollary of this is that a player who eiperiences no interest in the present may retain 
motivation through the ongoing anticipation of the possihility of a reward in the future which 
will reconstitute interest, or, more accurately, will provide Che reward of interest. Thnt is, even 
if the player hns invested far more chan the net return, and interest presently has a negative 
value, a player may persist with the game-or keep remming to it-in the hope that ongoing 
investment will (eventually) be rewarded. 
In video games like FFX, partial reinforcement may be a consequence of the fact !hat 
there is a promise for action tendencies to become more than virtual; players can enact a 
formerly hypothetical action tendency, or narrative sections may cue or prepare p!aye:s for 
this action tendency. In practice, of course, the actual action tendency is ol"ten a gross 
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enactment of the hypothetical action tendency: a desire for u particular hypolhctical resoluti,1n 
is reduced lo basic actions linked to a (usually) simple type of arousal {light/night). In the 
middle of a narrative sequence, player:; may dcsi;e 10 see Tidus win a game ofblitzball and be 
celebrated through Spira, but must co�solc mcmsclves with manipulating his inventory, 
seeing him winning a battle, or finding some new item. It is possible, then, thot narrative and 
game macroscquences provide partial reinforcement for each other. 
While narrative rewards may be insufficient to compensate for the high investment of 
time and effort engaging with game macrosequcnces, narrative rewards such as the desire lo 
sec unfolding character relations may function as catalyzers that prolong players' expectations 
of such rewruds. For example, a player's desire to sec Seymour confronted may find vicarious 
gratification in the hostile victory over a monster in battle, or a player's desire for !he power 
associated with character development and victory over opponents may find vicarious 
gratification in Tidus' acceptance as one of Yuna's Guardians, an acquisition of social rank. 
Furthennore, even during game seqnences, certain kinds of typically "norrntive" types of 
fontasising persist: "I wish he/I would just find that item"; "I wish !hose two would just get 
together!": "Don't light that!'"; "I hope it mis�es!"; "fidus should be stronger!"Thi� may give 
way to hypothetical stratcgising ("lf I do this, maybe •.• "; "If Tidus had that Celestial 
Weapon .•. "), but this strategising may hold open new cxpccmtions about both game and 
narrative events. 
In this respect, there ma)' be a confluence of actual and hypothetical action tendencies; 
a vinual action tendency which cannot be literally realised by the limited affordanccs of the 
interface may be perceived a.; a denied or aborted fantasy, or it may be experienced as a 
�oncrote compC11Jalio11 for the hypothetical fonn. By extension, 1,layers may take the concrete 
affordance as a temporary gratification that maintnins their {pha1ic) contact with the 
hypolheticul wish, wilh lhe promise that, even if they cannot immedrn!ely act upon it, 
continuing to play holds open its possible realisation. 
However. nurrativc and game mucrosequcnces are not only staggered, they are 
aesthetically inte(lratcd through cross coding. Perhaps most trivially, the scnsorimolor action 
of the player may function almost continually to reinforce symbolic oppositions. For example, 
the continued clicking on a keyboard while a player attacks a monster will reinforce a 
narrmivc opposition of good/evil, nnd amplify its emotional significance becJuse each act 
constitutes a micro-investment in the privileged tenn of that opposition. More importan!ly, the 
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prolonging of the proaircLic code through player actions may magnify suspcn,c. For ,;,xample, 
a player may deliberately hold off from moving into a dangerous area, thereby providing 
eatalyzers (Tidus waits, Tidus waits, Tidus waits) that defer an expected and feared event. 
To;; is especially notable when players are about to confront Seymour for the first time, or 
when players are about to confront Sin, or Braska's Final Aeon. The danger posed by all these 
opponcnLs--.-:specially if one has already tried to kill them and have reloaded a save game­
may lead players to keep wandering around, developing characters Lhrough tighling, or to 
continually manipulate and/or customise items. 
Thero are some occasions in which the addition or alteration of ergodic cupabillties is 
a consequence of developments in the narrative. For example, when fighting Seymour, Tidus 
and Wakka have a Talk option: Tidus also has this option when fighting Braska's Final Aeon. 
W11en fighting Evrae on the deck of the Airship, Tidus and Rikku both have the option of 
telling Cid to move the Airship closer to or away from Evrae. This leads a greater impression 
of coherence between narrative and game macrosequences, at [cast in te1ms of the 
conservation of motivation, goals, and virtual/actual affordances. More importantly, there arc 
some occasions when a significant narrati.ve symbolic code is decided within a game 
macrosequence, a.s when p!nyers must tight and defeat major opponents like Seymour, 
Yunalesca, Sin, Braska's Final Aeon, and Yu Yevon. In fact, fighting Seymour Lhe first time 
is likely to be one of most anxious moments of both the game and narrative because players 
have only witnessed !he 11od-like representation of Seymour in the narrative and are suddenly 
confronted with how !hat narrative coding will translate into £!ITTlC te1ms. Players arc \lkely to 
anticipate an extended emotion-episode marked by the anxiely of failing and having to repeat 
it. Euch subsequent failure may feel like a failure in the flow of narrative, but it may also 
renew the sense that Seymour is a serious antagonist, oo\ to be trivially dismissed. Seymour's 
cv�nlual defeat in battle leads to a significant symbolic transfo1mation in Lhe nmmtive 
macroscquence: Tidus is superior Lo the\ opponent, and Tidus' moraliLy triumphs over the 
amornlily or immorality of Lh,;, opponent. legitimating his heroism. The subsequent cut-scene 
functions as denouement for a narrative connict that has already been resolved. 
The integration of narrative and game macroscquenccs is no!, however, merely a 
matter of the game's aesthetic cross-coding, since players may experience such shifts as part 
of the total aesthetic of lhe game. In addressing this issue it is useful to consider Erving 
Goff man's (196!, 1969, 1974) analysis of "frames." Frames are structures that govern events 
and participants' experience of events, and arc useful in any consideration of the boundaries 
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of, and within, the p!ay space. Fine (1983) applied Goffman's model lO role·p!aying games 
(RPGs) nnd identified three levels of frames, which Mackey (2000) has expanded lO five: 
first, the social frnme inhabited by the person; second, the game frame inhabited by the 
player; third, the narrative frame inhabited by the raconteur, lhat is, when a player re-tells 
what has happened to his/her character; fourth, the constantive frame inhabited by the 
addresser, usually the Games Master: and, fiflh, tbe pcrformatlve frame inhabited by the 
character. Fine (1983) and Mackey (2000) argue that shifts between these frames is pm of the 
"engrossment" of play and may deepen the play experience. 
It might seem reasonable to identify a parallel to this in Tan's (1997) description of 
immersion in a fictional world as a consequence of a sequence of involuntary perceptual 
illusions and several voluntary illusions: illusions of apparent motion, the diegetic effect, the 
illusion of the controlled witness, and !he illusion of observational atlitude (pp. 236). 
However, it is not useful lO sec movement through frames as a linear progression into deeper 
immersion, since it cannot be slated !hat any narrative or game frame inherently offers a 
"deeper" level of immersion than any other. ]fwe take narrative and game macroscqucnccs as 
frames, it is not the case lhat nru-rative macrosequences are dicgctic and game macroscquenccs 
arc non-diegctlc. Given that FFX is a role-playing adventure game both types of 
macrosequcnce are part of its diegcsis. As will !Jc argued in Chapter Eight, there is a greater 
likelihood of non-dicgetic effects (and A-emotions) being experienced in the former because 
of the frustrating nature of play. The issue here is that the regulation of interest owes more to 
selection from aesthetic alternatives and the naturalisation of these variations as part of a total 
aesthetic experience. 
This is especially cvi,!cnt in RPGs. Role-players distinguish between frames in a 
similar way, not as marks of re lative engrossment, but as varied aesthetics; hence 
s\mulationist, gamist nnd dramatist playing "styles," or player "stances" as actor, audience, 
author, immcrsivc, or in-cliaructcr (sec Mack, onlinc). That these frames, styles or stances, are 
a maucr of player aesthetics is evident in distinctions between player types, such as the 
historian, military enthusiast, specialist, gamer, assassin, nnd competitor (Dunnigan, 1980). 
Indeed, the RPG form is nemp!ary of the way frame switching can be a part of immersion, 
rather than a disruption of in!ercst. To any external player, the RPG is an absurd mix of 
activities that seem to have no natural relationship with one another; cartography, drawing, 
narration, dramafrolc-playing, gaming, arguments nbout the rules, and socialising. As Meyers 
(!986) notes: 
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one may object that the language of the game is ephemeral, derivative at best, 
and, most suspicious of all, lacking !he traditional literary modes such as 
dialogue and description. An observer might find the language disjointed, 
unplanned and unreviscd, and frequently interrupted by comments on, 
questions on, or even arguments over the rules, with each interruption 
hampering the creation of the fiction. (p. 2485). 
However, for nny experienced player, the act of playing i� a mnttcr of routine and shifcs 
between its component activities arc unlilu:ly to atlract much nttention. The shift between 
!Jame and naJTative macrosequences in FFX may similarly be seen in terms of expected and 
semi-voluntary "frame-switching." This allows players to, in Eco's (1981) terms, "narcotise" 
a prior frame. and players may hlitomc increasingly adept at this kind of shifting. As 
Muckey's (2000) argues, "frame switching is considered legitimate as long as it does not 
overly affect the continuation of the game" (p. 197). If nnrrative and game macrostructures are 
seen as frames then the shifcs between them may be accommodated as part or the aesthetic 
experience associated with the genre. That is, plnyers may simply accept the frequent, 
seemingly tlisruptive shifts beiween narrative and game sequences as prut of the game. 
However, players also voluntarily shift between frames. This may be a matt�r of 
acsl�etic attitude in that a player bored with interminable wandering or a protracted battle may 
enter inlo an aesthetic of visual engrossment by paying more attention to the spectacle of the 
game's landscapes, nn:hitecturc, characlcrs, nnd fashion. But EEK also allows some freedom 
to choose frames in the more substantial sense of choosing to rctu:n to particular game 
macroscquences. Players may choose to wander in circles until they enter the frame of combat 
through a random encounter. In some areas there are consoles which offer n Tutorial with the 
option lo practice fighting the monsters unique to the area without any damage tv th� 
characters beyond the frame. In the Calm Lands players arc also likely 10 find the Monster 
Arena, which lels them emcr into a combat frame with any of the available monsters. 
Conversely, Tidus has a Flee Ability, which allows players to escape the combat frames 
forced upon them by random encoumcrs, such that they can pursue navigation and the �tory. 
Players also eventually acquire a No Encounters Ability, which prevents random encounters, 
meaniTig that game-functional scmes become narcotised while navigating the game world. 
Lastly, FFX incorporates the mini-games of Blitzball, Chocobo Racing, Thunder Dodging, 
and Buucrny Chasing as different frrunes. All or these allow the player to voluntarily shif: 
frames and renew their in1ercst. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that narrative marrosequences in FFX arc periodically 
interrupted by macroscqucnces of movement and combat, and !hat the qualiw.1ive distinction 
between narrative and game sequences may lead to the disruption of phasie interest episodes. 
However. the dysregulation of interest may be auenuated in several w�ys. First, the staggering 
of narrative and game hcnneneutic structures, and partial reinforcement J,ctwcen narrative and 
game macroscqucnces, muy preserve tonic interest in tl1c game. Second. the cross coding of 
narrative and game macrosequences may preserve interest during shifts between them. Third, 
frame-shifting means that player's may accept shifts between narrative and game 
macrosequences as pan of the game's aesthetic, and in FFX players can voluntarily renew 
their interest by switching to a different game macrostructurc. 
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Chapter Four-The Unreality of lhe Narrative 
If interest is regulated by expectations about events and the reward of their outcome, it 
can be argued chat the narrative construction of "reality" has a central role in regulating 
interest in FFX. After a review of Culler's (1975) categories of vraiscmblancc, this chapter 
will address fEK's cod;ng of unreality in terms of the "meta-genres" or "modes" of the 
"marvellous," the "uncanny," and the "fantastic." It will be argued that !:EX's coding of 
unreality not only regulates players' curiosity, surprise and suspense, it also extends these 
emotions into wonder, fear, and/or anxiety. The major implication of this nrgument is that the 
disjunctive experiences of realily·status addressed in Chapter Two may be aesthetically 
rccuperaied as part of the game's meaningfo! experience through t'ie ongoin� hermeneutic 
concern with reality. 
Vraisemblanee 
The narrative representation of reality is often addressed in terms of vraisemblance, 
the signifying processes whereby something is made to seem sensible and natural by the way 
it is placed in relation to existing conventions of discourse. Vraisemblance may be loosely 
identified with 1he operation of Barthes' (1!>75a) "reforence code," which provides a basis of 
cxtra-tclltual reality by referring to authorised texts in a culture. However, while Barthes' 
reference code provides u general link between vraisemblance and intertextuality (Baki,lin, 
1986; Krislcva, 1980), here we me beuer served by Culler's (1975) distinctions between types 
of vrnisemblance: "five ways in which a text may be brought inlo conmet with and defined in 
relation to another text which helps co make lt intelligible" {p. 140). This chapter will focus on 
the first three of Culler's tlve categories: the "discourse of the 'real'," the "cultural text," and 
"generic vraisembfance." 1
The discov.rsc(s) ofche real may be ur.derstood as including what Tan (19\;7) refers to 
as "nai've physics," "n�·ivc psychology" and "naive sociology" (p. 239), which constitute the 
"cnmmon sense" understandings of the world (see also Bruner, 1990; Bordv.ell, 1989). In 
regards to naive physics, we accept that objects exist in time ond space and arc bound by 
cause and effect. Much narrative information in _E!:K has the sole functinn of �'roviding an 
impression of n real object-world: the waves at Besaid beach, the wind iu the ·:rees, smooth 
' Culler's founh ond 1;fth �alcgories, the "convon1ior.ally natural" and "parody/irony," o� not addre,sed 
because sotisfoctory disc•Jss\on of them would require o lc11glhy, and unnece. ;ory. =�uni of the stnlus of 
reality in JIOStmodem theory. 
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motion-capture for chnracter:s, as well as war.dering monsters in their ecologically appropriate 
environments, nll denote a world governed hy fomiliar physical Jaws, Jn regards to naive 
psychology, we accept a version of Bordwell's (1989) "folk psychology," according to which 
people have minds and bodies, think nnd feel, and have traits and motives. FFX represents 
predictable psychological behaviour in this respect; Tidus wants love from his father; he 
shows romantic interest in Yuna; he defers co Auron as a surrogate father; the Al Bhed are 
hated and mistrusted because they are unknown; and Seymour's madness stems from his 
previous persecution. 
Al 1he level ofnalVc sociology, we accept that people are sociable, and that when they 
come together they fonn institutions, such as religion and law, which govern their 
relationships with each other. !n FFX, that people naturally seek out groups and community is 
represented by: the community ofBesaid; the bond between the Guardians; and the communal 
effort to mpair the docks after Sin attacks Kilika. That families arc important to personal life 
and social organization is represented by: the fomily huts in Besnid; the family link between 
Wakka and Chappu; Tidus' and Yuna's ongoing concems about their fathers; and the way 
Wantza carries on his brother O'aka's mercantile trnde after the Inner is imprisoned. That 
people form religious institutions through awe or revereocc for natural or divine forces is 
evident in the Temples of the Fayth, the teachings of Yevon, and the nulhority invested in the 
Maesters. That people fonn institutions of work is represented by: !he hotels or shops, such as 
Rin's Travel Agency; young Clasko's indecision to be a Chocobo Trainer or Chocobo Knight; 
and the ongoing mercnntile efforts ofO'aka and his brother. Lastly, that humans desire or 
need release and cnterrninment is represented by the institution of blitzbnll. In all these ways, 
FFX conforms to our "naive," or "folk," understanding (or discursive construction) of 
"reality." 
Cultural vraisemblancc is an extension of the discourse of the real that consists of 
''cultural stereotypes or accepted knowledge" (Culler, 1975, p. 141), including proverbs and 
ma.xims, 1md authorised "physical, physiological, medical, psychological, literary, historical" 
(Barthes, l975a, p. 20) discourses. While ideology may penneate a textual transaction, Culler 
(1975) argues that this category may be explicitly linked to ideology in that it nominates a 
system of preferred values (p. 144). Texts usually assume that the reader recognises its values 
or proverbs and "drnw[s) upon this fund of humar. knowledge [to] establish ••• action und 
motive, behaviour and personality" (p. 143). For example, in FFX players accept the presence 
of shops and/or mcrcllants at the far reaches of the world, hidden hundreds of miles from 
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other people, because they are de lined w; logical and nonnal by the ideologies of Ycvon (the 
Summoners' require service on their quests), economics {people go where the money is), and 
tourism {Spira, being so exotic, invllcs adventurers). 
However, texts sometimes provide their own explanation of otherwise inc.1plicable 
narrative facts or events, thereby staling their own maxims through a process that Gcnenc 
(1966/1982) calls "unvraisemblancc." For e�nmple, Tidus (and perhaps the player) is amazed 
at how the folk of Spira accept Sin, anC: must be repeatedly told by Wakka that the people of 
Spira believe Sin ls a punishment they must atone for. Tidus questions whether it is wonh 
sacrificing so many lives lo kill Sin l'ir the twenty year pence of the Great Calm, and must 00 
told by Yuna that the (to him) futile actions of the Summoners nre necessar) for a temporary 
r espite and the maintenance of a hope that one day Sin will 1w1 return. That those who live in 
Spira accept this situation is not surprising, since nalve psychology tells us that people �an 
learn 10 go on with their day-to-day lives despite terrible events (as during the protracted 
bombing oFLondon in the Second World WrJI). However, Tidus docs not truly accept Sin, and 
this rejection conforms to two other tenets of nal:Ve psychology; that people naturally resist 
oppression and that people a1e most happy w\',en liberated. When Tidus learns of Yuna's 
choice to sacrifice herself for Spira, he {along with the Al Bhed) is unconvinced at the 
justification, and only continues with the qnest after making a promise with Rikku to lind a 
way to save Yuna. What drives the narrative, then, is u conflict between, on the one hand, the 
beliefs of Spira about Sin (cultural vraisemblancc within the diegesis), and. on the other hand, 
a belief in the rightness of resisting oppression aml freedom (n,iive psychology ln the 
tiiscourse of the real). 
Generic vrnisemblance incorporates those codes that define "the range of possible 
speech acts which a literary text might perform" (Culler, 1975, p. 147); or, more accurately, 
genres form the basis for the expected and unexpected in any communicative act, since a 
degree of novelty is expected in fictional contracts between texts and readers/players. At the 
level of game macrostructures, another reason that players arc likely to accept the presence of 
sbops and shopkeepers in isolated regions is bccausu they arc conventions of computer role­
playing games: as characters adventure they lind and sell items they lind, and buy new, more 
powerful ones. Shops rn:e needed to perform this service. At the level of murative 
macrostructures, players will expect Tidus' rejection of Sin's tyranny because protagonists in 
epic fantasy narratives always confront a major opponent, and not only is Sin a pre-eminent 
opponent. the gonl to defeat him is stated in the blurb and manual. Generic vraisemblance 
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(fidus will fight the monster) reinforces naive psychology in the discourse or the real (people 
resist oppressors) against cultural vraisemblancc within the diegcsis (Sin ls part of everyday 
life). 
These aspects of vrnisemblance are centrrll to the operation or "mimeticism," which 
Jackson (1988) and Hume (1984) refer to as a "mode" or "impulse," embodied in classical 
realist texts. Mimetlcism is an effect that may be found in a variety or genres, such as horror, 
science fiction, romance, trtlgedy, epic and comedy. However, we can better appreciate the 
game's construction of the "m1real," nnd its concomitant ways of regulating player interest, ia 
terms ofTodorov's (1973) "genres" or the "marvellous," the "uncanny," and the "fantastic." 
These may be seen, like the "mimetic," not as historical genres, but as "modes" which cross 
other genres (see Cornwell, 1994; Jackson, 1988; Todorov, 1973). These modes provide a 
useful way or differentiating the ways in which FFX recruits codes or vrniscmblance for 
aesthetic effect. 
The Marvellous 
For Todorov (1973), the defining principle of 1he "m.uvellous" is the acceptance of 
violations of known physical !aws. More accurately. a new discourse of the real ls posited that 
governs tbc reality or the diegcsis and thereby provides a new context that renders the 
narrntive facts intelligible (Culler, 1974, p. 141). As a mode, the marvellous can frequently be 
found in, and oFten characterises, mythology, religious texts, magic realism, sword and 
sorcery, science fiction, and some horror and romance. However, Todorov (1973) identifies 
four varintions of the rnarvc!lous-the hyperbolic marvellous, the exotic marvellous, the 
scientific marvellous, and the i1,strumenta! marvellous-all of which may be identified in 
FFX. 
Todorov's (1973) exmic marvellous occurs when supcrnnturul elements are 
represented as nonm1J within the diegesis, usually through the acceptance or magical beings, 
abilities or events, which violate laws of life, motion and energy in the modified discourse of 
the real which defines a texts's {meta-) physics. In FFX, the precise location and nature or 
magic varies. Spira itself may be said to be supernatural because its ontology includes magical 
events (the Grand Summoning and Jccht's transfonnation into Sin) and magical beings . 
.f!:li's magical beings are somclimcs magical in themselves by virtue of their fontastic or 
impossible nature or ori!':in. For example, Yu Yevon has ihe mysterious, divine origins of 
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most gods; the Bandersnntch is a folkloric creature drawn from Lewis Carrol's poem 
Jabberwocky, with the same otherworldly slatus as unicorns or fairies; and thP l'lefcnd�-!S are 
inanimate matter inspirited by magic, like golcms. 
Figure 4. l. (a) TI1c "supernatural" Aeon Valefor. {b) Yuna's "magical" ceremony to "Send" 
the spirits of t hose killed at Kilikn. 
Some beings are magical by virtue of having magical abilities: this is as true of 
monsters, such ns Black Elements (with their elemental Strikes), and Behemoth Kings (with 
their Zombie Touch), as it is ofd111ractcr:s, such as Yun a (with her ability to Swnmon Aeons) 
and Lulu (who is typed as a sorceress with innat� spell costing abilities) (sec Figure 4.1). 
However, most magical abilities are external to the non-magical beings who use them, and are 
only acquired by: finding items (on monsters, or on the paths of Spira, or as purt of a quest); 
receiving gifts (from non-player characters, or NPCs, such as Belgemine); and through 
experience (the accumulation of Ability Points which can be used to advance on the Sphere 
Grid}. These mnglcal events, beings and abilities arc accepted as part of the laws of the 
diegesi.i in thnt, at the level of generic rniiscmblnncc, players expect magic in a fantasy ro!c­
plnylng game, and bec11use the chnracttr's cultural vraisemblance, and their basic reactions, 
reflect the discourse of the real in Spira. None of the characters are surprised at their magical 
nbilities, or at the presence of any event� simply because they are magical. 
Jn Todorov's (1973) next two categories, impossible but accepted magical events 1,.�d 
beings blur into science, or scientific explEllmlion. Todorov defines as scientific m11rve//011s 
those narratives in which ev�nts or items arc represented in rational terms but operate 
according to physical laws no longer accepted or not yet realised. This is, for Todorov, the 
realm of much science fiction, and the (forbidden) Machina embody this scientific marvellous 
in thnt while it may be possible to build an entire city over a river like the Moonflow, to 
contain water in the manner of the globe in the b!itzbnll stm:liwn, or to float nn Airship Jlke the 
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one flown by the Al Bhed, this technology is beyond our current level of understanding (sec 
Figure 4.2). Indeed, the player may be nwaro of developments in an:h itectun:, aerodynnmics, 
or magnetic field theory which legitimate a.<i future possibilities the city that Wl\5 built over the 
Moonflow, the Al Bhed's Airship, nnd !lie wnler sphere ln the blitzball stadium. However, 
even the Al Bhed, who are associated with the Machina, have only partial knowledge ofthe 
machines they repair. Rikku's brother slntcs this for comic effect as \le pilots the Airship oo 
its shaky, virgin take-otT from the Al Bhed home. Consequently, the vagueness of explanation 
of these possibilities allows them to relllin the flavour of the exotic mlll'Vcllous. 
Figure 4.2. (a) The blitzball stadium nt Luca filling up with water held in place by n 
presumably "scientific" force field, (b) The Airship escaping the ruined Al Bhed home. 
Todorov ([973) refers to as instrumental marvellous those nnITT1tivcs in which can be 
found devices that were not possible in a certain historical context but whose function has 
been produced in the present. He offers flying carpets, apples that cure diseases, and pipes 
which see long distances as examples, whose qualities exist in, respectively, helicopters, 
antibiotics and binoculars. Many suppos edly mngical devices in FFX similarly may be 
interpreted 03 poetic representations of scientific devices. For exwnple, weapo ns Tidus that 
may acquire include: a Taming Sword which captures creatures it kills (like a stun gun): 
Gil venture, which multiplies the amo unt of money found on a monster (like interest in venture 
capitalism): Twilight Steel, which, renders opponents blind (like certain poisons); and 
Soldier's Sword, which increases strength (like injections of testosterone). 
Indeed, magic in general mny be rend as a poetic representation of science and/or 
physical laws. In many fantasy texts and role-playing gnmcs magic is lenmed at something 
equivalent to a modern college or university, where magical research takes pince, such as the 
Schools ofMngic in J. K. Rowling's (1999) HntW Potter, Bruce HeN'd's (19&7) Dungeons & 
Dragons Gnze!)ee.- ."ri ncipa!ities of Glantri, and Tcny ?ratchet's (1985) The Colour pf 
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Magic. In other fiction, magic is acquired through personal tutoring or experimentation, as 
with Pug in Raymond E. Feist's (1983) Magician and Golian in David Edding's (1983) 
Belgariad series, or as a pscudo·science, as with fack Vance's (195011985) alchemical 
magicians in The Dying Earth, In FFX, all characters acquire magical skills through 
experience, and magic itself is structnred in a hierarchy of increasingly powerfnl spells. That 
is, !:.EK's magic is as dependent upon laws as strict and predictable us those of the natnrn! 
world, and its magical effects are as quantifiable as those of non-magical items weapons and 
armour. Using n water-based spell like Wntcra against a fire monster is na different from 
using a hose, and is strategically equivalent to usiug a Piercing attack against a monster with 
armour. In this respect, specific magical practices and effects mny be accepted as marvellous, 
but may also be read as poetic representations of existing scientific practices and effects, 
Todorov's (1973} last category of the hyperbolic morvellous refers to those tales that 
contain elements that arc supernatural "only by virtue or [excessive) dimensions" (p. 54) or 
through a liternliscd metaphor. In regards to dimension, physical laws are not subverted so 
much as exaggerated. FFX contains physically excessive (giant} wasps, pirnnhn and wolves us 
monster types, which bave non-fictional referents. In regards to literalised metaphor, ffX can 
be road in terms of the metaphor of the "overbearing father." Since exaggeration often 
functions to represent something in a manner which reproduces its psychological impact, the 
excessive size of Braska's Final Aeon, the game's visual spectacle, and its narrative drama 
(death, loss, revenge, and so on}, may represent the force of patriarchal authority us 
experienced by a son (andfor the forcerulness of the son as a liberal individual resisting and 
overcoming all adds). 
By considering these variations of tlie marvellous it is possible to identify a spectrum 
from the literally unreal, in which the marvellous exists as an accepted unreality, to the 
poetically rca!, in which the marvellous involves the poetic manipulation of a known reality. 
Across these variations, the marvellous may be ge11emlly accepted, but in some circumstances 
a particular marvellous quality elicits wonder, awe or surprise in characters. Tidus frequently 
displays amazement or disbelief. W11en Tidus encounters the Zu in Sanubia Sands, the 
"camera" moves behind him and he looks up at its unlikely, shaggy mass to exclaim: 
"Whew!" He is also amazed at the water-travelling, dinosaur-like Shoopuff, whereas the 
others consider it as no more amazing than a horse-ride, with Yuna reminiscing (and giggling) 
about a childhood experience in which Kim�hri fell in the wutcr, Simil�rly, while Tidus 
expresses surprise when h e  first sees Chocobos, lhc Chocabo trainer is surprised that Tid,is is 
96 
surprised, since they arc as fomiliflr to her (and to players who have played other Final 
Fantasy titles) as any other steed. Indeed, when Tidus ls confronted by the Aeons, the 
Temples of the Fayth, and Sin, his status as a visitor to the "future" allows him to express the 
wonder of a tourist lend through a marvellously exotic foreign culture: alien to him (and 
players), yet both possible and real within Spira. Th.at is, !he marvellous in FFX is reinforced 
by clcscriptions of exotic races, cultures and beings with their own cultural vraisemblance. 
Even !he words "Macstcr" and "Fayth" arc deviations from conventional spelling which 
evoke other-ness. Tidus, of course, comes to accommodate these exotica, and during Chocobo 
Racing the balloons and pri.res connote a carnival or circus-like affair, framing the marvellous 
elements as pan of a tame, sideshow amusement. Yet, despite a player's ready acceptance of 
these marvels as natural lo �pirn, s/hc may, along with Tidus, initially be surprised at them. 
1 10 game also undermines the bland acceptance of magic, and produces an altitude of 
awe, through its use of magical spells and events. W11cn Lulu uses elemental spoils for the 
first time she offers such comments as "Need a light?"' (for fire) and "Go with the flow" (for 
water). These comments may be glib, but they prepare the player for the new spr,ll's spectacle 
and damage. Inasmuch us new spells open up new powers they may be seen as violations of 
the previous economy governing gameplay, even if technically they merely confer a higher 
status (or greater access lo resources) within a consistent economy or magic. However, some 
spectacles or magic seemingly violate the rules of magic in a more radicll] sense, most notably 
the cataclysmic arrival of Sln al Z:markand and the devastating appearance of Anlma in Luca 
Stadium. Both of these spectacles are likely to be seen as a violation of expected magical 
effects in that they display magical effects so beyond the predicted curve of character 
development that the player cannot properly conceive of confronting these figures as 
opponents within the rules of the game, much Jess effecting an equivalent display of power. 
Yet, as the player continues the game, characters become exponentially powerful, may 
acquire Anima as an Aeon whose abilities operate within the rules of the narrative, and 
eventually confront and defeat Sin. Jn this sense, the spectacular representation of magic is 
presented as exceeding the development curve experienced as governing the rules of magic in 
the game macrostructure, but is subsequently normalised as players develop their churactcrs 
and learn more about Spira. Magic, then, is represented as variously accepted and un- or dis­
expccted through the gradual acclimatisation to the rising scale of magical efficacy. 
Players may also experience a sense of the dis-expected through the gradual 
revelations about Sin, which violate prior disclosures about the discourse of the real in Spira. 
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Sin is initially accepted us part of Spira's nonnul existence, and is inlelJlreted by the Laws of 
Yevon as divine punishment. However, FFX later offers a new explanation: Sin is an Aeon, 
like the Fiends, and his existence is ,wt nonnal and natural to Spira. He is the undcad armour 
ofa god, port of the Grand Summoning which preserves the memory or long-dead Zanarkand, 
and the key to the Spiral of Death, in which the dead govern the living. Suddenly, what is seen 
as a physical low (Spira's discourse of the real) is revealed to be a changeable social 
convention (cultural vraisemblnnce). What is at stake here is not ontology bui the 
epis(emo/ogy of Yu Yevon. Sin is not o symbol of divine punishment, merely n tool of Yu 
Yevon's unnntural vengeance. Since both epistemo!ogies presume a supernatural ontology, 
the shirt from one to the other stages Sin as marvellous a second time. 
The narrative strategy or FFX may, then, be seen in tenns oi a tension within the 
marvellous; between the literally unreal versus the poetically real: between acceptance of and 
surprise at the unreal; and between our initial expectations about the reality of the diegesis and 
our subsequent revision of this reality. These tensions preserve a tension that is central to the 
marvellous: the provision of on ongoing sense or wonder and awe that minimises the 
progressive acceptance and invisibility of the supernatural. 
The Uncanny 
If the marvellous is characterised by n sense of wonder at spectacles or the unreal, the 
"uncanny" is chorncterised by seemingly un:cal events that are symptomatic of a hidden, 
unsare, rearfo!, dreadful, or dangerou� reality (Freud, 1919/1990; Jackson, 1988; Todorov, 
!973). This usage can be traced to the un-negated and negated version of the Gennan tenn
"heim!lch": 
[Das Heimlich] signifies that which is homely, familiar, friendly, cheerful. 
comfortable, intimate .••. [It] also means that which is concealed from others: 
all that is hidden. secreted, obscured. Its negation, das U11/ieimlich, then 
functions to dis-cover, reveal, expose areas nonnnlly kept out or sight. .•. lt 
uncovers what is hidden and, by doing so, effects a disturbing transfonnation 
of the familiar into the unfamiliar. (Jackson, 1988, p. 65) 
Freud {191911990) distinguishes the uncanny as n type of fear directed not towards some 
known object, but to something that is in the process of being revealed andtor to the process 
of revelation itselr. Annitt (1996) summarises: 
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In order for us to feel something to l>c uncanny [as distinct from fear], it must 
derive from a situation, object or incident that ought to feel (and usually has 
felt) familiar nnd reassuring, but which has undergone some fonn of slight shift 
that rc.ults in what I have referred to as a fonn of dis-ease. (p. 49) 
The key mechanism here is projection. In fonnal tenns, projection refers to the 
process whereby aspects of the self 11re displaced and relocated in an external position. This 
may occur in fairly benign ways, such as the routine proximal-distal tnmsactions that Grodal 
(1997) discusses, or the projection of one's mood, which thereby seems to chW11Cterise the 
environment. However, projection also occurs when a subject cannot tolerate aspects of him 
or herself and auempts to expel them. It is this latter sense that infonns Freud's (19!9/l990) 
account of the uncanny, which is built upon his general theory that neurotic disorders are 
symptoms of repressed psychological causes. For Freud, a latent trauma is projected onto 
mundane events which are thereby imbued with the affects associated with that trauma. In 
addition, just as one may fee l unease as the psychic defences of the ego are being dismantled 
during therapy, the anxieties ofa projected trauma may l>c combined with dread at the gradual 
process of that trauma's revelation. 
Wlmt especially characterises the effect of the uncanny for Todorov (1973) is 
uncertainty about whether seemingly marvellous or unreal events have a psychological or 
physical cause. On the one hand, a character may conruse the real and the imaginary by 
thinking that an event happened when it was simply in his/her head, in the manner of a 
projection, dreilITI, hal lucination, or delusion. On the other hand, n character may confuse the 
real and the illusory, knowing tlrnt an event has happened but not understanding how it 
happened, as in the case of an inexplicable magic trick. The uncanny results when events are 
presented in such a way that n character, and usually the render, is unable to decide either 
way. Tiiis holds open the possibilities that: there is a genuine, hidden reality beyond a 
character's perception-consciousness; that the character is merely (mis-) perceiving events; 
and/or that the character is projecting some hidden reality of his or her psyche onto events 
(also see Cornwell, 1994; Mishra, 1994; Modleski, 1982; Radway, 1984). 
Freud (19!911990) describes four categories of events that can produce this effect: 
repetition, the perception of doubles, the animation or inanimate objects, and the omnipotence 
of thoughts. Todorov (1973) extends these tropes, but Jackson (1988) is even more 
embracing, linking the un,;ellllng effect of the uncanny to violations of linear time, space, 
cause and effect, as well as motifs of metamorphosis, entropy, and bodily disintegration that 
99 
violate the unity of the self. In licti<m, then, a character may perceive any of these as a 
violation of the natural, objective order that constitutes his/her reality. This not only holds 
open the possibility that events arc distorted by the character's perception-<:onsciousncss, it 
cues the reader to expect that some horrible past event about to be disclosed undlor that some 
horrible event is ubout !O befall the character. For Freud (191911990), Todorov (1973), and 
Jackson (1988), the effect of the uncanny is also linked to the violation of taboos, in that the 
subversion of a social order elicits anxieties of punishment aod expresses a desire for the 
repressed, unseen, and unspoken. Chapter Seven will discuss this in tenns of how EEX 
generates the empathetic emotion of fear. Here it suffices to emphasise that projective 
processes are at the core of the uncanny and that they promote a characteristically paranoid 
outlook characterised by a wary suspicion that what one fears is true (sec Swanson, Bohnert, 
and Smith, 1990, p. 8). That is, uncanny events lend characters to progressively confuse their 
anxiety about past or possible experiences with the nctuul throat posed by tl1eir environment in 
the present. 
Several aspects of FFX cue such an uncnnny, or paranoid, outlook. To bei;in with, in 
the opcnini; sequence at Zanarkand, it is revenled that Tidus' father is missini;, and no 
reference is made to his mother. Not Joni; after, retrospective narration reveals Tidus' 
psycholoi;ical abuse from Jech!, and his mother's inu!lention. Here players may realise that 
Tidus' success as a blitzball player, with thousands of adorini; fons, hos not made him 
narcissistic; rnthcr, he lives in the shadow of his father, who was a greater legend in the i;ame, 
and ultimately he feels abandoned. Tidns' fcelini;s of abandonment, even amid�t the 
enormous crowds at the Zanarkand blitzball stadium, are reflected in his isolation after 
walkini; away from his fons, his lonely musini;s as he walks the Causeway, and his isolation 
while preparini; for the i;ame. 
TI1e posoibility that Tidus' feelings or abandonment may be physically manifested is 
foreshadowed by the enormous mirror through which he passes to enter the blitzball stadium. 
As noted in Chnpter Tiuee, hermeneutic codes associated with dreaming sugi;est a shift from 
reality into fonlasy. Indeed, FFX is preoccupied with dream·states. When the boy appears on 
the bridi;c in Zanarknnd the world freezes us if preserved in memory. Prior to tcleportini;, 
Tidus enters the City of Dreams and swims underwater-in-the-air. Each time Tidus is 
teleported there is a fade,to-whitc that may be mctonymic of a !oss·of-consciousness or the 
passing from wakini; to drenming. The forplnne responds to visitor's thoughts and manifests 
their memories of lost loved ones. At the end of the game, Tidus returns to the City of Dreams 
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and confronts his father in u surrealistic parody of Zanarkand. He then confronts Yu Yevon 
amidst a dream-like abstraction of clouds, standins on the enormous sword that was wielded 
by Braska's Final Aeon. 
Apart from these explicit signs of dream-states, players may also perceive as dream­
like the radical oscillation between the ideal and nighunarish in the rapid, and seemingly 
incoherent, opening sequences. The serene situation at Zanarkand turns into the chaos of Sin's 
visitation. The disorientation after Tidus' subsequent teleportation gives way to quiet 
exploration of the Ruins, but this is broken by the auack by the Gcosgeano, who personifies 
oral-sadism with his Swallow attack. This is fo!lowcd by more quiet exploration, this time of 
the Temple, where Tidus falls asleep. However, another predator wakes Tidus. TI1c Al Bhed 
arrive to help him, but then they force him onto their boat and force him to help Rikku raise 
the Airship from under the ocean. Tidus is inexplicably tcleported again, this time to the 
paradise of Besaid, only to realise that the exotic, island peace is false because of the looming 
threat of Sin. While the pace of the narrative subsequently becomes more coherent, these and 
later shifts between threat and safety are paralleled by shifts between the spectacular 
(sweeping views of Zanarkand, Sin, and Geosgacno) and the mundane {gathering wood, the 
contemplative quiet of the ruined temple, and the quiet ocean); between the specular (cut­
sccncs) and the interactive (navigation and fighting); and between Tidus' role as active 
protector (as Guardian and lover to Yuna) and passive victim (lone!y, confused, lost, and a 
tragic romantic lead). 
Such a rapid succession of incoherent events, with a recurring sense of danger, may 
not only connote a dream-like quality; combined with Tidus' uncenainty about what is 
happening, this incoherence mny lead him (ond the player) to remain vigilant and hesitant 
about who his "true" friends are, where the "real" il.mgcr lies, und what is ''really" happening. 
It can be argued that this promotes a paranoid outlook in the sense that an internal siate­
suspensc or fear about what is happening and what could happen-is not properly 
distinguished from the actual threat posed by the environment. Each fearful event proves that 
fear is justified, and that some ''Them" or "It" is, indeed, out to get one, A distrusting 
vigilance about the "truth" or "reality" behind the appearm1ce of things is certainly justified 
each time FFX offers disclosures that force players to revise their view of events and they 
learn that Jecht, Auron, Seymour, Kinoc, Yunalesca, Yu Ycvon arc manipulating Tidus, the 
Guardians and Spira in ways that are selfish, potentially dangerous, or downright vengeful. 
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As Cho game nears its conclusion, Che uncanny in the fonnal sense of the supernatural 
explained is evident in that FFX allows players to infer !hat Tidus' teleportation from 
Zanarkand to Besaid, a thousand years into the future, was partly an illusion. After all, players 
are to!d that Zanarkand and its people, including Tidus, were destroyed a thousand years ago 
and only eilist as Aeons, as part of the Great Summoning. The Grand Summoning therefore 
preserved Tidus in tempornl stasis along with !he rest of Zanarkand, and since a thousand 
years have passed in the narrative, his seeming temporal displacement actually involved the 
lrrmsporr11rio11 of his Aeon-spirit by (or perhaps i11) Sin while he was "unconscious." So 
despite the presence of a supernatural context, there is another level of reality in the text 
which is invoked to explain the teleportation, even if this "reality" is also marvellous. It can 
be argued, then, chm one marvellous oncology is unmasked and replaced by another, but !hat 
an element of !he uncanny persists because the laws of time (and, perhaps, space) are 
preserved wllhin the diegesis. The obfuscation of illusion and imagination is thereby removed, 
allowing players lo perceive the psychological "reality" ofTidus' experience. 
However, because of subsequent disclosures, players will realise chat most of Tidus' 
experiences do literally happen in the exotic marvellous of Spira, and are not simply a 
projection of his emotional state. Most significantly, the uncanny conflation of Jecht as 
monstrous father nnd his subsequent role as Sin, tyrant of Spira, is eventually revealed to be 
merely a coincidence. Yet it remains II curiously uncanny coincidence, and it is not surprising 
that Tid11s experiences an uucanny congruence between his own anxieties und the drama 
unfolding in Spira. Jecht's transfonnation seems to haven poetic logic; it is hard /IOI to read 
Jccht's transfommtion into Sin as an elaboration of (or perhaps punishment for) his monstrous 
parenting ofTidus. Indeed, FFX as a whole makes a lot of sense when read iu tcnns ofTidus' 
psychological state. Tidus' repeated emphasis that ''This is my story" logically re-affinns !hat 
the story is hi.< (final und by implication fatal) fantasy. This preserves the unsettling sense that 
the story may be not merely a marvellous talc of supernatural ev ents, but a reflection ofTidus' 
mental stnte, nnd pcrbps nn imagined working-through of his abandonment. After ull, Tidus' 
feelings are made conveniently visible lo a surrogate Jove (Yuna), who accepts him, confinns 
his value, reciprocates his love, and provides a mirror of his own plight. His rescue of her also 
allows him to perfonn his desired-for heroism, and his dual union with and defeat of his father 
allows him to achieve psycho!ogical closure. Ultimately, the scale and intimacy of Tidus' 
suffering-the loss of his father, his mochcr, his home, his fame, Yuna, nnd his own life­
makes Lhe game's specmcular excess and unreality emotionally intelligible. 
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The Fantastic 
While Todorov's {1973) experience of the uncanny involves a hesitation that is 
resolved through subsequent expfanations, there is no such resolution in the experience of the 
"fantastic." For Todorov, tlie fantastic is characterised by three criteria: 
First, the text must oblige the render to consider the world of the characters as n 
world of living persons nnd to hesitate between a natural and supernatural 
explanation of the events described. Second, this hesitation may also be 
expericnct:d by a character •••. Third, the render must adopt a certain attitude 
to the text: he will reject allegorical as well ns ''poetic" interpretations. (p. 33) 
In regards to the first criterion, for an event to be fantastic n render must hesitate between 
interpreting an event, such as Tidus' tclcportation, ns either marvellous (supernatural) or as 
uncanny (an imagined projection and/or an illusion). Since the fantastic persists during the 
period of hesitation many texts thnt otherwise belong to the marvellous or uncanny mny have 
fantastic aspects or sequences. Indeed, while Todorov sees the fantastic in fonnal terms as 
occurring in te�ts in which there is no closuill, Jackson (1988) emphasises that the "fantastic"
is simply the most subversive form of fantasy in general and th.it the experience of hesitation 
often has the experiential qunllties of the uncanny. 
Todorov's (1973) second criterion is conditional, in Lhnt while hesitation is often 
represented in the mind of a character it suffices that the reader experiences it. It must be 
emphasised that this hesitation need not be a consequence of the formal qualities of the work: 
a character may make inferences on the basis of a short-auentlon span, confusion, or aporia in 
the plot, and these may give rise to uncertainty. In fact, we can avoid many of Todorov's 
formal verbal, syntactic and thematic requirements of the fantastic by foiling back on Grodnl's 
(1997) account of unreality ns the experience that occurs in the absence of closure in and/or 
between perception, affect and cognition. That is, the effect of the fantastic may be seen in 
general terms as a consequence of cognitive dissonance ir, the render produced through the 
inconsistent coding (or de-coding) of events. However, even with this qualification we can 
retain Todorov's (1973) third criterion of the fantastic. As he argues, there can be no 
hesitation about the status of seemingly supernatural events if they are explained away as 
"poetic" representations of a familiar reality, or if they are read allegorically as an extended 
metaphor for something beyond the diegesis, such as the universality of greed, nn historical 
conflict, or a political figure. 
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There are several evems in FFX which are represented in such u way that tl1ere muy 
be unresolved uncenainty about their reality-status; indeed, it cu11 be argued that the game's 
hermeneutic code actively works to code v raisemblunce in u logically inconsistent fashion. As 
noted above, an explanation forTidus' teleponalion may be inferred near the end of the game, 
but the game seems to be more concerned with e�ploiting its uncertain status. Since visual 
representation nt u cinematic level of detail is taken us objective description, the player is 
likely lo perceive him/herself as a witness to Tidus' perceptions undfor environment. After nil, 
players see Tidus teleponed, or, rather, they see the effect of teleportation, along with him, 
and so are inclined to accept the telcponmion as marvellous ut face v alue. However, the 
incoherence of the related narrative sequences may be perceived as an excessive 
represcmutlon of the physical disorientation of tclcportution within a marvellous text. Given 
the initial absence of any explanation for the te!eportation, players are more likely to receive 
the imprcssio11 from the first hour of play that the story itself is incoherent, and may feel 
premonitory doubts about the quality of i!S telling. Of course, some readers may simply 
inte!]lrct this in relation to the discourse of the real: "this (Spira) is a crazy world!" Yet if 
Spira is a marvellous world, why is there such an excessive representation of the violation of 
time and space? Why is Tidus so confused by events at the beginning of the game? Tidus' 
expression that "This is my story" here muy resonate with a player's awareness that he is not 
an omniscient narrator, but has a limited perspective, and may be subjectively distorting 
events. Nonetheless, Given Tidus' surprise and players' shared confusion, there is a 
possibility that the teleponation may have violated the discourse of the real that governs 
Spira. 
When Tidus talks to Rikku and Wakku, and as the nUITative srnrts to progress in a 
more linear fashion, players may feel assured that the incoherence of the opening sequences is 
intentionul {or, at least, merely a transitory example of poor storytelling). However, while 
Rikku and Wukka soon offer players information which helps them to make sense of Tidus' 
teleportution, they do not resolve its status. On !he salvage ship, Rikku tells Tidus that 
Zanarkand has been gone a thousand years. While honest and seemingly compassionate, 
Rikku is young and na'ivc, belongs to :i group that seems isolated from the rest of Spira, and, 
given 1110 Muslim coding of the Al Bhed, perhaps prejudiced, with a di stoned, fanatical view 
of lhe world. A short time Inter, Wakka suggests that, lmving gotten too close to Sin, Tidus' 
mind is addled by Sin's toxin. Wakku also seems honest, but he is characterised us 
unintellii:ent, primitive, and (like Rikku) as living in an isolated region. The unreliability of 
Rlkku's and Wakka's accounts holds open the possibility that what has been narrated has 
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another explanation. 
On the S.S. Winno, Yuna provides same early support for Tidus by relating how she 
met his father, Sir Jecht, ten years ago, and that her quest is Inking her to Zam1rkand. While 
Yuna's attraction to TidLIS may colour her willingness m remain-open-minded, she places 
more weight on the possibility that Tidus is right: players arc free to infer that Zanmkand has 
been displaced into this future, or that there is some temporal !apse between Zanarkand and 
the rest of Spira. In any case, having accepted the telcportation, the concern for Tidus 
becomes how/why he wns teleported, where Z:mmkand is (past or present), and how, or if, he 
can get home. This perspective is reinforced by Auron, who, by being present in boch Tidus' 
past and present, is readily perceived as knowing the truth of Tidus' tclcportation. Auron 
oventually confirms Tidus' account and provides the reason for the tcleportation: he had 
promised Jecht to bring TMus to Spira. (The reader may presum e that he and Auron "rode" 
Sin as Sin travelled through time nndJar space.) There is, then, a marvellous means to a 
mundane end: a father's desire to see his son. 
Through this, and with the subsequent disclosures about the Grnnd Summoning, 
players may come to accept Tidus' teleportation as marvellous and/or uncanny. However, a 
sense ofuncertabty �bout chc status ofTidus' teleportation persist because it is linked to other 
events that are equally uncertain. The fact of Jecht's transformation into the monstrous Sin, 
for example, is initially presented to Tidus by Auron. Tidus respects and relies upon Auron, 
but Aur on's appearance at Zanarkand to help Tidus seems overly convenient (and therefore 
suspicious), and Auron"s taciturn qua lities may lead pluycrs to suspect that he is not telling the 
who!e truth. The statement also is hard to accommodate. Players do not see a visual 
representation of Jecht's transformation (except analogously, when Seymourchangcs into his 
alternate forms), nor do tliey hem an explanation for how the transformation came about and 
its extent (does Jecht's mind reside iu Sin, or hs he completely changed?). There is also no 
basis for familiaritv between Sin and Jecht in terms of shape, intilligencc, or motive, except 
Tidus' perception thatJecht's treatment of him was monstrous. 
Later in !lie game players sec thatJecht seer•> to govern Sin's movements. Sin quietly 
presents himself to Tidus at the Musl,room Rock battle site, and later at Zanarkand after the 
confrontation with Yunalesca (Tidus here feels confident enough to refer to him as his "'old 
man") {see Figure 4.3a). When the characters fall under the ice under Guadosalam, players 
a!so !cam that Sin shares Jecht's love of thc Song of the Fnyth, likely confirming the fact of 
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the lrnnsfonnntion. However, some players mny recognise that !lie connection between Jecht 
and Sin is not entirely logical, even within the realm ofthc exotic marvellous. Auron says that 
Jecht is Sin, but players Icnm that Sin is aeongregalion of Aeons-port of the Swnmoning of 
all Ilic Aeons, or dead, in Zanarbnd---nnd Tidus Inter confronts Jecht iaside Sin. During the 
nclunl confrontation in the City of Dreams, Jecht snys that the transfonnation (into Sin and/or 
the Finni Aeon) is not yet complete, such thnt he still has some control over his (Sin's) mind. 
This is the logic governing Tidus' Tnlk function during his battle with Brnskn's Final Aeon: 
l>y Talking to the Aeon Tidus nppenls t,:, the vestiges of Jecht's humanity, reduoing his 
Overdrive Attack. After two attempt s to Talk, Jecht's hwnanity has faded nnd all that remnins 
vre his physical vestiges: muscularity, clothes, tattoos, wid the Jecht's Shot Overdrive Attllck. 
Figure 4.3. (a) Sin-Jccht presents himself to Tidus. [b) The pyreflies which compose the 
Farplnne. 
llie link be tween Brash's Final Aeon nnd Sin is equally ambiguous, unless players 
tl1ink of Jecht as the sacrifice thnt links the divine to the human, such that the Final Aeon is n 
kind of spiritual battety (an assertion that is never explicitly mnde). Indeed, there remains nn 
unresolved slippage between the Grand Summoning of the Aeons ofZannrknnd, the Aeon11 of 
Auron, Tidus and Jecht, Sin, and Braska's Final Aeon. All partake of the Grand Summoning, 
such that it is not merely Jecht thnt hos "become" Sin: Tidus and all the others from 
Zannrlrnnd are a part of the Grand Su mmoning which preseives Sin, and this in tum is merely 
part of the Spiral ofDcolh, in which the dead (Mncstcrs) rule the living. 
Even if the Grand Summoning and the Spiral of Death are accepted as marvellous, 
denth and the dead are in c�nsistcntly represented. Mika can voluntnrily reveal his spirit-state, 
and Seymour is able to sec that Auron is a spirit (players mny relrospcctively realise the 
significance of Seymour's comment of: "What are you still doing here?" to Auron in 
Guadosnlam as an indication of this). Howev�-r, Tidus is not even aware of being dead: he hns 
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mass, he can injure and be injured. he can move and be moved, and he can touch and kiss 
Yuna. Players might generalise from the convention that ghosts persist because of un resolved 
commitments or excessive attachment to the world, and that some ghosts do not know that 
they are ghosts, as was recently dramatised in The Sixth Sense (1999). Having acknowledged 
this, an Aeon who knows sfhe is an Aeon might choose to disappear, as does Mika when he 
]earns that Yunalesca has been killed. However, as long as one remains ignorant of one's 
situation and/or uses o ne's will to persist, one remains (like Tidus) in the world. 
Hero players might explain away Tidus' and other Aeon's solidity as part of the 
game's (meta-) physics. It is significruit that Tidus is not undead in the classic sense of a 
putrefying corpse. Indeed, the absence of zombies, vampires, mummies, and other literllf)' and 
cinematic icons of the undead is significant for reasons other than censorship. Excluding 
Anima, who embodies bondage and torture with her Pain attack, ffX. visualises death not in 
tenns of putrefaction, but dissipation. It is as if material existence is merely a soli d state of a 
substance that can tum liquid or gaseous. This is perhaps evident in elemental beings such 11S 
the Larva (Fire), Imps (Lighming), Ice Flans (Ice), and Remom (Water), which may be seen 
as a distillation of compound materiality into its fundamental particles. Players may also 
distin guish an even more fundamental particle: the atoms of spirit, or mind, positively 
embodied by Aeons, and negatively embodied by monsters such as Ghosts, who are 
susceptible to the White Magic spell, Ho!y. That is, the spirit world may be seen not as some 
"other" reulm, but as the inspiriting force behind all matter: an animistic conception in which 
all thing s have a spirit, and are spirit. 
However, if players make this inference, another distinction needs to be 
ac commodated. During combm, we bear witness to the way in which Fiends killed during 
battle dissipate in a spectral blur marked by motes of mulli-coloured lights. Given that Fiends 
are the spirits of the dead, we may presume that these motes represent the atomic particles of 
the spi rit-hood dispersing into the world. However, when we see similar lights at the 
Moon now llI!d at the Furplane they are called pyre mes. Pyre mes, we are told, resonate with 
the memories of the living, and in the Furplane they may manifest as the spirits of the dead 
(see Figure 4.3b, above). Since Tidus crosses the barrier into the Farplane, it would seem that 
Auron could enter but chooses not to because he knows he will sec nothing of value. 
However, as they leave, Seymour's father, Lord Jyscul, appears at the edge of the Farplane 
and physically passes eon a recording sphere speaking of Seymour's treachery. We arc, then, 
less likely to sec him as merely a projection. The problem is, do we read Lord Jy scul's 
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handing over of the sphere as a supernatural occurrence within an already otherwise 
supernatural dlegesis, in the manner of a new level of the marvellous? Jyscal's desire to pass 
on the truth makes his munifostation equivalent lo that of Aeons like Tidus and Auron, who 
are able to remain in the world because of their attachment to it. We have no basis for 
perceiving Tidus, Auron or Seymour as a mass of pyre flies, but Lord Jyscal's manifestation 
effectively blurs the boundary between Aeons and pyre flies. 
This indeterminacy about the metaphysics of death culminates in tl1c patent surrealism 
of the final battle with Yuna's Aeons and Yu Yevon. Characters have an Auto-Life status, so 
that when they die during combat with the Aeons or Yu Yevon they arc immediately 
resurrected. Even though they arc resurrected wllh minimal health points, so that characters 
may die quickly after being brought back to life, the abso/me wony of dying and having to 
replay 1he game sequence is suspended. In this respect, the end sequence is stmngcly 
abstraclcd from other combat sequences. Furthermore, while Yu Yevon is not physically 
imposing he is likely to kill the player's characters several times, and his healing abilities 
mean that he keeps returning lo his initial condition, undermining any sense of progression. 
The easiest way to kill him is by the logical reversal of attack types. If we cast Reflect on the 
characters, Yu Yevon's spells rebound back onto him. By casting Zombie status on Yu 
Yevon, his own healing spells injure him; and if we subsequently cast Full-Life on him he is 
suhject to the reverse: full death. The whale end sequence is, then, governed by a kind of 
dream-logic. 
While this last connict may seem anticlimactic, it retains a cenain retrospective force 
because of its inexplicabllity. With Jecht dead, the confrontnlion is a weird witnessing and 
panicipMion in the known resolution of a tragedy, a form of estrangement from the player's 
previous engagement with the game. At the same lime, the end sequence may produce a kind 
of exhilarating sense of freedom, of joyous reversal: we fight amidst the abstraction of orange 
c louds, aware of a moment of finality, destroying Aeon after Aeon as a permanent extinction 
(as opposed to the temporary defeat from which they can later be re-summoned). The whole 
sequence allows not merely an anticlimactic resolution to a ninety-hour-long gaming 
experience, but a kind of suspension of the telos that governed this play, governed by a 
euphoric recognition that one has actually performed the labour of the entire game: one has 
finally made it. If no single reward can adequately suffice to provide closure for such a 
sprawling n arrative, then Ilic surrealism of the c!osins: experience connotes the 111lnscendence 
of the laws of the diegesis prior to re·cntering the laws of the "real.'' 
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It is possible to argue that the subsequent nurrutive resolution expurgates some of 
these inconsistencies . By dispelling the Spiral of Dealll, the order of Life is re-instated, or, 
rather, Spira recovers its "natural" balance of life and death, matter and spirit, reality and 
unre ality. Prior inconsistencies can therefore be dismissed as an index of the prior imbalance. 
However, pl�yers may still have cause to lles itatc between different interpretations of the 
game. As has been noted, despite knowing tllat events are marvellous, there is a logical reason 
fo1· perceiving FFX as an uncanny projection of Tidns' mental state. Similarly, while Yu 
Yevon may be read as a supernatural being, he is figured as an elemental ball of anger or 
hatred just prior to being unveiled as a small, ugly, and pathetic figure. This may incline some 
players to read him us a kind of psychic residue, a distillation of the hate and rage born from 
four of tllose in Spira. That is, players may sec him as literally a projection of Spira's 
emotional life just as some ghosts are seen as psychic residue of the emotions experienced 
during their death. 
Players might also might read Yu Yevon as an allegorical projection, whereby FFX 
becomes a story about how giving into fear and hate can give rise to escalating, pointless 
suffering. Such an allegorical reading might be reinforced by the p;;rallel between Seymour's 
pathological way of dealing with the prejudice he was subject to as a child, and Yu Yevon as 
over-reac!ing to his fear of humanity's potential technological powers (especially given 
Seymour's desire to appropriate Yu Yevon's power). That is, these coincidences or parallels 
are readily interpreted in thematic terms, allowing players to read FFX as a parable about not 
only an ado lescent's rite-of-passage, but intolerance, fear, or, even more generally, the human 
condition. Indeed, even those players who do not observe any inconsistency in the logic of 
FFX's events, such that it is not experienced as fantastic, may still hesitate over whether. to 
read the game as supernatural, uncanny, or an allegory, preserving a hovering sense of its 
indcronnina!C reality-status, This uncertainty may promote a global anxiety about what is 
happening that may complement any paranoid, projective tendencies that the player 
experiences abont events in the game. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued �rnt FFX may be seen as placing emphasis on reality by not 
only revising henneneutic expectations about what is happening, but by also revising players' 
urtderstanding of what lla.r happened and if or how it happened. Therefore it is reasonable to 
suggest that the ambivalent perceptual impressions of reality addressed in Chapter Two are 
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recuperated in thematic tcnns and integrated as part of the gime's aesthetic effect. Tiiat is, the 
experience or intensities mid saturations produced by disjunctlvc proximal-distal transactions 
may work together with the inconsistent cognitive construction of reality to reinforce players' 
confusion, and suspense, about Tidus' experiences. As will be argued in later chapters, 
disjunctive affects may resonate with other aspects ofFFX, but before making such argumcn!S 
it is ncccssacy to address a dilTerent kind of reality: the reality of players' relationships to 
characters. 
IIO 
Chapter Five - Cognitive Identification and Character Interest 
!t is generally accepted that the marketing or Lira Croft, Sonic the Hedgehog, and 
Mario wns a large factor in the popularity of Sony, Sega and Nintendo respectively {Berger, 
2002; Poole, 2000). More tlmn that, the marketing or games in general has frequently 
emphasised known and likeable characters drawn from print or tilm texts. It may therefore 
seem logical to stan with the assumption that if one likes a character one is likely to be 
interested in any game in which that ch!UTicter appears. However, characters are not usually 
seen as having a role in regulutir1g interest, in that, as Skirrow (1980) has observed, there is 
"no [psychological] development of character as [a video] game progresses" (p. 331). Fuller 
and Jenkins {!995) similarly argue that characters: 
play a minimal role, displaying traits that are largely capacities for action: 
fighting skills, modes of trrmsportution, preestablished goals. The game's 
dependence on characters .... borrowed from other media allows them to 
simply evoke those characters rather than fully develop them. The chamcter is 
little more than a cursor that mediates the player's relationship to the story 
world. Activity drains away the character's strength as measured by an ever­
shifting graph at the top oftl1e screen, but it cnnnot build ch!UTicter, since these 
figures lack even the most minima! interiority. (p. 61) 
This position reaches its extreme in Stallabras' (1996) annlogy to commodification, according 
to which "digital objects encoumered in the g11mc [arc] types . . ranked on a common 
arithmetical scale in which every quality is tradeablc" (p. 90). Here characters arc figured 
merely ns the player's gaming assets, and any psychological drama lies solely in the player's 
experience of the rise nnd foll of his/her fortunes. 
While video game characters do sometimes function as simply II fomilinr face or a tool 
of the player (sec Chapter Eight), early researchers tended to generalise from kinaesthetic or 
puiile games in which the use of narrative was limited 10 cut-scenes which represented 
character goals. By contrast, adventnre and role-playing games like FFX have made ongoing 
use of nnrratives in which characters have a complexity equal to characters in film and 
undergo psychological development. This chapter is concerned with the way players produce 
II model of such complexity, drawing upon Tan's (1997) argument that, if interest is governed 
by dynamics of anticipation and outcomes, another source of investment and return lies "in 
the expectations and anticipations that are rooted in the vic1,;,r's knowledge of, and feelings 
toward, the characters of a film" (p. !54). Whereas later chapters nddrcss the "feelings" 
towards characters in FFX, this chapter addresses players' "knowledge of' them, or what 
Grodal calls "cognitive identification" of character traits, and the consequent expectutions that 
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regul�te inlllresl. After considering the limitations of early models of character, it analyses 
players' cognitive processing or what Barthes (l975a) calls scmic codes across narrative and 
game macrostructures. 
Narrative Mncrostructures 
A.clantial Model 
Aristotle {trans. 1965), in his analysis of Greek tragedy, began from the premise that 
"Anists imitate men in action," and went on to distinguish between "agents" (pratton), 
referring to figures who function merely to perfonn actions required by tl1e narrative, and 
"characters" (ethos), referring lo figures traitctl in such a wny that they have personhood. In 
practice, many narratives have characters that do little more than perfonn a function that 
advances the narrative, nnd early narratological theory paid much attention to these functions. 
Since some critics regard video game characters as functional, without any psychological 
complexity or depth, it becomes necessary to address the implication, which Berger(2002, pp. 
45-47, 78-79) makes explicii, that curly structuralist models of narrative (Barthes, 1966/1988, 
1975a; Chatman, 1978; Genette, 1980; Propp, 1968; Todorov, !977, 1981) have renewed 
relevance to video games. 
Vladimir Propp (1968) identified seven roles that characters in folktales may take 
up-villain, helper, donor, sought-for-person, dispatcher, hero and folsc hero-and which 
were distributed u,ross a fixed sequence of thirty-one funcuons (supposedly) common to all 
fairy tales. The problem with this model is thut non-fairy tale narratives (novels, films, video 
games) rarely conform 10 Propp's structure, either in terms of the sequence or number or 
functions at the level of fahula or syuzhct. In video games, Propp's functions may be 
manifested in some form, but video games have a repetitive {non-linear) structure, and draw 
upon various genres, from fantasy, through horror, to film noir, each with its own structurnl 
distinctiveness. Consequently, systematically applying his functions would be to subsume 
video games to one genre in another medium (the print fairy-talc). Propp's model also is, 
needless to say, insensitive 10 histo rical context, reader competence, and the poststructuralist 
recognition thut meaning is read inta, or/ram, the \e�t. 
If any use is to be made of Propp {1968), then, the appropriate departure point would 
be Anton Greimas' (1987) "fertile and inaugural rewriting of Propp" (Jameson, in Grcimas, 
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1987, p. xi). This crnapolates from sentence grammar by way or the semiotic square to 
identify six categories or "actants," which are only intelligible when grasped as a total 
structure: 
dminatc"r 
adj"vanl 
cbjc, '7 
r 
s11Jet 
Figure 5.1. Greimas (1987) ac1antial grammar. 
des1i11araire 
tJppo<anl 
This structure is understood us a fonn of exchange between the subject (sujet) who desires the 
object (abjet), and its tenns may be translated us follows (with the analogous Proppinn tenns 
in brackets); 
Sender '7 
(Dispoteher) 
Object '7 
(Sought-for-person) 
r 
Receiver 
(Hero) 
Helper '7 Subject � Opp0nent 
(Donoror (Hero) (Villain 
HelJ>er or Folse Hero) 
Figure 5.2. Greimas (1987) nctuntial grammar mapped onto Propp's morphology. 
While this model of actantial relations describes a basic grammar which governs the logic of 
narrative tmnsfonnations, it does not (like Propp's) rely on a fixed sequeace of narrative 
functions. Rather, a sequence of mrrrative functions may be seen as an "eITect" of these 
actantial relations through a particular act or reading. 
Ifwe apply this actantial model to FFX's narrative mru:rostructure, Tidus would seem 
10 be the subject (hero) because he is the first figure rcpr escntcd in the manual, the first and 
last figure players control, and other characters under the player's control are nbsorbed into 
him during many nnvigntion sequences (Tidus al�o states ''This is my s tory" on several 
occasions). Jccht, having given Auron his mission to retrieve Tidus to de foal h;,,,, would seem 
to be the sender. The object of the quest, not realised until near the end, is the defeat or Yu 
Yevon, who resides in Sin. Since the quest to defeat Yu Yevon relieves Spira or Sin's 
oppression, Spira is the receiver (of liberation). The Guardians are the helpers, in that they 
accompany Tidus through the entire quest. On this basis, it is possible to nominate the 
following general actamial system: 
113 
Sender 7 Object 7 Receiver 
Jech! Yu Yevon Spiro 
Helper 7 Subject • Oppanem 
Guordi�n• Tidus Yu Yevon 
Figure 5.3. Greimas (1987) actm1tial grammar applied to FFX's narrative macrostructure. 
If this is accepted as the aciantinl system that dominates the narrative macrostructure then the 
sequence of the fabula and the meaning of the narrative may be seen as organised nround the 
actions of characters. That is, Jecht sends for Tidus (who is helped by Yunn and the other 
Guardians) to destroy Yu Yevon (who is helped by Sin and Seymour) and, thereby, free Spira. 
A strict suucturn.Hst may conclude that a player's narrative competence won Id be reflcc1ed in 
his/her ability to generate a summary (no doubt with variations or differing degrees of 
emphasis) using this basic actantial grammar. 
A more diligent structuralist enquiry might elaborate upon which churncters function 
as supplements or intermediaries of these actantinl roles. Auron could be seen as an 
intermediate sender between Jccht and Tidus, given that Jecht gives him the mission to send 
for Tidus. Sin and Jecht (or at least Bruska's Final Aeon, his alter ego) are inde;,;icn! of Yu 
Yevon, and for much or the narrative function as supplement objects. The initial receiver 
seems to be Tidus, then Zamtrkand or Yuna. but later in the narrative Spira becomes the pre­
emincnt receiver, as is evident in Yuna's address to the stadium in Luca. While the other 
Guardians may be seen as Tidus' primary helpers, Spira may collectively function as the 
helper given that its citizens provide knowledge or resources and unite to sing the Hymn of 
the Fayth that calms Sin. While Yu Yovan is the primary opponent, all the monsters 
encountered are opponents, but since most monsters are random encounters the "boss" 
monsters may be seen as supplementary opponents, with Seymour the prc·emincnt 
supplement given his intention lo usurp Sin's power. 
The most obvious problem with such an account is that lt is only relative to a 
generalised epic or quest macrostructure. when, as Chapter Three indicated, FFX shifts 
between film and print fantasy, science-fiction, romance, adventurc/rolc·p!aying game, and 
tragedy. In the romantic macrostructure, Tidus may still be the subject, but Yu Yevon 
becomes an obstacle to the higher-order object or love with Yunn, and Tidus' subsequent 
dis)X!rsal as an Aeon makes thi5 a Jragic romance: Yuna receives Jove from Tiduo, but not a 
loving union. Alternately, since Yuna is the survivor and authorised voice who speaks at the 
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end of the game as the living leader or figurehead of Spira, players may sec her less as taking 
over the narrative from Tidus und more as having focalised his narrative from the beginning, 
with Tidus the (tragically lost) love object. (Indeed, in a final scene allegedly edited out of the 
game, Yunu makes this reversal explicit, saying; "I know it's selfish but this is my story"), 1
As a consequence of the trngic nature of the romance, t11e reader may take the moment when 
Yuna intends lo sacrifice love (for Tidus) by marrying Seymour to unite Bevelle and Guado 
as the key dramntic point, with publk duty the higher-order object. Since defeating Sin 
permanently means that Tidus will disappear, Sin and Yu Ycvon function Jess as obstacles in 
the wuy of romamic love than as necessary acllmts in a plot that dramatises Yuna as 
performing the public duty of sacrificing one's hope for love (which she was prepared to 
make with Seymour but could not because he was a "false hero"), In this reading, Tidus may 
be seen as the helper and Spira is at once the sender and receiver. 
A deta1i�d structuralist analysis of the dominum actantial relations of the various 
macrostructures, and the superimposition of these actantial systems, would provide some 
useful departure poiots in correlating the readings provided by players. For example, one 
player may emphill5iSe the fantasy, romance and epic macrostructures and ignore the trngic 
macrostructure, suggesting a preference for narratives that articulate a faith in the
transcendental unity of the self and its integration with society: a happy ending. Another 
player may emphasise tragic macrostructurcs, suggesting a preforence for nmwtivcs that 
express the fragmentation and alienation of the self: ambivalent or sad endings. Such a player 
may perceive the subject as being excluded from the actantfol ro!e of receiver, revealing at 
once a liberal faith in the capacity of the individual to change the world, but a tragic 
perception that an individual's suffering is in direct proportion to the benefit of others. The 
same player may consistently verbalise macrostructures around Tidus, even those in which he 
is not the character being controlled, such that using Yuna in combat is still just "helping" 
Tidus. The narrative's attention to Yuna rescuing Spira may therefore function to make a hero 
of the tragic self. These interpretations might be correlated with n player's personality (low 
self-esteem), social position (the absence of filial affection), and/or ga."tling history (a 
tendency towards solitary gameplay). 
However, if the structure of actnntia! relations extrapolates from the sentence. the 
above accounts do not do justice to the grammatical variation and flexibility of sentences and 
' This do<umont can be found undor lhe 1;110 "Final Fontosy X: The Eternal Calm" al lho Final Fontosy 
Shrine, last accessed January, l, 2005 (htlp:/lwww.ffshrino.org/ff,21 ffx2_ec.php). 
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sequences of sen!enccs. The actanlial roles of successive sentences may be pcrfonned by 
different subjects and vary from scene to scene. Not only arc other characters often the 
subjecls, each game and narrative sequence has its own object {rescuing Tidus, escaping 
Geosgaeno, rescuing Yuna, and so on). Banhes' (196611988) summarises; 
every character (even secondary) can be the agent of sequences, of actions 
which belong to him,,. when a single sequence involves two chnraclcrs (as is 
usual}, it comprises two perspectives, two names [for example, the "opponent" 
of one may be the "helper" of the other]; in shon, every character (even 
secondary) is the hero oihis own sequence (p. 119). 
It is, then, not sufficient to simply identify an end-state. Just as real-time interest cannot be 
understood retrospectively, comprehension and emotional response to chnraclcrs in any 
panicular sequence will depend upon dynamic changes in and across various 
macrostructures, including the complexities of focalisation and related mediations of spatial 
and attitudinal perspective. Indeed, the final structural arrangement may be highly un­
representative of the meaning taken away from it and the experience of watching it, a� is 
evident when we consider the process of character typing. 
Cognitive IdenlificaJion: Semic Codcg and Types 
Psychoanalysis tends to emphusise the ways in which individuals identify {or do not 
identify) wil/i something (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1988, p. 205). However, it is only possible to 
identify with something, or to resist such identification, after identification o/it, that is, after it 
has been idclltificd. In this sense, psychoanalytic accounts of identification marginalize the 
issuo of how viewers construct the identity of the subjcct-actunts with whom they identify. 
The narratological model of acrnntial refotions is inudequate in providing a model of 
identification since it focuses on narrative structures, not the dynamic perceptual, cognitive 
and emotional activity ofployers. Here we can tum lo Tan (1997) and Grodal (1997). For Tan 
(!997), impression fonnation directed towards fictional characters follows tho same patterns 
as with real people, and research suggests that cognitive evaluation of people is initially top­
down (pp. 163-164) (see also Brewer, 1988; Wyer and Gordon, 1984). That is, upon 
observing a person's traits, one will attempt to categorise him/her according to well-known 
types: "hierarchical combinations of roles, features and behavioural churacteristics" {Tan, 
1997, p. 164). Groda! (1997) refers to this process as "cognitive identification" ond ar,!_!;ucs 
that: 
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rhc most ba.<:ic levels are the most general. Tl1ey only presuppose abilities such 
as the ability to perceive remote objects, 10 experience tactile and imcroccptive 
sensation, lO foci simple motives, affects, and emotions, and to understand 
uncomplicated plnns, goals and acts. (p. 92) 
Indeed, Bordwell (1989) identifies a generic "person schemata" {p. 152) chElfacterised by; 
I. a human body, presumed 10 be singular and unified;
2. perceptual activity, including self-awareness; 
3. thoughts, including beliefs; 
4. feelings or emotions;
5. traits, or persisting dispositional qualities;
6. the capacity for self-impelled actions, such !IS communication, goal­
fonnation and-achievement, and su on.
According to this model, nil these features are attributed the moment we identify n person or 
subject-actant. That is, the moment we see a character we automatically a ccept a range of 
potential capabilities that will affect our evaluation of previous, present and future 
nnrrntive/gamc events. Consequently, narratives can be sparse in their description of 
characters; there is no need to specify the existence of limbs, the ability to perceive and be 
self-aware, the capacity for reflection and emotional responses, or that characters 11TC 
motivuted in panicular ways. 
As Eco (1979, p. 23) notes, a text may make some of these "propenies" more 
textually relevant andfor may narcotise others. In FFX, tl1c existence of Tidus' "hotly" 
presumes the existence of the full complement of organs, including the facility for ingestion, 
respiration, defecation anO sexual intercourse. However, not ull of these organs h�ve equal 
significance in tcnns of their effect on the unfolding of muwtivc or game macrostructures. 
The relevance of ingestion is only manifested during both navigation und combat sequences 
when players access the party's items and "use" potions, and the only represcntntion offered is 
the stylised action ofa character bringing a potion into tl1e vicinity of his/her face. The ability 
to respire is not only r.arcotiscd but abolished, since characters in FFX seem incapable of 
drowning: at the start of the game, Tidus plays blitzball underwater without artificial aids; 
later on other characters swim underwater for indefinite periods. Defecation is narcotised in 
that it is not represented and has no narrative impon, unless one sees some monsters' auacks 
(stJch a s  the Marlboro's squirted excretions) us a fonn of defecation. The potential relevance 
of primary sexual functions (the possibility of sexual intercourse between characters) is 
partially narcotised by the game's ruling and its platonic emphl!Sis on romantic love und 
friendship. However, the narrative does promote an adolescent voyeurism based on secondary 
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sexual characteristics, such that players may be cued towards sexual fantasy, even if they do 
not expect the game to follil them. 
Once a player has identified a general '"person type," more complex typing may occur 
which allows for more complex cxpcctutions aboUI n character's future behaviour or fate. Ton 
(1997) draws from Andersen and Klatsky (1987) to differentiate between simple and generic 
"trait typcs"-such as "outgoing, socially skilled, friendly, nuuy, power-loving, self­
confident, knowledgeable, and intelligent" (p. 165}-and more detailed "social stereotypes"­
such as "malioso, clown/comedian, politician/diplomat, bully/gang member, brain/genius, 
depressed/suicidal, wise man/guru" (p. 165), including specific person stereotypes, such as 
"'Ronald Reagan, Woody Allen, and Ghandi" (p. 165). An actantial type may function as the 
basis for organising these trait-, social- and person- types. For example, Il:ls�rnine 
consistently pe rforms the function of "helper," and this type is reinforced by specific trailing 
of her as female, beautiful, more experienced (older) and more powerful (a guardian). Even 
when she functions as an opponent by pitting her Aeons against Yuna's, she is testing players, 
helping them to better understand 1hc difficullies of their quest. 
However, structuralist accounts of characterisation tend to recognise that chmactcrs 
arc 110, types; "they nro simply subjects of a group of predicates which the reader adds up as 
he goes along" (Culler, 1975, p. 235). This is clearly articulated in Barthes' (1975a) nccount 
of the "sernic code," which refers to the provision "of the basis of character traits" {p. 19). For 
Barthes, reading involves o constant process of naming, but, as Culler (1975) summarises; 
naming is always approximate and uncertain. One slides from name to name as 
the texts throw up more semantic features and invite one to group and compose 
them. • . When one succeeds in naming a series of semes a pattern is 
established and a churnctcr formed. {pp. 236-237) 
Tan (1997) similarly argues that much mental modelling in feature lilms is a matter of tryiog 
out different schemata and discarding them as the narrative offers new or contradictory 
information about characters (p. 164). In cognitive terms, the top·down assignment of types is 
repeatedly revised through ongoing bottom-up processing of .1cw information that is 
incon�istcnl with the existing type(s). At the same time, viewers tend not to hypothesise 
connections beyond an immediate scene, and that when they have arrived at a particular view 
of a character they only reappraise it when new (inconsistent) information arrives (fan, 1997, 
p. 105). Consequently, the necessity ofrcappraisal---such as discovering that Jecht is Sin, tlmt 
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Yuna is tragically aware that she is about to die, and that Tidus and Auron are Aeons-is 
often cued through surprise. 
The literary und cognitive .ccounts may be seen as emphasising different aspects of 
this process. In semiotic terms, scmes may be grouped into "types," but these arc unstable, not 
only because of new disdosurcs, but also bccm.:.c ofpolysemy. Consequently, the emphasis is 
on variations within or between ty�s andfor the formation of new typei;. Jn cognitive terms, a 
type is synonyrnou� with II schemata, either 11 ''prototype" schemata (an established set of 
contents) or a "template" schemata (an estahlished form which readily assimilates new 
content). Wliilc accommodating new information is a dynamic activity, the cognitive model 
may be seen as emphasising prior types through it� concern with the stability of schemata. 
While the cognitive account distinguishes between top-down and boltom-up processing, the 
semiotic account better accounts for the dynamic exchange between the two. So, as FFX 
develops, characters accrue sr.mes, and the player attempts to "group and compose them" 
according to some �rceived association (e�plicit or connoted) andfor a well-known type. 
This typing may be relatively automatic, providing n quick and coarse way of defining and 
anticipating character behaviour, but new infonnation will cue players to re-type characters or 
to provide new scmic groupings, and, by implication, new types. 
The process of re-typing means tlmt relationships between acumtial roles and more 
particular typ�s become increasingly complex. In the beginning ofFFX, Tidus is the focaliser, 
so players arc likely lo type him according to his dominant actantial role n� the subject ("hero" 
or "protagonist"). This generic type w;!) be r�inforced as players ty� his thoughts, feelings, 
twits and goals in more detail. When Tidus receives adulation from fans prior lo a b!itzball 
game, ::,layers may type him as an "exceptional person"; when he obligingly signs his nnme 
we might type him as "n�odest celebrity." This provides some expectation that hb �bjecl, as 
subject {hero), will involve him using his skills as a blitzb,111 player. This is confinncd when 
he takes the sword from Anron and his prowess as a (modem-sty!e) celebrity translates into 
(old-fashioned) heroic prowess. This holds open the threat that he will lose his celebrity 
status, as he does when the Maester brands him and Yuna's other Guardiuns ns traitors. W11en 
1,lay�.rs see Tidus think reflectively about his father th;iy may ty� him as a "troubled young 
man," with the possibility that his goal will involve finding or confronting his father. When 
players later hear him speak in an upbeat manner in his oddly high-pitched voice they may 
type him as, at heart, "plucky and high-spirited," who must aucmpt ro maintain this upbeat 
nature and/or "youthful innocence .. in the face of what the world has in store for him. 
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As was discussed in Chapter Four, FFX plays with the pos�ibilily that events are an 
uncanny projection ofTidus' anxieties of abandonment. However, after h.is early typing Tidus 
is a relatively consistent character until it is revealed that he is an Aeou and will disappear 
upon the completion of the quest. This forces players to re-type him as a "tragic hero" and re­
categorise h.is moody imrospection, less as a sign of immaturity onrl more as o response to his 
loss. Players also arc likely to re-type his upbeat attitude not as just naive, immamrc or 
youthfully excessive, but as a poignant attempt to make the most of the time he has lcfc. This 
may resonate with the eru:lier recognition that Yuna seeks Tidus' light-hearted company to 
distrnct her from 1he knowledge of her impending death. When Tidus and Yuna talk after 
entering the Temple at Luca and deal with their foru:s by voluntarily laughing, Tidus' high­
spirits may be read as o humon re>'Ponsc !o th.c certainty of denth. However, what is 
pru:tlculru:ly important is that this may lead the player to recognise a disjunction between 
Tidus' general actontial type and his specific type: he becomes less a tragic hero than o martyr 
and, being o martyr, others must take up the cause. In shun, he becomes a helper to Yuna and 
the other Guardians, wh.o survive os the primary (retrospective, end-state) subjects. 
A more complex c�nmple of the ongoing revision of type-attribution that is central to 
the dramatic articulation of FFX, is the chru:acterisation of Maester Seymour Guado. Tidus' 
companions describe him os the new Maestcr: Lhc authorised voice of Yevon and "spiritual 
leader" of Spira. Players might anticipate from the gravity of his reception at Luco that he wilt 
he a key character who may me his authority to help Tidus, or that he may become an 
opponent who will entangle Tidus in some spiritual or political macrosequence. When he first 
descends from his boat and shares a meaningful glance with Ynna the specific type of 
"romantic competitor" cues players' expectations that, later in \he narrative, he will try to 
seduce or kidnap her. However, his appearance is not so easy to type. His robes may suggest a 
"wizru:d" and his seeming grace and gentleness suggest more n "monk," yet the casual and 
stylish. exposure of his toned (muscular) chest is contrary to both types. His ridiculous 
coiffure, soft voice, and display of flesh mark him as fashionable or effeminate, but his 
obvious confidence and control, the acclaim und respect he has from others, and his self· 
knowing manner and political savvy, suggest masculine authority (sec Figure 5.la). This 
showy mix of masculinity and femininity may lead players to type him as "unconventional," 
"homosexual," anlllor a kind of"transvestite." 
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When Fiends in terrupt the blitzbal! game at Luca, Seymour summons his Aeon 
Anima: a seemingly male {but actually female) cross between n corpse, sea-creature and bat, 
imprisoned by nu anchored chain. That the word "anirna" is the passive, female principle in 
Jung's (1978) terms rnny confuse players' typing, nnless they sec the inner-feminine {or 
unbalanced lack thcrcot) ns the source of Animn's power (perhaps in the fashion ofa "terrible 
mother" or "raging goddess"). The term also might be mistaken, as by a layperson, for the 
active, male principle, or simply be interpreted as connoting psychic 1r spiritual power. In nny 
case, players may rend Anima as an external representation of Seymour's inner state (see 
Figure 5.lb). This may mc�.n seeing him as evil, with the anticipation that he will tnm upon 
the player's characters. It may also mean seeing Seymour as good precisely because he has 
confronted and tamed the forces thut threaten Spira (albeit wilh the possibility !hat he will lose 
control of those forces). 
This rending of Seymonr's power and mystery as a sign of potential danger governed 
by potentially malevolent motives will be reinforced by players of Final Fantasy, who may 
observe that Seymour resembles Sephiroth in FFVII and Seifer Ansaly in FFVJJJ. Both 
Sephirolh and Seifer ore powerful role models for the younger main characters, Cloud and 
Squall, but eventually betl'ny them and embark upon crusades of power. In either case, players 
arc likely to type Seymour's civilised exterior ns a figurntive chain over his (repre.1sed or 
suppressed) true nature, but do not yet have n signifier for this nature in the sume w&y thnt 
they have signiliers for Anima's power: dazzling explosions end damage whose ridiculous 
magnitude is quantified by numbers onscrcen. Consequently, Seymour's ambiguity is 
reinforced nod players can only hesitantly attribute types to him. 
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When the characters next meet Seymour on the Mi'ihen Highroud he uses his 
authority to allow the characters to pass a guard post, and reveals u casual defiance of the 
musty traditions of Yevon by supporting the blw:phemous use of Machin a against Sin. Here 
players arc cued to type Seymour us a "young leader" who will bring u new era and revitalise 
Spira, and so players arc likely 10 type him as u helper. However, when the characters meet 
Seymour again he asks Yun a to marry him for political reasons (to unite Bevelle with Guudo), 
and so players arc inclined to abandon any romanticism attributed to him. He is mere likely to 
become typed as u "politician," caught up in the peuy, cffcminnte machinations of diplomatic 
intrigue. At the same time, his justification for wanting m marry Yuna does have a practical 
and moral basis and initiates the major narrative conflict between public duty and romantic 
love. This may incline players lO re-evaluate not only his character, but the narrative 
macrostructurc itself: perhaps the game is not a rom;JJ1ce but a tragedy about self-sacrifice? If 
players evaluate the macrostructure in terms of public duty, then Seymour may still be II 
helper, but relative to the romantic macrostruclurc he is an opponent. In either case, he still 
seems to be a helper in the epic mncrostructure, the quest to ki!l Sin. 
In Macalania it is disclosed that Seymour killed his father and that his ambitions are 
wlf-intcrested; the characters also must conrront him ia battle. Here the specific type­
attributions nre stabilised around the actantiul type of opponent us well as the more speclfic­
typo of "'treacherous tyrant," in the sense of someone who misrepresents himself when it 
furthers his own end of dominating others. This type persists when he kidnaps Yuna in order 
tu marry her and. in rescuing her, characters fight his second incarnation as Seymour Nnlus 
(wilh Mortibody). However. when Seymour catches up with the characters on Mount Gagazct 
in the fonn of Seymour Flux (with Multiorehis), and, Inter. in his final form of Seymour 
Omnis. players learn that he has personally exterminated the Ronso race nnd wishes to 
become and control Sin lO dominate Spira. Here players are cued to trait him notjusl ns n sclf­
intcrested tyrant, but as downright evil. At the same time. the extremity of his evil seems 
deranged, an<l during the short narrative sequences in Maculania and Zilnarkand it is revealed 
that Seymour, like Tidus, wns tormented for being u Guado half-breed and suffered the 
absence of his mother, suggesting that his evil is puthological. Consequently, players may 
type Seymour us "psychologicn!Iy disturbed," u trail ratified when Seymour. with his final 
words, recognises his defeat and death, and perhaps implicitly acknowledges his misguided 
grandiosity (mirroring Tidus" renunciation ofYunn and life). 
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This constant re-typing of Seymour is central to .EEX's hermeneutics. Initially players 
arc likely to be curious as to his motives (compnsstonate rule or tymnny'I) Players arc likely to 
be surprised when new information about him or his actions is disclosed, which cues re-typing 
him ("romfilltic competitor," ''young lender," "politicinn," ''tencherous tyrant," ''patricide," 
"genocidal lunatic"). Lastly, players nre also likely to experience suspense when they realise 
Seymour's intentions to destroy Spira and await the outcome. However, since Seymour's 
characterisation requires so much re-typing, players may begin to get the sense thnt their 
current, or anticipatmy, typing cannot be relied upon to provide adequate expectations about 
him. 
Indeed, the revision of types attributed to Rikku and her race, the Al Bhed, dramatises 
the limilaliono of(stereo-) typing. Rikku and several other Al Shed are first encountered after 
Tidus is teleportcd by Sin and pulled from the sea onlo their salvage boat. Because of their 
clothing (goggles, robes and veils), their aggressive nclions (seeming slavers} and harsh, alien 
language (which characters learn hy picking up Al Bhed language spheres), the most obvious 
type from which n p!ayer will draw is that of a radical/military "Muslim terrorist": ns 
"violent," "inflexible" and/or ''ruthless" (see Figure 5.2a) Titis type is undermined by Rikku's 
friendliness (see Figure 5.2b), but seems to be confinned when the Al Bhed attack the 
Guerdinns on the ShoopntT 11nd kidnap Yuna in Macalnnia. The player's evaluation of the Al 
Bhed ns characters also is played out through Wakka, who keeps espousing his hatred and 
distrust of them, to the extent thnt Tidns does not reveal that Rikkn is an Al Bhed. When 
Wakka docs finally learn the truth, he snubs Rikku. 
Figure 5.2. (a) Tidus' first encounter with the Al Bhed. (b) Tidus' gets to know Rikku ("You . 
• . Y 011 understand me?")
Lnter, when the party goes to the Al Bhed home in Sanubia Sands, it is revealed that 
the Al Bhcd were victims of racism. The people of Spiro hate the Al Bhed because of their 
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nssociation with Machina and all but drove them from the continent. The Al Bhed therefore 
were forced to find sanctuary in the desert. Their e11T!ier auempt to enslave Tidus on their boat 
therefore may be re-read in terms of survival under harsh conditions; those who do not 
contribute to the gmup must expect nothing from the group. Furthermore, players soon learn 
that the Al Bhcd's motive for kidnapping the Summoners wns that they did not want them to 
be killed trying !o defeat Sin, who a lways reappears after twenty years. They llfe, then, more 
morally informed than Tidus, who had not knnwn that Yuna expected to die fighting Sin and 
that, consequently, !IS Guardian, he had been guiding her to her death. Worse, after visiting the 
Temple at Ki!iku, he had spoken flippantly ah out the quest and its end. Consequently, players 
llfe likely to not only reclassify the Al Bhed in general tcnns (as helpers rather than 
opponents) and specific terms (ns "hardy and desperate" rather than "aggressive and cruel"), 
but also to transfer some of their traits (as "outcasts," ''revolutionaries," and "terrorists") to 
Tidus and the other Guardians, who similarly come to act against the teachings of Yu Yevon 
and the authority of Bevelle. Indeed, players may perceive thm, up until this point, Tidus was 
not the subject or hero at all; the motivating subjects were !he Al Bhed, whose quest Tidu� 
appropriates. 
Wakka's response to Rikku is of special note. Tidus, without prior knowledge of the 
A! Bhed, types her according to her actions as "helper'' and "young, friendly, reliable 
companion"; when he realises that she is an Al Bhcd he still merely types her as a "Guardian." 
However, since Wakka hates the Al Bhed his initial acceptance of Rikku involves, from the 
player's perspective, a denial of the obvious, since Rikku's race is evident from her clothing, 
accent, and eyes (pure Al Bhed have spiral irises). In this respect, it seems that Wakka's 
inability to reconcile Rikku as person and her racial type leads to a refusal to confront the 
disparity. Whea forced to confront the disparity between person and type, he creates 
unnecessary tension umongst the Guardians. 
Wakka's prejudice derives from his faith in Yevon, according to whose teachini;s Sin 
is punishment for the arrogance of the humans in the past who used Machina. Consequently, 
he sees the Al Bhed's use ofMachiua and the attempt to defeat Sin at the Mi'ihen Highroad as 
blasphemous, a view made particularly salient becaose his brother, Chappo, died trying to kill 
Sin with such Machina. Wakka is, then, shocked to learn that Sc)IIl1our, who is supposed to 
represent Yevon's authority, does not'objecl to Opcratioo Mi'ihen. However, it is only when 
the characters reach Macalania and fight Seymour that Wakka realises his faith wus 
misplaced. lfWakka comes to (evemual!y) revise his perception oft he Al Bhed, this is in part 
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becnuse he is also forced to revise his perception of Yevon, agnimt whom he presumes the Al 
Bhed are blaspheming. Wakka's revision paral!els, and is a prescription for, the player's 
revision of types, and dramatises the player's difficulties in typing certain characters. That is, 
if players become aware that their typing has, or may, lead to false expectations about 
characters and events, they may become more cautious or nexible in their attribution of types. 
It might be presumed that this constant revision of semic structmes through the 
bouom-up processing of new information leads to more detailed and precise typing of 
characters and facilitates more precise expectations about character's behaviour and fate. 
However, while ongoing trailing may affect players' interpretation of, and investment in, 
certain chamcters, its absence would not much alter acrantial relations or mmative functions at 
the highest levels of FFX's macrostructures. If players, like viewers, do not read far beyond 
the present scene (fan, 1997; Vorderer, 1996), then detailed traits may function less to help 
players anticipate what will happen and more to allow players to retrospecrive/y recognise the 
intelligibility and coherence of revealed behaviour. In this respect, the general significance of 
detailed trailing is the evocation of "roundedness" (Foster, 1927/1949), of complex motives 
and the inner life of an individual responding to events within the diegesis. As Tan (!997) 
argues: 
The more depth there is to the individuation of a character, that is, the sharper 
the differentiation in terms of subtypes [and, we might add], the mare roa! the 
character is and the higher the reality parameter of the situational meaning 
structure. (p. 171) 
Character believability nnd psychological coherence arc also governed by a readerly 
practice governed by the ideological tenet of individualism: the uo1ity of the subject. As 
Bnrthes (!966/l9SS) nrgues, the proper name of a character provides a kind of as.urancc that, 
as the reader selects nnd organises semes scattered throughout the text, they will cohere, and 
this may be the case even if the representation is not in itself realistic, in that (as is evident in 
much modernist fiction) realistic representation is not necessarily consistent with 
psychological verisimilitude. Jn this respect, as Culler (1975) argues: 
1he process of selecting and organi:,;ing semes is governed by an ideology of 
character, implicit models of psychological coherence which indicate what 
sons of things arc possible >IS charncter traits, how these traits can coexist and 
form wholes, or at least which traits coexist without difficulty ll!ld which arc 
necessarily opposed in ways that produce tension and ambiguity. {pp. 236-237) 
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Figure 5.4. Character summruies from FFX Gmne Manual {2001, p. 7). The pictures ofTidus, 
Yuna, Lulu and Auron arc not identical to those in the manual. 
TIDUS: Tidu.s is a cheerful, rising blitzbntl star playing for the Zonarkond Abes. 
He has long resented his fo1her, who Wiili n renowned player him.self before 
his untimely death. Tidus's quick moves allow him to aUack even the swiftest foes 
with ease. 
\'UNA, Daughter of High Summoner Brosko. Hones! w,d delcnnined, Yunn 
embarks on n pilgrimage to oblllin the Finnt Aeon ond defeat Sin. Yunn is 
learning the mystical art of summoning aeons - spirits of yore. 
W AKKA: Coach ond captain of the local blitzbntl team, the Besnid Aumch,. 
Wokka plons 10 retire from the sport nt'ter this year's tournament, so that 
he ean dedicate himself fully to serving os Yuno's guardian. His deadly 
blit>.ball is especially useful for shooting down aerial enemies, 
LULU: One ofYuna's guardians. She and Wakkn think ofYuna as n i•ounger 
sister. Lulu's stoic ond self-possessed natuie makes her appear insensitive ot 
limes. She specialises in the art ofblnck magic. 
KIMAUR1 RON SO: A young wmrior oflhe Ronso tribe, Kimnhri hos 
watched ovcr Yuna from her youngest days. He spe,,�s little, but is deeply 
devoted to Yunn ond serves her loynlly os a guardion. Kimnhri cnn leotn 
enemy skills wi1h his Loncct ability. 
AURON: The legendary guardian "tio, together with High Summoner 
Braska, defeated Sin len yem before, A mnn of few words, he guides Yuno 
and Tidus on lheir mission to vonquish Sin once more. He swings his 
gigantic sword with such power �\at even the toughest fiend, me cut 
asunder. 
RIKKU: A young Al Bhed girl. Herpmonolity is upb,a� Mdshe is not 
afraid to speak her mind. She works hard to restore her outcast people lo their 
fonner glory. Rikku hm1dlcs mechoniool devices wilh ease, Md cru, o1cnt 
Items from enemies loo. 
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Banhcs (196611988) uses the term ·�ndices" {p. 106) to refer to narrative infommtion 
whose function is principnlly the signification of "being," or, more broadly, "reality." Where 
these indices are associated with n chnrnctcr, they function less to guide functional 
trnasformntions of the narrative macrostructurc than to construct a sense that the characters 
/,ave a psychology and to evoke the sense of a habitable dicgesis. This kind of information is 
evident in the summaries that FFX's manual provides for the main characters {sec Figure 5.4). 
Tidus' "chcerful"-ness may be retrospectively significant if players realise that it is a 
way of staving off his fear and abandonment. This is mndc explicit in his discussion with 
Yuna at lJJca, when they agree to laugh in the face of their unhappiness, partly for the snke of 
others. Yuna's beauty and innocence make it unlikely that the player will expect that Yuna is 
/mowingly going towards her death. However, when this fact is revealed, the earlier trailing of 
her as "honest and detennlned," as well as compassionate and committed to public duty, make 
this surprise intelligible and logical. 
That Wnkka "plans to retire" will gain significance if the player realises that Wakkn 
is, in effect, giving up because his team has never won a game and wants revenge against Sin 
for the death of his brother. Thnt Lulu's "stoic and self-possessed nature makes her appear 
insensitive" facilitates players' impression of Tidus' SUIJ)risc when he overhears her talking 
with Wakka on the bridge of the S.S. Kilika. Here Lulu betrays the feelings beneath her sharp 
cynicism. Later, in the Calm Lands, Tidus learns that another Summoner died while Lula was 
nctiug as her Guardian, which provides an explann!ion for her attitude. That Kimahri 
"watched over Yuna from her youngest days" and is "deeply devoted" is !ntcr linked to him 
having found Yuna just after her father, Brnska, died defeating Sin. That Kimahri "speaks 
little" is later given additional meaning because he was exiled from his own race and is in tum 
protective of new family: Yuna and the other Guardians. It takes Kimahri time to trust, and 
talk to, Tidus. 
Aaron's summary functions primarily to reinforce a sense of his distance nnd mystery, 
wilh the implication that, being older nnd hnving been on !he quest before (a "legend"), he 
knows more than he is saying. This gains retrospective significance with each of his 
disclosures: that Jecht is alive; that Jecht is Sin; and that both Auron and Tidus are dead. 
Finally, that Rikku is "upbeat ..• not afraid to speak her mind [and] •.. works hard to restore 
her outcast people lo their former glory" becomes significant when players discover how 
greatly her people, the Al Bhed, have suffered. As with Tidus and Yuna, her ",1pbeat" altitude 
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is not merely a consequence of her youth or immaturity, but is, like Tidus' "cheerfulness," a 
wny of dealing with deeper s.:dness, and both she and Tidus fmm n seemingly over-optimistic 
pact to find a way to save Yunn. 
FFX plnces much emphasis ou the gradual revelation ofthe history behind, and the 
implications of, this indicia! detail. In this respect, it cannot be chnrged with Skirrow's (1980) 
accusation that, because of the constant, first person perspective, "there can be no suspense 
based on knowing more (having seen more) than the protagonist" (p. 331). FFX functions as a 
character-centred, or "psychological" narrative, focused on "the protagonist's motives for 
what he or she docs, and on how the protagonist will tum out" (Abrams, 1988, p. 119), and 
the next few chapters elaborate upon of players' relationships to chll!"llcters in more detail. 
Game Macrostructurcs 
Character Classes and Tra/J-Dependant Charocter Types 
Figure 5.3. (a) Tidrn fights Kimahri in Bcsnid ("Attack an enemy with equipped weapon"). 
(b) Tidus fights Sin's fin en route to Kilika ("Attack with magic and Wakka's ball"). 
While the nllmltivc macrostructure of £EX may be seen as having the complexity 
expected of some print and film texts, the gnme mncrostructures would seem more amenable 
to the criticisms levelled against video gwne chE1tacters. Unlike nllmltivc possibilities. which 
mny be of near-infinite range, anticipation in combat is limited to a character or monster's 
attacks and defences (Figure 5.3). Having weighed the strategic value ofan action, n p!nyer's 
concern is whether it has improved the probahility of winning the battle ("Has my chE1tacter 
hit? How much damage was inflicted?''). In this respect, many action-based video games mny 
be �ccn 85 analogous to the plot-driven "uovel of incident," which is focrned not on characters 
in themselves but on ''what the protngouist will do ncx:t and on how the story will tum out" 
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(Abrams, 1988, p. 119). In a combat macrostructure, the "characters" are mere agents of a 
strategy: to win the batt!c. More detailed characterisation therefore might be seen as impeding 
the flow of game-events. 
If anticipation about character types finds its crudest organization in ac tantial roles or 
types. then it can be argued that strategics in combat often find their crudest organization in 
the typing of a character according to "class" types. TI1e use of "character classes" to define 
generic ergodic strategies within game mncrostructures can be traced back to table-top role­
playing games {RPGs), of which Gary Gygnx's AD&D (1978) is the archetype. In the first 
edition of AD&D, the classes and subclasses were: "fighter," with subclasses of''pa]adin" and 
''ranger"; "magic-user," with the subclass of "illusionist"; "cleric," with the subclnss of 
"druid"; "thief," with lllc subclass of "assassin"; and "monk" (Gygnx, 1978, p. 13). Other 
RPGs and computer role-playing games {CRPGs) offered additional c!n.sses; the cfosses in 
earlier Fina! Fantn.sy included: "knight," "monk," "thief," "dragoon," ''ninja," "samurai," 
"archer," "berserker," "mystic knight," "while mage," "bfock magc," "time mage," "blue 
mage," "red mage," "chemist," "elemental," "bard" and "dancer." However, most subclasses 
or variations may be seen as variations or combinations of the mnin classes of cleric, fighter, 
magic-user and thief. Furthennorc, while FFX does not specify classes, and has no option for 
initial character creation, players familiar with {C)RPGs, early Finni Fnntasy titles, or even 
fantasy literature, will be predisposed to sec characters in tenns of these class types on the 
bn.�is of generic classes of action. 
Character classes are primarily determined on the basis of statistics which perform a 
panicular game-function. In AD&D there are six traits: strength {STR), dexterity (DEX), 
constitution (CON), intelligence (INT), wisdom (WIS) and charisma (CHA). As Myers (1992) 
argues, these statistics determine the (imemal) relationship within a character and the 
(external) relationship between a character and the game world, and .:re modelled on a 
rudimentary conception of physics. Characters' defensive capabilities nrc e;,;prcssed "as some 
combination or density (con) and volume (size)" while offensive capabilities "are cnlculatcd 
by (mass X linear velocity), which eqnals momentum {sir), amllor by acceleration, which 
would add a time factor (dex) to velocity" (p. 423). This reductive ''physics" extends to 
magical and spiritual attacks based on !NT and WIS, at least to the extent that intelligence and 
wisdom function quantitatively as mental density, volume, momentum and speed in the 
calculntion of auack, defence and damage. STR, then, modifies attack, CON modifies hit 
points, and DEX modifies defence. !NT and WIS modifies spell-casting abilities, while CHA 
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modifies interaction with NPCs. For Myers, these statistics provide n consistent representation 
of "chnrncter" in gnming tenns across n rnnge of gaming styles: n universal model of ergodic 
capabilities 11n11logous to Bordwell's (1989) geneml model of 11 "folk-psychology" of 
chnrnctcr tmits (pp. 151). 
In AD&D particular 1rnits were seen as "prime requisites" (PR) for II class, that is, 
certain traits associated with that class were expected to be particularly high. The PR for 
fighters was STR, but they also tended to have high CON and low INT and WJS. The PR of 
magic-users wns INT {WlS for a cleric), though a high DEX gave them n chance of casting 
spells before physical characters could attack them. However, magic-users usually had a very 
low STR and CON. Since thieves avoided combat like magic-users they also had a low STR 
and CON; their PR was DEX, which was used to calculnte such special actions as lock­
picking, moving silently, nnd firing Jong-range weapons. 
Table 5.1. Character statistic� for FFX. 
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While FFX uses different statistics (table 5.1), some of its statistics perform the same 
{or component) function{s), and/or statistics which in AD&D were modified by principle 
statistics, are principle statistics. For example, characters have Strength, which modifies 
attack damage, but instead of CON (which modified hit points), Hit Points (HP) is a principle 
statistic, as is Defonce (DEF), which reduces the amount of damage taken. CON can only 00 
inferred on the basis of HP and DEF. In place of DEX, churucters have Agility (which 
determines the frequency of attack in the queue of tum-based combat), Evade (which 
increases the chance of completely evading nn attack), and Accuracy {which affects their 
chances of striking opponents). In many RPGs, these functions are nil determined by DEX. 
Indeed, the role ofDEF in the reduction of damage is modified by DEX in some RPGs, owing 
to the de�trous use of weapon and annotll". Instead of INT and WIS as generic modifiers for, 
respectively, magical and clerical actions, characters in FFX have Magic Attack, Magic 
Defence, and Mana, which serve for both. 
CHA is a significant exception because it is visible through FFX's visual, dramatic 
representation. In RPG terms, Yuna would have a hi!!,h CHA because of her manifest physical 
attractiveness, the loyalty of her Guardians, and the adoration of the folk of Spira. Wakka, 
while relatively handsome, is fairly colloquial (his use of"Ynh" is, like a Cockney accent, an 
index of poor education and/or lower-class sensibilities) und iMdvertently bullying (putting 
Tidus in a headlock to convince him to join the Besaid Aurochs}. He is ulso poor ate�pressing 
himself (speaking hesita11tly with one hand behind his head), and his innexible faith 
sometimes makes him antisocial (he is confrontational when Lhe Law ofYevon is challenged). 
In RPG terms, Wakka would have a low CHA, though in RPGs which make the distinction he 
might be said to have a high Appearance (APP). 
Upon Lhe basis of these statistics and abilities, each character in FFX may be seen us a 
weighted distribution of the standnrd character classes. Auron conforms to the fighter type 
because of his high Strength; Lulu conforms to the magic-user type because of her high Magic 
Attack; Yuna conforms to the cleric type because of her healing spells (though her Aeons arc 
a cross between the fighter and magic-user type); and Rikku confonns to the thief type 
because of her high Speed, and Stenl and Mix abilities. Wakka may be seen as a "long-range 
attack" subclass of the lighter type (like an archer), becans� of his use ofblitzballs, and Tidus, 
while primarily identified with the fighter type, has spells like u mugic-uscr, and a high DEX 
(as well as a Ree Ability and Haste spel!s), like a thief. Kimahri, with a smaller personal 
section on the Grid Sphere, and the capability to learn enemy auacks through his Lancet 
131 
ability, is lhe most malleable character, and because of his size and strength might be seen as 
II fighter multi·class. 
Squaresoft's Final Fantasy X: The Official Strategy Guide (2002), like most RPO 
manuals, includes a bestiary listing each monster's generic srntistics. Inasmuch as monsters 
operate using the same game mechanics and statistics as characters, players may, at a coarse 
level, type monsters as a variation or combination of character class t)IJleS. In this respect, on 
Adamantoise, with great Strcngi11 (38), Defence (90) and high Hit Points (54400), may be 
tJ1Ped as II fighter. A Dark Element, with its low Strength (I) and Hit Points (1800) but high 
Magic Points (280) and various magic auacks (Reflect, Bio, Osmosc, Drain), may be typed a 
magic-user. A Chimera, with its high Strength (25), middling Magic Paints (130), and various 
magic attacks {Thundara, Aqua Breath, Mcgiddo Aame, Assault) is a fighterfmagic-usi:r 
multi-dais. The Sanctuary Keeper, with its high S1rength {37) and Defence (100), its high Hit 
Points (40000), magical altacks, and Healing ability, might be seen as a fightcrfmagic­
user/cleric multi�lass. 
Since high-level clerical spells defend against undead but also include spells such as 
Zombie and Doom associated witli and/or used by uudead, Yunalesca might be seen as nn 
"evil cleric." Thief monster types, identified with the possession of high Speed and Steal 
ability, arc relatively rare in FFX, though in FFVII there arc duck-billed Bandits that steal 
items and then disappear in a puff of smoke. We may sec the Basilisks disguised ns treasure 
chests in the Omega Ruins ns nn "nnti-thief'-type since they only transfonn and allack when a 
character attempts lo steal from !hem. Lastly, whereas Lulu, as magic-user, hns access to all 
elemental spells, many monsters are lJIJled according to a particular element-Fire, Blizzard, 
Water or Thunder-which affects their attack and defonce values. A Grenade, for example, 
always uses a Fire-based attack. Of course, there arc also many multi-elemental-types; the 
Chimera, for example, is capable of Fire, Water and Thunder elemental auacks. 
In this respect, primary attributes guide a rudimentmy top-down classification of 
chnracters and monsters for the pUl]IOses of ergodic capability in combat macrostructures. 
Once players identify Tidus, Kimnhri and Auron as Warriors, they know that their position 
should always be at the front nnd that they will do the majority of the fighting. When players 
encounter an opponent that is immune 10, or has protection again1t, physical attacks, they 
know that they should use Lulu's memnl anacks. When tl1ey encounter nn opponent that is 
immune to, or has protection against, a certain element, they know that they should use other, 
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or opposing, elemental attacks. When characters nre near death, players know to use Yuna to 
heal them (though, as a slight dev iation from type, Yunn's Aeons arc used lo weaken or finish 
off major o�ponen!S). When players wish to do damage to a distant opponent, they know to 
use Wakb, and when they wish to steal or mix items they know ta use Rikku. This basic 
strategy is sufficient to allow the player to defeat most of the game's opponents. 
However, even if players learn monster statistics through FAQs and spoilers, the 
average and Model Player will acquire knowledge about many monster types through 
experimentation. Indeed, many FAQs, including the relevant Playstntion Solutions {Pattison, 
2002) magazine, only offer hints, not complete details. Furthermor e, the permutations of 
combat arc enormous-Playstation Solutions (pp. 16-27) lists 182 enemies to be found in 
FFX, which may be combined in combinations of up to three monster types, against three 
characters (chosen from seven) on a tum·by-tum basis. In any case, many "boss" monsters arc 
the sole instance (taken) of their type, and player$ must construct a new model of their type 
during the encounter (albeit guided by other 1ypes). 
Realism in Character Development: Semic Caiegaries 
While charncter classes and monster types may define a general strategy or guide to 
anticipating future even!S, in practice the scmiG anribution of each character is not static. 
Indeed, players might begin by distinguishing l-etween static and dymunic semes. "Static 
semes" could refer to traits possessed by u character ns a linguistic ter.n or quality ("health"), 
equivalent to the persistent typo traits identified above. As stated, each character in FfX hus a 
fixed series of semes, including Hit Points, Mana, Auack, Magic Auack, Defonce, and Magic 
Defence. "Dynamic scmes" could refer to quantitative representations of a static trait, where n 
trait is assigned a different numerical value. In FFX, each character's numerical trait for HP or 
MP is repres6�t�d tlS n ratio against a (current) maximum. For example, Tidus' HP might be 
701100, and his MP is 80/80, but during a baule, his current HP may drop to 50/100. Yuna 
then may heal him to 100/100, only for him to be attacked again , �d far his HP to drop to 
201100. Such numerical variations might be equated with adverbial qualifications, in that, 
instc�d of having a series of semes ("seriously iajured," "ba�ly injured," "slightly injured," 
"not injured") a single scme may be marked by n more precise measure of degree (25, 50, 75 
or 100 out of a lOO}. 
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However, character traits are not dynamic solely because they fluctuate within a 
predefined range. As characters go up levels, the range of traits may alter (as when maximnm 
health points are increased) and/or charncters may guin adJitional 1ruits, or Abilities {such as 
Heal, Echo Screen and Zombie). Furthermore, if psychological coi1�,;:nce is a sign of realism 
in narrative macrostructures, experience-related character development is a sign of realism in 
game macrostructures. For example, in early text- and graphical-CRPGs, like Rogue (1980) 
and llm Bard's Tate (1982), players chose a class for a character during character creation, 
and this determined the weapons and armour !hat characrer could use and a fixed line of 
development. For example, the experience required to advance a level, and the spells gained 
with these level, was particular to each class. Later CRPGs, such as Bnldur's Gate (1997), 
a llowed for the kind of multi-class characters (such ns lighter-druid) found in the AD&D rule 
sys1em, and some, such as Daggerfoll: The Elder Scrolls (1994), have taken up action- or 
option- based skill development systems. In Daggcrfo1]; The Elder Scrolls (1994) and 
Everguest (2000). the more frequently a skill (say, IH Attack or SenGC Heading) is used, the 
more quickly it develops. such that skill development is a crude simulation of real-life 
experience: practice leads to improvement. In most contemporary CRPGs, the player has 
some freedom to select which statistics or skills he/she wants to develop. This not only 
provides for some nominal realism, ii offers functional diversity: rui individual character can 
incotp0rate the characteristics of more than one character class. This is extremely important in 
long singlc-characier g:imcs becansc options which otherwise would have been regretfully 
excluded on the basis of the initial character choice remain open to players. 
The system of character development in FFX partially reflects this trend. At a certain 
point, players may choose for their characters to develop skills more "natural" to another type, 
such that Tidus may learn Lulu's higher-level magical speHs. However, each character has a 
separate paradigm of weapons available to himfhcr, and each character begins at a certain 
point on the Grid Sphere, which partially determines the sequence of skill acquisition. The 
phrase "static semic paradigm (diegctic)" can be used to refer to the set of semes that a 
character can acquire within the game's dicgcsis. For example, there arc a range of items any 
chardctcr can collect-such as Potions, Elixirs, Phoenix Downs and Grenades-as well as 
character-specific weapons and mmour. All churacters can potentially acquire all the Abilities 
on the Grid Sphere, including new Abilities, but ench character's case or order in acquiring 
these varies. Ot��r abilities, such as Overdrives and Overdrive Mades, are character-specific. 
The phrase '"dynamic scmic range (diegetic)" could be used to refer to Lhe quantitative 
limits-current and/or absolute (static) minimum and maximum-that arc placed on 
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characters' dynamic semcs within the dicgcsis. In FFX, there is n universal 9999 Damage 
Limit. TI1is prevents characters from becoming too powerful and upsetting the game's 
balance-though fl2,;; eventually offers players a Limit Break, which allows characters 10 
innict more than 9999 damage. 
Despite the freedom for unique character development on the Grid Sphere, the initial 
principle statistics mean that characters' functional capabilities do not greatly dcpan from 
their class type, at least, not relative to one another. For example, Lulu's physical attacks arc 
never as high as Auron's, just as Auron's mental attacks arc never as high as Lulu's. 
Consequently, "non-natural" skills may only be used in a supplementlll)' fashion when 
primary auacks arc unavailable. When Lulu is suffering from a Silence status and cannor cast 
spells, players foll back on her minimal physical attacks, and when Auron is suffering from a 
Darkness status, and keeps missing, players are better served by using one of his spells (if he 
has any). L:istly, whereas combat in early (C)RPGs yielded generic experience points, FFX 
has eharacLCr-speciflc quests which leed to the acquisition of particular skills, such as finding 
Jecht's spheres (which allow Auron to learn his Overdrives), and the side quests required to 
find the Celestial (Ultimate) Weapons of each character. Here narrative development overlaps 
with ch11Tacter development, offering the minimal realism ofexper'ence-based development. 
It should be foregrounded that the attribution of static and dyn amic semes extends 10 
each item possessed by a characwr. While some items haven fixed use (especially quest items 
likll the Spheres used in the Trials of the Fayth) most weapons and nrmour can be 
"customised" by using up certain items. For example, Tidus' Vigilante sword has two blank 
slots, and 1wo Ability Spheres can be "spent" to give his Vigilante the Sensor ability. This 
leads to a cybernetic conjunction of both the item and character: the weapon itself changes the 
character's statistics. but the character's attack nnd defence detenninc the effectiveness of the 
weapon. Even if the only use of an item ls to sell lt, this will alter the scmic attribution of Oil 
in the party's and merchant's inventory, which affects the potential items purchased in the 
future. 
Semic Relaliom in Combat Macros/ruc/ures 
In RPGs, quantitative semes apply to a wide range of activities, such as forcing open 
doors, jumpini; long di6rnnces, lifting heavy objects, swimming underwater, picking locks, 
and so on. In FFX, character scmes primarily serve a function in combat. While a suspenseful 
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(blow-by-blow) baule sequence in a film or print narrative may lead to dynamic changes in 
the level of danger posed to chamctcrs, in video games these semes fluctume in a more 
quantifiable sense. The related conseqnence of this semic complelity and dynamism ls that 
nny attempt to complete each fight solely on tlte basis of basic class types would fail in certain 
battles, or would at least not provide the optimum strategy, since often a specific skill or spell 
is required to damage an opponent, and it may be necessary to use charnctcrs who possess the 
sklll but are not typed by it. 
For example, while Tidus is the character whose developmental path leads directly to 
the spells Haste and Hastega, Rikku might be a better choice to acquire and use those spells, 
since, being the foster character, she might be able to cast them before a monster has a chance 
10 auack. Similarly, when a character is neurdc�lh players do not care that Yunu is the prized 
healer; the only concern is that at least one character has a healing spell or potion. In this 
r�pect, despite the generic cl3ss-types in FFX, characters are in some respects 1101 just types 
or classes, since at a certain point of development they may deviate so much from a type that 
lhr.ir character becomes their clnss. Moro than this, players cannot base their entire strategy 
upon class types since more specific semic attributions infonn player's ergodic choices, such 
as to which character to rotate into the battle, which attack to use, when to heal, when to cast 
defensive spells, and so on. 
Mapping semic oppositions in comb.It macrostmctures by way of Grcimasian squares 
is useful where it reflects the minimal grammars of game logic coded by the game, and, by 
implication, the ergodic, scmic, and/or symbolic codes that players use to make decisions in 
combat. That is, while players may sometimes utilise class or character types to make 
decisions during combat, combat strategy is often based upon a series of significant 
oppositions that define the effectiveness of a particulnr attack. For example, certain mental 
defences block physical attacks, certain monslers are only susceptible 10 physical attacks, and 
characters with mental attacks have low physical attacks and defence. Using a physical auack 
or defence in place of a mental auack or defence, then, is often nol a matter of strategy, but 
necessity. 
Care must be taken in using a Greimaslan semiotic square to map the confluence of 
ergodic choices and player schemata since, us Jameson argues, the term which is taken as 
primary will affect !he results (Greimas, 1987, p. xv-xvi}. The fighter class, with his physical 
attributes, is the most logical primary tenn. The fighter class (or its va riation) offers the 
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easiest inlroduction to most CRPG systems, since fighters do not usually use many spells or 
class-specific skills, and players can fall back on the basic game mechanics of movement and 
swinging a blade. Funhcrmorc, as Myers (1992) observes, the statistics in RPGs may often be 
grouped according to a distinction between "physical" and "mental" characteristics: strength, 
constitution and dexterity versus intelligence, wisdom and charisma (p. 423). That is, 
"physical" can be taken as the primary tcnn, SI, identifiable with the attacks of1he fighter and 
thief classes, or, more specifically, with Auron, Kimahri, Tidus, Wakka and Rikku. The 
second term, 52, "mental," may be identified with the magician and cleric's magical attacks, 
or, more specifically, witli Yuna and Lulu. The third term, -SI, or not-physical, might be 
referred to as "immaterial," where one attacks but misses because of a low attack "roll" {one 
literally strikes empty nir). The founh or paradoxical term, -52, or not-mental, might be 
referred lo as "imaginary," where, because of paralysis or unconsciousness, the attack turn 
could not be taken in the first place. The utopian term, S, could be identified with "combo" 
attacks, as when one performs a physical attack with a weapon that also has a mental 
component [fidus' Liquid Steel has a Waterstrike ability), or a mental auack that does non­
mental damage (Gravity magic docs non-elemental damage). The neutral term, -S, could be 
identified with avoidance of battle. 
S Physical and Menial 
(combo ottock) 
St Physical S2Menl<ll 
(f,ghlcr and thief) (magk-user •-< nndclcric)
-S2 Imaginary
(turn missed}
,,,_..,,.,..- .. 
----- .Sl Immaterial 
(strike missed) 
-S Nnt mental and nnt physical 
(a,oid combat) 
Figure 5.5. Grcimas' (1987) semiotic square premised upon an opposition between mental and 
physical srntistics. 
Second, a distinction between direct and indirect attacks is important in that a long­
range allllck cannot {usually) be used at close quarters (Wakka's blitzba!l is an exception}, and 
a hand-to-hand attack cannot be used except at dose quarters (as when there arc two ranks of 
opponents, which is rrequent with robot opponents). Furthermore, physically weak characters 
may be held in the second row so that they ore protected from direct, physical attack. If 
"direct" is taken as the primary tenn, SI, mny refer to action in close proximity, associated 
with !he fighter-type. Auron's, Tidus', and Kimahri's physical attacks may be included here, 
though in practice Wakka's blitzball, and all spells, also operate at close proximity. The 
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second term, S2, "indirect action," may refer 10 action-at-a-distance, which is only possible 
\\sing the long-range attacks of the magic-user, cleric and thief types, including Wakka's 
blitzball attacks, Lulu's spells, and Rikku's Mix Ability, or throwing an ilem. The third term, 
-SI, not-direct action, might he labelled a "circumspect" strntegy, referring to when one tries 
to cycle a character in and out of combat so as to avoid retribution. The founh term, -S2, not­
indircct-action, might be labelled "avoidance" and could refer to when one docs not cycle u 
character into combat. The utopian term, S, might he identified with cenain attacks that may 
be either direct or indirect, including Wakka's blitzball attacks and many of Lulu's spells. The 
neutral term, -S, could refer to complete inaction: again, completely avoiding battle. 
S Dire<t and indirect 
Sl Direct 
(proximity) 
>< 
.S2 Avoidance----• 
(not rotntcd in) 
SZlndircct 
(disiancc: blitzball 
and most mcntnl ollncks) 
-Sl Circumspect 
(rotnlcd ,cgulorly) 
- S Not direct and not indirect 
(Miss strike or tum. or avoid battle) 
figure 5.6. Grcimas' (1987) semiotic square premised upon an opposition between direct and 
indirect effects, seen in terms or physical proximity. 
There is also a cle:ir distinction between atrncks that inflict damage to an opponent 
and actions which heal die ch:iracter being controlled. If "damage other" is taken as the 
prim:iry term, SI. including the physical and mental attacks of the fighter, magic-user and 
thief, the second term, S2, "heal self," could be identified with healing spells of the clerical 
type. The third term, -Sl, not-damage other, could be called "damage self," and could re for to 
when one inflicts damage oo anuther friendly character to remove one or both of the status 
ailments Sleep and Confusion. The founh or paradoxical term, -S2, not-heal self, or "heal 
other" could refer to status changes or defence spells, such as Haste, cast upon oneself or a 
friendly character, or to status changes, such as Curse or Slow, inflicted upon an opponent. 
The utopion term, S, might be identified with such situations as when characters cas: Heal on 
an opponent with Zombie status and thereby infli c t  damage by healing their negative health 
status (being undcad), or when a monster tries to Heal itself but characters have inflicted it 
with a Reflect status such that the healing effect is deflected onto the ch:iracters. The nemral 
term, -S, could be identified with passing, missing, or avoiding an attack. 
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S Damage other nnd henl ;elf 
(Heal on zombie slatus) 
SI Damagoothe S2 Heal self 
(all Fhysical and (clc,ic·type 
mental nuncks) �,,. spells) 
............... ...... .. 
..S2 Heal other �---�• ·SI Damage self 
(sto.tus change) (remove ,torus) 
- S Not heal 01her and not dam,ge self 
(Mis, strike or tum, or avoid ba1lle) 
Figure 5.7. Greimas' (1987) semiotic square premised upon an opposition between inflicting 
damage and healing injury. 
Players also must pay attention to the elemental attributes of the aUacker and 
defender, which operate as a simplified pair or oppositions; Fire opposes B!i.1-Zard, and 
Thunder opposes Water, A monster is immune to its own element, but takes double damage 
from its opposing element, such that a strategy often simply requires typing the enemy 
according 10 an element. For example, since a Grenade (monster) absorbs Fire magic, players 
arc cued to use characters with IJ!izzard-bascd attacks (or, if they arc not available, Thundcr­
or Water-based auacks). However, in some instances the elemental attributes cannot be 
generalised and depend upon the specific combat tum. Tbe Spherimorph in the woods of 
Mncalnnin seems n othing more than a shapeless, watery blob, so players are tempted to use 
Thunder-based elemental attacks, but those are as likely to heal the monster. Scanning it leads 
to a Caunterattack against all party members, punishing players for not working out its 
"nature" through experimentation, but trial and error allows players to realise thnt, while its 
appearance does not change, the creature periodically transforms into a different elemental 
fonn. it is healed by attacks and spells of its current state, and only suffers adequate drunage 
from attacks and spells oFthe opposing type. Similarly, when players first fight Seymour they 
!earn lhnt he casts his elemental attacks in a pnrticulur sequence, and by anticipating this 
sequence players can cast a series of elemental defence spells in the appropriate order. When
players encounter Seymour the lu.st time, his elemental attack type cycles according to rotating
coloured spheres that surround him, and players need to adapt their e!emcn!UI auacks to this
sequence.
S Elemonllll combos 
SI Fire S2Bliz,ord 
..S2Thundor +---� ·SI Water 
·S Non·clemenrnl
Figure 5.8. The oppositions between elemental effects, presented as a reworked Grcimasinn 
(1987) semiotic �qunre in which oppositions operate hori1.0ntally but not transversely. 
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It must be emphasised that the theoretical categories nominated above do not 
represent actual structures in the game. The game's computation is more complex than this. 
However, many of the oppositions nominated above arc significant in that they represent the 
game's ergodic codes and constitute 11 grammar of combat straiegy. If we accept that the S 
and -S positions tend toward_� nbstmction, and that even the -Si and -S2 positions may only 
be applicable in certain situations, then players may ccnd to base their decisions on the basic 
oppositions nominated by St and S2. Nonetheless, even if a general strategy is based upon 
basic types. e ach decision is determined through the basis of bottom-up processing of 
in dividual scmes in refotion to the total set of active semes. 
Indeed, many battles require not just a cycling through of recurring attack types by 
particular characters but a step-by-step, goal-driven cognitive strategy. While there arc 
sometimes several successful strategics in killing boss monsters like Sin, Yunalesca and 
Braska's Final Aeon, these strategies sometimes require up to an hour to complete, and 
finding them through experimentation can require many more hours of trial runs. There arc, it 
should be noted, Save Spheres and wandering monsters next to '"boss" monsters so that 
players can pause lo develop their ch aracters if they arc not strong enough, in the hope that the 
next Ability acquired mny unlock a new strateg y. Yet players may not know how long to keep 
developing their ch aracters, leading to protracted sel:Sions in which they alternate betwee n 
minor battles and trying to defeat the "boss." 
When players ca111Jot find an appropriate strategy, or do not wish to waste time doing 
so. t�ey arc likely !o search out a FAQ document. The Playsrntion Solutions (2002) guide, for 
example, cffers the following extended strateg y for fighting Yunalesca, who has three fonns, 
each with their respective statistics: 
Rather than using up your Overdrives on the first form, it's more effective to 
save them al! for the third fonn. After casting Protect. Shell nnd Haste, have 
Yun a back up the anackcrs by healing everyone is the best way to go. For the 
first fonnjust keep chipping away at her with the heavy hiUers, p ausing to cure 
any status effects Yunalesca tosses your way. During the second fonn 
Yunalcsca will inflict Zombie status on all the characters. Normally this spell 
should be countered immediately but lhc boss also follows this up with Mega 
Death. While Mega Death usually kills instantly, it has no effect on Zombie 
chomcters, so it's a better idea to stay in Zombie status during this baule. When 
the third form is triggered the boss will hit you with Mega Death and continue 
to soften you up with Hell Biter. Use your Aeons' Overdrives now. Shiva is the 
most effective. Attack with Shiva's Diamond Dust first, then follow that up 
with its Heavenly Strike. The Heavenly Strike cnn freeze Yunalesca. allowing 
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you to score many hits. After bringing out other heavy hitting Aeons, like 
Bahamut, Yunalesca should be preuy close to death. (p. 66) 
This s1rntcgy is governed by class types ("heavy hiuers"), spell types (healing), specific spells 
(anyone with Protect, Shell and Haste), specific characters (Yuna), and specific attacks 
{Yuna's Aeons), as well as by dynamic scmcs (health and status). However, while it 
constitutes a relatively linear sequence it is only a generalised and simplified form of the 
specific sequence of actions that the player will produce when fighting Yuna!esca. That is, ns 
a strntegy it consists or a series of interventions during a more aleatory series of strategic 
choices, and depends less upon what hnppe11cd than whether or not the present state of the 
game allows for a present or fu!ure action. While a diachronic sense of "what happened"' is 
registered as the vaguely remembered history ofinter·re!ated micro-game events that define a 
strategic trajectory, a player will be more attentive to the synchronic register of game­
vruiables which define current possibilities. A player is less likely to attend to which spell was 
cast at what exact time earlier in the baule, limn they are to be focused on the problem that 
they have no more Magic Points and cannot (now, or for the remainder of the battle) cast any 
more spells. 
Conclusion 
A mixture or structural (Ulalysis, ethnography, and/or other empirical research, could 
produce a more detailed account of the step-by-step process whereby players make decisions, 
relative to an end-goal, during longer battles (sec Loftus & Lofins, 1983). The mathematical 
tradition of game theory here would be useful in suggesting some of !he decision-making 
processes in tcnns of risks and pay-offs (see Colman, 1982; Myerson, 1991; Thomas, 1984). 
However, the above account suffices to redress some of the criticisms made against the role of 
characters in video games. The player nfFFX is likely to be engaged in a top-down auribution 
of character types in the muwtive macrostructure 1hat is equal or superior 10 many print and 
film narratives in its complexity, and the game demands constant and complex bouom-up 
processes of type-revision and semic nuribution across both narrative- and ergodic­
macrostructures. Both types of coding reinforce interest, either through suspense, surprise or 
curiosi1y at the history, motives and fote of characters, or through the development of a 
strategy in combat through experimenting with ergodic affordances. However, before 
appreciating the significance of the dual narrative and game coding of characters in any more 
detail, it is necessary to elaborate upon players' "feelings towards" characters {Tan, 1997, p. 
154). 
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Chapter Six- PsychoaruJ!ytlc Identification 
The previous chapters have addressed some of the codes that structure players' 
interest in tenns of expectations about, and the outcome of, narrative and game events. 
However, while the confinnation of a henneneutic code may afford pleasure in and of itself, 
the interest players have in a sequence depends upon the relationships they have been fonned 
with the subject·nctants, or characters, in that sequence. In accounting for these relationships, 
recent researchers have drawn from the psychoanalytic model of identification initially used 
in film theory in the late 1960s. However, this account sits uneasily alongside recent cognitive 
work on film. While Bordwell (1986. p. 30) argues that the psychoanalytic model, with its 
emphasis on sexuality, gender, and the unconscious, does have a limited, or specialised, role 
in film theory, Carrol (1990) and Grodol (1997) argue thnt psychoanalysis is II flawed basis 
for film theory, since many of the basic processes of film reception are non-sexual, trans­
gendered and conscious. It suffices to say that the pre-eminence of psychoanalytic theory in 
Cultural Studies means that it cannot be easily dismissed, and this chapter draws from 
Cowie's (1997) account to suggest what the psychoanalytic model of identification offers a 
theory of video gameplay in general and an analysis ofFFX in particular. 
From Primary to Parlinl, Mulliple and Transitile ldenUfie11tlon(s) 
During the late 1960s, film theory began to draw upon Ahhussurian Marxism and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis to argue that the film screen operated much like ideology itself. For 
Baudry: 
the spectator in the cinema 'identifies with the camera' and perceives the 
events that are depicted in the image in the manner of a transcendental subject. 
That is, the spectator is not simply positioned by the image but assimilates her 
own vision to that of a camera-�ye with limitless powers of vision and sees the 
world viewed through this eye in a way that appears unmediated. (1974, p. 20) 
Metz (1975) referred to this as "the thesis of primary cinematic identification" (p. 20), arguing 
that the viewer was ideologically posnioned at the centre of the visual field. The screen was 
here seen as an "imaginary signifier," in the sense that no matter how realistic the images 
onscreen might have seemed, they were not produced from light reflected from an actual 
object but from a projector; that is, the light reflected off the screen was phenomenologically 
"real" but signified what was not present. As Tan (1997) summarises, this postulated a "tragic 
viewer" assuming: 
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the reflection of an imaginary, absent object, based on a lack or some kind, a 
shortcoming that is at once compensated for and constantly recalled. Rim 
technique denies the existence of this lock, creating the i!lusion of presence; in 
this sense it is a fetish, a surrogate. (p. 155) 
The cinematic viewer, then, uses a voyeuristic gaze, seeking wholeness in an imago that is a 
fetish for its own absence, misrccognising his/her ideological position in relation to the 
images anscreen (Dayan, 1974; Heath, 1981; Oudart, 1977). The "cinematic apparatus" wus 
therefore defined in terms of the way primnry identification naturalised a false and 
unconscious ideological position far a subject, and Metz {1975) dismissed all other forms of 
identification, especially those with characters, as intcrmillcnt, referring to them collectively 
w; "secondary identifications" (p. SB). 
Oudan (1977) referred to the positioning of the subject as "suturing," nnd Dayan 
(1974) argued that the shot/reverse shot sequence provided a space for the absent viewer 
relative to the multiple point of view onscreen shots. However, Rothman (1975) argued that 
Dayan (1974) too readily identified the operations of the cinematic apparatus with bourgeois 
ideology, nnd that what Dayan was referring to wus a shot/reverne shot/shot sequence, which 
occurred less frequently than was asserted. Theorists such as Heath (1981) subsequently went 
on to argue that (the viewer's) space wus governed by such cinematic codes and conventions 
as framing, cuuiug on action, eye line match and the 180° and 30" rules. These are, of course,
the dominant codes of the traditional realist feature film (Bordwell, 1986), und it wus 
generally accepted that realism was the dominant mode 1hat naturalised the inlerpellative 
process of the cinematic apparatus. Indeed, what Donald (!989) calls the "Screen project" 
involved exposing or breaking primary identification through sc,cial criticism, or privileging 
Brechtian conventions of"alienation" or "distancintion" which made the viewer aware of how 
cinematic conventions positioned them. 
This model has serious problems. Feminists criticized the Frcudian/Lacanian model 
for presuming a male subject, though they corrected for this by analysing how female viewers 
identify with characters (Cowie, 1997; Mulvey, 197S/L992). More importantly, the cognitive 
account suggests that gendered and sexua!ised modes of gazing and identification mnst be 
taken as special cases of general perceptual, cognitive and affective processes. In terms of the 
previous chapter, identification may occur on the most minimal basis with any subject-octant 
which fulfils Bordwell's (1986) "person" schemata. This recognition is al the busis ofCowie's 
(!997) and Allen's (1997) position that viewers nre often indijfcre/11 to the gender of 
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characters: viewers identify with characters as humans with i;oals and motives that arc being 
frustrntcd or fulfilled. So while gender may frequently be a sii;nificant factor in how viewers 
relate co characters it is not necessarily the basis for identification. Grodal {1997) 
acknowledges that some films employ "voyeurism in the trivial sense" (p. 105) of visual 
inspection, and that some films may explore issues of castration, but he argues vision has a 
broader ecological function of gaining information. For Grodal, reducing the cinematic gaze 
to voyeurism and fetishism gives an undue and over-generalised precedence to the sexual 
drive and castration 3llxietics. 
Cowie (1997) offers a further qualification in her revision of the psychoanalytic 
position. Cowie cites Luplnnche & Pontalis (1988) definition of identification as a: 
psychological process whereby the subject assimilates an aspect, propeny or 
attribute of the other and is transformed, wholly or partially, after the model the 
other provides. (p. 205) 
The imponant qualification here is "partially," since identification is never total or tir1 eless. 1 
As Cowie (1997) emphasises, there is a distinction between identification of something, as in: 
"I identify that figure as Tid�s." and identification with or Cl.I something, as in: "I identify with 
Tidus.'' Cowie argues that "these two processes involve a common element" (p. 72), which, in 
the above example, would take the form: "I am not Tidus": 
Jn order to identify, to make the same, an acknowledgement of dHTerence is 
required, implying a separation prior to any n,similation with the object of 
identification. As a result, nnd in this gap, n psychological process comes into 
play. (p. 72} 
Within the Lucanian (197712001) model, of course, what is born in this gap is desire itself, 
that is, a sense of lack born from the insufficiency one feels when foced with an image. 
Upon this basis Cowie (1997) critiques Metz.' (1975) distinction between primary and 
secondary identifications. Cowie (1997) argues that we may occasionally identify with the 
camera's perspective, but there is also a sense in which we do 1101 identify with the camera. 
Whenever we are aware of the camera, or digi1:1l equivalent, panning, but arc also aware that 
I ldcntifo:1 1ion is disti11Ct from incorpornlion, inlmjection, in1<maliso1ion, and pmjeclion. Laplonohe and 
Ponta!is ( 1988) suggest that inoorporntion and introjection ore "prototype.," of id,mificotion in which "1hc 
menial process is symbo\i$Cd as n bodily one {ingesting, devouring, keepings something inside oneself, 
etc)" {p. 207). They orgue !hot the lcrm intern,lisotion opens up the problematic lssuc of "whac ii is 1ha1 1ho 
subject assimilates him.self to" (p. 208), suggosting that whercos one identifies with objects one intcrnallsos 
relations. However, they conclude 1hot those terminological distino1ions om still not well decided. Projection 
hos olroody been discussed in chapters thmc aOO four. 
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our head has 1101 turned, there is a sense that n gaze has been provided for us. For Cowie, 
cinema constantly shifts between n mode in which it seems we nre seeing things for the first 
time and a mode in which \\:o arc aware that what we are about to sec has already bee,1 
produced and therefore has already happened (p. 101). Indeed, suspcmse is ofien predicated 
upon the foct of an audience's aw:u:eness that certain events will (or have} happened (pp. 101-
102}. 
Identification with charac1crs, which Metz' dismisses as "secondary," similarly is 
variable. There is always a genernl spatial and temporal gap, or distance, between the 
viewer/player and character. This idea finds its most comple:1: elaboration in L.ncan's (1977) 
"grnphc complet" (p. 348), according to which what we identify with is always somewhere 
else("! nm Tidus, but Tidus is there, and I am here") and tlie act of representing it displaces it 
into the past (' Tidus is rhcre, but the 'is' !just referred to is prior to the moment I referred to 
it") and tl1e abstr:ict play of longuagc ("the word 'Tidus' nnd the image of Tidus nre not the 
Tidus I spoke of'), There are also particular physical and psychological differences between 
players and the characters wilh whom they identify. In FFX, Tidus is 17, but the ploycr may 
be 30; Tidus is b!onde, but the player may have brown hair; Tidus is high spirited, but the 
player may be withdrawn; Tidus' motivation includes the desire for intimacy with Yuna, but 
the player may be homosexual and desire Tidus. TI1csc physical and psychological differences 
extend to players' and characters' sensory modalities. If we emphasise that Tidus' sensory 
modalities are not realistically represented, and that players can therefore only imagi11e the 
''reality" of his experience, then we can acknowledge that: players do not taste or smell Tidus' 
blood, sweat and dirt; plnyers' hearing is displaced by the television's speakers; lhe natural 
relntionship between saccades and head movements is mediated by the way the program, or 
plnyer, changes the "camera" perspective; and players do not physically move, walk, swing a 
sword, or dodge blows in �le way that Tidus would experience. 
Cowie (1997) concludes tlrnt Metz' distinction between primary and secondary 
identifications is a false distinction, because transitory identifi�ations "signify the 
incompleteness and insufficiency of the constitutive identifications" (p. 76), and in this 
respect it offers an artificial hiernrchy of identification (p. !02). It is now accepted that 
viewers may identify with multiple positions in a dynamic progression, and that no one type 
of identification can be seen as pre-eminent in and of itself. One basis for this is Freud's 
(1919} "A Child is Being Beaten," which: "demonstrates the possibilities for the subject of  
fantasy lo participate in a variety of roles - sliding, exchanging and doubling in the 
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interchangeable positions of the subject, object and observer'' (Stam, Burgoyne and 
Aiucnnan-1..cwis, 1992, p. 154). For example, players of FFX may, at one time, or over time, 
speak of, or perceive, Tidus as an external figure ("He is aurnctive"), as oneself in the present 
("I am attractive"), as a future-self ("I will be anractivc"'), as a threat to oneself ("He is more 
attractive than me"), and so on. In this respect, what Mell. (1975) dismissed as "'secondary 
identifications" cannot be dismissed as posterior or inferior to "primary identification." 
Even wiih the qualilication that identification is partial and transitory, Bordwell 
(1986) and Branigan (19\>l) argue that the psychoanalytic tradition makes undue 
presumptions about the relmionship between point of view as optical perspective and point of 
view as a symbolic structure or set of values (a subject position). For Bordwell and Branigan, 
space is a device of narration, part of the total fonn of the filmic text, and affects the 
dissemination of infonn�tion by concealing, revealing or framing certain objects and events. 
If narrative comprehension occurs by way of cognitive processes of deduction and inference 
about the causal logic of events, then focalisation has less to do with constituting subjectivity 
than regulating curiosity, suspense, and surprise. Grodal (1997) makes clear that focalisation 
docs not ;., itself determine identilicution: that is, changing the optical (perceptual) point or 
view From one character to that of another docs not 11ecessari/y mean that viewers shift their 
(conceptual) identification from one 10 the other. If the "camera" in fl2i. aligned itself with 
Seymnur's optical perspective, that would hardly be sufficient for players to abandon their 
allegiance to Tidus in favour of Seymour's co11cepmal perspective: identification is conserved 
in ways that optical variations may jar, but do not usually sever. 
Modes or Identification 
The qualifications above undennine the possibility of analysing processes of 
identification and subjeclification without closer analysis of a wide runge of lilmic and 
cognitive processes. What remains panicularly useful in the psychoanalytic account, however, 
is its distinction between !he "id�al ego," "ego-ideals," and the "super--t:go" (Cowie, 1977; 
Freud, 1921/1985; Lac�n. 1977/2001). 1 Thes.e throe types of identification do not occur in a
fixed order or hierarchy: they are al! transitory and dynamic. While particular texts or media 
may motivate certain types more than others, no type can be exclusively identified with a text 
or medium, since they may operute simultaneously, in co-operation, or in conflict with one 
2 As SchDro (1994) argues there seems ID be sDmo neurobio!ogicnl bnsis for these \�pc> of identifieotion
(p, 349). 
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anolher. Indeed, it is precisely the imer-relntinnships between these identifications th�! is 
t csealing, in that they foreground the dynamics of clcsirc. As is argued below, these categories 
nre useful in suggesting some of the ways players engage with video games in general, and 
EB; in particular. 
ldeul Ego: Tl,e lnde:iiroctible Self 
The first mode of identification with the ideal ego in the register of the real relates to 
"nn image which restore� to the subject its original narcissism, of being without flaw, 
omnipotent" (Cowie, 1997, p. 103). This is referred to as "primary narcisiism," even though 
the putative fl'Storation of the subjecl is partial and nostalgic, since the desired state--of 
completeness and unity, of solipsism prior to the recognition of the Other-is already lost. As 
Cowie argues, the ideal ego "is not a set of ideal contents so much us n position, the place in 
which the subject is beyond reproach and, therefore, in n sense super-human" (p. 103). 
Consequently, identification with the ideal ego emerges not simply because of a character's 
trailing but because a character (or player) functions as omnipotent aml/or invincible. 
In fil, certain characters offer fairly pronounced representations of the ideal ego in 
this sense. Auron's age, wisdom, mystery, legendary status, and power (and the fact that he 
has previously completed the quest to defeat Sin with Yuna's father) may be  taken as n 
r,uarnnte.; nfhis invulncrnbility and inevitable triumph over advers:ty (see Figure 6.la). While 
FFX's narrntisc tends to align the player with Tidus, ns apart from and ir.ferior to Auron, 
players regularly gain control of Amon du:ing combat. However, Tidus himself perfonm 
some seemingly impossible tasks that jlOSi!ion him as indestructible, such as sliding down the 
Airship's anchor cables over Bevelle while trying 10 re�cue Yuna (sec Figure I> lb). The 
eictory sequences at the end of each bntll�. which offer swinging camera views and close·ups 
of the victors to the accompaniment of triumphant music, may also be seen as offering phatlc 
contact with the ideal ego. Furthcnnore, since the game's major opponents, such as Se)II110llr, 
Sin, and Jecht, have powers on a scale beyond nonnal comprehension and eonstilute an 
aggressive challenge to the player's ego, their defeat may be seen as offering a sudden 
1cgrcssion to the ideal position of primary narcisism. 
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Figure 6.1. (a) Auron as ideal ego, calmly walking through th e hysterical crowd to confront 
the Fiends that disrupt the b!itzbnl! game nt Luca. (b) Tidus about to rescue Yuna from 
Bevelle, perfon ing the seemingly impossible fen! of sliding down the Airship's anchor 
cables high over the city. 
However, Yuna's Aeons (Valefor, Jfiit, lxion, Shiva, Bnhnmut, Yohimbo, the Mngus 
Sisters and Animn) offer nn especially pronounced and routine form of the idea! ego. The 
constantly repeated sequences in which they arc summoned function much like the 
transfomrntion sequences found in superhero 1111d anime television shows and films, such as 
Batman {1989) BDd Sailor Menn (2000), by staging nn energetic anticipation of the 
indestructible force of the ideal ego. This 1111ticipntion is (usually) justified in that tl1e Aeons 
do more dnmngc than most characters nnd monsters, 1111d, in their Overdrive mode, inflict 
1000s of points of damage, devastating opponents wilh spectacles of elemental nbll!ldon (for 
einmple, the grap hical sequences for Sonic Wings, Energy Ray, Meteor Strike, Hellfirc, 
Heavenly Strike nod Oblivion). Despite being Summoned, and therefore being po£ilioncd as 
subservient, the player directly controls Aeons, and is thereby given access to their power, 
which is beyond that of ElllY hwnElll or mortal. Aller all, up unlil the final battle with Yu 
Yevan when all the Acoru nre banished, it docs not mutter how often they nre killed, they may 
be re-Summoned, offering the position of a metaphysical ego, beyond life ?;id death, 
indcslructible. 
Since £.EX is not just a nnm1tive, but a game, the ideal ego is produced not simply 
through representations of characters with whom player arc encouraged to identify, and/or 
control, but through the player entering into a confident state of masttry, either in tenns of the 
perfonnnnce of prCK:edural schemata {the easy grace of the expert player navigating a gnme 
environment or mastering the snmc controls) or the abstract mastery associated with slmlegic 
cognitive opcT11tions (the player who has "demystified" a gnme so that slhe knows which 
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strategies guarantee triumph). This confident mastery lnd identification with the ideal ego 
would initially seem to emerge from a state of flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1992). However, 
identification with the ideal ego is accompanied by self-grandeur and motivated by an anxiety 
about separation from a prior solipsistic sense of scl!hood. By contrast, in a state of flow one 
is engaged in the present without any sense of self. Consequently, it could be said that 
identification with the ideal ego may emerge from a state of flow, but its emergeoce may 
mark the border of n state of flow: a conscious recognition of one's alienation from the 
process in which one was previously immersed. 
Indeed. the principal relevance of the ideal ego to gameplay is the consequence of its 
loss whenever the limits of the player undermine identification with the ideal. The limits in 
question may relate to the player's scnsorimotor coordination, his/her mastery of the 
interface/game, or his/her recognition of other chamcters and the game as separate entities 
(minds, narrative agents, narrators) that withhold information. That is, identification with 
ideal ego i s  losl every time the player is unable to advance in the game, for example, when 
s!he cannot work out where to go or how to advance in the Trials; it is lost every time the 
plnyer loses in battle, leaving Titlus and the other characters dead; and it is lost every time the 
player becomes nware that the characters kTIOw more than s!he, for example, when players 
sense, but are not quite conscious of, Wakka's relationship to Lulu, Ynnn's feelings forTidus, 
and Auron's knowledge about the fate of Jech!. Indeed, the ideal ego is lost every time n 
player becomes conscious of salient physical or mental limits lo hi!:lher activities vis-a-vis the 
narrative/game world. 
The significance of this loss is that identification with the ideal ego presumes n state 
of complete mastery, and any threat to it muy be seen as cueing an nction tendency to (re-) 
gain mastery. When this action tcmlcney is frustrated, the p!nyer mny fall into an aggressive 
pattern of trying to reassert hi!:lhcr will, and cnch subsequent frustrnlion may lead to a more 
pronounced and aggressive denial, leading to a cycle of affective amplification which may 
quickly pass from anger to rage. Indeed, it is such frustration of the ideal ego that is the basis 
of narcissistic rage in general (Lacnn, 1977/2001), and an inability to reconcile with the reality 
of one's limitations is, developmentally and clinically speaking. the basis of a narcissistic 
pathology (Schore, 1994). Of course, the issue here is not pathology, but how sustnined 
aggression towards n perceived source of frustration may lend to sadism as an active coping 
strategy. In ot!Jcr words, the repeated frustration of the idenl ego may be seen as a motivation 
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for sadistic p!ay, a point Lhat will be elaborated in Chapter Eight in tcnns of the empathy 
players feel for themselves. 
Ego-Ideals: Tile Desiud and Desirable Self 
The second fonn of identification penains to ego-ideals ln Lhe register of the 
imaginary. It involves the subject identifying with an external image rnising from the demands 
of others so that it can be lovabfo by the Other. This happens when "we identify with an 
image for the gaze of the Other, as the space from which we are desired by the other'' (Cowie, 
1997, p. 93). This is referred tons "secondary narcissism," and Cowie suggests that it is 
invoked by cinematic c!ose·ups, which (like mirrors or photographic images) promote that 
fundamental mode of identification in which "1 am what I see." However, idenlificmlon with 
an ego·idea] is produced whenever an image is offered to a subject who illlcrprels it as 
desirable (and seeks such desirability), and this may occur across Lhe range of cinematic 
perspectives. 
This is evident when we consider the Lwo main psychoanalytic types of desirability. 
The first, the "narcissistic type," includes love of what one is, Jove of what one was, love of 
what one would like lo be, and love of what was once a part of oneself(Cowie, 1997, p. 80). It 
is generally concerned with relations to the self. The second, the "anaclitic type," is directed 
towards the primary caregivers, usually !he mother and father who feed, care and protect the 
self, and those who subscquemly take on this role (p. 81). It is, then, generally concerned with 
one's relations with others, Laplunche (1976) sees Lhe narcissistic-type as metaphoric, in thnt 
the narcissistic object-choice is made on the basis of similarity (p. 80). We may love our 
perceived imago, those Lhat resemble that imago, or those that resemble others we would like 
to be. Since the perceived similarities may appear in a spatially, temporally, and causally 
separate image, lhis involves a transporra1io11 of desire. The anaclitic Lype, by contrast, is 
metonymic, in that it follows from a series of slippages, from breast, to mllk, to nunurer, such 
Lhat there is a greater spatial and causal connection between its objects. This involves a 
displaceme11t of desire onto that which we perceive to be parl uf, or compfomcntary to, us. 
However, ln practice, identification with an ego-ideal may involve complc� combinations or 
operations of both these types, the simple£! case being that we often love what resembles our 
caregivers and we often Jove our caregivers as lost pans of ourselves. In terms of visual 
(photographic or cinematic) representation, Lhe operation of metaphor and metonymy mean 
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that not only c!ose ups, but also partial, displaced or figurative images of body parts and 
objects may be taken as desirable if they are perceived ns similar or related to nn ego-ideal. 
To tnkc nn extended example, Tidus' nnd Yuna's similar ngc (17), attractiveness, 
cdolescent uncertainty, nnd role ns public figures (blilzball stnr nnd Summoner) mnke the two 
mirrors of what the other is and desires to be. If a well-defined Other motivates narcissistic 
rage, then Yuna's familiarity marks her as not-Other, as part of Tidus {see Figure 6.2a). 
Certainly, because of Tidus' abandonment by his primary caregivers, Yuna, tlie hope and 
potential snvoir of Spira, presents as n pro-eminent swrogate caregiver, in the sense u'mllking 
Tidus feel loved and important. Of course, wi thin a traditionally gendered social context 
Yuna's vulnerable femininity also implies the need for Tidus to take on the masculine role of 
Guardino. The image of a positive likeness is thereby complemented by lr aditiona! gender 
roles nnd nn equation ofmutunl desirability in which the differences between Tidus and Yunn 
nre part of n larger unity. Tidus' gnze in Figure 6.2b therefore may be read as bctmying a 
mixture of admiration, a desire for intimacy, and protectiveness. 
Figure 6.2. (a) Tidus and Yunn Sin together. (b) Tidus stenls a glance at Yuna. 
However, as is evident from their conversation at Ki!ikn, what Yunn especinlly desires 
from Tidus is his cheerfulness, his ability to make her laugh in the face of impending death. 
This morale-boosting role is metonymic of the moral support provided by mnny of the citizens 
of Spira, through which the party pass on their journey, nnd which finds its most utopian 
moment when the population of Spirn nll start singing "The Hymn of the Fnylh" to help calm 
Sin. Indeed, while Tidus' role as nn ego-ideal may depend upon his role of protecting and 
supporting Yuna, .rhe is Spira's protector and saviour. It is her unique power as n Snmmoncr 
that is capable of defeating Sin and bringing the Great Calm. Furthermore, the people ofSpira 
offer support for both Yuna and Tidus. Besides overt compliments and encouragement, 
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passers-by offer free items, such as healing potions. The protection of Yum:t and saving of 
Spira therefore may be seen as a means of achieving a deferred state in which one is protected 
and provided for by Spira, a form of desirabili ty-in-perpetuity. Yuna is metonymic of Spira 
and her gaze stands in for that of Spim's in defining what one would like to be. In this case, 
one's desire to be desired by Yuna, and one's subsequent identification with an ego-ideal 
associated with the trait of cheerfulness, involves providing for and protecting Yuna whilst 
being protected by her in 1he hope that Spira will provide for and protect oneself in the future. 
These transitive identifications arc, of course, ruptured whenever the partiality of 
identification (the disparity between ego-ideal and sclO becomes evident, or when Tidus 
conducts himself in a way that affects his desirability {when he does something shamdul or 
embru-rassing). For e�ample, in Snnubia Sands, after Yuna. is kidnapped by the Al Bhed, Tidus 
learns that Yuna must die if she is to be successful in her quest to kill Sin, and that the Al 
Bhed kidnapped her precisely to protect her from such a fate. He also learns that everyone but 
he knew this, and is ashamed that his upbeat talk about the end of Che quest hurt her. At this 
moment, Tidus role as ego-ideal is undennincd. However, transitive identification is resumed 
when the desire of the Ochcr is reconstituted. When the othercharucters finally rescue Ynnn in 
Bevelle, and Tidus takes her to one side to apologise for his inconsiderate comments, her 
acceptance of him suggests that their relationship has in fact deepened, and Tidus is 
recuperated as an ego-ideal. 
We also can argue that, if the ideal ego may be constituted by a position rather than a 
set of contents, then similarly a charucter onscreen may become a desirable ego-ideal because 
of the way the gnme positions it and the plnyer. As in many video games, Tidus is a desirable 
ego-ideal simply on the basis that he, in particular, is requested and needed by the Other, 
constituted by a relay of signifiers ranging from individual characters, such as Auron, Wakka 
and Yuna, through to the collective of Spira, or all humanity. That is, the game indirectly 
recruits the player as the displaced ego ofTidus to rescue the helpless (the people of Spira), 
kill mons1ers (wandering monsters, the Chocobo Eater, key opponents such as Seymour), and 
free the land (Spira). In doing so, Tidus is loved and rewarded with gratitude from the Other 
(the population of Spira, Yuna, and the other Guardians) and a love-object {wealth, power, 
Yun a, the el\tended family of the Guardians), Thul is, the entire world of Spira is under threat 
from Sin, and the fate of Spira depends upon the actions of the player as Tidus' displaced ego, 
or, conversely, Tidus as the player's principal alter ego. 
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It is precisely because the em ire game world is under threat and 110 ,me else can (or is 
available lO) perform the task'th at we can thoroughly accept our role. The Other"s demand for 
the hero's performance is itselr a last hope, and may be read in two wnys. First, we may see 
the individual as the /as/ choice: no one else is available, which may be taken os an affront or 
os an opportunity to prove oneself a hero that hos bi!en previously unrecognised. Second, we 
may see the hero as the first and 011/y choice: no one else is important or special enough, in 
which case the hero will pcrfonn and confinn an already-acknowledged heroism. The latter 
impression may be seen as facilitating identification with the ideal ego in the register of the 
real, buL within the register of the imaginary the special status of the hero is significant as a 
basis for desirability, in that it points to a particular ego-ideal that is desired by 1he other. 
Lastly, while the hoped-for love from the other is at its most pronounced when the call is 
mode (each time a character states how much the hero is needed) the player may see this 
desirubility reinforced by the simple act or survival and may feel that even in failure one is 
loved, at least temporarily or partially, because no 011e else got so far. One may remain a hero, 
relative to other failures. 
The diMinctiveness of identification with ego-ideals, compared with idemification 
with the ideal ego, i� particularly revealing when we consider the dual coding of charncters 
across narrative- and game macrostructures, as addressed in Chapter Five. We might restate 
this dual coding in tenns of, on the one hand, the represenrarional coding of characters for 
observation (primarily in narrative sequences), and, on the other hand, the.functional coding 
of characters for ergodic purposes (primarily determining a character's effectiveness in 
combat). This can lead to two opposing attitudes towards the same character. For example, a 
player might find Wukka desirable because his physical appearance connotes physical 
strength, health and exoticism. However, Wakka's low hit points and ur.-ma.cu!inc altock of 
throwing a blitzbal! may cue the player to reappraise l1im, or to experience a dual or 
ambivalent identification with him as on ideal ego aml/or ego-ideal. 
This problem is most clca, when a player deliberately equips hi!:lher charncter{s) with 
functionally inferior weapons beiause of an aesthetic preference, or abandons an aesthetic 
preference for the sake of functionality. In FFX, a player may choose to give Tidus a different 
name and/or may choose one weapon over another. For example, a player may choose Tidus' 
Liquid Steel blade over his Vigilamc blade because the former appears more powerful. It is 
nlso conceivable that a player may prcfcrTidus' Death bringer blnde to his Hcartbreuker blade 
solely on the basis of the connotations of their respective names. Alternately, a player may 
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begrudgingly sacrifice Tidus' Liquid Steel blade f.-,r the snkc or n better weapon, but may 
make the point of retaining the item in the inventory such that it retains its indcxical 
relationship to Tidus. This problem is more pronounced in CRPGs which offer greater 
freedom lo customise characters' clothing and weapons. In Dnggcrfoll: The Elder Scrolls 
(1994), for example, a player may attire his/her character in black skin lights, leather armour 
and daggers because they conform to a panicu!ar ego-ideal: romantic connotations of night­
time, thieves, assassins, the underworld and sneaky voyeurism. However, these items have 
lower statistics than other available items, such as banded armour and double-bladed 
weapons, in regards to their effect in the game. Players in video games, then, may approach or 
evaluate their characters in representational andfor functional terms, such that a character mny 
be aesthetically desirable as an ego-ideal (attracting the desire of others) but functionally 
undesirable and therefore less effective as an ideal ego (it does not have the quantitative 
power to perform well in the game), or vice versa. 
Ideally, and sometimes in pmctice, these two codes may (come lo) coincide. Auron, as 
a legendary chamcter in the narrative and a powerful character in the game initially offers 
players an ideal ego nnd ego-ideal, but as the game progresses he increasingly lives up to 
these ideals: he ends up with over 4000 hit points and innicts 9999 or more damage with 
every hit. Indeed, the character's visual image and cognitive type may be seen not just as the 
player's ego-ideal, but also as the ideal of the game charac/er, inasmuch us the chnracter is 
developing towards the maximum statistics of its type. In practice, there may be no such 
"max.imum" since the equipping and development of chnracters is usually a mailer of 
balancing differenl choices: one connot equip all the weapons or forms of armour at once, and 
even the most powerful weapons are incapaMe of all the possible effects or that character's 
weapons. Tidus' Celestial Weapon, the Calndbo!g, when completely "unlocked," has Break 
Damage Limit, Triple Overdrive, Evade & Counter, and Magic Counter auto-abilities, and 
docs domugc relative lo Tidus' hit points, but it will not confer every bonus nor allow every 
magic/status attack. Players may take the functional increase or maximum of damage as a 
basis for increased identification with the character as an ideal ego, us a relatively super­
human figure. Also, players may revisit areas in the game world to better appreciate the 
cnonnous (relative) power of their characters. For example, the monsters in Be said may be 
killed with a single stroke by characters who have 1rnvellcd all the way to Zunarkand, 
developing 1heir statistics aU the way. 
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The disjunction between representational and functional coding may be minimised 
when players accept the aesthetic distinctiveness of game and narrative macroslructures. As 
was argued in Chapter Three, one way that players can regulate interest is by voluntarily 
changing frames when their interest is exlrnustcd, and FFX has various means of allowing the 
player to shift between game and narrative macrostructures. lmismuch as voluntarily framc­
switehing involves a level of meta-gaming, there may simply be a pragmatic "narcotising" 
(Eco, 1973, p. 23) or the semic codes relating to the previous macrostructure. That is, since 
the activity of a game macrostructure is usually unaffected by narrative t raits and the player is 
positioned as the strategic agency, players may take for granted that psychological coherence 
does not extend to game macrostructures. While there may always be a sense of lack in the 
gap between ideal ego and ego-ideal. any frustration may be attenuated when frame-switching 
has been adequately achieved. 
The disjunction between representational and functional coding may also be actively 
reconciled by a forced naturalisation of the unity of the ego-ideal through the player's 
preservation of their investment and positive affect. For example, investment in Tidus may 
motivate players to nrucotise schcmma that logically contradict any positive valance towards 
him. So, as the narrative macrostructure of .Efli. unfolds, players may overlook Tidus' 
emotional insecurity-most obviously his tendency to cry, which his father Jccht pokes run 
at-as an unnecessary and unwanted addition to the schemata of"cxceptiona! person," which 
reinforces Tidus' desirabilily as an ego-ideal. Furthermore, while players may sec Tidus as 
functionally weak compared to Auron, who at the beginning of the game inflicts about ten 
times as much damage, they may perceive that: first, Tidus' exceptional status as bliizball 
player makes him more capable of becomi11g a Guardian (like Auron) than "others"; and. 
second, being young, and the functional subject of the narrative, the whole point or the game 
is lo enjoy Tidus becomillg a Guardian. In short, he remains an ego-idea! by way of his 
potential desirability. This expectation is naturalised by hermeneutic codes of rite of passage, 
bilduugsroman, the quest of the unexpected hero (discovering strength inside himself), and 
character development. However, such a favourable, ongoing investment is also eminently 
praclicul, given that the player must interact with and (partially) identify with Tidus for the 
duration of the game (see Clrnpters Eight and Nine). 
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Super,EgO!I: Shared ProllibititJm 
The third form of identification with the super-ego occurs in the register of what 
Lacan cnlls the Symbolic and involves identification with not only tlm dcmu11d of the Other, 
but nn acceptance of prohibition (and lack) as such. This occurs whenever we internalise "not 
only [a] prohibicion but, more imponantly, the point of address, the subject of enunciation of 
[that) prohibition" (Cowie, 1997, p. 96). That is, we internalise tl1e voice and perspective of an 
authority that prohibits us. 1110 acceptance of a prohibition is predicated upon the recognition 
that the prohibition is not imposed just upon ourselves but also upon the Other; it is not just a 
personal but n social prohibition in that we identify "one's own ]nck, with the Jack in the 
other" {Cowie, 1997, p. 97). The psychoanalytic model has trnditionally elaborated upon this 
in terms of the Oedipal complex, in which the surrendering of the mother as love-object, and 
acceptance of the normality of this, marks one's accession to the Lnw-of-the·fother. 
There bre, of course, as many problems with the theory of the Oedipal comple.< as 
there arc with the notion of gendered identification. Freud's Oedipal complex reveals a 
Victorina sensibility by presuming that the individual grows up in a (pctit-) bourgeois family: 
it naturalises the sexual division of the mother as nunurer and father as pro1ector/competitor; 
it normalises the phallus and heterosexuality; it can be staged and resolved without direct 
confrontation with the father ijust as the mirror stage need not require an actual mirror): and 
the Oedipal complex is now used less as a description of a psychological singe thrn as a 
metaphor for patriarchy's symbolic division of gender. 
Nonetheless, the Oedipal complex is so well known as n stereotype that even those 
without any salient experience ofit may employ a hermeneutic macrostructure focused around 
parental connict, the desire for love, and personal identity. In this respect, ffX offers an 
"Oedipal hermeneutic." Jecht, the bullying father, continually criticises Tidus for his "crying," 
which may be seen as a demand for his mother's attention (sec Figure 6.3). Jccht also 
competes with Tidus for his mother's love and attention, most importantly in the sense that, 
when Jecht disappears, Tidus' mother becomes even more remote. Consequently, Tidus hates 
his father, and struggles to surpass him in their shared sport ofbli17.ball. While the bulk of the 
narrutivc follows Tidus' tragic love for n new love-object, Yuna, and the 
rcp!nccment/extcnded family of the other Guardians, the narrative concludes with Tidus 
confronting and killing his father and dissipating. This not on!y reminds the player that both 
actually lived (and died) a millennium ago and are merely spirits (Aeons), it may suggest that 
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Tidus' desire for a new love-object WIIS always-already a belated attempt to acknowledge and 
resolve o deeper fooling llfrejection. 
Figure 6.3. (a) Fln.shback to Tidus' with his mother ("If he dies, you'll never be able to tell 
him how much you hate him"). (b) Tidus' dream of Jccht at Bcsaid {"Gonna cry again? Cry, 
cry. That's the only thing you're good for!"). 
Tidus' Oedipal narrative is paralleled, and given additional significance, by 
Seymour's. Since Seymour not only possesses his mother in the form of the Aeon, Anima, but 
o!so killed his father, players may read his criminal actions in the nll!Tlltive as stemming from 
his refusal of the Oedipril prohibition. Given Tidus' anger at his own father, and his bitto:rness 
at his own mother, Seymour becomes what Tidus could have been ifhe had uot restrained his 
anger at his father and developed surrogate attachments to Yuna, the "family" of Guardians, 
nnd Spira. In fact, it is because Tidus accepts Spira as the highest order super-ego-a 
prohibition of his own desire for the sake of the "State"-that he is a/lowed to confront and 
murder his father. Jecht, having taken the form of Braska's Final Aeon, has become opposed 
to Spira, legitimating his murder. Tidus' patricide opens the door to defeating Yu Yevon, and 
thereby the banishment of a!I Aeons, including not only Sin, but the ghost of Znniuknnd, 
Auron, wid himself. 
Player.; need not, of course, rend FFX in terms ofthe OedipEli complex, since they arc 
free to emphasise other hermeneutic codes, but the game makes a lot of sense when 
interpreted in such terms. Even if the player adopts a populist or critical rejection of Freud's 
pan-sexuality, familiarity with the Oedipal complex cues an expectation that Tidus will 
confront his (feelings about his) father, re-unite with his mother, and find o surrogate love­
object, wid that Seymour will pay for his patricide. It also provides a basis of surprise as the 
Oedipal drnma unfolds in an unexpected manner. 
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In any case, identification with a superego operates in far more general terms tlrnn 
Odipal prohibition. In practice, one can accept ally prohibilion out of fear, as a means for 
taking masochistic pleasure in being prohibited, or as a licence to prohibit others sadistically. 
The point is that we arc more likely to volimrarily accede to the voice of authority if a 
respected person who embodies that authority has him/herself suffered and accepted the force 
of its prohibition. We might restate this by saying that positive figures of authority tend to act 
according to the authority they embody, whereas negative figures of authority tend to impose 
authority on others that they do not accept themselves. 
Cowie (1997) illustrates this by recuperating Oedipal connotations, arguing that many 
figures of authority in cinema are represented as "castrated," as ,,hysica\ly weak or crippled. 
The best example of this in FFX is Auron, who takes on the role of father-figure, dispenser of 
wisdom, and guide. Auron has legendary powers and is distinguished from the other 
characters as "old," at least in that (at 35), he ls twice as old as other characters, has grcy­
streaks in his hair, and is blind in one eye (a classic psychoanalyric symbol of ''castration"). 
He not only risks his Jifo to go on the quest a second time, it is later revealed that he is an 
Aeon and will share Tidus' fate of dissipation. Moreover, he knew this all along, and so his 
voluntary aid is a �urrendering or his own freedom (and pseudo-life) in the service or others, 
reinforcing his authority as the voice of a super-ego. Of course, when players learn that Auron 
fetched Tidus on Jecht's behalf they may feel that Auron mediates Jecht's voice and thererorc 
stands-in for the father's prohibition. However, Jech! himself is cursed with the inhuman hody 
of Sin, and Tidus' eventually realises that Jech! risked his life on the previous quest to defeat 
Sin, and that lhe journey made him recognise his love for Tidus. (Auron relates this in 
Macalania Woods, though it is also revealed in the Spheres thm Jecht used lo record moments 
of his journey and which characters collect during the game). 
Nonetheless, the operation of the superego in EJ:Kprincipally may be seen in terms of 
the moral prohibition against surrendering to one's own desires in the face of doing one's 
public duty. We can see this in the figure of Belgemine, the Summoner who o ffers to help 
Yuna. Like Auron, players are likely to respect Belgcmine for having been on the quest 
before, especially given her statement that someone who cannot defeat her "is nor ready" to 
defoot Sin. She and all her Aeons must be defeated on three (or more) occasions before she 
gives up her Moon Sigil, required for Yuna to acquire her Celestial Weapon: Nirvana. It is 
only when this has occurred that 6hc offers her full approval �nd sanction, and this may affect 
all three modes of identification. At the level of the ideal ego, players arc offered the 
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narcissism of defeating a master and occupying her position. At the level of Lhe ego-ideal, 
players may desire to plense or impress her as deserving of the status of saviour of Spira, such 
that she ccmfirms the player's desirability. At the level of the super-ego, players may sec 
themselves as similady risking (sacrificing) their own (vinuatj lives fir. the common good of 
Spim. This may resonate with Yuna's selflessness in having already chosen to confront Sin, 
despite knowing that it will lead to her death. 
The authority of public duty, as opposed to the Law-of-the-Father, is more explicit 
when Seymour asks Yuna to marry him for the sake of Spira's political stability and morale. 
At this point, Seymour and Yunn function as the authorised figures of the prohibitive force of 
public duty (others' needs before one's own), but this conflicts with Tidus' (and later Yuna's) 
privulc inner voice of romantic love (do what your hean tells you). When Seymour is revealed 
as a false image of authority (having, in true O.,dipal style, murdered his own father), his 
image is separated from the voice of duty. However, the hope tlmt the aud10rity of romantic 
love may win out is undermined by the recognition that Tidus is an Aeon, foted to disappear 
when Sin is destroyed. Here Lhe discourse of the real encodes the authority of the prohibition; 
since it is not (meta-) physically possible for Tidns and Yuna to stay together, the prohibition 
of one's desires in service of the state seems to be a part of the tragic reality of the story, or 
the tragic nature of life. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided suppon for Bordwell's (1986, pp. 30-31) argument that 
psychoanalysis may complement cognitive accounts. In video games with extended narrative 
macrostructures like FFX, many familiar psychoanalytic processes may be analysed, and 
psychoanalytic models of identification suggest some interesting dynamics between players 
and characters in video games in general. Chapter s�vcn will extend the discussion of the 
super-ego by analysing how taboos function as a basis for anxiety and fear in FFX and how 
the  representations of a character's self-imposed restraint may function as a basis for sadne5.'l. 
Chapter Eight will consider the appropriateness of psychoanalytic models in accounting for 
players' aes1he1ic responses to the play situation. Here lt suffices to make the broader 
assertion that the multiplicity of identifications evident in the psychoanalytic model 
undermines simplistic assumplions that identification in video games ill general is more or 
less effective or complex than that of other media. The modes of identification discJsscd 
above regulate players' varying levels of investment in characters. 
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However, the psychoanalytic tradition is not n viable b11sis for an account of 
gmncplay. As was noted at the beginning of this chapter. viewing is a non -gendered process 
thnt has the hooad, non-sexual function of acquiring information that viewers use to make 
conscious inferences about what they are watching. In addition, the cognitive identitieation of 
characters, addressed in the last chapter, often occurs prior to identification witlz them; and 
that a character has identified with a character as an ideal ego, ego-ideal, or super-ego only 
explains part of u player's relationship to that character. It may sometimes be useful to 
�mphasisc these types of identification, and/or to sec some situations as activating, or 
resonating with. a charncter's unconscious few-s. However, the normal range of emotional 
responses in Frijda's (1986) model owes to homeostatic responses to situations that cannot be 
reduced to psychoanalytic terms. Just as not every long. hard object is phallic, not nll fear is 
fear of castration. Genernlly, fear is on action tendency to avoid the threat of harm. The 
psychoanalytic model's emphasis on repressed trauma and/or desire in a broad sense therefore 
is insensitive to the rich affective life of individuals in everyday life and to the emotional 
dynamics of gamep!ay. The next chapter pays closer auention lo the dynamics of players' 
emotional responses, arguing that players' emotions result. not from identity between the 
player and a character, ur the desire for such an identity; rnther, players' emotional responses 
are premised upon their distance and difference from characters. 
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Chapter Seven - Character Empathy 
"Empathy" is often understood as the projection of oneself into another's emotional 
and conceptual perspective. The modem term can be trnced tu Johann Goufried Herrler's 
Gcnnan tenn "Ei11.f1 h/e11," which was later developed by R. H. Lotze, and roughly uanslates 
as "to feel into" or "to feel within." It is supposed that Herder's concept entered Anglo­
Amcrican psychology in !he work of Dilthey and Lipps. and E. B. Titchener (Meares, 1992), 
but other 1heorists like Kohut (1971, 1977) elaborated upon the concept, which now occupies 
an imponant theoretical and pmctical role in the clinical process. Two aspects of the present 
undemanding of empathy nre ofparticulnr pertinence. First, empathy is not a simple or single 
process, but an aggregate one wilh separable affective and cognitive dimensions (Berger, 
1982; Davis, 1980: Richcndoller & Wenvvcr, 1994; Stiff, Dillard. Somera, Kim, & Sleight, 
1988). Scco�d. we arc capable of empathising with people with whom we are have little or no 
sense of identity; indeed, even when identif,catlon exists, the motives and emotional stale of 
an cmpalhiscr are often different from that of the person being empathised with {Basch, 1983; 
Kohut, 1977). 
This understanding is renected in Grodal's (1997) and Tan's (1997) analyses of 
viewer's empathy 1owards characters ·in feature films, which this chapter uses as a basis for 
addressing empatr.�tic emotions directed towards characters in FFX. It begins by addressing 
empathy's affective dimensions ln tenns or unlearned stimulus and nonverbal expressions. It 
then addresses empathy's cognitive dimensions in terms of situational contexts, emphasising 
!he disparit: between the emotions of players and charnctcrs. It argues that while FFX may 
elicit a rnnge of emotions. such as happiness. anger and fear, the game may be characterised 
by a mood of sadnes� linked to a dominant henneneutic code of trngedy. The chapter 
concludes by considering how empathy is reinforced by players' investment in, and morn[ 
allc1dancc with, char4Clers, but· may be blocked by impressions or inhumanity and personal 
distress. 
Affective Dimensioas or Empathy 
Tl1e affective dimension of cmpalhy is usually seen in negative tenns, in the sense that 
we feel "sensitivity tn the misfortune of others and feelings of compassion for their plight at 
seeing their pain, ill-trenlmcnt, lo�eliness, crying and helplessness" (Tamborini, 1996, p. l 1 l). 
This sensitivity to affects of fear and distress has been referred lo as "sympalhy" (Bennet, 
161 
1979) or "sympathetic arousal" (Hoffmun, 1977). For Grodal (1997), "empathy has a g�netic 
basis caused by the dear survival-value or social bonding resulting from emotional ties" (p. 
94), in th�t it motivates the defensc of another and the subsequent fonnation, preservation, 
and consolidation of sociality (Izard, 1991, p. 395). 
However, stimuli related lO mating- or rearing-behaviour, which similarly serve a 
social purpose, may produce positive arousal that motivates or reinforces action tendencies of 
seeking intimacy, care and protection. In acknowledging both negative and positive 
sympathetic arousal, it is useful to tum to what Frijda (1986) calls "unlearned emotional 
stimuli" (p. 162), which Tan (1997) discusses in terms of"innate releasers" (p.160). These 
are unlearned types that have an adaptive or survival value for the species by causing the 
automatic attribution of intentions to another, and an action tendency towards them. 
Movement. attractiveness, a11d vulnerability are three dominant groups of innate releasers 
cued by visual representations of fictional characters, including those in FFX. 
Movement 
Grodal (1998, p. 87) points to research (Perret, Harries, Misti in & Chitty, 1990) which 
suggests that there is a neurological sensitivity to the perception of living beings, cued 
[lrincipally in tenns of their moving forwards, or moving their arms away from, their body (as 
opposed to moving backwards and moving their arms towards the body, which cues a less 
marked cognitive and affocti1•e response). Consequently, if a fictional character in a film or 
video game begins moving, play :rs automatica!ly perceive this movement as more imponant 
than other movement in 011e's immediate field of vision, in that the movement may be 
i11tc11tioriu/, and the player (or charac1er) may be the (threatened) object of this intention. The 
animation of most figures in FFX, especially in cut-scenes, may be seen as especially 
fa:;cinating because of the smooth precision of the movement, derived from vectors on actors 
in body suits. The reality-status of lhis movement connicls with the lower reality-status of 
crude graphical textures and cartoon-like faces, which may give it additional salience. 
Innate releasers of movement may be seen as having the gcnern! function of 
reinforcing the rcaderly practice whereby the activity of u narrative is seen as a consequence 
of the actions of individual charnctcrs (Bordwell, 1986; Tan, 1997). However, they apply inn 
more obvious way to kinncsthetic game rnacrostructurcs, especia!ly first person shooters 
(FPSs) of the Doom (1994) mould, in which reflexive auention to movement is pan of the 
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aesthetic. In FPSs, play is polarised around rnpid-lire evaluation of the sudden movement of 
fictional charncters (or monslers) according to basic affordanccs of fight/flight, the prior state 
of arousal being especially determined by the player's current level of health and amount of 
ammunition. Indeed, a strnc of high arousal cued by the game (and this arousal in many cases 
being central to the game's aesthetic) usually means that a11y movement (be it non-human or 
non-living in origin) will be perceived as the motivated (threatening) movement of an 
opponent. In games based on hofTOT movies, such as Aliens vs Predator (1999), any sudden 
movement (such as the sudden hissing of gas escaping a broken pipe) may be sufficient 
stimulus for players to automatically presume it to be the intentional movement of a goal­
directed being and move or lire, revealing their character's position and wasting ammunition. 
The same holds for games with tactical or hostage·rcscuc sccnurios, such as Counterslrike 
{2000}, in that players must inhibit this inn1le response to the sudden appearance of a living 
being so that they do not act counter to their goal of protecting civilians. 
Since the combat game macrostructurcs in FFX opernte on a tum·ba.1ed system, in 
which the player can enter non-diegetic time while selecting a menu oplion, player responses 
arc rarely time·pressured in this way. Nonetheless, the Chocobo Eater encountered on the 
Mi'ihen Highroad, is notable not just because of its oversized mouth but its enormous anns, 
wide-open and held apart from the body in a pose of threat. This threat is made manifest 
during its Charge anack, which push the player's characters back until, after three successive 
charges. they arc pushed off a cliff. However, since the player can only control his/her 
ch:rracters when their turn arrives, and the Chocobo Eater's charge is only an occasional 
attack, the innate releaser functions less to cue an immediate response than as a background of 
arousal: during the delays between the charge auacks. and when the player chooses an option, 
the potential danger is manifested as suspense i� the game macrostructurc. 
The auimation of the slowly grasping hands of Iron Giants and the jerky movements 
of Ochu ten:aclcs similarly cue an affective alenness: a sense of dnngc1ous proximity, 
intention and/or capability. However, the perceived danger in these cuscs has a less 
pronounced rclnlionship to the danger actually posed lo characters during battle, since these 
monsters arc less powerful and/or chaructcrs develop their powers until these monsters pose 
(almost) no threat. When characters come t<' kill such monsters easily and routinely, such that 
they become a reliable source of experience and items, this animation may function li�e the 
non-threatening tentacles of a sea-anemone, cuing a kind of hypnotic interest in ceaseless 
movement without (apparent) purpose or danger. Thal is, on the one hand, there is n recurring 
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and highly-valnnced innate releaser or ceaseless movement, cuing interest und aMiety about 
intention. On the other hand, players have a cognitive evaluation that the movement is 
automatic or non-intentional and that they are safe. This tension· between cognitive and 
emotional evaluations may incite a selF-amplifying cycle that may cue excessive excitement; a 
kind of suspense wi1hout structure or closure in which players feel a creepy awareness of 
danger until the movement is withdrawn. 
The perception of movement is significantly affected by the size of the moving being, 
both because the mass of the movement ilse!f is a more prominent stimulus and because the 
correlation of size and intention poses greater potential danger. Relatively large beings, then, 
arc likely to cue avoidance or hesitation. The initial appearance of sucl, en.::nno1.:. opponents 
as Gcosgeano, the Chocobo Eater. Sinspawn Gui, the Omega Weapon, Sin and Braska's Final 
Aeon requires a moment's pause and cognitive evaluation to overcome the initial uncertainty 
and anxiety about the threat posed. Indeed, given that many of the larger opponents central co 
the narrative macro�lructure are inescapable, one is precisely forced to act against the action 
tendency to flee. 
It might be presumed, then, that small subjects .;-_ •1 cue less arousal. However, in 
the context of n gamc-macrostructure, the secondary apprai�al of small monsters, like Bite 
Bugs, Funguar and Killer Bees, involves a cognitive evaluation of a !ow reward for the 
expense of time and effort; an unproductive inccrruption of either the narrative macrostructure 
or rewarding game encounters. This sudden (cognitive) anticipation of wasted energy may 
elicit anger, and likely will be'aggravuted by the helplessness of the player to over-ride the 
minimal time required to deal with it. This recognition may become so routine that the player 
is primed for small size as a cue for an anticipated, and anticipatory, negative arousal, the 
degree of which is relative W the interest invested in the macrostructurc that is interrupted. 
Innate releasers of movement may also operate in another way, in that empathy may 
be traced back to genetic cues for co-ordinated group fight/night activity, or "motor empathy'' 
(Michoue, 1948/1991), in which one imitates the movements of another, This can be seen in 
animals, in which aggression, retreat, or a change of direction in a group cues other 
individuals in that group to respond sin1ilarly. It is also obvious in a mi�;mal sense in video 
games when lhcre arc parallel movements between characters and players . .\• Poole (2002) 
observes, part of the pleasure of interaction comes "through a joyously cxa�gcratcd sense of 
control. or amplilication of input"' (p. 148) focused around movement, as when one 
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accelerates or turns a comer in a vinual car. However, while the Chocobo races in m_ offer 
something of this amplification, the characters of the game offer no dynamic and responsive 
amplilicnlion of player movement. Direct control is limited to a single-speed navigation of 
Tidus across a 30 landscape, or menu-options, such as when one pauses to consider and select 
an attack type, and Tidus subsequently leaps into a sword attack. 
Anractiveness/unal/ractivenen 
Physical auractivcness is a dominant innale releaser which gives rise to an action 
tendency to seek and/or maintain proximity/imimacy. To a large extent, beauty is equated 
with average or similar facial nnd body forms within a population (Langlois & Roggman, 
1990; Light, Hollander & Kayra-Stunrt, 1981) and iis appearance may involve the release of 
opioids which promote a positive state and motivate mating behaviour. Of course, since what 
one finds auractive is also determined by the imprinting of primary caregivers (Schore, 1994), 
and innate releasers for beauty ore oFtcn stimull lcamcd from personal experience and cultural 
types (Corcllo, Grosotsky, Shaw, Piuengcr & Mark, 1989), referring to them "s "innate" does 
not mean that they arc genetic, merely archaic und/orhabituatcd. 
In many onimc-stylc television shows and movics, Japanese people arc represented as 
wide-eyed and while-skinned, such that some Europeans mistake them as European (Herz, 
1997). ll is here significant that FFX is the first Final Fantasy title with such resolution and 
reulism that Tidus' and lhc other characters' cpicanthic folds arc signs of rncial diffcnmcc for 
European players. However, these racial markers are only evident in the highest-quality FMV 
sequences, and since the realism of the clean-skinned physical beauty and heollh of the 
characters is coupled with (cpicanthic folds not withstanding) wide-eyed, youthful 
vulnerability, it can generally be expect o minimally positive primary appraisul, and action 
tendencies of protectiveness and seeking intimacy, in players of both European and Orie nm] 
racc/etlmidty. 
Innate releasers of physical attractiveness include genetic sensitivity to secondary 
sexual characteristics. Many video games dcliberntely over-emphasise these characteristics to 
the point of physical impossibility; Lara Croft's thin, pinch-waisted and top-heavy deformity 
is the classic example of the hyper-female; muscle-bound mesomorphs like Rustan, Hercules, 
and Duke Nukcm ore representative of the hyper-male. In FFX, the emphasis docs not reach 
the point of unrealistic deformity, but Yun a ond Lulu have pronounced breasts and hips, and 
Tidus, Wakku and Kimahri have broad shoulders, deep chests (especially Kimahri) nnd high-
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mrncle tone. These chW11etcristics are often emphasised by optical perspective, in the sense of 
breast, chest and hip shots, and clothes which either reveal more than everyday clothing 
(Lulu's cleavage and dress and Yuna's upper nrms) or hide it in such a way that imitates the 
smoothness of skin (Yuna's near·skin·whitc tunic and Rikku's tight leather top}. For 
Occidental players, the main characters' inna1e releasers of physical attractiveness and sexual 
characteristics are likely to eKcced racial traits. 
Figure 7.1. (111 Yuna's epicanthic folds are clearly visible wilhin the high-1esolution cut­
scenes. (b) Lu!n's customarily exposed cleavage. 
If cpicanthic folds give pause to some Occidental players in their evaluation of n 
chnractcr's likeness and desirability, this is because abnonnal, unattractive fonns often 
produce negative arousal, and in extreme cases lend to action tendencies of avoidance, 
sometimes reinforced by affects of disgust (sec Carrol, 1990). As Tan (1997) notes: 
An!llgonists ••. [arc often] characterized by means '>f innate releasers of 
aversion and foor. These include such things as a sligh1 deformity, a 111.'lping 
voice, a pclJ)etual expression of anger, or-less commonly perhaps--a remolc 
physical membl!lllce to animals ,hat generally call up a reaction of fear, such 
as rats, snakes, and scorpions. (p. 162) 
In other words, innate releasers of extreme (sudden or massive) movement and 
unattractiveness inherent in the enonnous, insectile, deformed and other qualities of most 
monsters cue action tendencies of fight/flight or avoidance which oppose empathy and 
sympathy. Notably, players may have some reserve towards Seymour because of the blue 
veins on his face, ond his indeterminate character trniting. This cues uncer1ainty as to whether 
he expresses casual, youthful irreverence combined with duly, ordeviorn, arrogant design. 
When strong enough, these cues mny give rise to a reflexive and energetic attempt to 
remove the offending object. However, while many of the monsters in FFX arc abnorrnnl, 
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they arc also wucalistic, drawing from stereotypical types in European and Japanese 
mythology, fantasy, science fiction nnd horror. Consequently, the iosectile qualities of a 
Varuna, the gastropod form of n MElrlboro, the deformity of nn Ochu, or the hybridity of a 
Chimera Brain, primarily cue nn interest in monstrosity as a marvellous spectacle. 
Nonetheless, a genuinely abnormal form with sufficient reality-status may coincide with a 
prior state of high arousal and sense of threat. This might include the appeamncc of Anima 
(sec Figure 7.2n), the oddly deformed Sin (sec Figure 7.2b), or Yunalcsca's hideous, ginnt 
head, with its lolling red tongue nnd Hellbite attacks. No doubt innate releasers which do not 
have a corresponding effect in the game macrostructurc may be suppressed as irrelevant, but 
these releasers may produce or reinforce a global, generalised (virtual) fight/flight response 
("! don't wnnt to fight this thing! Flee!"), or even a minima! pause (sensorimotor pElrnlysis) if
the player is unable to find immediate cognitive closure in its attempt to accommodate the 
form ("What Is this thing?"). However, this last instnncc may be no more significant thnn the 
pause ofr cncction when we wonder ifDisney's Goofy is a horse or a dog. 
Figure 7.2. (a) Animn nnd (b) Sin. 
Vulnerability 
Vulnerability, perceived in terms of mcgalocephaly, overlarge/wldencd eyes and 
sensor:motor clumsiness, is another dominant innate relenser, and cues action tendencies of 
sympathy nnd protection which may be seen in cvolutionmy terms ns linked to parental nnd 
mating behaviour (Alley, 1983, !986; Brooks & Hochberg, 1960). Many video game 
chEl!"llcters arc "cute" as a consequence of their overlargc eyes and heads, small, child-like 
bodies (sec Poo!c, 2000, pp. 139-142; 151-152), nnd movement eharnctcrised by a seeming 
clumsy, sensorimotor retardation. Poole (2000, p. 140) notes that the small bodies and big 
heads in earlier gnmes wag a consequence of the technological limit on the available number 
of pixels onscrecn, in that by reducing the size of the body, programmer's mEIXimised screen 
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spncc. Yet mcgaloccphaly persists despite technological advances. In many respects, the Final 
Fantasy series has always conformed to the cut; Japanese anime style, as is most evident in 
the cartoon exaggeration of the female form in Sailor Moon (2000) and of the male fonn in 
Dmgonb11II Z (2001). In ffX, these innate releasers !ll'C evident in the ctlrtoon portraits of the 
character.; in the character screens, in Lulu's "Moggie"-which is, after nil, n toy bear-as 
well as the youthfulness and wide·eyed nnrvet<! of Tidus, Yuna, Rikku, and the villagers of 
Spira (see Figure 7.Ja). The coding of such characters us cute or vulnerable means that they 
may function as "safe" transitional objects (Winnicott, 1971), that is, a familiar, non· 
threatening point of identification for children. Indeed, since, as Poole {2002) suggests, "lru:ge 
hends and limitless curiosity remind us of children" (p. 150), in marketing tenns they may 
provide an idea of what is safe and suitable for children for pnrcn1s as consumers. Given the 
popular E1I1Xicty about the influence of video games, it may be presumed that parents who 
know nothing of a gume's content are more likely to purchase a cartoon-style gume over n 
realistic one. 
Figure 7.3. Innate releasers of vulnerability: (a) Rikku as startled child and {b) Yuna's 
enlreaty us she falls from the tower at Bevelle. 
Innate releasers of infantile or chi!d·like vulnerability-large eyes, clear skin, 
innocence, and nnlvet<!-nro often seen as feminine. That is, if we byposs the issue of the 
genetic origins of the correlation between them, feminine features are ctxfed in tenns of these 
innate releasers. Furthermore, in video gumes, irrespective of their physical representation (as 
children, princesses, a.nd/or virgins), female charncters arc often represented as victims in 
situations which require the perfarm1111ce of actions of sympathy/protection assodated with 
vulnernbility, irrespective of whether this is experienced as a.n (emotionally motivated) action 
tendency. This was more pronounced in early, rudimentary video games in which the princess 
or maiden was kidnapped Bnd needed to be rescued, �uch as Donkey Kong (1981). However, 
it persists in gumes like EEX, in which Yuna (despite being the "saviour" of Spira) requires an 
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entire complement of Guardians, some (Auron and Kimahri) dutifully parental, others (Wakka 
and Lulu) like protective elder siblings, ond s1ill others (Tidus and Seymour) potential mates. 
Despite this protection, she is kidnapped, ond must be rescued (see Figure 7.3b). Of course, 
Yuna's role as saviour is related to her holy purity-her sacred quest requires thot she remaill 
holy-,md !his holine�s is coded in tcnns of child-like or feminine innocence and asexuality. 
She becomes more like \he figure of Tripiloka in Monkey (1978): her sexual innocence 
becomes the virtue !hat must be protected, whereby one's own desire is an internal warning or 
a potential ex1emal threat, and its repression a sign of one's purity relative to those who 
threaten her. 
Traits or vulnerability ore also evident in Tidus, whose pretliness, high-pitched voice, 
�light physique {compared with the other males), and tendency to cry, trait him as both child­
like and feminine. Tidus' bravado--cvident in his desire to become a Guardian and such 
plucky but nervous comments as: "Sec you next time!" when he retreats from bau!c-may be 
seen as either/both a manifestation of his childish high-spirits and nalvet6, and/or as the bluff 
of a liger cub baring its claws. The player, then, may be cued to take on u protective 
relationship to Tidus, even if this relationship will be undennined as his character develops 
and he functions more effectively in combat. 
Facial and other 11a11-�erbal expression.s 
Facial expressions may be seen at a basic level as more specific forms of innate­
rclcasers. in that humans nm only possess a universal set of facial exprcssions-Frijda (1986) 
includes happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, anger, disgust/contempt, and otlention-1he face is 
the primary site in which affect is experienced and communicated {Darwin, 1900/1965; 
Ekman, ]973; Ekman, Fricsan & Ellsworth, 1972; Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997; Fridja, 1986; 
Tomkins, 1976). Facial expressions are a primary way in which visual texts make the 
emotional states of characters accessible, and may be seen as a significant basis for 
"emotional conrngion" (Stiff, Dillard. Somera, Kim & Sleight, 1988), which refers to !he 
process whereby individuals involuntarily imitate or adopt the emotions of someone being 
observed. 
Digital technologies nre, of course, opening up channels of access to interior states 
found in other forms of communication, and PS2's so-called "emotion engine" allows fer 
quite clear facial expressions durin(: n1UTative sequences (see Figure 7.4a), However, 
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historically speaking, video games have been too limited to provide detailed facial 
expressions readily mapped onto basic affective states. In FFX, the facial expressions ure 
ollcn as poorly timed as the lip-synch in a budly dubbed Martial Arts film, and in the low­
rcsolution cut-scenes and in-game cut-scenes and sequences, expressions are static and 
pixelated. Even in the high-resolution cut-scenes there is a blankness which underlies the 
focial expressions, given the limited ability to perceive minimal eye 11nd muscle movemcnls. 
It might be presumed, then, that video game characters are incapable of activating some 
affective dimensions of empathetic behaviour through the display of character emotion. 
Figure 7.4. (a) Tidus' anguish when confronting his father near the end of the game. (b) 
Yuna's blnnk expression in the game engine("! will defeat Sin ... I must defeat Sin"). 
Several arguments can be mnde against this presumption. While players may 
sometimes rend the blank, jerky, or rigid expressions of chnrncters as non-dicgetic signs of 
FFX's limited graphicnl engine, such expressions can be inte1preted in diegetic terms. Players 
might perceive blanlG1css as disinterest, which may be true enough in the case of Auron, who, 
having previously completed the quest to defeat Sin wlth Braskn, may be relatively bored (he 
usually limits himself to occasional grunts of effort when lighting unexpectedly powerful 
monster,). Players might also interpret blankness as unhappiness or depression. This would 
seem to describe Yuna, who Tidus occasionally watches stare inscrutably into space, 
eventually realising that she expects to die and is saying goodbye to each pince. Consequcntly, 
her blankness may also be read as sadness and depression. In other instances, however, her 
blnnkness may sometimes be read IUl a form of quiet determination (sec Figure 7.4b). Indeed, 
players may generally read jerky or rigid expressiveness as a sign of anxiety or repressed 
emotion. For example, plnyers might see Tidus' blankness in relation to his high-pitched 
voice and infer nervous tension (ns when he offers a scratchy "Hi!" upon reuniting with his 
father). However, sometimes the jerky animation of all expressions from a state of underlying 
blankness has a creepy qnality, as if a ghost were using its lingers to move n dead person's 
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foce imo a smile or frown, creating an impression of inhumanity or pathological instability. 
This kind of impression is likely to be appropriate in the case of Seymour, who progressively 
reveals his deranged nature. 
It also is obvious that video games have developed conventions for expressing 
emotional stmes in the absence of facial expressions. Within computer-mediated 
communication, it has been argued thm "emoticons" such a :) and :( wlthin the ASCII 
character set compensate for absent channels aad allow for the fonnmion of genuine 
emotional rcfotionships and community (Baym, 1995; Beaubien, 1996; Danel, 1998; Kolko, 
1998; McRne, 1997; Reid, 1994; Stone, 1995). The same can be said of the symbolic signs 
derived from crutoons, for example, the use of a light bulb to express an idea, an exclamation 
mark to express surprise, and wavy lines to represent anger {McCloud, 1990). In FFX, this 
kind of convention exists through the use of an exclamation mark to signal when something 
has been stolen from a charncter within the Battle Screen. 
Such expressiveness is more clearly compensated for by emphasised and/or stylised 
nonvcrbal gestures. In FF7, gestures arc clearly ovcr·emphasised: when Cloud is depressed, 
frustrated or ashamed his entire upper body flops forward and his anns hang free; whea Barret 
is embarrassed he drags nnd kicks his feet; when Cait Sith is happy he jumps up and down 
witl1 flnpping feet; and when Tifa is embarrassed at having been seen with Cloud, she runs 
into a comer and covers her face with her hands. When signs and nonvcrbal over-emphasis 
become familiar enough, they may activate networks of association associated with affect, 
much like un·mediated expressions, and may therefore be sufficient to produce emotional 
contagion. Of course, when seen out of context, !he above kinds of expressions arc readily 
perceived as not only excessive, but absurd or comical. This is exploited in FF9, when the 
exaggerated gestures of Captain Albeit Steiner complement his bumbling antics, running back 
and fonh through Lindblom castle, punctuated by his clanking annour, creating the cruicnture 
uf a frustrated cgo1ist. 
In any case, compared with earlier games in which the face is a fixed sprite or has no 
movement, .!:EX presents more realistic expressions, and its relatively pronounced graphical 
expressiveness defines a change in the experience of empathy. As Bela Belasz (1952/1999) 
hns argued in relation to film, the tiniest facial movement reveal internal drama, and the 
microcosmic details of facial mo,emenl seen in closc·up provides for an emotion�! intensity 
tha! is not dependant upon the rest of the body or any context. An entire emotionul exchange 
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can 00 convoyed simply by culling OOtween different faces, devoid of body gesture or nn 
informing narrative frame. FFX's capacity lo create extremely minor facial mnvcmcnts 
provides for explicit revelations of inner life, a real-time, suspensive fascination with how the 
charncter's emotional sta!e wlll be expresse(1• and resolved. 
However, facial expressions are easily (and routinely) misperceived without 
knowledge of the context (Ekman, 1977). Consequently, expression must be linked to the 
cognitive evaluation of the context in which it occurs. Indeed, the face docs not usually 
simply communicate basic affects, nor is it necessarily nn object offoscination in itlelf. A face 
mny function as a marker or index, pointing to an object, or, like focalisation, may simply 
define relationshi[Js within a dramatic situation, in the sense of partaking of a network of 
signification or causation (sec Deleuze, 1986, 1988). In considering the actual emotional 
response of tlie viewer, then, it is not possible to rely upon lhe innate releasers, and facial or 
other nonverbal expressions, which constitute primary appraisal. Since lnle emotions in 
Frijda's (1986} model require secondary appraisal, it is necessary to address the cognitive 
dimensions of empathy. 
Cognitive Dimensions or Empathy 
Empathetic emotions, as opposed to "sympathetic arou�al," require secondary 
appraisal, or cognitive evaluation, of another's menrnl, physical and emotional state (Coke, 
Batson & McDavis, 1978; Feshback, 1975; Grodal, 1998; Stiff, Dillard, Somera, Kim & 
Sleight, 1988; Tun, 1997). However, it is useful to distinguish between empathy and 
empathetic emotions. Tun (1997) defines '"empathy" as "all the cognitive opermions on the 
part of the viewer that lead to a more complete understanding of the situational meaning for 
the character [italics added]" (p. 172). This includes processes of cognitive idcmificalion and 
may be linked to accounts of the ability to "imaginatively" inhabit the minds or perspectives 
of others, otherwise known as "perspective taking" (Coke, Batson, McDavis, 1978; Davis, 
!980, 1983; Dcmsch & Mudie, 1975; Dymond, 1949; Feshbach, 1975; Krebs, 1975; Mead, 
1934/1972). 
By contrast, "empathetic emotions" are "characterized by the foct that the situational 
meaning structure of the situation for the character is port of the mea11iHg far the viewer 
[italics added]" (Tan, 1997, p. 174). That is, both character and viewer share, and have an 
emotional response to, some of the S(Jtne concerns (though, again. the character's and viewer's 
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understanding of, and emotional response to, these :nay differ). This may be linked to 
"fictional involvement," ln which one emotionally projects oneself inlo the feelings and 
actions of others (Stotlnnd, Mathews, Chennan, Hansson, & Richardson, 1978). 
There is a general reason why the cognitive and emotionn! aspecls of empathy may act 
in concert with one another. As Grodal (1997) argues: 
The mental apparatus is primarily developed as a tool for implementing the 
preferences of lhe subject. The senses safeguard us against danger and register 
possible objectives, such as food or muting, which are then transfonned into 
plans and goals and carried out by the motor system. There will therefore be a 
very strong relationship between motivation nnd cognitive activities. If a given 
preference finds its way into the consciousness, the consciousness will 
immediately begin to seek scripts for implementing that preference. 
Conversely, cognitive scripts will activate the corresponding emotions and 
preferences if these are previously known by the subject. (p. 93) 
According to this !'\odd, the most minimal or general cc>gnitive identification of a character as 
a prolagonist with a goal may be sufficient to define preferences that a viewer may take up. 
This creates a figure-ground relation in the sense that the world nnd its objects only become 
significant in tenns of their significance for the fictional being. However, the migration of a 
character's preference into the player's own preference-seeking system "will very often be the 
consequence ofa prolonged cogn itive identification" (p. 93), because of the c lose relationship 
between cognition, emotion and motivation. In FFX, characters offer persistent points of 
identification for the ninety or more hours of play, and have complex and developing 
backstories. This, and the Co1Tesponding effort of typing of characters discussed in Chapter 
Four, constitutes not only the cognitive component of empathy, but also un investment which 
provides the hasls for a tonic anitude of interest in, and �ympathy for, characters. 
However, the distinction between empathy and empathetic emotions remains 
important because the cognitive work of empathy may sometimes be devoid of the feeling 
which laypersons might associate with the word. As Kohut (1977) and Basch (1983) have 
argued, while there is a clear survival or adaptive value in being ahle to evaluate another's 
intentions and emotional state (or "perspective") as a basis for dctemtining our interaction 
with them, the cognitive component of empathy is value-free. Basch {1983) observes: 
Much of the lime we nre empathically attuned to the affective states of others 
primarily to fulfill our own needs and to spare ourselves pain .. , some of !lie 
world's greatest scoundrels have been exquisitely and unerringly attuned to 
grasping the significance of the unconscious and unspoken affective 
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communications of others and have used that knowledge to achieve base aims. 
(pp.119-120} 
In shorl, we may empathise with on other without sympathising wilh them; or, rather, we may 
have cognitive empathy (understanding) of another's menlal/physical state while remalnini; 
sympathetic m our own needs. [n fact, the understanding of another, and a manipulative 
attitude, may give rise to negative empathetic emotions of superiority and contempt. 
Even when we are sympathetic to the plight of the other, and understand the key 
determinants which govern a character's internal stale and behaviour, empalhy is premised 
upon limited identification of another character's internal state. Most of Lhe empathetic 
cmOlions experienced in fiction depend upon the difference in situation between the person 
empathising and Lhe person with whom they arc cmpathislni;. As is evident from Tan's (1997) 
and Grod!ll's {1997) accounts, the viewer takes an observational animde such that instead of 
feeling the same emotion 115 a character, such as fear, we may feel a witness emotion, such as 
suspense. In video games, w e  may also feel witness emotions, but die player's emotional 
response will also be affected by their position as player. 
Since the player's position as a player is addressed ;n ChaplCr Eight, the following 
focuses on witness emotions in FFX. However, even witness emotions may be experienced 
from the perspective of the se!F ("imagine-self' empathy) or from the perspective or another 
("imagine-other" empathy) (Davis, Hull, Young & Warren, 1987; Hoffman, 1982: Stotland, 
Mathews, Sherman, Hansson & Richa.-tlson, 1978). McCloud (1993) argues that a simple 
visual representation p,.,vidcs more space to project one's self. That is, unlike a realistic face, 
a blank face does no! present us with differences which mark an Other and oo provides fewer 
blocks for projection. By way oFparallel it can be argncd that the more generic a situation the 
greater the opportunity there is for the individual to draw upon his/her own experiences and 
trails in defining the significance of Iha\ situation, and in hypothesising possible affordances 
and outcomes. As Tan ()997) argues, Lhe mere me11tio11 of a characlcr type, such us "racist 
dictator," may elicit an emotional response; Lhc same may be said of typed sil11atia11, such as 
Tan's "thematic structures." As is evident in Carrol's (1990) account of the emotions 
experienced by film viewers, one may foci anger at thn very idea of something, for example, a 
"selfish person about to reallsc the consequences of selfishness," or of a "villain getting away 
with villainy."That is, Lhe more genernl a situation Lhe more we may simulate ii from our own 
perspective, recruiting concrete content from our own experience, promoting imagine·self 
empathy. 
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Of course. situatio�s may be described with concrete detail, such us "a child pulting 
up poster of lost dog (who ls deud)," or "u wife about lO discover her husband has left her (on 
her binhday)." 'fhcsc situations may, by virtue of !heir specificity, add salience to the type, 
increasing its reality slatus, and thereby its Foignancy. Indeed, the more panicular the 
situational type. and the more panicul�r the tralting of charncters in the type, the more one is 
inclined to evaluate the situation on behalf of one of the characters, and the greater the 
likelihood of imagine-other empathy. That is. the increasing particularity of u situa!ion may 
complement psychological verisimilitude and focililale increased interest in both what 
happens to characters and in how characters evaluate and experience what happens to them. 
Tan (1997), it sho11!d be noted, makes the competing argument that the complex, 
individuated opprai:;al of a character encourages an imagino-self attitude. For him, this is 
because the sel�"displays a similarly complex and ncxiblc organisation" (p. 187) und in such 
cases "I here are so few schemas available that suppon the daboratie,1 and organization of the 
infornmion provided by the film" (p. 188). That is, the complexity of the character sugg�st� 
that the actions in the narrative world will be JS complex as those in real life, and will !IOI 
confonn to any simple narrative schemata; tonscquently, the viewer is encoumgcd or required 
use his/her own inferential capacity on behalf of the character to cntcnain future possibilities. 
In the absence of empirical confinnation of Tan's (1997) account it suffices lo suggest that a 
concrete situation may have salience eitl,er because we identify with the particularity of the 
situation from the perspective of a character (imagine-other empathy), or because the 
complciity of the situation resonate� wllh the compleiity of 011r reality, and thereby cues our 
(simulaced) responsiveness to the situation (imagine-self empathy), 
Empctheti� lim'.!'!fo�� and Situational Contexts 
Just us interest is the basic emotion that operJtes during film viewing und video 
gamcplay, Tan (1997) argues that "sympathy" may be the basic empathetic emotion, 
polarising viewer interest in favour of a prowgonist overcoming a complication. Sympathy is 
characterised by a sense of equality and reciprocity, nnd its action tendency "may be an 
inclina1ion to wek proximity and intimacy, a sharing u[ thoughts and feelings, and a sense of 
cherishing and being cherished" (p. 178). This usually involves a character be ins weak�, than 
an opponent but relatively equal 10 a p!nycr, and its action tendency is seeking intimacy, 
giving and rccciving. nnd sharing. 
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Tan (1997) places sympathy between "admiration" and "compassion." For llim, 
admiration usually involves the admired character being perceived as superior, at leas! in 
regards lO the particular quality being admired. Tnis superiority may elicit action tendencies 
involving the �eeking of proximity. r eceiving ,Jnd giving {p. 180), but it is premised upon a 
certain distance between oneself and the desired character. The implicit distance involved in 
admiration makes difficult the giving :ind receiving which characterises sympathy; indeed. it 
may involve us seeking lO prolong complicalio.:s so that characters can continue to perform 
their admirable qualities for our benefit. With compassion, the character becomes inferior to 
the player, if only in terms of their relative vulnerability, and the action tendency is one of 
proteclion. helping and/or consolation: "a form of giving, a willingness to go more deeply into 
the unpleasant significance of the situation. to Sl-Ck hope und grounds for defence or 
rcsigna1ion" (p. 180). 
Innate releasers or auractiveness and vulnerability predispose one to sympathy, 
admiration m1d compassion in that they elicit rencxivc action tendencies of seeking 
proximity/intimacy, seeking sexual cnga1;cmem, and protectiveness. This not only creates a 
desire for continued (phatic) contact, either in the fonn of witnessing them onsercen or 
controlling them through the interface, it reinforces panial identification with them as ego 
:Jeals. However, what cspecfally promotes e, .. pathy is our expectation that a narrative will 
reward Ilic protagonist. The misfortunes or the protagonists are unwelcome (and the 
misfortune� uf the antagoni.<ts nrc welcome) precisely because they do not reward our prior 
investment in their wcllbcing . .It is, in short, in our illlcrest to sympati1ise with the 
protagonist's interests. 
In defining the key components of a situation, and how it guides empathetic emotions, 
Tmi ( 1997) arr,ues that: 
To [the three major cmputhetic emotions: sympathy, admiration and 
compassion] may be added others, such as gratitude, unger, envy, con•�mpt, 
and embarrassment. These ofl�n complement the first three, forming a response 
10 a!lendant features of the situation that evoke sympathy, compassion. or 
admiration. The fate of the protagonist is, as we know, bound up with the 
actions of the other charac!crs. When the prorngonist reaches his goal, this 
delights the viewers; when that goal is at�1ined thanks lo someone else, they 
feel gratitude as well. (p. 181) 
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This constitutes the extent ofTan"s discussion of more complex empathetic emotions; Grodal 
( 1997) similarly avoids the diversity of empathetic emotions in favour of how different genres 
elicit panicu!ar types of arousal or ,·motions. However, Tan"s {1997) mention of "attendant 
features of the situation" (p. 181) suggesl.S that his account may be translated into Greimas' 
(1987) acmntlal model. That ls. it might seem useful to map empathetic emotions onto 
a ctamial transactions: 
Sender (S) -)a 
(Dispatcher) 
Object (B) -,, 
(Sou ghl -for -person) 
l 
Rcceiver(R) 
(Hero) 
Helper(H) -)a Subjoc! (CJ f. Opl"'nenl (0) 
(Donar or (Hero) (Villoin 
Helper orF,tsellem) 
Figure 7.5. Greimas (1987) actantlal grammar mapped onto Propp's morphology, labelled (S, 
B, R, II, C, 0) for translation into formulaic situational conte:<t. 
If we follow the terms in Figure 7.5 the following provisional notation could be used 
to denote the relationships between Greima.' (1987) terms:"+" could indicate a transac.tion, 
"=" could indicate the result of the transaction, "-" could indicate the loss of the subse<.juem 
term. Fnrthennorc, """ coulll indicate a weakened or blocked relationship with the subsequent 
term, "A" could indicate a strengthened relationship to the subsequent tc:m, and "f' could 
�ep:uate possible, exchangeable, and cumulative tenns. On this basis it is possible to derive a 
fonnula for each situational context. Sympathy, and compassion, could be seen a. the 
consequence of a tnmsaction in which the subject-actant's access to the object is delayed, 
weakened, or blocked (S"B). Anger could be seen as the consequence of transactions in which 
a subject-actant loses (access to) an object because of an opponent ((S+OF-B). Happiness 
could be the couscquci1ce when a subject-actant acquires its object, or is helped (Cl+W+B), 
and admirntion could be the response when a subject-actant am as his/her own helper 
((CecHtO), Gratitude could be seen as occurring when a subject-actant is strengthened by the 
sender, object, receiver, or helper ((Cl+S/+0/+Rl+H)'="O), or when transactions between 
helpers and subjects block or reduce the power of the opponcm ((S+H)ec"O). Fear could be 
seen a. the consequence of transactions in which a subjcct-actant is in a position to be 
diminished or defeated by an opponent ((C+Q)ec"B), and sadness could be seen as a result of a 
transac1ion in which a subjcct-actant loses an object or helper {S/-D/-H). 
(If course, a more elaborJte notation could be developed, but the one above suffices to 
demonstrate the problem with such notation· r.ot ever)' trausaction of ;;\is type produces an 
emotional response, Not only is the actamiul structure dcpcndJnt upon the plaj'l:r� 
intcrprclntion of the situational contexl, the mere /u/,e/li11g of. say, "anger" on the basis of a 
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transaclion in which a subjcct·actant is blocked by an opponcnl is hardly a guarantee that the 
player experiences arousal and that this arousal may be described as anger. TI1is discrepancy 
is evider.t in Tan"s (1997) distinction between the "situational meaning context," which may 
simply be a cognitive construction of the "text base." and an "emotionai situational context." 
which refers to 1ha1 aspect of the situational meaning context that provides the basis for an 
emotional response (p. 197). Many transactions may form part of the situational context, but 
arc of little or no emotional relevance. 
An emotional response to a situation also is affected by the progress and outcome of a 
sequence, since situational contexts change during the course of a transaction. Sympathy 
frequently gives way to compassion and admiration as a charnctcr navigates the obstacles ofa 
plot. alternating betw�en moments of defeat and triumph; envy may give way to anger; 
gratimde may give way to resentment at any obligation. If Tidus is evaluated as a victim 
player are likely to offer virtual support and wish for his triumph. If Tidus then triumphs 
players are likely to re·evaluate the situation and feel triumph on his beholf. However, if 
Tldus is subsequently defeated the resulting sense of defeot may be worse, relative to the 
fonncr sense of triumph. 
Indeed, emotions often work in a complementary fa:.nion lo define what we can call 
m1 "emotional dynamic." As Tan observes; 
A situation that arouses compassion for the hero may at the same time evoke 
anger directed towards the villain or envy at his success. But it is also possible 
10 experience a combination of compassion and anger, for insrnnce, when the 
protagonist suffers a reversal !hat is in some way his own fault. Admiration for 
Lhe hero can go hand in hand with contempt for the antagonist. Empathetic 
embarrassment often accompanies failures of the protagonist whereby he loses 
foce (Miller, 1987). In short, empathetic emotions occur in regular 
conligurations that reflect the mutual rclmionsh1ps - and in particular the 
conflict - between various characters. (p. 18!) 
Given that the same !ypc of arousal may be labelled in different ways (Grodal. 1997, p. 96), 
and it is possible to evaluate a situation in different ways (Fridja. 1997, p. 375), it can be said 
!hat an "'emotional dynamic" describes the basis for a variety of emotional responses to 
different subject·actants wi1ilin a situational context. Thot is.just os each ehoroclcr moy be the 
hero of his own sequence (lfarthcs, 1966/1988, p. 119), �o too may players interpret each 
situation from a different perspective. For cxomp!c, a character's situation may prompt the 
player to oscilble between anger toward.I the ontagoni�t ,ind joy for the protagonist, 
depending upon the player's cognitive position and/or the game's cues. Together, Lhe two {or 
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more) emotions that the player experiences may be said to constitute the emotional dynamic 
for !hat situation. 
Yet. even with these qualifications, the actamial model's concern with textual 
structures is less sensitive lo the physiological and psychological bases of emotion than 
Frijda's (1986) model of situational con!exts. Fridja differentiates between ten "core 
components" of a situation: objectivity, rel�vance, reality level, difficulty, urgency, 
seriousness, valence, demand character, clarity, and multiplicity (p. 204). 1 In the absence of 
experimentation there is no need not elaborate upon. or apply, all of 1hesc parameters. It 
suffices to emphasise that, for Frijda: 
Each emotion corresponds to a different appraisal - a different situational 
meaning structure - and is characterized by it. . Different situational 
meaning s1ructures map onto different modes of action readiness. (p. 195) 
Frijda subsequently provides a "profile" for each emotion, and, drawing from his account, ii is 
possible to define a basic situational structure iu te1ms of particular cognitive appraisal and an 
accompanying action tendency. The rest of this chapter indicates some pertinent aspects of the 
dominant emotions as !hey pertain to FFX, arguing that while t/>e game offers situations likely 
to elicit happir,css, fear, and anger, i• may be characterised by a dominant mood of sadness. 
Happiness 
Gameplay is often seen as inlrinsica!ly motivating, or as producing Csiksr.entmihalyi's 
(1975, 1990. 1993) happy stale of flow. but little auention is usually paid lo narmtive 
situations that elicit happiness. 11,e situational profile of happiness (or joy) may be described 
as the positive (labelling of) arousal, involvin�. the attainment, possession or engagement with 
a desired object, person, quality or s tale. Its a;tion tendency may be seen as either a passive 
desire to enjoy one's happiness, or a partic•�lar object of happiness, or it may be a kind of 
global vitality which reinforces interest-excitement directed to anything within our immediate 
experience. From the perspective of a viewer, the action tendency is to enjoy and prolong the 
present srnte of !he character, albeit with the expectation that the narmtive will threaten it. [u 
I Frijda al,u idcn(ifie, ten "'c,,mc,I"" or "aclion·rclcvom components"' (p. 208): presencc/obscnce.
(un)ccn,inty, change, oren·ncss/doscd-ness. inlentionality. conuollabilily. modifiability, object versus 
event cvaluaiion. focoUly-glohahlY, mangcncss-forniliari1y. He olw idcnlifies four "objccl components"' 
(p. 214): ego as constituent, ego as object. object versus subject fate. ond value relevance vm:us 
contingency. 
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ff.X happiness within the nilffiltive mncrostructure might be seen as a likely response to those 
situntions in which Tidus meets, befriends, socialises, and bonds with the other Guardians. 
Tidus' happiness at the security of this surrogate family is especially pronounced given thnt 
Yuna offers the hnppy prospect of love. Here players experienc,: not only the ideal·ego of 
Tidns' lovabilily confinned and self-esteem gratified, but also the contagion of Tidus' 
concomitant joy. 
Figure 7.6. Tidus' (a) and Yunn's (b) complementllf)' happiness dtuing their romantic 
dalliance in Macalanin Woods. 
However, for Tomkins (1962), the underlying affect of happiness, or what he calls the 
"smiling response," is the sudden relief from a prior stLle of high arousal--ilr the smile of 
triumph that follows from n reduction of anger (p. 371}. As Frijda (1986) snys, "it is 
achievement of positive outcomes rnthcr than having them thnt generates positive emotion" 
{p. 187). In other words, the situations ofgrenlcst happiness are those which occur after, or nrc 
won from, some stmggle wilh on imhnppy situation. Of course, the player may be primarily 
happy for him or herself upon completing the Trials, sub-quests, and/or traversing a territory 
like the Calm Lands {sec Chapter Eight). However, players are inclined to feel happy when 
Tidus re-encounters Rikku at the MoonHow; when Tidus rescues Yuna nt Bev�lle and renlises 
that she will not willingly mnny Seymour; and during the ensuing moment when Ynnn 
forgives Tidus for having spoken glihly about what tlicy could do �fter the quest (not knowing 
that she was destined to die). Tidus' and Yunn's expression of !ovc in Mncnlanio Wood� is 
joyous precisely because it is nmplified by relief from their prior uncertainty and restraint (see 
Figure 7.6). Indeed, FFX spends a great deal of time cultivating the bonds between the mnin 
players, principully through intimate exchanges (Wakkn !llld Lulu on the S.S. Winno), gradu'11 
disclosures of background (Lulu speaking of the death of Chappu), growing loyalties 
(Kimuhri finally talking to Tidus) and mutuul dependem:e (YWlll's need for protection, Spira's 
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need for Yuna). This happiness, or its promise, is partkulnrly significant because it provides n 
basis for negative emotional responses. 
Anger and Contempt 
Anger's situational meaning structure may be seen ns negative arousal that occurs 
when desire, or lelos, is blocked by a voluntary extemn! agent {Frijda, 1986; Griffin and 
Mascolo, 1998; Tomkins, 1991). It is generally argued that nn intentional and vo luntaiy slight 
or hurt maximises l!llger. As Tan (1997) says, paraphrasing Spinoza (trnns. 1994): ''The more 
the olher is free, lhe more we hate him l>he is a cause of our pain" (p. 198). Such intentional 
and voluntruy obstruction by someon e allows for n sense of anger, or, indeed, righteous 
outrage ("How dare you! You should know better!"). When Seymour repeatedly attncks the 
characters, kidnaps Yuna, sets the Guado nnd the authority of Spira against them, and destroys 
the Renso race, players nrc likely to see this as not merely immoral and inhwnan, but as n 
wilful attempt to destroy another's happiness. This is especially evident when, while forcing 
Yuna to marry and kiss him, Seymour acknowledges Tidus (sec Figure 7.7). The action 
tendency when we empathise with a chnrncter's anger is clear enough: we hope for, 
hypothesise the means of, and fantasise about, revenge on the character's bch3!f. At the s(lllle 
time, we may remain alert to tl1e character's admirable qualities, since these diminish the 
relative success of the opponent. Consequently, we are likely to experience II/lg!)' flllltnsising 
in response to Ilic Mnesler's pnrticipation in the lie about Sin l!lld the Summoning, as well o.s 
Kinoc's l!lld Seymour's callous d isregnrd for those they supposedly protect. 
Figure 7.7. (a) Seymour's confident ncknowlcdgement ofTidus while forcing Yuna to many 
him. (b) Tidu�' initial dismay at Yuna's false marriage turns into nng�r at Seymour's 
wil fulness. 
Conversely, when blocking is seen a� semi-volwitary, Pr involuntary, wiger may blur 
into frustration or impatience, in thnt n certain inevitability is accepted thnt we Cl!llnot control 
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and the anger becomes more global in its appraisal. This may extend to the amoral animals. 
plant-animals, robots and so on mcmioncd above, in that :heir automatic and routin� nature 
means they arc not always experienced as wilfu' (though players may become genuinely 
angry al the constant interru:itions posed by amoral t>cings, or may see them as an extension 
of a wilful agency that has sent or placed them). A telling example is when Wakka shows 
angry contempt at Rikku for being Al-Rhed, crear\;,g tension between the Guardians. Wakka's 
prejudice results from his belief that the Al-Bhcd Machina were responsible for his brother's 
death, which he cannot accept. C'Jnsequcntly, the player's action tendency is loss likely to 
involve fantasising revenge and more a hope that Wakka will come to some r.:a!isation and 
become capable of choosing to act differently. A similar frustration may exist towards Miko, 
who participates in the He of the Maesters and the Spiral of Death because he believes that it 
is in the interests of those in Spira, and that there ls no alternative. For both Wakka and Mika, 
it is not their wilfulness but their narrow-mindedness that is the salient aspect of the situation. 
Frustration is also likely when others refuse to believe Tidus when he claims lo come 
from Zanarkand. For much of the game both Wakka and Lulu do not believe him, and while 
Rikku and Yuna me open-minded they advise Tidus not to tell anyone what he thinks because 
they know many would not believe him. Tidus' position may be seen in terms of Carrel's 
(1990) argument that horror films ol'ten utilise a macrostructure in which children or teenagers 
try to convince credulous adults about the impending danger posed by ghosts, monsters or 
other supernatural beings. Of course, everyone in Spira knows that Sin exists, and is 
dangerous, but players may sec other characters' refusal to believe Tidus as a basis for 
suspense in that it generates the prospect of what will hapl)en if others do not believe him (for 
example, the Guardians may ignore clues that could help them to defeat Sin). However, even 
if this is not the case, Wakka's and Lulu's refusal to accept Tidus' "reality" may activate d1e 
same anger and pity as is experienced wben someone is blamed, shamed and/or punished for a 
crime they did not commit. That is, their denial reinforces players' sympathy with Tidus. 
Even though we may understand Wakka's and Lulu's denial, the player may feel 
sadistic pleasure at the anticipated moment of their comeuppance, that is, the moment when 
both characters arc forced to confront the "reality" that the player has already accepted. 
Certainly, Wakka's initial rough treatment of Tidus (putting Tidus' iu a headlock, like a 
condescending big brother), and Lulu's detachment, cynicism and pragmatic criticism, may 
both invite such petty retribution. More importantly, when players realise that Tidus can never 
return home their sympathy n!ay motivate resen!ment or anger towards those who do not 
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believe him (because in refusing to believe him they deny the v.didity of his puin). The longer 
the denial is drnwn out the more the player can relish the possibility of a comeuppance. 
through cith�rlboth the possibility or withholding forgiveness and/or the possibility or the 
other's subsequent pity and guilt. 
It is nornble, then, tlrnt Lulu's belief in Tidus is revealed by casual comment on the 
sled over Lake Macalania. Tidus is able to say: "So you believe me now?" but there is no 
drama about it. By rernining her aloofness, and confronting the truth on her own, she 
effectively robs Tidus (and the player) of the pleusure of seeing her arrogance challenged; this 
may reinforce players' sense of distance from, and/or dislike for, her. Wakka, on the other 
hand, is made to look idiotic far not believing Tidus, for his prejudices against Rikku, and for 
his slow recognition of the corruption of the Macsters he has always respected. He 
subsequently apologises, contritely, offering players the satisfaction of another's unjust 
attitude being reprimanded, and reversing the position of Wakka us older brother and Tidus as 
the ignorant newcomer. 
Anger often may accompany contempt, or disgust, which results from the presence of 
negative auributes in another. Contempt's situational profile may be described as neg�tive 
arousal produced by another's misconduct, especially when the other does not feel shame for 
him/herself (Frijda, 1986, p. 73}. Its action tendency may be to make the other aware of, and 
feel, our contempt, usually by hoping that another character will express it, or through 
fantasising about ill-fonune which will force them to re.evaluate themselves. For example, 
players may feel contempt for Wnkka when he is ineffective in baU!e, or when he expresses 
prejudice against Rikku, undennining the harmony of the Guardians. However, once Wakka 
shows comritcness far his prejudice against Rikku, players no longer need to communicate 
their contempt since he is embarras·Jcd for himself. At this point, his prejudice seems less 
wilful and more a mauer of a character flaw, allowing players to feel compassion for him. 
Nonetheless, since the blocking of a protagonist's actions is often the result of contemptible 
qualities in an antagonist, such as Seymour's arrogance, angry fantasising is likely to 
a ccompany contempt. 
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Fear and Taboos 
When one is angry, the danger faced is noc usually part of one's evaluation of the 
si tuation. By contrast, fear involves a heightened awarener,s of danger perceived in proximity 
to the selr, oflen accompanied by uncenainty as co one's ability to cope. When fear operates 
as an emp;ithctic emotion that a player feels on behalf of a character, its action tendency ls 
likely to be to direct that charac!Cr to safety (Frijda, 1986, p. 197). In FFX, the most obvious 
assenion might be that players experience fear when characters enter into new and unknown 
environmems, which holds the promise of new threats, necessitating some degree of caution. 
Of course, if !here is anything to be afraid of during navigation ofSpira's wi lderness it 
is encounters wich fierce opponents. However, while the random and therefore unexpected 
entry imo combat may be startling, combat is usually routine and not really a cause for threat. 
It is more likely, then, thut most new environments give rise to suspense rather than fear. 
Where a pronounced suspense or fear is likely to occur ls during encounters with new, over­
sized and/or unknown monsters, and/or when characccrs arc weak and low on healing potions 
or magic points. This suspense or fear may be reinforced by countdowns, us when Sin, AJima 
and Jecht gradually charge their devastating Overdrives, or when opponents like Seymour 
alcemate be tween different auacks for which players may not have been able to prepare. Any 
suspense or fear may also be reinforced whenever the Flee option is disabled and there is no 
affordance for escape, as is the case with most Doss monsters, including Seymour and Sin. In 
these situmions, players may see no way for the characters to survive, and can only fantasise 
about some impossible escape or protective force. 
Howeve r, as !he next chapter argues, emotions within game macro.muctures arc more 
likely to be experienced from che perspective of the player. not a character. The implication is 
that empathetic fear, in the sense discussed here, is less likely to occur in the Field or Battle 
screens, and more likely to occur as a witness emotion felt towards characlers during narrutive 
sequences. including cut-scenes. Indeed, the inability to act during such sequences may be a 
significant parameter of empathetic fear. As Grodal (1997) argues, when there is no 
affordance for volumary action all that is left is an involuntary autonomic response of fear, 
pity and/or horror. Perhaps the cleares t eiample of this is during Sin's attack on Kilika, which 
brings forth an enonnous, advancing wave. The close-up on the faces of the vi!lage folk, 
especially the mother and child, elicits compru;sion and protectiveness, but, more chan this, the 
immobility of the viewer as wimess reinforces the sense of helplessness (sec Figure 7.8). 
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Figure 7.8. (a) A mother and child in the shadow of Sin in Kilih. (b) The folk of Kilika 
helpless before the advance of Sin. 
It also can be argued that EEX makes systematic use of taboos, and their violation, as 
a way of evoking a sense of dread and danger. Hero it is relevant that Besaid, Tidus' departure 
point in Spira, connotes the kind of tribal life often ns.sociated with taboos: n primitive world 
stripped or civilising masks, nuked in its sex, denth, nnd ritual. Certainly, Besaid is an 
idealised village, and the tribal connotations may derive less from FFX than from stereotyped 
representations of "primitives" in colonialist-styled texts, such as Rider Hnggnrd's King 
Solomon's Mines (188511956), or Indiana Jones: Raider's of the Lost Ark (1981). 
Nonetheless, FFX's representations of "primitive" rituals (the "blitzball" prayer, the 
SL!.'nmoning, and Scndings) and taboos (not entering the Trials of the Fayth, praying at die 
standing stone before leaving Besaid island, and not using Machinn) suggests the potential 
relev1111ce oftaboos to player's henneneutic expectations (see Figure 7.9). 
Figure 7.9. (n) Yunn shows respect to the imposing Temple in Bcsnid. {b) Wnkkn prays to the 
standing stone before leaving Besaid ("It's an ancient custom. People leaving the island pray 
here for a safe trip"). 
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Frctid {[913/1950) defined taboos as social prohibitions that have their origin in group 
survival, and anthropologists have elaborated upon the fonnation and function of the major 
taboos, such as incest or marriage within families, eating one's totem animal, speaking of the 
dead, and observance ofcaste (Evans-Pritchard, 1937/1985: Frazer, 1912/1993; Levi-Strauss, 
1963, 196611976; Malinowski, 1926, 1927, 1954, 1963). 1110 issue her,., is that, following 
Jackson (1988), it cnn be argued thnt fear, or at least suspense, may be elicited when 
characters in FFX violate social prohibitions. 
Jackson (1988), like l,reud (1919/1990) and Todorov (1973), sees taboos as 
contributing to o sense of the uncanny, which is a specialised form of fear. She argues that 
representions of the unspeakable, the nameless, and the taboo, express resistence to the 
dominant cultural order, "truth" or "reality." We may sec this as significant both because it 
troubles the cpi�tomologica! cenalntles of a nrurative, suggesting some "other" reality, and 
llecause the violation of a cultural order invites fear or punitive consequences, promoting a 
vigilant search for hidden thrents. Of course, just as the experience of trauma cannot be 
generalised, the experience of the uncanny depends upon the taboo in question. Nonetheless, 
it is possible to argue that any anxiety or fear exists largely in relation to the prohibition itself. 
That is, one may be horrified at a taboo act, such as murder, putrefaction, or rape, but this 
horror may overlap with fear of the prohibitive forc!l that prevents lls expression. Jfthc taboo 
exists through our prior acceptance of the prohibition at the level of the super-ego, then its 
violation may resonate through our moral being. Our pursuant anxiety about the consequences 
of transgression may be globally projected ns a vague, but overwhelming, fear of wrongness, 
deviance, and punishment. There is no need lo foll back on the Freudian equation of 
punishment with castration; it suffices to say that what one fears is the punishment itself 
and/or the emotions associated with the punishment {such a s  fe�r and shame). The uncanny 
therefore may be regarded less in tenns of reprcs�ed trauma and mare in terms of a learned 
anxiety about a prohibitive/punitive force. Jn regards to lictiona! texts, the sense of d-ead 
about some hidden trauma or violation in a character's past, and/or some unsp�akablc mboo in 
the present, creates a sense that ther,., is nn nnterior "reality" beneath the appearanc� or reality. 
With this qualification, it is possible to focus on which taboos are represented in EfX. tl1e 
extent to which the nrurative preserves the force of prohibition, and therefore the extent to 
which they may elicit nnxiety and fear. 
While many psychologists have rejected or reworked Freud's (1920) dual-instinct 
theory (Mitchell & Blnck, 1995; Stein, 1991; Tomkins, 1962), the b:rrns Thnnutos (death-
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drive) and Eros (sex-drive), as used by Todorov (1973) and fockson (1988), usefully point to 
two clusters of taboos in FFX. In regards to the taboos associated with death (Timnatos), 
taboos of patricide, suicide and matricide can be observed in the game. Patricide, as 
mentioned in Chapter Six, may be the most prominent taboo in FFX, in that both Tidus and 
Seymour slay their own fathers. However, while Seymour's blasC acknowledgement ot' 
patricide shocks the 01her Macstcrs, there is no Oedipal moment of crisis during which Tidus 
states; "I rn11'1 kill my own father" or "I have just killed my father!" Despite Tidus' growing 
recognition that he must defeat his father he never verbalises the problem as one of patricide, 
nor is patricide the explicit basis of narrutive suspense (except perhaps before the fight with 
Brnska's Final Aeon, when Tidus says "let's get this ovorwith"). 
Nonetheless, there is a definite sense in which Tidus wishes to e�cape or conquer the 
influence of his father. In one notable sequence, the player i� asked to try and perform Jecht's 
trademark kick while "bad memories," in the form of Jecht's discouraging voice, keep 
appearing ..-;:i the screen: the player must strike the a�propriatc keys quickly enough to 
"banish" them. If the player docs not "banish" the bod memories, Tidus docs not m�ke the 
kick and keeps living in Jccht's shadow. Furthermore, the silence in regnr<!s to patricide may 
be seen as analogous to Yuna's silent awareness of her impending death through se]f. 
sacrifice. Yuna's fate is not spoken of because, as Lulu says, "some thing.· nre too painful." 
Similarly, Tidus may be unable 10 speak of the impending murder because he is rcp1cssing tlie 
pain ofit, such thnt �is silence bespeaks the force of the taboo. 
However, given the Japanese concern with filial piety, it is more likely that the taboo 
in question is a verbal one against speaking ill of one's father or family. Tidus' anger at his 
father is largely represented while he is narrating lo himself, or alone. Yun a is shocked when 
Tidus expresses hme for Jecht, especially given her positive memories of Jecht and the 
enormous public respect accorded to both Jech! nnd her father, Braskn, for defeating Sin. 
Indeed, Tidus' disrespect for Jccht is m1 indirect disrespect for the pilgrimage itself, and is 
therefore sacrilegious. When, in Macalania Woods, Auron tells Tidus lhnt Jccht loved him, 
observing that "it had to be said," Tidus' 1;uppresslon o[ his anger may be read as rcnectlng 
his own {need for) love. In light of this, Tidus' real confrontation with Jecht may be seen, not 
as any act of violence, but the verbalisation of "I hate you" to his father's face. This verbal 
acknowledgement, within the context ofmutuul understanding of their love (evident in Jecht's 
gr,ntly laughed "I know"), is the true moment of resolution between child and primary 
caregiver: the moment in which Tidus acknowledges not only hi> mixed love and hate for his 
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father, but his father's love for hil�. 
It is significunt that, even though Tidus subsequently fights Jer.ht's form in Braska's 
Final Aeon, Jecht is being transformed into something other than a fother (Brnska's Final 
Aeon) and he orgo11fsed for Tidus to kill him. Indeed, Tidus rescues his father from being 
confined to the cun;ed form of the monster he no longer represent.. The murder, then, is an act 
of love. Indeed, part of the tragedy of the game is that at the moment he realises that Jccht is 
not the monster that Tidus thought he was, Jccht tums into a monster in the ]item! sense, and 
Tidus must kill him. There is a kind of dreadful wish-fulfilment in this, a parody of the id's 
drnma being realised to punish the ego that has exorcised it. This diffuses the sense that Tidus 
(intenti1Jnally) commits patricide, yet retains a sense of the horror, or tragedy, of the a,::t. 
Suicide as a taboo is implicit in the Sununoners' (including \"una's) quest to kill Sin, 
despite knowing it will !cad to their death. Within the religious discourse ofYevon, spoken by 
Yuna, I his is self-sacrifice for the sake of those in Spirn: the highest act of altruism, supponed 
and respected by the majority of Those in Spira. However, that thi� self-sacrifice violates the 
sanctity of human life is represented by the Al Bhed, who kidnap the Summoner:; to prevent 
them going to their deaths. For them, the Summoner's deaths is not u case of self-sacrifice but 
of being sacrificed to preserve a god (Sin, Yu Yevon) or a system (rule by the dead Macsters) 
which is itself unjust. Volunteering to be a sacrifice to Sin crosses the taboo of suicide 
because such an act pclJ)Ctuatcs the Spiral of Death. The Jramatic refusal of the Guardians to 
sacrifice one of themselves to Yunolesca to become a Fmul Aeon is the definitive moment 
when suicide is preserved as a taboo, when the liberal rights of the individual nru held above 
Spira's tradition of sacrifice. Suicide also is made explicit in the cut-scene in which 
Seymour's mother gives ber life to become an Aeon, the horror of which is represented by 
Seymour as a crying child, dramatising a prohibition against mothers abandoning their 
children. This suicide is s11pposcdly a compassionate act of motherly self-sacrifice, in that 
Anima hoped the power sh� could give Seymour might help him overcome his difficulties as 
a taunted, half-breed Ouado. However, when the characters reach Baaj Temple and talk to 
Anima in her human fomi, she acknowledges that her sacrifice was a mistake because it 
denied Seymour a mother's 1nvc and facilitated his compensatory greed for power. 
A subtext of matricide may be perceived in th·� way Seymour embraces the power of 
his dead mother. While Seymour did not kill her and �uffcrcd her loss as a child, players may 
infer that he has come to sec her death as m.;:eSF.dry, and, wcoe he given a choice between 
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keeping her alive and killing her to receive Anima's power, he would choose to kill her (as he 
killed his Father). Her death precipitates his goal to rdease everyone from suffering by 
murder. a munfor of all life {vita!is,cide1) which subsumes all variations of murder: or, 
perhaps, gyno·cide, in the sense of killing the womb, that which gives life. Players might 
perceive deeper m01ives in Seymour's character. By killing everyone, his mother's death may 
be rendered meaningless and in some sense nullified, leading to a kind of reunion with her. 
Nonetheless, Seymour's disregard for, and illicit exploitation of, his mother's death cor.n<.>tes 
matricide, or at least the taboo against hating or disrespecting one's fami!J. 
lfwc consider the taboos associated with sex (Eros), it is possible to observe taboos �f 
voyeurism, incest, necrophilia, homosexuality and miscegenmion in ·:!:!::K, Most trivially, 
FFX's emphasis on visual spectacle gives way to focalisation on (especin!ly) Yuna's and 
Lu lu's secondary sexual characteristics, promoting the paradoxically safe and legitimate taboo 
of voyeurism. At the same time, the G-rated rrX !acks direct or explicit representations of 
sexual intercourse, and the romance between Yuna and Tidus is represented in the manner of 
coy romanticism. FFX's gameplay, being n private act before a television, may be negatively 
structured as a private, guilty act of voyeurism, but no other aspect of the game structures this 
voyeurism as prohibited: the player may wait for and relish the exhibitionism. Nonetheless, 
the sexuali.:.ution of Yuna may be seen as structured as a UJboo for several reasons: her 
virginal purity as a Summoner; her role as a Guardian of social virtue {and therefore us 
prohibitive in herselt); and Tidus' status us Aeon (in that any suggestion of sex with .Ti(!::;s . �- -
- .m.ight c�nnote JI ��;;i.1ui1zation of death}. :·::.:,c-s- c--. :=�.:.>·
Tidus's love for Yunn may olso be interpreted as symbolical!y prevented by an incest 
taboo, through her sisterly qualities as wiser, sibling guide, and the subtext of the Guanlians 
as an extended/surrogate family, with Tidus and Yuna as brother and sister, or cousins 
(especially given that their fathers both knew one another, !itera!ising the metaphor "brothers 
by the swonl"). This taboo may also be seen us occurring between Wakka and Lulu. given 
that Lulu was initially attached to Wakka's brother, Chappo, or at least their relationship may 
be seen as connoting the pos�ible violation of the biblical prohibition against coveting 
another's wife. Through the majority of the game, Lulu's waspishness and criticism afWakka 
place their relationship in negative terms. However, when Tidus overhears them talk through 
a tent flap in Besaid, and then, later, while siuing on a staircase on the S. S. Winno, his 
voyeuristic eavesdropping may re·position the two characters' relationship in terms ofnol just 
some hidden secret, but forbidden desire, and some after-hours romantic tryst. 
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Necrophilia might be seen as a weak, flickering subtext ofTidus' and Yuna's romance 
given Tidus' status ns an Aeon, a spirit of the dead. Of course, Tidus is not represcntcd (like 
Aniinn) as n decayed corpse, but as a nomml, young male, and his ultimate dissipation into 
spirit dust on the deck of the Airship is more akin to transcendence, Ultimatcly, his and 
Yuna's romance is represented not as necrophilia, but as Jove that-foreshadowed by 
Seymour's proposal-is doomed. Thematically, it is tragic, not taboo, and the taboos derive 
from the qualities indicated above. However, necrophilia may be read ns a stronger subtext of 
Seymour's union with his dead mother's Aeon. The figure of Anirna, as a grotesque image of 
Seymour's mother chained and toi:ured in bondage, is sexually unattractive, yet Seymour is 
sexualiscd by the casual display of his chest and his proposal to Yunn, wilh the unstated but 
inferred promise of connubial obligations. If Seymour is scxunliscd, this sexualises his drive 
for power, and the player may characterise him in terms of some transfer of desire between 
Seymour und Anima. 
A minor taboo of miscegenation may be observed in FFX in that Seymour is half 
human and half Guado. While players eventually discover that Yuna is half Al Bhed, the Al 
Bhed seem to he a different roce of humans, whereas the Guado, with llieir larger size, bestial 
manes, and long claws, seem to be a different species. The blurring of cat�gorics associated 
with miscegenation might be linked to a minor taboo of homosexuality, given Seymour's 
sexually ambiguous self-presentation. That is, Seymour's trans-gendered appearance, which 
violates the r�pectations or clearly gendered roles set up by the clearly heterosc�ual 
protagonists, marks the absence or simplicity or wholeness. He is marked by complexity, 
some tension (or pathology) under the surface of his image, which can later be interpreted as a 
sign of his subterfuge, treachery and patricide. 
Despite the weakness of some of the taboos noted above, calleclive/y all the taboos 
represented in FFX connote a trespass upon the forbidden, and all of these taboos may be seen 
as embodied in the prohibitive force of Sin. Sin is initial!y perceived as col lective guih, 
humanity's punishment for its arrogance. He may be profaned (defeated), yet only within the 
ritual defined by the Mnesters as acceptable (the pilgrimage), and he always returns: an 
eternal fetish of veneration, of fear and awe, unwanted yet accepted. When the Guardians 
defeat Seymour and a,tack Yunalesca in the hope of defeating Sin once and for all, they 
commit an net of blasphemy against the Law of Yevon that preserves Sin. When Mnestcr 
Mika benrs of Yunalesca's death he is so dismayed at the sacrilege and its potential 
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consequences that he chooses 10 end his undeud existence and dissipate. Even though he 
serves the Spiral of Death, which the Guardian's have chosen to attack, Mika's dismay 
expresses the Guardians' fears about the consequences of their actions. As traitors they arc 
scapegoats, inheriting nll 1he fear and guilt of taboo, fostering not only sympathy for them as 
victims of injustice, but an uncanny feeling that anything and anyone could be an agent of 
their punishment. 
However, players later learn that Sin is not, litcrally, the embodimertl of human sin. 
Rather, Sin is the armour of u god, Yu Yevon, who witnessed Bevelle's destruction of 
Zanarkand a thousand years earlier and wished to defend himself against the threat of 
technologically-empowered humans. While the people of Bevelle were arrogant and justly 
punished, the punishment of Spira a thousand years afterwards is a consequence not of the 
stain of that Sin, but the fear and vengeance of Yu Yevon. It is only when Sin's sacred nature 
itself is bravely defiled-when Sin is revealed to be neither natural, moral, nor divine, but 
merely the armour of a fearful supernatural being-that he becomes tmly profane, something 
to be hated, cursed and purged in the name of sacred life. Indeed, the ritual of the Summoner's 
quest retrospectively may be seen as a neurotic script which ultimately preserves the affect 
(fear) it tries to repress, and which the Guardians must banish. Certainly, the defeat of Sin not 
only reprieves Yun a and her Guardians, it also allows for the inauguration of a new order, of 
the son (Tidus) over the father (Jecht), and the daughter (Yuna) over the mother (Yunalesca). 
This retrospectively legitimates !he Guardians' taboo-breaking. To kiU the already-dead is not 
a crime against life. A situation in which the dead rule the living is the trauma, the taboo, 
which must be brought to consciousness and undone. 
Sadness and Troged> 
Despite the prevalence of cues for fear in FFX it can be argued that the emotion that 
especially characterises the gr.me is sadness. Sadness may be charar.terised as negative arousal 
resulting from the overwhelming loss of desired object or state without prospect of recovery, 
or at least of likely or easy recovery (Frijda, 1986, p. 199). Its action tendency is a withdrawal 
which provides the space to work through one's sadness and accept the loss in the present, 
leading either to a renewed hope for (eventual} recovery of the object, or to a more complete 
acceptance of 1he irrevocable nature of !he loss. FFX represents many profound losses 
experience by characters: Tidus' father dies; his mother dies; his home is destroyed. He meets 
Yuna, whose parents are dead, and Wakka, whose brother, Chappu, is dead. Tidus latcr !earns 
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that his father is still alive, but must be killed. Worse, Tidus learns lh.it he is nlready dead nnd 
that his desire for a loving union with Yuna is an impossible dream. 
Many of these losses, and the losses experienced by other charncters in FFX, are 
disclosed retrospectively, such that tl1c p!ayer is forced to recognise the previously 
unperceived sadness of characters. Rikku is initially represented as exuberantly happy, but we 
later are told that she and her race have suffered prejudice and violence, including exile from 
Spira. Her new home in Sanubia Sands is subsequently destroyed. Players learn that Kimahri 
was exiled from the Ronso home in Mount Gagazet, and that his broken horn is a sign of his 
lost honour. Although Kimahri returns home nnd reclnims his honour by beating Biron and 
Yenkc in a fight, Seymour subsequently extenninatcs the entire Ronso race. Lulu, while 
initially represented as coldly indifferent, suffers from the death of her Jover Chappu. She is 
also mvealed to have failed an earlier Summoner, who died before the completion of her 
pilgrimage. Worse, Tidus learns that everyone but him was aware that Yuna was expected to 
die if her pilgrimage was successful. This means that he had not shown sympathy where it 
was due, and the player may also sense a Jost opponunity for consolation, here and whenever 
a formerly hidden loss is represented. This progression of retrospective disclosures of loss 
culminates near the end of the game when it is revealed that Auron is not only dead but knew 
the entire tragic story of the Spiral of Death all along, and was prevented from his final mst 
because he had promised Jech! that he would bring Tidus to Spira. His formerly mysterious 
and distunt manner therefore may be re-read as a sign of the burden he has carried: the secret 
of the suffering that his companions had already experienced or had yet to endure. 
Indeed, part of the tragedy in ffX is that characters' emotions, honest expressions or 
sadness as well as happiness, arc rep1essed. From the character's perspective we might say 
that this repression compounds any loss by !liking away the promise of emotional release and 
consolation. Perhaps the clearest instance of this is the drawn out silence between Yuna and 
her Uncle Cid after she is rescued from Bevelle. When Cid turns away and the external 
focalisatioo closes in to reveal his suddenly stricken face, the combination of surprise at the 
ability of a video game character to present such an expression is combined with surprise at 
the extremity of Cid's grief/relief. The visibility of this expression is likely to be perceived as 
a form of inhibition because the object of the expression, Yun a, docs not ;;cc it. Consequently, 
players may see this expression not simply ns a sign of Cid's inner life or of the intimacy of 
Cid's and Yuna's relationship, but as a si(';D of the repression, or inhibition, of feelings in 
general, Cid's expression may make players more aware of the feeling-world beneath the 
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digital representations of the characters and beneath the surface of chE1111cters' casual 
transactions. 
This restraint or helplessness is evident elsewhere in fEX. Tidus must restrain his love 
for Yuna because he does not believe she reciprocates; later they both must restrain their 
mutual love because of their duties to Spira; then their love is denied through Tidus' death. 
Tidus must restrain his anger towards his father because Jech! is respected in Spira and liked 
by Yuna, who he does not wish to alienate. Yuna must restrain her anger when Seymour 
forces her to marry him, as is evident in her clenched, but impotent, fist (sec Figure 7.10). 
Kimahri, being hyper-masculine, also constantly restrains his emotions; Lulu represses her 
feelings at Chnppu's death {only truly showing her weakness at Mushroom Rock); and all the 
Guardians restrain their emotion about Yunn's impending death ("some things are too painful 
to talk aboul"). This restraint is evident even in Tidus and Wakka's frequent qualifying use of 
''well," "then," ''you know?" and ''yn," which may sometimes be read as indMical ofan idea 
or emotion thnt is simply too overwhelming to express. Lastly, Tidus' forced smile and 
laughter is likely to be perceived more as a way of dealing with an underlying fonr than as a 
sign ofhappiness. 
Figure 7.10. (a) Seymour forces Yuna to kiss him. (b) Yuna, having been warned that 
resistance will lend to her friends' execution, clenches her fist in her effort to restrain herself. 
This restraint could, given Squnresoft's Japanese heritage, be explained in ter:ns of 
stereotypical n:presentntions of the Chinese and Japanese {Occidentals arc linble to conflate 
them) 115 restrained and inscrutable. However, it is more likely that restraint is interpreted in 
terms of characters being afmid to lose nffcction or the possibility of affection. IfTidus takes 
on the role ofYuna's Guardian as a means of indirectly expressing his love, this is because he 
fears she does not feel the SllffiC. When Wakka punches Tidus' shoulder and gets him in n 
headlock, this is n.,.·�o.ingful because both of them have both lost loved ones: the aggression is' ,I}/ 
/'' 
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an indirect expression of nffcction that holds at bay !he possibility of rejection or further loss. 
Players mny Ellso see restraint in ten s of characters' super-egos. For example, Cid's and 
Wakku' masculinity mnkes any expression of emotion n sign of weakness. The issue here, 
then, is not !hat players identify with the prohibitive force of a super-ego a�cepted by n 
ch11rncter, but that a player may perceive a prohibition as a regrettable force which holds a 
character back, and which the character is helpless to overcome. Thi is, players may fool 
compassion towards characters who arc prevented by thr.ir own fear or other traits from 
realising !heir happiness, and !he loss of this potential happiness hns a tragic quality. 
Of course, restraint may also be seen us a sign of external forces in that, for the Al 
Bhed, who are con.stantly persecuted and must struggle against adversity to survive, their 
masculine super-egos have an adaptive function. Indeed, it is likely that the various 
exhibitions of restraint in FFX gencral!y may be coded in tenns of the charnctcrs as helpless 
victims of the events in which tlicy find themselves. Tidus' love of Yunn is threatened by 
Seymour's proposn:t, his kidnapping of Yunn, and his threat to her life, and their romance is 
doomed by Tldus' knowledge of his d eath. Tidus may spend one evening with Yuna in 
Maenlania Forest during which they express their love for each other, but only in the 
awareness that Yunn may die. When Tidus nms after Jech! following their conversation in the 
CUy of the Dead, he betrays his true goal, his desire to be re·united with his father. Tiie final 
moment of Tidus' departure is one of desire frustrated. He and Yun a reach towards one 
another from opposed realms: the living, material and present world of Yunn versus the dend, 
immaterial, past world ofTidus. Consequently, as Tidus attempts to embrace Yuna he simply 
passes right through her (see Figure 7.11). 
Figure 7.11. (a) Tidus attempts to embrace Yuna but (b) p!lllses right throngb her. 
The tragic quality ofFFX especially lies in characters' lielplessness at !he possibility, 
or inevitabf/ity, of loss. [fwe define tragedy in the limited sense of characters caught np in en 
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unfavourable chain of events they cannot control, and which arouse in viewers fear (plwbos) 
and pity (eleos), then mauy of the macrostructurcs di�cussed above arc tragic (sec Abrams, 
1988; Aristotle, trnns. !965; Kaufmann, 1969; Leech, 1969; Lucas, 1966). Notably, Tidus 
appears in Besaid only to be caught up in conflicts whose momentum is beyond his ability to 
(initially) alter, much less understand, and all his hopes and loves arc tragic because he is 
already dead and they can never be realised. 
Indeed it can be argued that, by occEJ.Sionally or eventually making most characters' 
motives accessible, and/or making them seem inevitable as a consequence each character's 
/iamania, empathetic fear and sadness is distributed across many characters. This is not 
simply because multiple Chumcters suffer their respective losses, but because characters share 
the same loss and/or are helpless victims of1he same circumstances. For example, the moment 
when Tidus inteJTUpts Yuna with the recording sphere at Rin's Travel Agency at the Mi'ihen 
Highroad is narrated a second time later in the game, with internal focalisation that allows the 
player to appreciate Yuna's feelings for Tidus, which she had hiddeu at the time. This is likely 
to reinforce the player's empathy towards bo1h Tidus and Yunn ns victims of a situation that 
keeps them apart. 
More generally, n!I the characters in .E!::X arc caught up in the wake of Bevclle's sins, 
the follies of human nature, and the chaos and violence at loose in the world. It is significant 
that Yu Yevon is such a weird and inhuman being, for as a visual representation he eann�• 
suppon all tho villainy that players have witne:.sed throughout the game. Yu Yevon resembles 
nothing more than a ball of elemental fear and/or rage. His violent conduct is nn ongoing 
reaction to the threat posed by the Machina wielded by Bevelle a 1000 years ago when it 
destroyed Zanarknnd, and because this attack is represented so far in the past, almost as 
timeless as legend, Yu Yevon may be read as a projection of universal negative attributes of 
human nature: selfishness, intolerance, fear, and the hunger for power. Since these attributes 
are evident in the actions of the Seymour, the Maesters, and even Wakka, it is possible that 
players may see Yu Ycvon as the face of human nature and may see susceptibility to this 
natUF- ns the Jiamania of humans in general. This means that players may pity not only 
individual characters, but many, or all of, the game's characters. 
These arguments can be linked to the shifts between observational and enactive 
attitudes discussed in Chapter Three. When viewing a cnnonica\ narrative we usually identify 
and empathise with a voluntary, self-impelled protagonist acting towards a particular goal, 
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and, ns a result, experience motor-oriented tensities in the form of suspense. Tiiis requires, of 
course, a sense that the chElfacter (or, in the cnse of game, the player), has n choice to net, or 
not to act, or to choose from one of severnl actions, suggesting a decision-making process 
embedded in a living individual (pp. l 16-122). When a chamcter's "capacity for voluntmy 
acts and thinking is blocked it usually lends to a feeling of alienation, strangeness, and 
unreality in the viewer" (p. 120), a kind of impenetrable detachment. The consequence of 
subject-nctants being controlled or mrutipulatcd by forces ofnntnre, superhuman agents, social 
institutions, or "phenomena representing metaphysical agents, like Destiny or God" (p. 170), 
is "passive-introjection" Ip !60), in the sense that a viewer can only identify with the passive 
position ofU1c iubject·actant as object. 
Figure 7.12. (a) A blitzbal! floats through the debris of Kilikn and then {b) floats out of the 
frame. 
Since, in Grodal's (1997) account, "reality" is usually characterised by the cnpncily 
fur agency, the passive position may create connotations of unreality. It may also create more 
disturbing sensations in thnt the subtraction of a future in which choices and possibilities arc 
held open produces an impres.sion ofpastness, inevitability, and deadness. As Groda! argues 
of Terminator JI (1997), viewers witness an horrific future in which a nuclear wnr destroys 
much of the plnnet and leaving the rest ofhumnnity to be hunted by mercemuy robots: 
The viewer is put into a state of high nronsnl, labelled four and grief. But voluntary 
reactions seem to be totally b!ock�d, because we are told that lhis is a precise 
recording of a future event in the history of mankind ..•. Logically there can be no 
teleological and voluntary acts, no guesses of outcomes. Everything is 
preprogrammed and causal. We can only shiver, cry, or react with various types of 
involuntary reactions of the nervous system. (p. 122) 
Similerly, in EJX.the player is repeatedly placed in a position of helpless witness to tragedy. 
Pcrhapi the most effective example of this occurs after Sin's destruction of the village of 
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Kiliku. Here the "camera" focuses in on the water and a blitzball bobs into view, only co pass 
out of the frame (sec Figure 7.12). This blitzball is, given the devastation, likely to be read ns 
metonymic of the deocl at Kilika, The resulting transfer of significance and affect may meun 
thnt it is anthropomorphised and given a vulnerable, pathetic quality. This places the player in 
the passive position in a quite literal sense, because the player empathises with an object 
manipulated by natural forces: its movement across the debris-strewn water both restages, and 
mnkes more poignn11t, the player's helplessness. Furthermore, the mctonymic operation itself 
constitutes a form of inhibition by making the dead bodies invisible. This is not merely a 
polite censorship that allows tlie dead to preserve their dignity, it signifies the inexpressible 
horror of their pointless and unpreventable death. It is also significant that the ball floats away 
and refuses the more obvious and contrived representation of the ball sinking below the 
surface. The ball is not merely a signifier of loss or grief, it testifies to the reality that it 
survives while people have not. 
While gameplay is frequently disrupted and each player will have distinctive 
emotional responses, it is possible that these recurring situational meaning structures may give 
way to a "mood." Moods are of more enduring quality than emotions, and characterised by 
"the absence of an object" and nn appraisal that is of a "highly global nature" (Tan, 1997, p. 
204). If this is the case, then the tragic elements of FFX may, in conjunction with the 
ambivnlent reality-status, !end to a tonic tone of sadness or melancholy characterised by a 
passive position. Indeed, when players witness characters caught up in a tragic sequence of 
events beyond their control, this may resonate with the inability of the player to alter events in 
the concext of ennction. The player's limited interactions in a linear onrrative only serve to 
advance the tragedy, producing a seemingly paradoxical emphasis on involuntary autonomic 
responses (sadness and pity) from n passive position. 
Empathetic Emotions, I,weslment, and Allcgia11ce 
Expressions nnd situational contexts may, in general, be seen as operating along n 
synchronic axis and as largely regulating phasic emotions. Conversely, investment in, and 
allegiance to, characters may be seen as operating nlong a diachronic wlis and as regulating 
tonic emotion towards characters. The usefulness of this distinction is that it emphasizes how, 
on the one hand, a situational context may have precedence in defining a player's empathetic 
responses. Even when the antagonist Seymour is killed it is possible to experience empathy 
with him by identirying with the generic situntion of a person experiencing their deat11. On the 
mher hand, sometimes the tonic sympathy generated through invesuuent in, and allegiance 
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with, a chamcter may be what especially determines the emotional rcspom0o of the player to a 
situation, or at least the degree of that responoo. 
As Grodal (1997) notes, interest in, and sympathy with, a character usually results 
from prolonged cognitive identification; more precisely, investment provides a basis for a 
tonic attitude of sympathy which functions as an antecedent of other, phasic empathetic 
emotions. However, this investment may be reinforced by "allegience," which Murray Smith 
(1994) defines as the e�tent to which one cognitively or affectively adheres to a character's 
values or moral perspective. In identifying the potential allegiance between players' and 
characters' values it is useful to look at how types of moral agency and values operate, and 
their relationships with one another. Smith distinguishes between "Manichean moral 
structums," in which there is a clear "binary opposition of values," and "graduated moral 
structures," in which characters "occupy a range of positions between the two poles" (p. 207). 
FFX may be seen as possessing a graduated moral structure, and in elaborating upon it we can 
tum to Lawrence Kohlberg's (1981) model of moral development. This model is a reworking 
of Piuget's (1932} model, and attends to the changing relationships between individuals and 
rules. Without debating the validity or a stage-dependant model or processes of moral 
reasoning (see Kohlberg, 1976, 1981; Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer, 1983), Kohlberg's {1981} 
six stage model suggests six broad categories which frame players' differentiation of value 
systems: amorality, self-serving {or sadistic) immorality, egocentric morality, rigid morality, 
equal (liberal) morality, and selfless morality. We may see these categories as moral "types" 
along a spectrum of negative allegiance to total allegiance tlmt define a basis for evaluating 
and positioning oneself in relationship to conflicts between or within characters, and which 
frame more subtle distinctions between the values and goals of characters. 
First, a type of "amorality" may be identified in the limited sense associated with 
natural forces, inanimate matter, or beings devoid of conscious awareness or any capacity for 
empathy. While they may be organised and act strategically as opponents, the activity or 
amoral beings is akin to the biologically motivated, non-voluntary responses of nnimals or the 
programmed agency of machines. As noted above, the significance of this may be to reinforce 
a sense of frustration, rather than anger, in that any blocking produced by such beings is 
involuntary. More generally, amorality provides a negative position against which to define a 
suitable subject of identification and allegiance: in the absence or consciousness there is no 
basis for allegiance. As is elaborated in the next two chapters, amoral beings, such as robots, 
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may cue a sense of nutomutic and indifferent assault a fear of loss or death made poignant by 
the lack of acknowledgement c.f our meaningfulness or humanity. 
This type may be distinguished from a second type of "self-serving" or "sadistic" 
"immorality." Unlike the "amoral" type, the "immoral" type is predicated on a being's 
awareness of the perspeccives and interest of others, but is qualified by that being's 
willingness to violate others' in!er�ts for his/her own ends, or for its own sake. As noted 
above, anger towards another is greater when that person nets voluntarily, and this is the 
category in which we position most of the humanoid monsters in FFX: they are attributed 
with sufficient intention that we can readily perceive them as having made an anti-social 
choice against us. Seymour embodies this category in that he freely manipulates others for his 
own ends. Generally, the expectation that villainous or inhuman characters will be punished 
makes it unproduccive, or impractical, to empathise with them in anything other than a 
transitory way. Once a player knows that a character is an antagonist, or ·�mmoral" or 
"inhuman," there is not usually any need for further cognitive identification, except to 
hypothesise (or, in the case of gameplny, experiment with) the means for their defeat and 
punishment. Inhumanity, then, allows plnyers to recognise antagonists, provides a target for 
negative empathetic emotions, and maximises sympathy, compassion, and (potentially) 
admiration for characters who oppose it. 
Both the "amoral" and "immoral" types, which are in some respect "inhuman," may 
be reinforced by the distinctive qualiti� of video game characters. This is evident if we turn 
to Grodal's (!997) argument that the impression or humanity usua!ly requires an impression 
of organic unity, a Gestalt of"hnman-ness," which is clearly embodied by Bordwell's (1989) 
"folk-schemata" of "the putatively sane, me11tally active and uncoerced human adult," or 
generic "person schemata" (p. 152). In narratives, the most minimal description-often 
merely a name-is sufficient for us to provide a basis for identification with a character, 
inasmuch as players will infer other basic auributes (Grodal, !997, p. 92). So long as these 
traits are projected onto them, even patently inhuman characters-animals, plants, animated 
objects, and so on-may be identified as human, in that one can empathise with their stmgglc 
to attain goa!s within a diegesis. By implication, human-ness is "often described negatively, as 
something lacking, in non-human figures of fiction such as robots and monsters" (Groda!, 
1997, p. 106). If the subtraction of notably "human" traits is a basis for perceiving deviations 
from human-ness, then it is likely that the limited coding and ergodic affordanccs of video 
games may read as a subtraction of these traits and may contribute to a sense of inhumanity. 
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Humuns are presumed to have a "singular and unified" (Grodal, 1997, p. 152) body, 
which provides a basis for us to evaluate the imention of a being ("it has teeth and claws, it 
can injure me ifit gets close enough to bite or scratch"). In ffX, a player will usually react to 
"monsters" onscreen with some sense that their onscreen bodies define the proximity of their 
actions. Certainly, many rohots, notably Defenders, Gemini, and YKT, embody mechanised 
masculinity, whereby their physical presence has a direct correlation with physical danger. 
Many monsters also have physical characteristics which correspond with an attack type, as in 
the YKT's "Kick," Behemoth's "Heave," the Sand Worm's "Swallow," or the Bomb's 
"Explode." However, with some opponents the entire form and capabilities may not be 
immediately apparent from their body, or they may inflict drunage beyond the nonnal range of 
that body. Yunalesca, for e;cample, sends an enonnous tongue out al the characters, and her 
He!lspite mtack involves tenmcles burrowing under the ground and up at the characters. 
Furthermore, several opponents have more than one incarnation. Seymour reappears three 
times after his initial defeat, taking a different form each time: Seymour Rux, Seymour Natus, 
and Seymour Omnis. Yuna!esca takes three forms during the single baulc with her: she is 
initially a goddess-like figure: she then summons tentacles to her; and then takes the form of 
nn enormous, black, medusa-like head. This body-hopping inclines players to see the 
perceived body as but part of a larger presence, pcrhap, suggesting nn immaterial body behind 
\he physical one. 
Humans are nlso presumed to have "the ability to perceive remote objects" (Grodnl, 
1997, p. 92), which allows us to identify another's line of perception ("it has poor vision, I'll 
be safe if I don't move"). In FFX, it can be said that "monsters" have perceptual ac:ivity, but 
thnt it is often limited to a (heightened) awareness of characters. In many 3D games, like 
J;lQQm (1994) or Yampire: The Masquerade (1999), players cnn see monsters approaching, 
nnd arc free to attack and run in real-time. In FFX, the only real instance of this real-time 
action is the escape from Guadosalam where players must guide Tidus to run from the 
pursuing Guado in the Field Screen. However, each time a Guado comes too close the game 
jumps to the Combat Screen. During most ofFFX players do not even get this much warning: 
there is a jump from seeing Tidus travelling alone in the Field Screen to seeing Tidus and the 
other characters fighting a wandering monster in the Combat Screen. Within the Combat 
Screen characters cannot hide or outmanoeuvre, they can only (try to) flee from the fixed site 
o;� batrl�. Yet trying to flee involves chnracters running on the spot until they succeed, and 
:,: �
1
�cai�. This holds for not only seemingly immobile monsters, like Funguar, but fast-moving 
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insects that players might imagine would chase characters across the landscape. In this 
respect, being perceived by a monster may be e:sperienced as n kind or immobilising force. 
Charncters struggle not so much to escape a monster's proximity, but to escape the irresistible 
force or its perception and will. Indeed, in some video games, opponents respond before 
characters move into their line of sight, Gauntlet (1985) being perhaps the most discomforting 
example. Such opponents respond as if their perception and consciousness are not confined by 
a physical body, but extend through the software andlhardware with access to the game 
database. 
In addition to a physical body and basic faculties for perception, humnns are presumed 
to have the ability "to experience tactile and in!eroceptivc sensation" (Grodal, 1997, p. 92), 
nnd, by extension, "to reel simple motives, affects, and emotions" (p. 92), including se!f­
awareness and empathy for others {p. 109). At this level, we can infer another's state of 
aro�sal ("is it hungry?"). As Grodal observes, an impression of inhumanity is orten produced 
through the absence of emotions, or when emotion is not ho!istica!ly integrated. For example, 
we might perceive as inhuman: the absence of another's emotional response to an event which 
we would presume to produce an "emotional" event (such as a violent deatl1); an lncongruent 
emotional response (such as n character's surprise that s/hc forgot his/her umbrella while 
witnessing e violent death); or "odd" emotional responses, such as "weird, psychotic, cold" 
(p. 31). In FFX there are specific instances ofrhis. When it is revealed that Seymour killed his 
father and he offers an indifferent: "Didn't you know?" Similarly, Kinoc and Ynnalesca 
express a shocking indifference to the suffering of the people of Spira, given the regard in 
which both of them arc held. In these cases, the absent or inapprop1fate emotional response is 
perceived as inhuman, as monstrous. More generJ!ly, players may experience the emotions of 
most monsters as fi:<ed and organised by a pathology of hate and/or fear. While players may 
accept tliat robot opponents like the Oblitzerator arc simply unemotional, robots may be seen 
as extensions of human agents, and the distribution of probabilities in a robot's programming 
may be seen as affective amplifiers, in that a robot may be predisposed towards certain kinds 
of responses. Alternately, since robot opponents function no differently from other opponents, 
their perceived absence of cmution may be projected onto other monsters creating a general 
impression of the un-emotionality of all opponents. 
Humans arc also presumed to have the ability "to understand uncomplicated plans, 
g1mb and acts" (Grodal, 1997. p. 92}, includins the capacity for flexibility, and "teleological, 
intentio.,al and volnntary behaviour" (p. 108). This allows us to infer future conduct ("Is it 
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aggressive? Does it sec me as food?"). For Grodal, an impression of non-human-ness may be 
produced through the absence of such intention ar mental representations or the goals of 
others (p. 108). This extends to obviously non-human, amoral opponents who arc devoid of 
conscious awareness or a capacity for empathy, and act according 10 reflex or programming. 
In EEZ. this includes: animrds (Achelous, Adamantoise, Bandersnatch, Bite Bug, Cave Iguion 
and so on), plant-animals (Funguar, faoray), robots (Mech Guards, Gunners, Hunters and 
Lenders, Oblitzerator, Yat-99, YKT-63), magically-animated creatures (Defenders), and 
(arguably) elemental forces (Black, Blue, Dark, Gold, Red, White, Yellow Elements, and the 
Spherimorph). However, this impression is especially pronounced when one perceives 
auto matism, exemplified by mechanical-like behaviour and/or n lack of characteristically 
human feedback and adaptability. This includes the tendency to walk rigidly, to gaze 
implacably, to speak formulaic statements, to possess a generic voice without emotional 
modulation. It also includes acting according lo a mechanised or fixed fonn of behaviour, in 
the sense of a narrow motivation or "one-track-mind," being driven by some program or 
script, or being impelled by some external force. 
Of course, most video game monsters have no, or limited, capacity for self-impelled 
actions, such as communication, goal-formation, and goal-achiovemcnt, other thnn those 
associated with its narrative function or  its traits for combat. It is only rccont!y that Artificial 
Intelligence has been sufficiently developed so that enemy characters may, for example, 
investigate sounds and run to get reinforcements. The only responsiveness of opponents to 
player strategy in FFX is linked to their current status: some monsters may flee, heal 
themselves, or use a different atl.'.lck, after a cenain amount of damage is taken. For example, 
once Seymour Au�'s HP drops below 35, 000, his Multiorchis will use Total Annihilation 
within two attack rounds. Most encounters in FFX are random or fixed to a cenain location, 
and there is no "seeking," merely a reflexive (reactive) auempt to attack and destroy under the 
generic semic attribution of"guard," drawing from programmed strategies of defence nnd (in 
rare cases) rc!ront. If players perceive any motive at all it is likely to be: pathological; blind 
obedience to the commands ofn "boss"; or n biological imperative to survive. 
It can be argued, then, that the distinctive or limited qualities of video game characters 
may be interpreted as a subtraction of human qualities and produce an impression ofwhal can 
be called a ''pathological, physically over-reactive and coerced human" or "an inflexible, non­
intelligent, programmed machine" (or "robot schemata"). At the level of gross typing, to be 
confronted by that which is "inhuman••---especially if it is coded as monstrous, psychopathic 
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or mechanical-implies a greater expectation of threat. This is not lo suggest that every 
chan:cter. in a video gnme who has the above characte ristics is perceived as inhuman. Many ,. 
opponents.'simply repeat a cycle of action, such as the sharks in Hercules (1997), or pass 
' . 
through pl\l�mmed or random sequences of fixed functions, such as the bricks in Tetrjs 
{1984). It can be presumed that players often regard these not so much as uctual opponent.I, 
··, but as agents of a greater opponent: the game itself (sec Chapter Eight).
An impression of "inhumanity" therefore may reinforce, and characterise, the typing 
of video game characters ns "amoral" or ·�mme>ral." Of course, many humans may have 
limited perception, or be reflexive, inflexible, narrow·minded, obsessive, and so on. The issue 
is that whenever they net in excessively selfish or immoral ways we are likely to jXlrceive 
them as less human, or even monstrous, having lost the tolerance and altruism that marks the 
best of humanity. Inde�d, Seymour is perhaps the most monstrous figure in FFX precisely 
because he is (part) human, and therefore has the copocity to be tolerant and altruistic. His 
conduct is a sociopa1hic negation of humanity's highest defining vinues: tolerance, empathy, 
compassion. altruism, and selflessness. Indeed, while Seymour's ambiguous trailing and 
miseegenntion may foreshadow his madness and treachery, Yuna's pnrallel miscegenation 
means that his actions are more likely to be read as a warning of the psychological and social 
consequence� ofcgocentrism, intolerance, and the inability to forgive: that is, as a warning for 
humans who act i11human. 
While nil video game characters may have qualities of"inhumanity," games like FFX 
mark protagonist.I by more "moral" types, and/or discourses, as a means of fostering 
ane'i.iance. Aside from the "amoral'' and "immoral" type, it is possible to identify a type of 
"egocentric morality," whose basis i� self-interested, but more in the l iberal sense that people 
in ge1Jerol are "out for themselves," and this self-interest is legitimated by nn ideology of 
individualism. It can be argued that allegiance in video games is often based upon this 
morality in its form as the seemingly "natural" morality or right for individuals to do what is 
necessary to survive. This extends to Tidus in FFX. At the beginning of the game, Tidus finds 
himself an orphan, teleponed alone into a strange ocean, attacked by Gcosgneno; he explores 
the dcsened ruins, makes a fire so as not 10 free··J, then falls nsleep, only to be auacked by a 
giant lizard. Tidus's pructical cor.ccms with survival, safety and comfon define an agenda 
with which to define his o:her goals in the game {as well as the player's attitude towards 
gamcplny, sec Chapter Eight). Tidus' character is forced into a situation which promotes a 
rcfleiive individuntion, a self-interested one-to-one relationship between self and 
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environment. In this sense, once he has been de lined him as the protagonist, a player is likely 
IO persist empathizing with him on the basis of his survival (ironically or tragically, given that 
Tidus is already dead}. 
A player's concern for the survival of another may be exploited by games in which 
characters are self-interested and expiatory to the point of vengeful carnage. Players are 
unlikely 10 question Tidus' right to defend himso!f against the many monsters that attack him: 
his encounters with wandering monsters are likely to be seen in Darwinian tcmts ns survival 
of the fittest. (Player's .investmert in Tidus also is likely to mean that players become 
concerned with the morality of fair play, in the sense of their right to enjoy a game they paid 
for; again, see Chapter Eight). Both investment in Tidus' survival and the conservation of 
gameplay incline players to cultivate a sense of Tidus' moral right to victory: that might 
makes right (or should). Given the continuity of game mechanics and tl1c fact that Tidus' 
quest reqr1ires him to cross many landscapes and confront countfoss monsters players ulso are 
unlikely to register as morally significant their choice to chase wandering monsters simply for 
the sake of increasing Tidus' experience (if only because this is part of the game, rather than 
the story). However, it needs 10 be emphasised that FFX does not exploit survival in its 
nnrrative frame in the same way as FPSs like Doom (1994), which involve n lone protagonist 
violently destroying hundreds or thousands of foes. 
It is possible to distinguish this "egocentric morality" .�rom a type of"rigid morality," 
in which a character believes in absolute truth and/or authority ond inflexibly follows a 
particular set of rules as embodiments of this truth and/or authority. In FFX this is most 
evident in characters who follow the faith of Yevon. la Be said, Tidus meets characters who 
profess obedience and devotion to the Law of Yevon and its priesthood. He also learns that 
the whole of Spira accepts the Law that states that Sin reappears every thirty years, that 
Summoners should die on the quest to defeat him, and that one of the Summoner's 
companions must sE1Crifice himself to bc,;ome the next Final Aeon (Sin). Yevon's rigid 
morality, which is a belief ia an absolute truth or amhority and whose rules are mP.ant to be 
followed as a categorical imperative, is most clearly represented by Wllkka. for whom actions 
are (initially) defined as right or wrong according to tl1eir adherence to these Laws. For 
example, the use of Machina to defeat Sin at Mushroom Rock is wrong because it is against 
Yevon's Law, and Macster Seymour's treachery is incomprehensible because Maester's 
embody the Law. TI1is leads to njudgemental attitude. While Wakka humbly accepts that all 
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people must "pny" for the sins which gave birth to Sin, he blames those of old Bevelle and 
those who use Machina. 
This type can be d istinguished from a fifth type, of "equal morality," predicated on 
some degree of undersmnding and the tolerance of others' moral values. For example, when 
Tidus is abandoned at the beginning of the narrative, his lonely return to the basics of survival 
functions as a context in which tn define the value of sociality. By being helped by the Al 
Bh�.d ("You're friends!"), Tidus !earns that it is easier to survive in the company of others, 
with the possible implication that humans aro naturally gregarious. This provides a pragmatic 
basis for empathetic activity: irrespective of racial or cultural difference, those who help us 
survive arc friends, if not our moral kin. 
ff'X also dramatises a morality based on the fair and tolerant negotiation of differeut 
people's va lues through its representation of inter-racial and inter..:ultura! interaction. Early 
on in a bar at Luca, Tidus witnesses a conflict between Kimahri and two other Ronso. Tidus is 
told that this is none of his business and, while he has reservations that non-interference is 
cowardice or a lack of loyalty, he holds back in the awareness that he does not fully 
understand the situation. Later, when Kimahri has to confront his Ronso brothers, Biran and 
Yenke, at Mount Gagazet, the other characters respect the honour-bound traditions he lives 
by, and stand back to let him fight alone. More generally, Yuna, as Summoaer, embodies the 
virtues of harmony, and accepts men, women, human, Al Bhed, and Ronso as her Guardians. 
Yuna is also willing to marry Seymour, who is hnlf·Guado, for the sake of harmony in Spira. 
The Al-Bhed are rejected by most of Spira, but Tidus i nitially accepts Rikku (as does Yuna 
when she meets her) and eventually nil the other characters overcome their prejudice. Indeed, 
becau se of Yuna's attractiveness, the love that Tidus, the Guardians, and the people of Spira, 
feel for her, and her increasing role as a protagonist in whom players have invested, her 
miscegenation as half-human :md half-Al-Bhed forces the characters, and inclines players, to 
overcome their prejudice against the Al Bhod. 
While a type of "equal morality" may be predicated on self-interest, in that acting 
a ltruisticaUy holds open the likelihood that others will act altruistically in our interest, it blurs 
into a sixth type of "selfless morality" that is predicated on not on!y empathy with the other, 
but a sense that selfless altruism is its own end. This is expressed in the actions of the 
Guardians, in that, as the heroes of the land, they precisely endanger themselves for the 
benefit of others. Tidus transfers the skills which make him a celebrity to the task of helping 
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Ynna, the Guardians, and Lhc community of Spira. Of course, ahruism may be seen in cynical 
terms as a pragmatic way of ensuring one's safoty in the sense that we wish well those who 
wish us well. After all, Tidus is alone in a strange land and 11eeds help to gel home. In this 
respect, "Guardian" is his occupation. and the help he receives from Yuna and the others is his 
wage. Yuna's quest conveniently leads towards his own destination, Z:markand, and also 
allows him to stay clow to her. 
Nonetheless, .EEX occasionally dramatises a selfless morality predicated on the belief 
that the effacement of one's own interests is its own end. Yun a not only offers II single act of 
selflessness, of giving up her love forTidus by promising to many Seymour, she accepLS the 
ultimate act of self·sacrifice: surrendering her life to Sin for the sake of her people. This self­
sacrifice is significant because the empathetic realisation that another is altruistic makes it 
safer and more productive for one to maintain proximity and allegiance with them. This might 
be explained in psychoanalytic tenns in that the voluntary restraint exhibited by moral 
characters not only foc ilitales the player's allegiance with them, it facilitates the player's 
nccept.:ince of them as a super-ego. More generally, nny admiration for another's compassion 
and sacrifice produces a growing gratitude and obligation. manifested as loyalty and 
friendship, because most narratives reward virtue, nnd the more moral the protagonist tl1e 
more likely one is to expect a reward from investing in them. Certainly, since Yuna is the 
character with the most effective ability to heal characters and cure status ailments, FFX 
literally and continually rewards a player's allegiance to her. 
The conflict between different moral types is a useful basis for nominating dynamics 
of empathetic emotions. Generally, characters of equal or selfless morality are seen as 
justifiably opposiog amoral, immornl and rigidly moral characters. However, this tension is 
not only between obvious opponents, but within or between protagonists. Much of the 
narrative tension in FFX results from Tidus and Yun a, who are already flexible in their moral 
attitu�f· being confronted by those who are closed-minded and oppressive. Indeed, if survival 
provides a seemingly universal basis for allegiance to characters, then the resistance against 
the imposition of another's rigid morality is naturalized as an extension of the human right to 
live in, and fight for, freedom. Throughout the entire Final Fantasy series there is a 
celebratory disobedience and revolutionary quality against a tyrannical ruler or rulers. In FF7, 
Cloud is a member of Avalanche, who commits terrorism against the polluting Shinra 
ColJloration. In FF8, Squall joins a resistance movement to overthrow the Garabadian 
government and then challenge a Sorceress bent on world domination. In FFIX, Daggerrebe!s 
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against her mother, the Queen, who is later seen EIS a pupp et  of another Sorcerer. In FFX, 
Tidus and the Guardians defy the Law of Yevon, and violate a host of taboos, as noted above. 
Much or this revolutionary activity finds its subtext in the adolescent drive to find and 
assert oneself: final Fantasy's characters tend to be young (Tidus and Yuna are 17), and the 
games often narrate a rite-of-passage, If adolescence is about finding one's place in the world, 
then across the Final Fantasy series there is a subtext of "adults" having not run the world 
properly and as needing to be overthrown by the "natural" vitality and morality of the 
protagonists. It is only once a "natural" moral order-ir. which everyone is freed from (some 
tyrant's) oppression-that the young can find their place, So, in comiTig-to-age through 
service to the state, characters realize that their values are not those of the state, and that they 
can only realize their selfhood by confronting the corrupt{cd) world of adult power and 
politics. Here it is significant that the Al Bhed, who arc the first to reject Yevon's law in�. 
are initially coded as barbaric, childish, or tcrroristic {violence and kidnapping), but arc later 
seen as more morally infonned. The neces.ity of acknowledging one's own misjudgement 
may not only elicit shame, but also allow us to feel that we have both matured and renewed 
our contact to a more natural morality. Players may not only feel intellectually and morally 
superior to other characters because of this, they may feel moral outrage when others persist 
in reversing their initial jud!"'ment. 
Conclll!lion 
This chapter has argued that FFX positions players to sympathise with Tidus' and 
Yuna's vulnerability and attractivoncss, which may elicit compassion and foster their 
desirability as ego-ideals. This is likely to be reinforced by players' allegiance with the equal 
andfor selfless morality of the Guardians, which fosters identification with them as super­
egos. Sympathy also will be reinforced through negative arousal towards unattractiveness, 
thrcatenir.g and abnormal opponents, which is likely to bo reinforced by negative allegiance 
resulting from their immoral, amoral, or rigidly moral typing. However, FFX also promotes a 
global sympathy for the population of Spira, including most opponents, as having experienced 
suffering or loss through the hermeneutic coding of tragedy. The helplessness of the player is 
partly dependant upon his/her positiou as a passive witness, but it may also resonate with 
his/her position !IS a player whose limited affordance merely serves to advance the tragic 
hermeneutic, producing not only the withdrawn tonality that Grodal (1997) associates with 
passive-introjection, but sadness as a dominant empathetic emotion or mood. 
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Nonetheless, we must mnke one final qualification. It is possible that Tidus' an d 
Yuna's excessive vulnerability and sadness iu the face of such an enormous and hopeless 
quest may produce "empathic distress" (Frijda, 1986), in the sense of discomfort around, and 
aversion to, the suffering of others. For exnmp!e, a player's pleasure at being able to watch 
Yuna (for mules) and/or share in her situation may occasionally be outweighed by the player's 
frustration at the lack of access to her, the labour of t he gnme (notably rescuing her when she 
is kidnapped by Seymour), and her ongoing sadness (as a consequence of her self-sacrifice). 
That is, Yuna is hilrdly a fun girl. Her tragic air may be alluring, but its poignancy may 
become excessively painful, especially given that she rnny die. This anKicty will be greater if 
players suspect 1ha1 her function in the story will be like that of Aeris in FFVIT; a tragic 
female who s acrifices her life for others. If this is the case, players may expect that any 
po sitive investment in her (ns a character in the narrative and as a character in the game) will 
be wasted. Players sirnilnrly may feel personal distress in reaction to Tidus' ongoing lament 
nbout his father's mistreatment of him, and, later, from the realisation that he is dead and will 
not be united wi1h Yuna. 
Any such personal distre.s might manifest itself in a path of minimal investment: 
players may not let themselves feel too much towards a character, and/or may not spend too 
much Gil and/or time developing them. It may also ·manifest as momentary wishes nnd 
fantasising. For example, players may wish that Ynna disappear or die sooner rather than 
later, or thnt Tidus abandon his interest in her. Players might hold open the possibility of n 
positive resolution, such ns Yuna and Tidus uniting as spirits, or that Tidus will come back 
fiom the dead (the pn,mise, it turns out, of FFX-2). Alternately, players may displace interest 
onto other ru:pects of the character, or other characters entirely, perhaps by attending to 
Auron's prowess, the bond between Tidus and the Guardians, or the potential romance of 
Wakka and Lu!u. Indeed, personal distress may increase the attractiveness of Seymour, whose 
easy composure in a position of authority offers an ideal of both autonomy and freedom, 
reinforcing players' experience of the game as a tragedy in which weak "virtues" are doomed. 
However, personal distress is significant in a broader sense, since it is metonyrnio of the 
general process whereby the p layer's empathy with characters i s  affected by, or gives wny to, 
the player's own self-concern. 
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Chapter Eight- Player Empathy 
The previous chapter has argue d that players arc not in the same position as 
characters. When a character feels nn egotistic self-concern, such as fear at a monster, a 
viewer may mentally simulate an (inhibited) version of that emotional state, but the viewer 
primarily experiences an altruistic concern for them. Her? what concerns us is Carro!'s (1984) 
additional observatioa that film viewers may feel an egocentric concern for their own position 
as a viewer and that this selr-concern may conflict with their altruistic attitude townrds 
chnrncters. It similarly can be argued that players sometimes cnre less about the interests of 
their characters than they do about Uteir own interests as a player. For example, when players 
engage in combat in JTX a character may function as a tool in the player's al!empt to win the 
battle, and failure may be registered as sorrow in and for the player. 
We cannot simply refer to this self-concern as imagine-self empathy and oppose it to 
imagine·other empathy directed to characters because there is no 11eedto "imag ine" another's 
situation: the player responds to his/her immediate position of oneself as a player in a game 
macrostructure (Tan, 1997, p. 185; see also Davis, Hull, Young & Warren, 1987; Hoffman, 
1982; Stoll and, Mathews, Chennun, Hansson & Richardson, 1978). Grodal (2003) and Frasca 
(2003) have offered similar arguments that some video games function as simulations, in that, 
rather than treating the game as representing anything, tile player acts as ifs/he occupied that 
space. Unlike the empathy 1111d virtnal wishing on behalf of characters which occurs while 
watching a film or cut-scene, ergodic sequences utilise tl1e player's sensorimotor, cognitive 
and emotional scripts as ifs/he were in that situation, albeit within a context of (partial) 
enactive mediation andfor subtraction. 
It might seem inappropriate to use the term empathy to refer 10 the player's experience 
of his/her own situation, but to say that the player actually believes slhe occupies the 
simulated space, and acts on that basis, is to presume that the player is eitl1er gullible or 
deluded. Even in the most convincing simulation one can maintain cognitive awareness of the 
simulation, and most video games, includingFFX, offer something very far from a convincing 
simulation. By implication, the situational context of play is defined by rules that are absent, 
or differently codified, outside of the play-space. Players· .,1ay empathise with their prospects 
of winning or losing a game in a way that is uncommon during their daily activity. The term 
"player.empaUty" can be used ta distinguish the empathy lhat players feel towards themselves 
from the empathy that players feel towards characters. This player empathy may be seen a s  
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separable from, but usually overlapping with, the ways in which players empathise wi!h 
themselves beyond the play-situation. When u player feels that what has transpired in the 
game is significant beyond the game, ns when a character's death in the game reinforces a 
pl:..yer's general sense that s/he is a failure, or mortal, then "player-empathy" may be said to 
have blurred into the player's everyday experience of selfhood. 
This chapter addresses players' emotional experience of play by arguing that 
gamep!ay promotes "pre-operatory" cognition (Piagct, !951, 1978), characterised by 
eg ocentrism, by extending the agency of players, but that this egocentrism is regularly 
blocked. It is argued that while blocked egocentrism may be explained in psychoan.:dytic 
terms of narcissistic rage and anxieties about the (male) ego, Tomkins' (1962) and 
Nathanson's (1992) model of shame provides a more useful account of the emotional 
experience of gnmeplay. 
PreopcrnUannl Egocentrism and its Blocking at the Interface 
For Piaget (1951, 1978), intelligence emerges from sensorimotorexperience, in that as 
children grow they not only become capable of mentally representing scnsorimotor actions, 
they become more systematic and logical in their organization of schemata, and increasingly 
adept at mentally manipulating them. Pia:i;et refers to such cognitive work as "operations," 
which he defines as "internalised actions." At the concrete·operational stage, these operations 
can be mentally reversed, but they cannot be applied to complex or hypothetical problems. At 
the formal-operational stage, operations can be applied to all types of problems, including 
comple� verbal and hypothetical ones. 
While gameplay frequently engages the sensorimotor system, the performance of 
procedural schemata during e r godic sequences usually requires higher-level strategic 
cognition. Cenainly, Loftus and Loftus (1983) discussion of player's strategies presumes that 
players have these cognitive capabilities, and the bottom-up and top-down cognitive processes 
discussed throughout this thesis require concrete- and formal-operational thought. Indeed, 
Turkic's (1984) distinction between two dominant styles of computer mastery parallel 
Piaget's categories. The "concrete" style is akin to Levi-Strauss' {1966/1976) notion of 
"bricolage" in that it is an approach to problem-solving which "involves entering into a 
relationship with [one's] work materials" (furkle, 1984, p. 51). The individual experiments, 
makes mistakes, goes back, and reconsiders different approaches, until a workable/working 
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model is found. By contrast, the "abstract" style of mastery is characterised by a lop-down 
approach, that is, an attempt to progre&Sivcly break down tasks into components. Turkle's 
"concrete" and "abstract" styles may be seen as modes characterised by the predomimmee of 
concrete- and formal-operational operations, respectively, in that both styles would involve 
the use of both concrete- and formal-operations. 
Turkte's emphasis on "abstract" and "concrete" styles is valid at a high level of 
generality, but it ignores what Piaget (1929/1973, 1950/2001, 1951, 1978) called "pre­
eoncepts," or ''preopcratory thought," now commonly referred to as "preoperationnl" 
(Wadswortli, 1989). For Piaget, cognition is prooperatioua\ prior to the acquisition of 
operational thinking. Preoperations have prelogical qualities, and are characterised by: an 
inability to follow ceruin transformations: an inability to mentully reverse operations; a 
tendency to focus on only one, or n few, of a stimulus' v:uial:les ("centration"); and the 
privileging of perception over cognition. 
In characterising preoperational cognition it is useful to emphasise itt close 
relationship with magico-religious modes of thought. Early anthropologists' were particularly 
concerned with the presence or absence of "rationality" in particular cultures and made a clear 
distinction between prelogical and logical thought (Horton & Finnegan, 1973, p. 17). Freud's 
(1913/1950) early account of magico-religious thinking, for example, fo!!owed Frazer's 
(1912/1993) view that ontogenesis recupillllntes phylogenesis. An individual's psychological 
stages of narcissism/auto-eroticism, attachment to love objects. and abandonment to the 
reality principle were seen as respective parallels to the evolution of to!emism, monotheism, 
and science. Consequently, early anthropologists tended to dismiss the primitive thinking-of 
''primitives", women and children--as developmentally inferior. 
This position is no longer accepted because so·called "primitives" are as capable of 
scientific modes of thought as "civilised" scientists, who may in tum utilise non-scientific 
modes to legitimate their supposed "objectivity" (se� Evans-Pritchard, 1937/1985; Levy­
Bruhl, 1935/1983; Malinowski, 1954). Indeed, Turkle (1995) argues that the increased 
tendency towards a "concrete" style of computer use results from a cultural revaluation of 
concrete modes of thought that were formerly dismissed as "primitive," child-like, and 
feminine. The present position is that both pragmatic {proto-scientific) and mngico·religious 
modes of thought may be found across the diversity of human cultures and that this reflects 
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lhe "psychic unity or [hu]mankind" [fombiah, 1989, p. 84); yet at the same lime, different 
"modes" of rationality coc�ist within cultures and individuals. 
Mngico-religious thought is not reducible to prcoperntions, nor do players of ffK 
simply regress to a preoperatiom1] stage, since they remaiu capable of formal-operntions. 
However, formal-operational thinking is domain-specific, nnd unless an adult's environment 
demands accommodation there is not usually any need to utilise formal-operations. This being 
the case, it is possible to argue that there is a "preoperationa! mode" characterised by a 
preponderenee of preoperational reasoning, but which presumes the use of other operations. 
More specifically, it can be argued that certain aspects of gameplay promote characteristics of 
preoperational thought-phenomenalistic causality, naYvc realism, and physiognomic 
perception-often associated with magical thinking. 
Phenomenalistic causality describes the process whereby the conjunction of events is 
mistaken as a causal relation, and is associated with children's (and ''primitive") beliefs in 
magic, as when opening a cunain is seen as creating light or jumping up and down is seen as 
causing crops to grow higher. In video games this may as result from players mispereeiving 
the causal, or cybernetic, relationships which bind them to the game. For example, 1he 
conjunction of pressing the "O" button may be immediately followed by the appearance of a 
wandering monster, and may thereby be seen (or experienced) as causal!y related, even if the 
effect was random, or was trig gered by some other event. This is partly a consequence of 
"intui1ive" and well-known interfaces: 1he less troublesome the process of interaction, the less 
likely it is that a player wil! attend to signs nt !he interface as representations of computational 
processes. While !his is likely to be a fairly transitory phenomenon, it overlaps with na'ive 
realism, the belief !hat signs have an indexical relationship with the objects to which they 
refer. This is evident in children's beliefs in the power of words and language in which the 
quality of the object is seen us residing in the word and vice versa. Here tliere is no:, active 
perception of signs standing for, or motivating, processes within the computer. TI,<1t is, digital 
signs-tlie character, the game world, and opponents-become treated as the ,1bjects of one's 
actions, not as representing something else. For example, players may perceiv,� "power-nps," 
including potions, as powerful irJ and of themselves, not us indexical of1he power a character 
gains from them, and which is observed in subsequent actions. 
This process is perhaps most obvious when one imbues the buuons and game 
controller with a quasi-mystical power, a 1endency that has been exploited in Sony's 
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Playstation advertising campaign, which mystifies the game controller's symbols. Certainly, 
the Playstation controller's symbols are the point of contact between the dicgetic and non­
diegetic, the liminal entry point between the unreal and rea!, between the extended agency or 
the player's will and the limited agency of the character in his/her mundane existence, These 
are the symbols on the gates of the 'Third Space" l<!ferred to in some of the advertisc:nents 
for the Playstation 2. It is therefore not surprising that, stripped of any specific context of 
(inter)action in/with the game, they may represent the magical act or immersion or 
imagination itself, or the magical enforcement of the player's will, and are imbued with power 
(see Tambiah, 1996). 
What is significant is that it is easy to mistake 01Jesel/as the cause of an event. This 
may occur whenever a player experiences a fortuitons congruence between his/her desire and 
game feedback: a cha�acter is injured, but finds a healing potion; a character is close to dying, 
but the oppone
01\l misses himfher; an opponent seems to be winning, but then the character 
defeats it with a ctitical attack. In such instances, it may seem as if the player has caused 
something to happen. Since the transparency of the interface brackets out the technicalities of 
mediation, a particular act, such as clicking on a menu item, seems to translate thought into 
deed (see Dibbe!l, 1993; Stefik, 1996). This blurs the boundaries between mind and body, 
such that the interface may be experienced as a place where one's thoughts or desires are 
magically manifested. 
A player's felt interpenetration between will and world may lead to physiognomic 
perception, the tendency to project emotional states onto inanimate objects, or, more 
accurately, the inability to distinguish inner states of being from an external situntion. We 
have already discussed this in tenns of projection and the uncanny, and similarly Scott 
Bukatman (1993) has argued that virtual reality environments, and computers in general, are a 
''place for the return" of Freud's notion of the "omnipotence of thought" (1993, p. 209), in 
that the interface not only masks the body, it seemingly translates thought into deed. lt can be 
argued that this experience occurs when players project or perceive events in tcnns of their 
own anxieties. For ex(lll)ple, players of.EEX may worry that they will not find enough potions 
to get them to the neM s�ve point, or that they will not find a save point before they have to 
stop playing to perfonn some social obligation, and one of these fears comes rroe. Players 
may feel anxious about being attacked by a particular monster, and find themselves suddenly 
confronted by a wandering monster of rhat type. In such situations, players' anxiety about 
their fate readily leads to an assumption that there are aggressive and malevolent e�temal 
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forces acting against them, and players may constantly search for proof of this in game events. 
Here the player does not so much foe! that s/hc has caused something lo happen so much as 
feel that his or her fears were {and aro)justificd. 
While Csikszentmihalyi's {1975, 1990, 1993) flow state is chnracterised by a 
narrowing of attention it is, of course, not necessarily accompanied by the kind of illogical 
cognition that Pingel associates with prcoperational thought. Nonetheless, increased 
immersion into the logic of the game world and a state of flow docs promote an egocentric 
tendency to bracket out mediating (computational, biological and social) processes. If, for Tan 
(1997), film viewers voluntarily enter into the illusions bound up in the diegetic effect, then it 
is likely that players may voluntary enter into the experience of the machine as a proximal 
extension of the self, cultivating a preopcratiomtl egocentrism which serves their pleasurable 
experience of mastery. In other words, if gameplay is a space for ego-gratification, then 
players may seek a high degree of attunement between their thoughts and feedback at the 
interface, and this may produce characteristics of preoperntional thought, including 
egocentrimt. 
While both psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology may have tenninology for this 
process, the Freudian account (1919/1990) is less productive. A return of the repressed may 
occur during gamcplay, producing some paranoid projection, but a modified version of 
Piaget's (1929/1973) model of preopcrational egocentrism offers a more genera! account of 
, the adaptive'.function of players' cognitive and affective work. Emotion, in its uninhibited
, , extremes, overrides cognition and forces us to act; in its less extreme or inhibited forms it 
motivates and narrows auentiveness. It may be useful, then, to see the motivated and 
narrowed auentiveness that occurs during an emotional event as a fonn of "centration," in that 
certain aspects of o situation are not processed; one focuses upon the most salient throat and 
the concomimm affortlanr.cs. This involves an increasing emphasis on nervous processes ihat 
are phylogcnctically archaic, and it may activnte preoperational thinking which is global or 
stereotypical in its appraisal (''The Al Bhed nre Arabic! Don't trust them! Fight/Run!"), 
Stereotypes arc a potential pr1.>blem in any communicative context, in that they tend to 
produce a generalised negative/positive affect for a group, minimise the perception of 
variation, nominate and marginalise "others," constrain perception and beha viour, and ,m, 
often self-confinning (Guirdham, 1999, p. 163). However, stereotyping, which may be seen as 
an adult manifestation of preoperational thought, is not simply pre!ogical, outmoded, or 
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incorrect. Stereotypes are an economic (albeit lazy) way of appraising one's environment, 
They provide ready-m-lmnd. general appraisals which arc sometimes valid at a broad level of 
generality, short circuiting the need for convoluted reflection, thereby freeing one to act 
quickly (sec Mackie & Hamilton, 1993). Because much gameplay demands quick action. and 
deliberately fosters a gratifying immersion, flow. and egocentrism, preoperational thought is a 
functionally useful way of accommodating information at the interface. Egocentrism therefore 
may be seen as the de lining aspect of those preoperations that occur at the interface. 
Blocked Egacculrism and Its Emotional or Aesthelic Significance 
While cgoccntrism may frequently occur, then, gameplay may be characterised 
tluough its repeated blocking, and earlier chapters have indirectly discussed aspects of video 
gamcplay that may cause this. Chapter Two argued that digital articulation may block Gestalt 
impression of an image, and that shifts between observational or ergodic attitudes produce 
disjunctive proximal-distal transactions, especially when players are promised the freedom to 
act in a virtual world but can only choose from some basic, repetitious commands. We can 
extend this account by arguing that because preoperational experience is characccriscd by 
ignorance or mediation, video games may block egocentrism by drawing attention to their 
semiotic qualities. For example, the sense or the video game as an expression of one's mind is 
effectively blocked when one !cams, or is confront ed by, a new assignment of sign-runclions. 
This occurs at the beginning of EfK, when characters acquire a new Overdrive, and when the 
player lirst plays blitzball. Such blocking is obvious when the player hus to consciously check 
the controls and (re-)read the manual. 
Increasing mastery will minimise an awareness of sign-functions, but the forced and 
hurried use of habituated procedural schemata may lead to make mistakes that create the same 
effect. ETTors, for example, are obvious during thooo actions, such us Overdrive c harging. 
which require complex and/or time-pressured button combinations during periods of high­
affect: Auron's Shooting Sbr Overdrive requires players to press: "t,.." ''O," "l," "X."" "Left.'" 
"Right," and "X" during a rapid countdown. More routine "eTTors" occur during combat when 
one scrolls down a small menu to lind an item but scrolls past it because the inventory has not 
been properly sorted. Similar problems also occur because of unexpected or complex options 
during menu navigation. For example, a player may have fallen into a pattern of choosing 
various menu options for three selected characters in combat which is effective against most 
monsters (Auack: [Selected Monster]), but then may come across a monster which requires a 
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different sequence. If the player accidentally folls imo the habituated sequence at some point, 
the player may be rrustratcd at the computer's inability to differentiate the selected 
assignment of sign-expression to a sign-vehicle (the routine: Attack: [Selected Monster)) from 
the !mended assignment of a sign-expression to a sign-vehicle (such as: Summon: Ixion) in 
the Combat Menu. 
Chapter Three argued that shifts in and between narrative and grune interest structures 
may defer or block access to the objects or one's interest, and we may extend tliis by arguing 
that the game interface may block one's agency by limiting access to infonnation tl1a1 is 
important to the maintenance offlow. Poole (2000) addresses this by distinguishing the use or 
thil "camera" in video games from its use in film. For him, the analogy to "camera" in 
describing the point of view in video games is limited in that, "cinematic camera work of the 
kind that is immediately noticeable or stylish . . orten depends for its effect on hiding 
something from the viewer, not letting you see everything" (p. 81). We might accept Poole's 
point, then, that: "there can be no dramatic irony in videogames, because dramatic irony 
depends on a knowledge differential between spectator and protagonist - yet in a video game 
the player is both spectator and protagonist at once" {p. 81). When games attempt to "replicate 
this kind of stylised shot choice," by (say) hiding an item or monster where players cannot see 
it, it "becomes a fraudulent and frustrating method of inducing teusion: the player can get 
killed by zombies, not because the environment is cleverly designed, but because s/he was 
deliberately hindered from seeing them coming until it was too late"; consequently, "a purely 
filmic notion or crunerawork cannot work in a videogame context. Rlm manipulates the 
viewer, but a grune depends on being manipulable" (p. 81). 
Against this it cun be argued that level design in many grunes (most especially FPSs) 
involves the deliberare placement of monsters and objects to surprise, startle or rrustrate the 
player (see Kushner, 2003, p. 143) and/or to exploit the graphical technology (Poole, 2000, p. 
l30). Some players accept that levels have to be replayed until they are known and 
mastered-after all, this is Friedman's (1995) aestlietic of "demystification," Turkic's (1995) 
"tinkering," and Myers (1990b) "experimentation." While ffX's game macrostructurcs are 
not governed by an aesthetic of surprise and shock, they do reward with items players who 
explore hidden areas. Consequently, the blocking of items, like the chests hidden behind 
crates on the Luca docks, is a challenge that is part of the gume's aesthetic of mastery and 
demystification, coded in both ergodic and narrative in tenns of the exploration and 
colonisation of space (Fuller &Jenkins, 1995). Certainly, it is frustrating to search an area and 
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re alise there was n o�1ing to be found, but players aro not requi red or expected to find every 
item hidden on the side of paths, behind boxes, or in distnnt or secret locations, since play.�rs 
can pass the game without them., Whether players search systematically, co ntinuously, or 
occasi ona!ly depends upon theirt,f:cted strategy and style of ploy. 
Nonetheless, earlier c hapters address�d other processes that may block a player's 
egocentrism. Chapter Five discussed the dual n111TUtive and game coding of characters, which 
Chapter Six argued could lead to a tension between characters as ideal egos and ego-ideals; 
and Chapter Seven argued thnt players' empathetic emotions depend upon their separateness 
from characters. These arguments hold open the possibility that churacters may act against a 
player's virtual wishes, guidance, or commands. While empathy may result from seeing 
characters us independent, unique and unpredictable personalities, a character's ignorance of 
one's virtual guidance in observational sequences, aud the absence of desired affordances 
",during ergodic sequences, may be e xperienced as defiance. Consequently, characters who 
engage in actions Ihm are no t in accord with a player's motives or goals may effectively deny 
or undermine that player's free interaction,  mastery and desired omnipotence over lhe game 
world. 
It is evident, th.in. that gameplay both encournges and blocks egocentrism; the issue 
that follows this recognition is the emotional or aesthetic significance of suc h blocking. 
Wittiin psychoanalytic discourse, the blocking of egocentrism may be seen primarily as a 
cause for fear or ill1ger. In Freud's or Klein's terms (sec respectively Kinder, 1991, and 
Skirrow, 1980) blocked cgocentrism may be seen in terms of fear, in that the constant throat 
of failure or being ovctwhelmed by opponents during gameplay may be premised upon an 
nggre�sive defence ngoinst the regression of the male ego to an eurller state of vulnerability. 
First person shooters (FPS) may be seen as exploiting this quality. For oxample, ...:arr {2003) 
urgues that Silent Hjll (1999), being a horror game, "aims for intensity, tension and fright" (p. 
3), and to this end is "tense, sparse an.d linear" (p. 2). Its incessant '.lghting and tight first­
person perspective hold open the possibility of sudden death, and its horror-genre premise of 
supematural in cursion creates a sense of the mon�trous violation of the real. The fighting, 
m�c-like space, limited save points, keys and p=les, all drive the player inevitably forward 
in a "tidal pull" {p. 3), allowing the game to "instigate and muintain pace and tension, 
[fuelling] its unnerving visions of death and possession" (p. 2). This constitutes a 
charncteristically mule !IBSthetic or pathology that constantly places the ego under t hreat while 
providi11g affordances for reactive and pre-emptive d<lstruction. Creed's (1993) account o f  the 
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monstrous-feminine would seem applicable here, in that the presence of monstrous and 
dangerous females, such ns the alien in Aliens vs Predator (1999), explicitly links a threat to 
the player's ego to mole anxieties about female sexual power. 
However, such accounts arc not particularly relevant to role-playing games (RPGs). 
Carr (2003) observes that, compared with Silent Hill (1999), the RPG Planescape: Torment 
(1999) is more concerned with immersion, and is consequently dilatory, encyclopaedic, open­
ended and cyclical, encouraging detours and the (re-)examination of detnil. Players can save 
almost anywhere, minimising fear of re-play, and there is a more accommodating top-down 
perspective which provides for visual mastery and a strategic orienliltion. Its goals also 
"remain dispersed or vogue," and in place of nn ongoing anxious rush it prefers "to be 
savoured, wandered through, in the company of armed companions" (p. 8}-in short, in 
relative safery. Carr implies that it would 00 misleading to place undue emphasis on 
psychoanalytic accounts of negative affects-on a constant re-srnging of primal fear about 
death or ego-loss-in RPGs, which promoto an aesthetic that is atmospheric and strategic. 
These comments apply almost wholesale to FFX, which allows replay, offers a third 
person perspective, is open-ended, and enconroges mastery through combat strategy and 
cxplorotion. Most of the game's images of bodily disintegration nnd death are so typical to 
fantasy fiction, RPGs, and previous instalments of the Fipnl Fantasy series, that they may be 
seen less as expressing Intent anxieties about sr.paration anxiety, (s)mothering, castration or 
death than as conserving the genre. For example, while sterr.otypical images of the monstrous­
feminine {Creed, 1993) may be found in many CRPGs, the only real horrifying female figure 
in .EEK is Yunalesca: the main opponents are male. A player may interpret this absence in 
terms of a male destructive force that must be destroyed to re-instate the role of the nurturing 
mother (absent from Tidus' life) in the (re-) productive (social) lifo of Spira (whose positive 
aspects are figured by Yuna}. Yet such nn interpretation is more intelligible at a hermeneutic 
level in relation to broad cultural anxieties, and hardly describes the player's likely 
interpretation of the game or motivation. 
In a Lncanian {1977/2001) account, the forced shifr from a narcissistic experience 
when one's agency is blocked may be seen as posing the presence of an Other that challenges 
the Self at the level of the imaginary, inciting narcissistic rage. This might 00 seen as a useful 
�nd broadly applicable model. After all, while play may be ideally satisfying to the ego, 
games require challenge and necessarily frustrate the ego. Difficulty settings not only 
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accommodate !low by adapting play to a player's increasing mastery of the system, they 
indicate that challe11ge is an aesthetic of gamcplay, and anger is an emotion that may help us 
face challenges. Furthermore, the labour of play may be seen as analogous to the labour of 
shoring up the ego. Indeed, it cannot be over-emphasised how much of the player's affective 
activity is bound up in the simple issue of labour, of the expenditure of time and effort. FFX 
requires up to 90 hours of gameplay and complex cognitive strategies which, if they fail, 
require players to repeat extended sequences. Charncters, including the history of their 
development, may fum;tion as an i11de.x of the player's investment in the game as a whole, 
with death of a character less a figuration of the player's castration than an index of the 
player's loss of labour. The point is that the greater the loss of labour, the greater the offense 
to the ego, and the greater the narcissistic rage. 
This angry response to a challenge to the self response may be reinforced bec�use, as 
was argued in Chapter Seven, the absence of moral, humllll qualities minimises empathy and 
mal\imises negative empathetic emotions. That is, the computer may be attributed with super­
human qualities tlrnt promote an angry sense of unfair opposition which opposes any sense of 
egocentrism. If a computer wins it can be accused of cheating because, not being humun, il 
does not rl,illk, it merely calculates to an inhuman degree. This promotes the kind of injustice 
one might feel if two people were given the same mathematical problem to solve, but one of 
the people had a calculator. In tliis sense the computer is an instrumentolity to which the 
player has no access. Such nn awareness of the computer as a computer may lead players to 
recognise that there is not an equal playing field, which takes away any sense of play as a just 
experience. The computer's lack of reciprocity may lead to an expiatory type of anger in 
which players punish the game, smashing and cursing it, for a felt injustice. It is not just that: 
"You cheated" or: "You broke the rules"; there is a more profound sense that: "You betmyed 
me! This was meant to be fun!" It is precisely because players are encouraged to promote 
ego ccntrism at the irterface (an overextension of the self into the machine) that the rnge they 
feel towards the machine may be so potent: there is a sense of having been betrayed during an 
(invited) intimate moment. 
However, seeing gamcplay in tenns of male ego anxiety and aggression readily 
suggests a phalloccntric stance or a polemical feminist agenda. We should not forget that 
story- and character-based games such as Final Fantasy attract more of the female market 
(Cassel & fonkins, 1998), and psychoanalytic accounts tend to draw attention away from why 
some games appeal to botlz genders. As Grodal (1997) argues of film, most of the perceptual, 
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cognitive and atTectivc aspects of gameplny already addresscd-atTcctivc tone, the regulation 
or interest, and the production of empathetic emotions-arc not gender specific. Therefore, 
reducing analysis to issues of gender misrepresents the emotional experience of gameplay. 
This is not to argue that gender should not be addressed, that gender is never central to the 
experience of gameplny, or that the above psychoanalytic accounts are witlmut value; it is 
morc\y to state that m<Jre fundamental processes need to be accommodated. Indeed, we cau 
correct some of the gender bias in psychoanalytic accounts by simply observing that male 
players do not usually fear the loss of their penis so much as the loss of the phallus, and that 
castration may be read as trans-gcnder mctui:,.or for the dimunition of a player's ego through 
the loss of (syml.>ols oQ power. Similarly, while aggression may be associated with males, we 
can observe that narcissistic rage is not always gendered and often will depend upon the 
consolidation of un individual player's ego. 
Nonetheless, while play may 00 experienced in psychoanalytic tenns as the labour of 
shoring up the ego, with fear resulting from one's loss of power and anger resulting from a 
challenge to one's agency, it can be argued that players may somelimes feel quite differently 
about the work of gamcplay: slowly guiding a character across an entire level, fighting 
recurring wandering monsters, r e-loading sections and rcpluying them, for the pcissibility of 
some future reward of interest or fun. The following argues that if gameplny is experienced, 
not as a constant state of egocentrism and now, but as a recurring sense of blocking with an 
ongoing threat of the loss of labour, then shame may be central to gnmep!ay. 
Shame, and the Compass of Shame 
In Tomkins' (1963) account, the familiar emotions of shame, defeat, shyness, 
inferiority, guile, humiliation, and frustration are built upon an underlying affecl of shame. In 
this mode!, which accords with Iwrd's (1984) model of the physiological substrates of the 
major emotions, shame is an nuxilinry affect whose activator is the incomplete reduction of 
interest or joy. More broadly, ShEIIlle is a physiological response to sudden and unexpected 
separation from positive atTect, and it is associated with the inhibitive activity of !he 
parasympathetic nervous system. The immediate fonn of shame as a "slump, blush, averted 
gaze, and loss of attention" renects an attenuation of interest, in the sense that "nobody can 
think clearly in the moment of shame •••. [It] turns off interest-based consciousness and turns 
on shame-based consciousness and shameful attention" (Nathanson, 1992, p. 133). Schorc's 
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(1994) neurophysio!ogical account describes shame more precisely in tenns of an "attachment 
deactiva101" component, which: 
[is] mediated by activation of the laterul tegmental limbic circuit, [and] acutely 
brukes hyperaroused and hype1stimula1ed states, diminishes positive 
narcissistic coloring of self-1eprese11tations, contracts the self, lowers 
expectations, decreases self-esteem, active coping, interest and curiosity, 
interferes with cognition and increases overt consciously experienced shame, 
parasympathetic supported passive coping, blushing, gaze aversion, and 
depressive affect-toned mood. (p. 363) 
Defined this way, shrune is the le11St damaging of the negative affects. It forces us to re­
appraise a recent situation, and potentially re-engage with that situation with greater attention 
to those 11Spects ofit which we perceive to have caused the shame response. 
As we develop, this affect is socialised and begins to take on the emotional character 
usually associated with shame. For example, when we have been cut short mid-sentence, we 
may initially experience the underlying affect of shame, but we wi!l a!so search our memory 
for similar situations. These may refer to social conventions, such as speaking out of turn or 
too loudly, and layered associations to one's physical ability, sense of helplessness, a lack of 
success, sense of self, attractiveness, visibility, and anxieties about intimacy, and so on 
{Nathanson, 1992, p. 317; sec below). This awareness of shame is a significant characteristic 
of its socialised form as an emotion, e&pecial!y given that the visible signs of shame, such llS 
blushing, usunlly amplify the affect (fomkins, 1963, p. 36). 
Of cou1se, gameplay is often a solitary situation with a non-human opponent, and 
players do not usually accord the machine the authority to shame them in the everyday sense. 
However, the ongoing blocking, frustrntion, failure and loss of positive affect may be seen llS 
an experience of this innate ajfecl of shame, and it can be argued that there nre some instance s 
in which the ematia11 of shame may emerge. If this is the case, then it may be possible to see 
some player's strategics of self-regulation in tenns of Nathanson's (1992) model of '"the 
compass of shame" (Ulb!c 8.1), developed in co-operJtion with Tomkins to find therapeutic 
applications of his theory. This model identifies four general tendencies-.. withdrawal, .. 
.. auack other, .... avoidance," and ••auack sclf'-which suggest four categories of the ways 
players may attempt to self-regulate the play experience. 
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Table 8.1 Nathanson's {1992) compass of shame adapted to scripted pauems of shamc­
regulation in video gameplay. 
Pt,in1or Sl)loor 
Comp"" Opmlioa 
WiU,d,..w,I s"'"'"'"""'' 
,..,uch 
At<><kSolr A,oid 
h<i(ll""""' 
Avol<l>nec i'r<v<Ollli• 
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Atl><W.<>lhcr Moid 
lof,flo,lty 
Se,u,Hty 
lmpot<11e<; f,igidity 
M.,«hl.on 
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Sod�m 
Ao,iliuy Affeol> 
lli,•c,,:foar 
p;....,,: self.di>&""' 
,.,r-m«moll 
E,,ci1etn<t1C""gcr 
Ron10 of Aelion 
8,,. ln P'"'"" of g,mo 
� rcsi&l>'hido from g,n,o 
D<forto g,mc1,im,ci.,,,,I 
Ioli<� b<liUloown ability 
Pcnyor e<IV<r·up failure 
byrtinforcing on•'• pfldo 
(,olr..,,o,m), or by ,dju,ting 
oo,·, ottitudc 10 !ho g,mo 
iprep:iratioo, se<king help, 
ohe.,tiog). 
l'll\-<!Olln ...,,., ... g,me, 
goon. medium,"'""'' of 
play 4"d/or gan,o prod'"'" 
� o,di,tioh<hn,ioutogaio!l 
g,un<Md/orgarnowo�d 
In the context of play, which is often characterised by an energetic and pleasurable 
immersion in the play space, a miuimal form of the affect of shame may occur whenever a 
player's engagement has been suddenly cut short. Where this is seen as simply unexpected, or 
as reflecting upon one's own failure, this may manifest as a momentary lack of 
responsiveness , or e11halation, characteristic of resignation. That is, the player may take a 
second to recognise the separation before making the effort to re-enter the play space. 
However, it is also possible that gameplay may elicit more extreme forms of shame, 
especially when the player has a personality prone to shame, or if there is an amcccdcm 
condition !hat makes the player vulnerable to shame, for example a pronounced depressive 
state. A player in this state may take longer to pick themselves up from their ejection from 
pl easurable engrossmct11 in the play space, in the depressive sense of learned helplessness. 
This might be manifested as siuing and staring at the game controller or floor, looking away 
from the screen, or (at its most extreme) the player quietly getting up or turning off the game. 
The cognitive expression of this shame might be intelligible in terms of the game as an 
(;JJ1thropomorphiscd) witness to one's failure and, consequently, a desire not to be "seen" by, 
or not to be near, the machine. 
However, this sense of shame may become even more pronounced, since the status of 
the computer as a partner in, or context for, play holds open the possibility that the player may 
recognise or experience the entire process of gameplay as wasted labour, as an empty kind of 
play. The issue is that, while the computer may have same super-human qualities, ii especially 
may be characterised by the abse11ce of human qualities. The computer does not experience 
fun, nor can it witness or acknowledge one's fun or ego: it is a cold, rational, unfeeling 
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device, and one's victory may occasionn!ly or retrospcclivcly change from excitement i nto nn 
uncanny moment of r e alising that one's intimacy with the game  nnd its characters was 
experienced with such an impersonal artificial intelligence . Even if one does win, the victory 
may be seen as a hollow, partial or alien victory against something incapable of recognising or 
un derstanding that victory and/or the strategies which led to it. 
Shame in the more common sense, as an emotion, may occur whenever one makes a 
personal link between oneself and negative stereotypes of people who play games, as when a 
player recognises oneself as having spent too much time on a game, as lazy, failing to 
confront the real world, or as excessively escapist. However, it is perhaps more likely that 
players feel shame as a consequence of evnlunting gnmeplay from someone else's perspective. 
That is, a player may experience the game not in tcnns of bis or her own grntificntion, but 
someone else's gratifications, as when the player is engaged in such tedious tasks as 
navigating the landscape, looking behind bushes, trees, and crates, re-<:hecking areas in case 
anything was missed, and becomes conscious that this activity is not gratifying to a co-player , 
viewer or commentator (say, a competitor or resea rcher). Such an empathetic emotion 
requires only a minimal form of cognitive empathy: for example, the presumption thot the 
observer prefers kinaesthetic spectacle or some dazzling dcmonstrntion of spatial or strategic 
skill. The player may feel that s/he has failed whenever there is no such spectacle or 
demonstration, and may oscillate between shame, guilt or embarrassment towards oneself, 
anxiety about th� protracted nature of a dull sequence, or anger towards a!l the perceived 
causes for this experience of foilure. This can be extended to players who participate w ith 
observer-participant research and become self-conscious that play is being evaluated 
according 10 some "intellectual" aesthetic. If nothing else, such sha mefulness may be 
sustained by the ongoing presence of the observer, attenuating now and its pfoasurab!e 
egocentrism. 
The avoida1Jce pole of shame refers to the ways we ''reduce, minimize, shake off or 
limit" (Nathanson, 1992, p. 313), either through drugs, sex, or other stimulation, or by calling 
attention to whotever brings us pride, That is, avoidance is achieved, not through the physical 
withdrawal which characterises shame as such, but through diversionary stimulation nndfor 
positive evnlnation of one's self-esteem, for example the activation of narcissistic scripts, 
sometimes to the extent of denial. For Tomkins (1962), Nathanson (1992), and Schore (1!194), 
pride is complementary to shame in regulating se lf-esteem, or, more precise ly, self-esteem is 
governed by "two dissociable psychobiological components" (Schore, 1994, p. 363). The 
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"attachment deactivator," which is part of shame, constitutes one of Lhese components; the 
other component, the "attachment regulator": 
[is] mediated by activation of the mesocortical central tegmental limbic circuit, 
[and it] reduces consciously experienced shame, negative affective self­
rcpresentations, low-keyed depressive states and passive coping, and initiates 
self-comforting functions which enable recovery of sympathetic supported 
positive hedonic-1oned mood and narcissistic affect, expansion of the self, and 
active stress coping capacities. (p. 363) 
The cognitive compooent of the "shame modulator" that Schoro identifies as a ''pride" 
response may include benign responses such us "I'll get it, if I keep trying." This may give 
way to attempts 10 re-define one's aesthetic relationship to the mE1Chine. For example, players 
may accept that the game is harder than they desire and may subsequently change the 
difficulty settings, or may check to see if there is any preparation that can be accomplished, 
such us double-checking the manual, p!nying tutorial sequences, and s��rching out hints, 
cheats orwalklhroughs. ln FFX, certainly, a great den\ of time is spent preparing characters by 
buying and selling items, rearronging items in the inventory, checking cheat notes. and so on, 
to maximise the chances of surviving a dangerous opponent or section of the game. This 
allows one to literally avoid moments ofmis-auunement or failure and/or overcome whatever 
initiated shamo, and thereupon re-engage with the game without damage to one's self--esteem. 
However, pride may also lead to such over-optimistic responses, such as "I'm worth 
it, I'll give me/it another chance!" or ''There must have been a mistake, let's try that again!" 
This may lead to preoperational thoughts thnt conserve the player's egocentrism in spite of 
contradictory feedback {Reith, 1999). That is, when the conscious exertion of will docs not 
seem magically realised, phenomenalistic causality may be preserved through !he use of the 
kind of magical thinking that gamblers use to justify continued play in spite of losing. Jn this 
model failure docs not necessarily disprove (the efficacy ol) our (desired) omnipotence, it 
merely proves one"s failure to fully enter into the potency of that state. For example, 
sequences which contradict our e�pectatlons of influence may be dismissed in tenns of: 
intention ("I was not thinking about it so I shouldn't have expected it to happen"); 
intervention ("something was influencing my attempt to realise my intention"); llawed 
method ("I did something wrong so it didn't happen"); orwcightcd probability ("If! keep at it 
it will happen"). 
Since pn:op�rational reasoning may function to preserve the state of play, the above 
kind of thinking is not necessarily symptomatic of some problem in the player's personality or 
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in the experience or play. The broader significance of the pride response is thnt it functions to 
renew nnd nugment interest by creating n positive net return, which may provide sufficient 
stimulus to provide closure and comfortably terminate g:imeplay. If the affective {and 
aesthetic) character of play is oriented around seJr-esteem, priOO may signal adequate sclf­
esteem vis a vis the act o[play: a sense of accomplishment, of a resolved action tendency. The 
cognitive form of this might be: "[ plnycd t o  win, and I won: so the game is over." This 
closure may make it easier for the player to compartmentalise n gaming session, in spite of the 
absence of a discrete emotion-episode, and achieve something closer to the kind or cathartic 
or aesthetic pleasure found after viewing a classical drama or feature film. Nonetheless, some 
players may tum to pathological evaluations, such as: 'Tm great, no motter what this !1$%h 
thing says!" and may play and fail repeatedly as a means to prove the game's inability to 
recognise their perceived worth {"What do you know, you're just a dumb mnchine!"). This 
kind of pride is so excessive that the experience of gameplay primarily enables aggressive 
scripts that deal with negative self-esteem. 
In the case of the attack self pole of shame, anxiety about the helplessness und 
isolation characteristic of shame leads one to attempt to take control of the experience, that is, 
by voluntarily putting oneself down in the presence of another. We thereby accept u reduced 
sense of self but avoid feelings ofhe!plessness and isolation by maintaining n social dialogue 
(Nathanson, 1992, p. 3!3). In place of nnother, of course, we muy simply internalise the voice 
of the other as a conscience or super-ego and regard the intensity of this voice as surrogate 
proximity to the othe;. The most benign response to this might have the cognitive form of: 
"that was more unexpect,'d M difficult than I could have expected; maybe I'll !earn," such that 
the player defers to the ga,ne .!Ea pupil to a tutor. However, the player may respond in terms 
of far more damaging layers of association, such as the player cognitions listed in Table 8.2, 
adapted from Natllanson's (1992) schema!a of negative self-cva!ua!ion. 
Table 8.2. Schemata of self-evaluation. adapted from Nathanson (1992. p. 317). 
Schemata category Snmple schemarn 
(A) physiological limillltion,
(B) dopcndenco/indcpendencc 
(C) competition
(D) serue of self
"! am slow, clumsy. incompetcnL" 
··1 cnnnot design games; I am 1ollllly hclples, before rl1is game; 
there's nothing I con do but cheat by consulting someone else who 
can do !his properly."
�1 om a low. I hnve h<cn beaten by a machine." 
"I must� lhe only person who can't gel !his; it must be obvious to 
everyone else who plays 1his." 
225 
(E) pcrson:il ouractiveness "How amocti,e can I be, siuing here atone playing this gamer 
(F) sei<uolity "I om so ,c�uolly inodequole I am faiUng ot fighting imaginary 
opl)OncnlS, ou1oero1ica\ly twitching the controls while watching Yuna 
nnd Lulu." 
(F) visibility ''Thank God 1his ;, not an arcade game, I can't let anyone see me 
like this." 
(H) wishoslfeors about closeness "I nm completely nlone with a machine and even ir is unresl)Onsive; I
,ould never be loved or deo! wilh a real person." 
The emotional tone of play may not always involve such conscious cognitive 
rcsp<,nses, and will certainly vary with the player's personality and scripts. However, a 
frequent, significant response to such negative self-evaluations may be the resumption of play 
not to prove that the game is faulty, as in the avoidance pole, but lO prove that the self is 
insufficient. This ongoing demonstration may function as a l imited form of phatic contact, 
maintaining the relationship that staves off a feared sense of isolation. 
It is common, of course, for players to have cmotiona.l �sponscs to the game which 
are fundamentally aggressive, premised upon narcissistic rage, or upon more complex 
appraisals of the situational context. However, sometimes aggression may be a secondary, 
defensive response, as in Nathanson's (1992) founh pole of shame: a/rack other. In this case, 
the shame response "is associated with a feeling of lowered self-wonh that is simply 
unbearable" such that "we are likely to reduce another person so that we can at least be better 
than someone else" (p. 136). The obvious cognitive fonn of this kind of response is a verbal 
reduction, humiliation or abuse of a sec/jon of the game (''This section is boring, when do I 
get back to the fun!"), the game as a whole ("I hate ffK!"), the ge11re ("I hate Final Fantasy 
games" or "I hate adventure role-playing i;ames!"), the medirm, {"! hate video games!" or "I 
hate computers!"), or a physical (sadistic) auack on the video game itself (striking the 
console, keyboard or joystick). It might be observed here that when players think: "You 
cheat!" they are not necessarily engaging in physiognomic perception, that is, projecting of 
human qualities onto to the game. The expression "you" may be a linguistic convenience, 
since the designer of the hardware or software may be accused jn absentia, or the player may 
simply be giving voice to an experience in which s/hefee/� "cheated." 
However, the attack other pole of gameplay may also be seen when the player takes a 
prolonged and (mediated) sadistic attitude to play, For ex.ample, in5tead of physically 
attacking the machine, the player may play in spite oftheirresentment and deliberately go out 
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of their way 10 violate the rules of the game. This is evident when players take their time 
during a timed sequence, deliberately go the wrong way when given a predetennined path, 
avoid goals or quests the game provides for them, or delibem!ely crash/kill their 
vchiclclchnracter, In video games, of course, this rejection of the rules may sometimes be seen 
as producing a kind of humorous mayhem through comic mis-use. This may, in tum, be rnken 
as setting up an opposition between the inert, stupid inhumanity of the computer (with its grim 
confonnity to rules and its fonnulnic guide for play) and the creativefdestructivc activity of 
the human player (capable ofillogicul behaviour and absurdity). 
Nathanson's (1992) model of the shame therefore suggests some of the ways that 
players may el<perience shame and self-regulate ii, but it is particularly useful because it 
suggests that what video games really offer is a crmte.i:t for self-regulation. After all, while 
self-regulation may be a necessary consequence of gameplay, it is possible that the provision 
of a conte1<t for self-regulation may constitute the aesthetic appeal for some players. This is 
not the same as saying that players wish to enter a state of"flow," since a game may offer a 
series of challenges, frustrations and failures which tlueaten to sever the player from a srntc of 
"flow," forcilig the player lo recover from it. The desired "zone" of self-regulation is premised 
upon a level of difficulty that is not only sufficient to maintain interest but is also capable of 
producing shame m:ponscs. The player, then, may have a sense not so much of seamless 
"flow" as of a staggered series of interruptions, after which the player must re-appraise the 
situation, pick themselves up, and re-enter the "flow" state; or, alternately, they enter a state 
of "flow" whose tonality is negatively charged relative to the perceived proximity of a shame 
response and the labour required to process it. 
It is obvious, of course, that players may feel happiness in the sense of relief at the 
unexpected end of a long sequence, or gratitude at suddenly finding or being given some 
desired item or aid. However, happiness, e,:pecially as it is associated with flow, may be seen 
as a reward for self-regulation: mastery comes through practice, through constantly 
overcoming an opposing force, through defying the e1<temal agency of the game nnd 
subordinating to our own will, assimilating it as procedural schemata.. It is not merely that 
players win or complete a game, nnd that their happiness is thereby over aad done; happiness 
itself is won from the game, and this victory allows the player to retrospectively value 
gameplay. For example, an entire, frustrating and dehumanising session, or history of play, 
may be emotionally and aesthetically recuperated when au ongoing process of self-regulation 
finally culminates in success. 
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The Transrer and Dynamics of �motion in Video Game Aesthetics 
Earlier chapters have identified a number of processes and factors that govern the 
relationships between players, characters, and games. Notably, it has been argued that 
focusing upon the identity between characters and players is misleading because a pluyer's 
position is mediated by an observational attitude and ergodic conventions. That is, players' 
empathetic emotions are, even when sympathetic, usun!ly dilTerent from those of characters, 
and the empathy that players may feel for themselves a.r players may interfere with empathy 
with ch:iracters. 
Of course, as was noted in th!l introduction, this thesis has largely focused on 
"homogeneous" emotional cJ\periences, when in practice each pla}'llr's emotional experience 
depends upon antecedent factors. For eJ\ample, n player's psychobiography and !earned 
patterns of expectation may lead to distinctive emotion-!lpisodes (see Tan, 1997, p. 154). An 
individual player may have a learned affective response of dissmcll to a particular class of 
people, and may, upon becoming aware of this habituated response, feel guilt which self­
amplifies until the individual feels distress, whereupon the individunl becomes angry at their 
susceptibility to this distress, and directs this anger at the class of people in question. If tiiis 
assembly of affect is triggered by an event in a film, then its points of articulation arc unlikely 
to find realisation in th!l narrative. Consequently, a viewer's emotion episodes may cro.s 
scenes and give rise to expectations and action tendencies that are not accommodated by the 
narrntive. 
More generally, existing affects or emotions will affect a player's sensitivity to 
concerns presented in the game, to the extent that players may respond to uneJ\pected aspects 
of a situational context. A player who is in an angry state may seek objects for that anger, 
whereas another player may seek attunement with objects that mirror his/her own self-pity. 
For example, one pla}'llr may experience anger at Wakka when he abuses Rikku because of 
her race, while another player may experience embarrassment, awkwardness or anxiety on 
Rikku's behalf. Yet another player may experience anger at Sin, who caused Wakka's 
prejudice by killing his brother Chappa (while using an Al Bhcd v,eapon). Consequently, for 
some players Wakka's chiding by Tidus may constiture adequate resolution, while for other 
players the only adequate resolution of defeating Yu Yevon comes later at the resolution of 
th!lgame. 
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Nonetheless, it is possible to define antecedents that players are likely to share 
because of the emotions likely to be cued during prior sequences, and if interest may be 
preserved or transferred between narrative and game macrosllllcturos, then we may presume 
that the empathy players reel for characters and the empathy they feel for themselves may 
operate as antecedents for one another. Anger which finds its expression as global empathy 
with oneself against the machine ("I hate this game") may be redirected as local empathy with 
oneself posed against a particular opponent ("I hnte this Funguur!"). Similarly, a global or 
local empathy with oneself ("I'm useless at this game!'') may be redirected as local empathy 
with a charocter ("I pity Tidus!"). This local empathy with Tidus may be redirected as global 
empathy with all the characters in Spira, or nil humans ("We are trapped by our greed and 
hate!"), Indeed, any locnl empathy folt towards Tidus when he is attacked by Machina may 
resonate with a players' sense of being the victim ofa frustrating machine. 
Multiple, mixed, and dynamic emotior,al cues may also lead to conflicting or 
ambivalent emotional states. We may have motor empathy with a character that affords us the 
pleasure of kinaesthesia, but we may dislike the character's appearance or persona. Innate 
releasers may present a character as unattractive, yet vulnerable, such that we feel both 
repulsion and sympathy. We may feel a tonic sympathy for a character as a hero or helper, yet 
a situational context muy promote a phasic contempt for them during a sequence. We may 
disagree with the reasoning and motives of a character, yet we may respect their courage as 
they pursue their goals. We may feel that the constraints ut the interface resonate with the 
construints experienced by a character, yet may also feel thut u character's goals arc imposed 
upon or own (we want to do this, but Tidus wants to do //,is). We may find that we are so 
concerned with our labour that a character becomes an index of our own agency, a vehicle of 
our own gameplay, and we evaluate it solely in tenns of aesthetic appeal or functional 
usefulness. At the same time, some aspect of the character may continually draw us back into 
a position of sympathy, compassion or admiration. 
Some of these dynamics may occur in any medium. For example, poor television 
reception, a book that is falling apart, or a noisy person in a cinema, may occasionally 
produce a context of irritation that may 00 transferred as the desire for an antagonist's 
punishment; and a book or tilm character may be both admirable and contemptible. However, 
the necessary blocking of egocentrism which is a part of any rule-governed game muy 
routinely produce emotions directed towards the medi11m, or what Tan (1997) calls "artefact 
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emotions" ("A-emotions"). These A-emotions may constantly come into conflict with 
emotions directed towards the diegesis of nurrative nnd gnme macrostructnres, or what Tan 
calls "fiction emotions" ("F-cmotions"). The tensions resulting from the conflict between A­
emotions and F-emotions, which mny often result from the dual role of the player as 
participant and witness, may mean that video games may be characterised by disjunctive or 
ambivalent emotional statcs. 
Earlier chapters have argued that fil aesthetically recuperates some of its disjunctive 
qualities; here we can elaborate that video games in general may accommodate the disjunctive 
experience of dual character and player coding as pan of their aesthetics. Tim Schafer {cited 
by Pearce, 2003), for example, has observed that when a character is required to pcrfonn a 
particulnr action, game designers often offer the player a reward so that their own actions 
coincide with that of the character. For Schafer: "you can't just rely on the story empathy, you 
have 10 put in little gumeplay bribes, to make them like [a] character and want to pursue 
[them]" ('i 6). In FFX, for example, the character's and player's motives for rescuing Yuna are 
different. While both Tidus and the player may desire to see Seymour get his comeuppance, 
Tidus has the opponunity to "win" Yuna by saving her, whereas the plnyer is motivated by 
investment in the act of viewing the progression and/or culmination of a romantic 
macrostructure, tlie pleasure of being able to renew a voyeuristic relationship with Yuna, and 
the practical reward of being able to fight with Yuna's Aeons. 
For Schafer, such moments of divergence bcr.veen character and player motive may 
be "kind of interesting to the player'' (p. 9), and he argues that the player can be thought of as 
the "intuition" of the character; 
The character is. , , hearing this voice in their head that's saying "walk to the 
right." And they're like, "okay, I think I want to walk to the right." And the 
charru:\er always exhibits this cognitive dissonance. They act !ike they wanted 
to. "Ycal1, I think I want to go over here. I think I want to open this door." But 
it's really you, you're kind of like this voice in their head, this Toure\le's­
syndrome compulsion -"Open the door. Open it!" And they're like, yeah. nh, I 
want to open the door. , • , Because you're not the actual thought of the 
character, you're son of the hunch .... It's like in real life, we're getting these 
weird impulses that we don't really understand sometimes. ('j[ 90-92) 
TI1is certainly suggests some possibilities about the psychoanalytic relationship between 
player and character. for example, the player may be not only a character's "intuition," but 
also hi�er super-ego or unconscious. In the firntcru;e, charactern muy perform such vinucs �s 
courage, bravery and self-sacrifice which players have no �ope to pcrfonn in their mundane 
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lives. The player therefore may runclion like the character's super-ego, making noble choices, 
or the character may exlemalisc the player's super-ego such thu! (he play space becom�s a 
realm of honourable heroism. More than this, where the player sees more than the character, 
helps him to choose wisely, and/or corrects mistakes through replaying a sequence, the player 
may enact a position of benevolent guidance. That is, acti.1g 10 ensure a cha racter's survival 
may be e�perienced as committing to a reassurance in a higher self or higher forces, n kind of 
secular faith. 
In !he second case, characters mny perform anti-social acts that e�press a player's 
, unconscious or repressed impulses. That is, the play space may be seen ns criminal
, playground in which·!he prohibited desires and villainy that enters players' minds during their 
everyday life cat: find remorseless exercise. However, since players' desires are constrained 
by not only by the social order, but also the limited scope ofcrgodic action, aggressive actions 
·may be a response to the formulaic rules of the interface and game. Indeed the player's 
expiator; agency may be targeted at characters, who may be placed in precarious situations 
Jess to tempt death than to tempt relief from the stress of tl1e challenge that prohibits the 
player. Having lost the game a player may renew his/her non-virtual life, simulating an oddly 
fatalistic immortality. The player thereby becomes part of the forces that drive ch!ll'Uctcrs into
danger, and is liberated by his/her capacity for chaos and destruction.
Whil� it is poss ible to view characters � n psychic extension or the player, or \'ice 
versa, it is more useful to sec divergences between characters and players as inclining players 
to recognise, understand, and/or act in accordance with, 11UOther's (conceptual) point of view. 
That is, differences between characters and iilayers may help players to become aware that 
!hey arc engaged in an act of empathy, that they are, after all, role-playing, and may wonder:
"What would the character do? How docs it differ from what I would do? What are the 
rcpcrcussious of this choice? Given those repercussions, why did I choose to do that? What 
does that say about me?" Ultima IV· Quest of !he Avatar (1985) was memorable and 
sign ificant pr ecisely because of the moral dilemmas it posed for players, who found that their
actions as a player had repercussions for their characters (Herz. 1997, pp. 155-1.'.i9; King &
Borland, 2003, pp. 74-75). In one section, for example, the player.Could choose to pay a blind
woman a single coin for her he!:i, ignoring not just her disparaging comments, but also the
moral implications of such exploitation. Later in the game, the characters learn that they need
her help, and ff they have been miserly it is too late to apologise: she remains resentful, and 
the game is hwicr to complete. Not only is the player forced to realise 1he consequences of
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his/her act in the game world, the morality of this act unexpectedly traits the characters under 
his/her control. 
Unfortunately, FFX does not much exploit th.ese possibilities. While the game has 
na!Tlltive depth and complexity, its ergodic freedom is navigational or strategic in that its 
linear nnrrative macrostructurc is unaffected by player choices, and it has no alternntive 
endings (if failure to reach the end is excluded}. In short, it offers no major moral dilemmas 
premised upon divergences between char.icier and player choices. However, we might make 
two observgtions. First, the Final Fanta.w series does allow players the freedom to decide to 
kill or run from certain monsters. While most opponents are Fiends, or Aeons who have not 
found rest, such that battle is encouraged as part of the quest to free Spira, the player may act 
out a moral attitude, by avoiding unnecessary battles and retreating from animals or
supposedly neutral humanoids. 
Second, FFX allows players to select from different dialogue options, and, as Smith 
(2003) argues, choosing one dialogue response over another allows players to take moral 
ownership of the character's attitudes. Forexaraple, in FFVTI, players can refuse to buy Acris' 
flowers, or can buy them as an act of charity and subsequently give them to Marlene. 
However, FFX has less options for such moral manoeuvring than FFVTI. Perhaps 1hc most 
notable choice 'i's whe1her players offer Clasko their honest opinian that he is more suited to 
work a Chocobo Trainer, or whether they encourage his seemingly hopeless dream to become 
a Chocobo Knight. In the first case, the attempt to be genuinely helprul risks offending 
Clasko; in the latter case, the attempt to spare his feelings, or to make him learn the lesson 
himself, may lead him to waste his time and effon, and may be a cowardly avoidance of 
coofrantation on the player's part Across the Final Fantasy series, dialogue options like this 
have no effect on character or murative development, and tend to provide predictable choices 
of self-presenting as honest or dishonest, as private or open, as aggressive (rude) or peaceful 
(polite), as mean or nice, as self-interested or selfless (and so on). 
Video games, then, may exploit the disparity between characters and players, even if 
FFX is m>t particularly innovative in 1his respect, However, even when video games do not 
actively exploit their disjunctive qualities, players may ju�tify ll!ld personalise their 
investment in video games by. perceiving disjunctive qualities as personable quirkiness. As 
Aarseth (1997) argues, some video games may be seen as "autistic" in 1hat they do not 
properly respond to relevant contextual cues and are governed by their own {often 
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ine,r.plicable) logic. We might equally say that video game characters may sometimes be 
coded in cerms of the cute imp recision of the developing child, in the sense of clumsy 
sensorimocor co-ordination, and pro-logical cognition. For c,r.ample, the absurd contradiction 
between a desirable ideal-ego and its functional weaknoss-its evident undesirability as a 
game-agent-may be dealt with through a human resignation, a kind of tolerant and humorous 
acceptance. This "human" response to the video game character, or, more specifically, the 
attributes which mark it as a product of a compucer program, humanises one's relationship 
with that character. That is, the human ability to project affection onco inanimate objects, 
which so characterises children's play, may code the intense relationship between player and 
character as itself "cute" or "human." Indeed, because of the defenceless and vulner ability of 
video game characters as they passively await our informing agency, a protective stance 
towards them flatters one's own sense of humanity (Tan, 1997, p. 192). 
More than this, the computer itself may be coded as child-like. This was more obvious 
with older PC computers, such as the System-SO, or even later models like the Commodore 
64. The crude simplicity of the low resolution pixels on older machines may (now) be seen as 
something like an innate releaser for cuteness. Older users may also remember waiting while 
their clunky muchines look half an hour to load from tape or disk. Beyond the periodic 
frustration und technical confusion there was sometimes the anticipation of some simple, 
child-like uccomplishment which could be performed wi1/wm the computer, such as a digital 
version of a game that might be played better with paper c�rds or a board. At such momeuts 
the computer's execution of its task could create something akiu to parental pride, and also 
perhaps a sense that one can remain in contact with one's own childish qualities from a 
position of technical mastery. However. just us a child's selfishness and an inability to 
consider consequences may frustrate us, the "autism" of a computer, coupled with its 
inscr utable computation, may be distressing. The ne,r.t chapter takes up this issue by 
addressing the existential implications of the computer as a partner in play. 
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Chapter Nine- Existent in! and Holistic Gameplay 
The Existential Experience of Ploy 
J! 
If we do not belabour its problems w, a ph ilosophy, existentialism offr.rn useful 
analogy that helps us to draw together some of the arguments in the preceding chapters 
(Camus, 195511991; Heidegger; 192711962; Sartre, 194311993, 195911954). 1 By Sartre's 
(194311993) account, existentialism refers to the belief that we ore trapped in existence, 
forced to live in a meaningless world without recourse to absolute values or any essence of 
human nature that might organise our experience. The only facts we can t:ike for granted arc 
that we exist, that we will die, and that our int e1pretations of this existence and death are 
arbitrary. The human condition consequently involves the absurd necessity of making 
meaning in a meaningless world, and the awareness of this may be experienced as anguish, 
shame or nausea. 
It can be argued that some of the processes described in previous chapters produce in 
players the shame, anguish nnd nausea that Sartre (1943/1993) associates with existential 
experience. Sartre describes shame in his account of Being-for-others (etre-pour-autrui) where 
a being becomes (shamefully) conscious of his/her being as defined by others, as when one is 
caught peeping through a key-hole {p. 259). He emphasises how, through shame, we exist in a 
different way: "Shame is by nature recognition. I recognise that I am as the Other sees me .. (p. 
221). This is a radical moment of disruption, of separation from a prior slate of knowing oue•s 
self and of Being-for-itself (eire-pour-soi). Here Sartre describes shame as what, in Frijda's 
(1986) tcnns, we would call an emotion in that it incorporates a cognitive appraisal of the 
"Other." The existential character of this emotion lies in Lhe way it alienates an individual 
from a valued and meaningful c,pcrience ofselfhood. 
As noted in the last chapter, while some players may feel shame by perceiving 
themselves as associated with negative stereotypes of gamers, to presr,me an emotion of 
' Sartre's (194311!)93) exisienliolism betrays il5 class ,talus by ignoring the imponant ways lhnt people 
rue beholden to social forces. Many people nrc so disodvaniugcd by poverty. wOJ". repression that 1heir 
e,pcrlence is chnrru:terised by tenor or slarvalion, and Sart,e's nausea is not only the least of their 
concerns. it would be a lu,ury. It is an insult, or naivct�, to suggest that ,uch J>O(lple be "aulhenlk" to 
themselves. 
Furthermore, while anyone may has•c an e,istentiol moment such a moment hardly defines that 
person's constant altilude to life unless !hey have a personality di,ordtr. Evett lh� mnst nthcistic person 
may hove, or oct au1omatkally according lo, o (vogue) faith in porticular beliefs, such os "'good is ilS own 
reward,'" ru,d even the most religious person may have "existential"" moments. 
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shame on behalf or players is to reproduce assumptions that gameplay is a shamerul activity. 
Nonetheless, the frequent disruption of a player's interest or flow may be seen in tenns of 
Tomkins' (1963) account of i;hame as an auxiliary affect. Schore (1994) not only cites Sartre 
in his account of shame, he situates Tomkins in relation to more recem theories, notably 
theories of "mis-attunemcnt" (Kohut, !974; Meares, 1992). "Mis-alluncmcnt" refers to when 
one experiences (the possibility of) a certain type of attentiveness or feedback, but finds it 
continually fruslmted. This does not require identity in tenns of what the two seek from the 
exchange; if one person likes to talk and the otl1er likes to listen we have an instance of 
attunement; if both people like to talk and neither likes to listen we have an instance of mis· 
attunement (see Tomkins, 1962, p. 411). In its mild fonn, the reductioa of a (potentially) 
positive affect sta� elicits Tomkins' (1963) definition of shame, with archaic resonances in 
early experiences of mis-attun,;:ment with primary caregivers. Ho wever, as Meares (1992) 
argues within the tradition of self psychology, mis-auunement und its related processes may, 
at their most systematic and extreme, lead to dissociative disorders, including borderline 
personality disorder, in which tl1e individual has not had the opportunity to develop an 
authentic sense of self (see Erikson, !950, 1968; Kohnt, 1971, 1977). 
The dysrcgulation of interest and flow discusseil in early chapters may be referred to 
as mis-attunement with the machine. or course, players may self-regulate the resulting affects 
of shame well enough, but shame may nonetheless constitute a significant aspect of !lie 
aesthetic experience. Indeed it is possible that the disjunctive qualities of gameplay may 
resonate with an awareness of the status of the computer as n medium and partner in play. 
While play is meant to be satisfying to the ego, the player may experience a gap, an 
emptines s, between him/herself and the computer as a fe!low agent in a grune. Computation, 
and computers in general, are coded ns nnt merely mathematical, but logical, as rationality 
deprived of emotion and morality, as cold, impersonal, and inhuman. If, for existentialists, the 
world is disenchanted, its focticity is analogous to scientific language: even if there is 
structure in the world, even if there is order in il, it is not mea,iingfill in that it holds no 
dignifying pince for the human. The player's position vis-a-vis the computer is, then, 
analogous to the existential indivitlual's position vis·n-vis a universe whose grim facticity, its 
impersonal order, has nn empathy for u�. TI1e computer is egoistically self.concerned, 
stubbornly disinterested in the wants of the player. Mis-attunement therefore may be 
experiencetl as a loss of meaning because the computer as an iahuman, dysfunctional 
opponent blocks empathy and creates a context in which our sease of self, or self-esteem, is 
diminished. In short, a sense of meaninglessness is linked to not merely !lie lowering of self· 
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esteem, but to the absence of empathy; a context in which one's ego is not even recognised. 
The player experiences the emptiness oflhis disavowal as shame in its most profound sense as 
a separation from a positive experience ofselfllood. 
Even when players do not experience any such sense of the emptiness of p!ay, some 
effort is required to reinvest in a state of interest, flow or joy from which one has been cut off. 
Indeed, it is difficult to emphasise how important this labour is to the experience ofp!ay, and 
in elaborating upon it we can find an analogy in what Sartre (1943/1993) ca!ls "anguish." For 
Sartre, anguish refers to the (presumably) familiar moment when we experience the salience 
of our choices, where our future hinges upon 3J\ action in a present separnte from the past (pp. 
30-33). Anguish i.
the recognition of a possibility as my possibility: that is, [anguish) is constituted 
when consciousness sees itself cut from its essence by nothingness or separated 
from the fmure by its very freedom. {p. 35) 
If anguish for S3J\re is a sense that the future is contingent upon our agency, this may be seen 
as analogous to the situation when a video game hangs in temporal suspension while awaiting 
player input, as occurs in most of the menus and navigation screens of FFX. It is ot that 
moment that one may feel isolated from the tomporal flow ofp!ay nnd forced into labour. A 
player may become overwhelmed by the one's awareness of the enormous scope of the game 
world and the necessity of rraversing this scope to satisfy an aesthetic of mastery or 
demystification. If, as the cover of the Playstntion Solutions issue dedicated to FFX suggests, 
players wish to; "Finish every Quest/Win every baule/Master every character/Learn every 
secret," they may feel a sense of incompleteness every time they miss a path they cannot 
return to, or have missed an item, or have failed and aborted a game. It is possible to speak of 
as an existential moment whenever the labour of p!ay reverberates upon oneself as a player, 
when we become aware of the Sisyphean task of wrestling joy from a machine. This is the 
moment when an attempt 10 involve the motor system in some supposedly me,>ningful or 
pleasurable activity in a play space gives way to demanding, pointless labour. 
This experience of shame and anguish may be linked to the experience of nausea. For 
Sartre {194311993), nausea is a consequence of a horrible realisation of the facticity and 
contingency of experience, its grim reality and emptiness. His claim that this is fundamental 
to other spet:ilic types of nausea, for example to spoiled meat, ignores physiological 
explanations for nausea, but these physiological exp!nnations may be adapted to account for 
an existential experience of gameplay, given the physiological !ink between shame and 
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nausea. As Schore (1994) observes, shame is linked to not only the parasympathetic nervous 
system, which arrests arousal and trigger,; partial paralysis of motor function, it is also linked 
to the onset of the vagus nerve, or vagal mtraint, which reduces the motility of the 
gastrointestinal tract, and produces the characteristic nausea a ssociated with shame. 
Nausea may also be seen as an independent affect, as is evident in the case of motion 
sickness, a category of venigo in which a mismatch between visual stimuli and motion in the 
vestibular canals of the middle car interrupts our sense of balance and creates nausea. This: 
begins with epiga,stric discomfort, often described as "stomach awareness," 
which is usually accompanied by increased salivation, eructation, and a feeling 
of bodily warmth. With sustained e�posurc to the triggering stimulus, gastric 
emptying i s  inhibited and symptoms progress to nausea, pallor, sweating and, 
eventually, vomiting or retching. (Gahlinger, 1999, 'I 2) 
What is important here is that: 
11Ctual movement of the body is not necessary to produce symptoms. Purely 
visual stimuli, such as those from flight simulators, video games, panoramic 
movies, or even the movement of slides under a microscope, can produce 
symptoms more effectively than does actual physical motion. ('13) 
The latter phenomenon has long been known in military simulators, where it is known as 
"simulator sickness." Its cause is held to be either the mismatch of v isual and vestibular cues, 
or too much strain being placed on the vestibular-ocular reflex, which governs 
s ynchronisation between eye and head movements. A distinct cause may be the stroboscopic 
effect oFthe interface which occurs when, for example, the monitor's refresh rare is too low. 
Postings to websites, which include amateur experimen!ation, are one anecdotal source of 
nauseous responses to video games (sec Solomon, 1998, 2000). Working from player 
accounts, the nausea in video games seems to have become prominent with the rise oFthe FPS 
Wolfeostein 3D. This experience was exacerbated by virtual reality goggles, in which case it 
sometimes elicited vomiting (Kushner, 2003, p. I 14), though a staff member at id Software, 
which designed the game, was known for routinely lying on the floor to recover from motion 
sickness from the PC interface (p. 150). 
In games like FFX, the absence of both first person perspective and accelerated 
motion minimises the chance of "simulator sickness." Nonethele ss, disparity in and between 
the perceptual, affective and cognitive dimensions or experience may be felt ns uncertainty 
about, for example, an event's or object's proximal or distal qualities, or, more broadly, its 
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"meaning" or significance. This ambiguous reality-status may be experienced us a kind of 
disorientation in the literal sense that we cannot properly orient ourselves towards the event or 
object. Even if we commit to an action tendency there may be a persistent feeling of unease 
that we are acting blindly, or wrongly, without fully understanding what is going on. That is, 
the disparity between visual and spatial cues for ren!ity-statns may produce an occasional 
disorientation, analogous (and arguably related) to the nauseous disequilibrium that results 
from disparities between visual and vestibular cues. Unless the perceptnal qualities of the 
interface addressed in Chapter Two are entirely attennated through habituation, it is possible 
that a minimal sense of ''an-reality" or disorientation persists as a background tone during 
gameplay. It can more confidently be stated that a more pronounced disorientation occurs 
during shif"ls between the dicgctic and non-dicgetic, when we pass from a state of immersion 
and re-orient ourselves to the world beyond. The moment when we become aware of having 
sat in the same spot for hours, of the demands of our forgotten body, and experience our re­
orientatien to non-diegetic space and time, clearly marks the passage from one state to 
another. 
Whether shame, simulator sickness, or the stroboscopic effect of flickering interfaces 
are causally distinct in the elicitation ofnansea is beside the point. Here we can suggest a way 
of linking together an emphasis on pre-meaning intensities, the dysregulation of interest and 
flow, the absence of empathy, and the coding of computation as meaningless. All these 
processes may be experientially linked as fractures in the Gestalt of play. If for Gestalt 
psychologists the absence of closure fractures the Gestalt impression of wholeness, and our 
search for closure is experienced as a search for meaning, then the sustained dysfunction of 
Gestalt ofplny may be felt as the suspension, frustration, or absence of meaning. The human, 
creative activity of the player is alienated and disavowed by the inhuman, logical machine. 
This is not merely some anxiety about the death or the Joss of self, it is a sense of the selffu!ly 
present to itself as a possibility, yet denied through the absence of another's (the computer's) 
empathy. This sense of non-being is, of course, not without meaning, since a player might say 
that the ''meaning" is that the game was unsatisfying; the point is that it is experienced as a 
Joss of {personal) meaning and value. 
It is pwsib!e that, in FFX, an� disorientation and/or loss of meaning will resonate with 
one's cognitive engagement with the narrative. Chapter Four observed several aporin which 
result from the uncer111in reality-status of cerlllin events and which are characteristic of the 
fantastic. In he� account of the fantastic, Jackson (1988) argues that figurations of physical 
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and psychic fragmentation parallel (or arc an effect of) social fragmentotion in secular, post­
Romamic, capi!nlist culture. These figurations ore subversive because they mark the margins 
of o dominant (ideological) reality or di!:<:ourse, thot which is unseen or unsaid, pointing 
towards the renlm of non-signification. What is notoble is that Jackson cites Sartre's 
categories of the "thetic" and "non-thetic" to emphosise the tension between meaning ond 
non-meaning that characterises the fantastic (p. 75). In short, for Jackson, the uncanny and the 
fnntostic hove on existential character. If we set aside Jackson's idoologicnl assertions about 
the subveisive quality of the fantastic, it can be argued that the disparity of some narrative 
information in FFX moy produce o sense of hesitating uncertainty or cognitive disorientation 
which complements both shameful ejection from a state or interest and nauseous 
disorientation produced by mixed perceptions of movement. Collectively, these processes 
may give rise to o pronounced existential quality or experience. 1
or course, if perceptual experiences of unreality may be oestheticolly recuperated 
through FFX's hermeneutic concern with (un)rcolity, then similarly an existential drama in 
ffX's murotive may aesthetically recuperate nny felt sense of meaninglessness. After all, 
Tidus is teleported-pcrhJps, in Heidegger's (1962) terms, "thrown"-into a chaotic world in 
which the (un)dead rule the living, who are threatened by the random destructiveness of Sin. 
Tidus finds it difficult to believe Spiro's acceptance of Sin's domination, but in guiding Yun a 
to defeat Sin he learns that he is leading her to her death ond must confront his own 
responsibility for her impending death. While Tidus helps to find o way to save Yuna, Tidus 
discovers that he was already dead. In repeating: "This is my story" several times, Tidus may 
be read 115 marking FFX as a bildungsroman: Tidus is a suffering individual, striving to assort 
his voice nnd his destiny, to find his pince, in o hostile world. Yet upon Tidus' death, Yuna 
takes up the phrase: "This is my story," such that his attempt to make sense of the world with 
himsolfat the centre of things is lost in the story of the freedom of Spira. 
Of course, o key ospcct of Sartre's (1943/1993) occount is that it is only by accepting 
our existentinl stnte nnd entering that mode of being he labels anguish that we open ourselves 
'We might reposition Saru-e ( l9431l!l!l3) by saying thol on "existenliol" expericneo may ref or to a variety 
of disjunctive stoics that may result from, or be linked to, a range of percepiuat, cognitive, cmotion.ol or 
sooio·hisioricnl factors. For example, we might disiinguish between: nn intclleetuol responso 10 event, 
which suggest a cruelly indifferent humanity and/or universe, such os 1ho bombing ofNngasnki; the 
emotion,! response of those who endure trauma (van der Kolk, McForlone & Woisoeth, 1996); the 
olienalion which results from our psyrhologicol sopomteness from others; che cullumlly speeif,c 
"a tie nation" "'-porienccd in copi!alist society; ond palhologieol exporicncos which find their ex1reme fonn 
in borderline person.olity disorder (BPD), in which a person doe, not feel like s/he owns or e�poriences on 
oulhentic senso of self (Meares, l 992). 
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to the dreadful freedom of choosing our world view, our way or life, and taking responsibility 
for the consequences (p. 553). Similarly, in E!:K, Tidus is forced to re-experience the brusis for 
his engagement with a seemingly chaotic world and relearns the reasons for co-operation, 
trust and loyalty which provide the foundation of morality. Even if we rend Tidus' upbeat 
personality as a kind of desperate happiness, or as a nervous manifestation of unhappiness, he 
does try to find courage and optimism in the face of what seems hopeless. Similarly, while 
Yuna is more introspective and maudlin, owing to her awareness of her impending death, she 
sees it as her duty to put on a brave and happy race for those of Spira, to offer them hope. The 
conversation between Tidus and Yuna outside Kilika presents the render with their united 
choice to laugh and find joy in the company of others. Both ultimately define their humanity 
by way of humour and moral action in the face of loss, death, tragedy and evil (compared with 
Seymour, who uses his dreadful freedom lO end the freedom of others). That is, Tidus' and 
Yunn's commitment to laughter and happiness is premised 11po11 loss, hopelessness, and 
impending death, and therefore has a kind of absurd or hysterical quality to it. The other 
Guardians certainly point this out to both of them, wondering if they have both not gone 
insane, 
Even if players do not interpret the game precisely in these ellistential terms, they may 
experience the game as a tragic romance that dramatises emotional states of hop'lllessness, 
resignation, uncertainty, loss, and sadnes�. In such a reading, the player's ellpcrience of 
shame, anguish and nausea/disorientation, may be experienced as a basis for empathy with 
Tidus' psychological state. Indeed, just as Tidus and Yuna use humour as a means of dealing 
with a harsh and indifferent world, the player may confront the meaningless, programmed 
machim>--or nny disjunctive affect experienced during play-through the use of conrnge and 
humour. That is, the player may define his/her humnnity as an attitude of courage and humour 
in the face of the computer as meaningless data and agency, which holds power over them, in 
the context of a supposedly ego-validating experience. As was noted in Chapter Eight, 
Aarseth (1997) has observed that the potential for absurd theatre in computer-generated 
narratives through "the possibility of unintentional sign behavior" (p. 124) has not gained 
much a';ademic attention or been systematically exploited by the gaming industry. However, 
playcr/;have. long regarded the happy, but accidental, convergence of output as a distinct 
aesthetic of gameplay, and there is a tradition of designers making in-game jokes about the 
limitations or the interrace. While FFX does not go out of its way to e;,;ploit self-reflexivity in 
this way, the use of humour by designers and players is one way in which players may 
240 
maintain the sense of interaction with the mm:hine, or computer-mediated communication, as 
an expressive, human act. 
Tow11rds Holistic Gnmepl11y 
For critics of video games, of course, the problem with video games is precisely that 
they are meaningful, but that their meanings arc ideological, in that they pelJ)Ctuate violent, 
sexist, and capitalist values, Following Stallabras' (1996) polemic, the most pervasive 
ideological contradiction in FFX may be its emphasis on the moral agency and responsibility 
of the individual. Underneath its supposed values of community, of sociality, of morality, of 
empathy, the individual player avoids sc.cial obligations by spending money on a video game 
console and game, sp ending ninety or more hours playing it alone, and dignifies this activity 
as a demonstration or empathy and a virtual proof of one's own moral disposition. The 
political activity of the public sphere is reduced to the individual's relationship with the 
g:iming interface as a simulation of intelJ)Cr:sonal communication. The narrative therefore 
legitimates and heroises the self in an ideological context in which the self is a mere consumer 
in acapitulist system premised upon inequality. 
While this is true enough at a certain level of description, it restages anxieties and 
assumptions about the influence of ideology inherited from the Althussu rean-Marxist 
tradition: that realism naturalises ideological content, and that interaction reinforces 
identification with chnmcters. This thesis has complemented recent reader-response based 
researeh (Consalvo, 1993; Hen, 1997; Frasca, 2003; Jenkins, 1987) by extending the critique 
of traditional notions of realism and identification. It has argued that reality-status is affected 
by various perceptual, cognitive and emotional processes, and may have a largely aesthetic 
function. It has a!so argued that identification must be seen mor e in terms of the player's 
cognitive work, and in relation to empathetic emotions, including those directed towards the 
player. 
Even if we accept that players of video games have. the same freedom that they have 
with other media to produce meaning (sec Frasca, 2003), it remains necessary to avoid the 
fallacy of meaning, espedully gi�),' that adventure and role-playing games are valued in 
literary or artistic terms (Aarseth, 1997, Buckles, 1985, 1987; Kelley, 1993; Randall, 1988; 
Ziegfield, 1989). Players certainly make sense of FFX, but this "making sense" is not the 
same as the te�t's "meaning." To presume that players "find meaning" in the sense ofa clear 
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interpretation may misrepresent the experience of play because meaning so metimes may be 
subordinate to strategic activity andfor emotional experience. In Morley's (1980) terms the 
"meaning" of many texts may be irrelevant to an audience {or players) (see also Jenkins, 
1992: Morley, 1992: Tulloch & Jenkins, 1995). Play is often nn end in itself, not merely a 
, conveyor of meanings, or a cause for a secondary experience. This is not to argue that the 
practice of play cannot, or should not, be seen in semiotic, narratological, ideok,gical or 
discursive tenns. The issue is that some players may not bother to construct much or nny 
meaning at all, except 11S a retrospective reading fonnation, and their aesthetic evaluation may 
be in tenns of enjoyment or boredom. Any ideological cognition therefore may be dependant 
upon whether or not the game successfully met their preferred uses andfor gratifications. In 
more precise terms, the p[ayn's defence of his or her labour will likely affect any evaluation 
of the game. 
The importance of a player's emotional experience to his/her evaluation or meaning of 
a game may be addressed by way of terms of Tomkins' notion of "affect grouping." For 
Tomkins (1962, 1963, 1991) and Nathanson (1992), reemring stimulus-affect-response 
sequences are called "scenes," and become grouped in terms of similarity of source, affect, 
and response (Nathanson, 1992, p. 246). Stem (1985) refers to these groups of scenes 11S 
"Representations oflnteractions that have been Generalized," or RIGs, (p. 97). These scenes, 
or RIGs, are not memories of particular experiences, but "the summation and integration of a 
hos! of el\periences" {Nathanson, 1992, p. 246), which al!ow the individual to select an 
appropriate script for action. However, what is imponant is that: 
Whenever the organism is able to form such groupings, the group itself 
becomes an entity that is now capable of triggering affect. ... [f]his affect 
magnifies everything within the group. {p. 246) 
Affect grouping can be seen as a theory of emotional stereotyping whose dynamics depends 
upon na rcissistic and anaclitic transfer. This model may be applied to either people, 
characters, games or genres to account for not only the tendency to evaluate complex 
impressions in general tenns ("I liked it" or "I hated it") but also more subtle relationships 
between emotion and meaning. 
If we apply the concept of affect grouping to real or fi ctiomtl people it is evident tl,at a 
positive high valance towards a loved person will lead to a generalised positive valance being 
extended to all that person's characteristics, including those that W'e non-average or 
unattractive, such as a dark mole, a protruding stomach, wide-eyes, ond wide-teeth. This 
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generalised assignment of emotion may require, or be raciHrnted by, a conscious resolution, 
the cognitive fonn of whicl: ,night be: ''you have tl,al, which I don't like, but, after all, I 1,we 
you, and so in fact I really love this, and therefore, o/1 of you." Since this labour, or 
investment, is undergone in relation to another person, a re/ariom/Jip is fonned which our 
homeostntie drive will try to preserve: "Through my acceptnnce or your imperfections I've 
invested in you and shared something special (my act of love), so how can I give up on you 
now?" This may be governed by some anxiety that the act of investment (of love, of the equal 
acceptance of one's own flaws) will not be rewarded {with reciprocal love). 
Rejected love, of course, involves an undesirable shame, and the denial of the 
possibi/iry of such shame may give rise to a frantic effort to preserve one's charitable 
in)(estrnent, to maximise the significance of one's act of love as deserving reward. Previously 
non-ideal characteristics may, subsequently, become signs of the act of investment, of the love 
ru; acceptance, us a charitable act which {being compussionate}, seems to make oneself 
lovable. We might subsequently think: "how could you not love me, after I've made the effort 
of overlooking your imperfections?" Indeed, by taking on the role of defender of the other's 
imperfections, one has acud 0111 an action tendency of protectiveness ('1ust imagine how 
mhers might criticise you for those imperfections"). "The imperfect characteristics may come 
to function anaclitica!ly, through a metonymic transfer of desire, not just as individual 
desirable qualities ("you are this particular lhing, not that genera! type") but to a plenitude of 
them that exceeds the unity of any imago: ("I desire this, and that, and that-all these things 
about you!"). At the same time, magnification of the entire constellation of signs, the 
"grouping" of the person's characteristics as part of u total "chnracter," may make them 
cohere emotionally. 
These processes are particularly relevant to nurrative macrostructuros in which 
characters are developed in complex ways. Chapter Seven argued that prolonged cognitive 
identification of chnracters constitutes an investment that raises the stakes for empathetic 
emotions. This is espccinlly significant when one is cued to judge characters a certain way 
only !O:� later offered disclosures tl1at render such judgments inappropriate, as is the case
with the' Al Bhed and and Jecht. If players develop negative arousal towards a chnracter, any 
shame, guilt or other emotional response to the initial misjudgment becomes part of tl1e 
history of their relationship to the chnracter, increasing the arousal that is redirected to, or re­
grouped around, the charnctcr. Conversely, the process of affect grouping in response to re­
typing may occur with negative emotions, as is the case with Seymour. While players may 
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never completely trust Seymour, they may admire him as an ideal ego or cgo·ideal, and 
perhaps even as a super-ego, given that his proposed union with Yuna for the sake of Spira 
may connote a shared commitment towards civic duty. Given the ambivalence or his trailing, 
the positive investment in Seymour likely will be accompanied by cognitive dissonance, 
which will make him a more emotionally interesting character. However, when he betrays 
Tidns he also betrays the player's greater emotional invci;tment in him, and the excess of 
emotion will 'streng!hen the player's tendency to polarise negative cognitive and emotional 
closure around him. In this respect an opponent who initially self-presents as good but then 
betrays the player's trust may elicit more anger than a character who is evil from the outset. 
Complel'. characters, then, require greater cognitive and emotional investment, and are 
more emotionally engaging. The implication is that the disjunctio11 betwee1  narrative nnd 
game mncrostructures, nnd the tension between the dual narrative and game coding of 
characters, may make gameplay more emotionally engaging. As Chapter Eight argued, the 
disjunctive qualities of video game characters may be exploited for aesthetic reasons, and may 
even be perceived as personable. Here we can add that affect grouping may mean that 
gamep!ay is given a Gestalt impres ion of coherence, during play and/or retrospectively. For 
ex�ple, plnyers may determine whether a particular game or gaming experience is 
aes1hetica1ly akin to other games in the genre by simply identifying a match-mismatch 
bet�ccn immediate experience and an existing script. For example, if a p!nyer likes CRPGs 
but dislikes FFX, one may not only fee! that FFX is a failed CRPG, one may feel a kind of 
amplified emotional betrayal of one's history of investment in the genre. In broader tenns, it 
is through the operation or scripts that players retrospectively assign a genera! valance to a 
game irrespective of the actual conflicted emotions or ambivalence experienced during play. 
A game that was experienced as enormously frustracing may be re-evaluated in positive terms 
to mailltain one's pooitive attitude towards the genre to which it belongs, and players may 
generalise from one or more (idealised) sessions or elements of the gwne to the rest of their 
gaming experience, or the rest or their valuation of a genre. 
This may be seen in terms of some generalised cases. For example, a player may 
believe that: "I play CRPGs; I enjoy CRPGs; therefore CRPGs ore good." This belief raises 
the stakes for a negative valuation ofFFX. For oxomple, if: "CRPGs are good, and FFX is an 
CRPG .•. but FFX is awful," 1hen one has a problem. If another gamer says: "I played a 
CRPG, I hated it, and CRPGs ore awful," the player may foci the need to reconcile his view 
with the other person's. Closure may be achieved by means of !he fallacy of pelitlr, principil, 
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or circular logic, once used to justify the inclusion of "literary" texts imo the canon of 
"literature": "CRPGs are good because they facilitate 'imagination'; this is evident in that, by 
playing them, my 'imaginntion' is stimulated; nnyone who docs not hke the game is 
'unimaginative,' and therefore my intellectual or artistic inferior." However, some players 
may respond to the claims of dissalisfied players using more benign reasoning, such as; "they 
did not understand the game because they have not spent enough time investing in it to 
recognise its value; that is why they did not enjoy it and why they are not in a position to 
judge the genre." An even more benign de reuse would simply 1:e to acknowledging one's own 
experience or subjective preference as the source of justification: "I've played the game for 
y ears und have fond r;m mies ofit; that is why it is good (for me)." 
The importance of a history of investment or labour in the production of a reading 
fonnat:on may be linked to the formation of community through a final analogy to 
existentialism. The e�rience of online communities in massively multiplayer Online role­
playing games, such as Ultima Online {1997), Eve,Qu�st (2000), and park Age of Camelot 
{2001), is promised upon, or reinforced by, a realisation of shared vulnerability to the whims 
of the network. During play one experiences mnny frustrations: hours spent (or Wa!>ted) 
installing, patching a11d re-patching tl1e gnme (or patching the pntches, in some cases); hours 
spent puichnsing and installing the appropriate new hardware; being subjected to inexplicable 
Ing, or being kicked oITa network in the middle of a game; and, in EverQues!, dying, running 
across half the continent to fetch one's corpse and invento1y items, only tr die agnin. Until 
one has experienced and dealt wilh this l�bour-unti! one has factored in suffering as part of 
th� aesthetic cxpcriencc--nntil one has !corned to sdf-regulate oneselr during gameplay­
until one hns found a way to wrestle joy from such an indifferent machine/network-one has 
not truly entered the game community. Thnt is, confronting the existential exp..�.ence of the 
machine in isolation is the rite of passage which facilitates one's sense of connection to other,; 
on line; we empathise with a shored conditio11 of dealing with the inhuman context of human 
ploy, and use this sense of connection as our basis for evaluating the game as a whole. The 
same may be said in regards to most video games, including FFX, in that the shared 
investment in the labour of piny not only guides our evaluation of play, it n!so constitutes a 
basis for a recognition of another player's suffering. Indeed, the fan community of video 
games may sometimes have less to do with shm-ed pleasure than with shared auempts to cope 
with its absence. 
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Within this framework, naturalisation need not always be seen in ideological lenns of 
nonnalising or recuperating potcmially subversive impulses and placir,g them within a 
socially conservative fonn. The preferences of players may be motivated by a personal desire 
!o defend one's investment in a fonn of leisure, albeit a defence that may often appropriate
ideological associations. The ideolozical function of naturalisation therefore may be seen as a
secondary effect, or a special instance, of the equilibration of the individual to his/her
environment. In such a framework it is possible to engage in ethnographic work that relates 
players' experiences to not only broader social fonnations such as class, gender and race, but 
also to personality types and scripts. 
Conclusion 
While game designers like Freeman (2003) eschew "theory," an und�rstHnding of the 
psychological principles that determine how fictions and games are experienced opens up new 
possibilities in the creative use of video games as an expressive medium. Throughout this 
thesis it has been argued that, while gumeplay may be a hybrid process, its elements gain 
coherence and interweave through the cognitive and emotional activity for the player. The 
regulation of meaning and emotion has been seen as something that occurs not before and 
after gameplay, but during it, and the supposed limitations of the medium may become purl of 
the aesthetic practice as elements of a holistic medium, genre, game, or experience. These 
processes are not reducible to vulgar accounts of"realism," "identification," or "immersion." 
If, as Murray {!997) has argued, certain types of game structures may complement the 
characteristics of the computer as a medium, in FFX narrative and game macrostructures 
exploit the characteristics of the medium. Notably, an hermeneutic emphasis on reality and 
tragedy may aesthetically recuperate the disjunctive experience of gamcplny. 
Lastly, while there is a definite need for ethnographic and other empirical research to 
counter decontextualised claims about the "effects" of video games, there is still a need for 
analyses of the structure of the texts themselves. The twenty-five-year head start of the 
industry means that, in reaching back through the history of the medium, we also have an 
opportunity to reach back through the history of theory. While theories such as semiotics and 
structuralism have !imitations, they promote attentiveness to textual fonnations rhat may 
sensitise us to the potential subtlety of meaning in general as we!l as distinctions in and 
between player discourses produced during ethnographic research. At the s11me time, 
cognitive prychology and recent theories of emotion are highly sensitive to non·textual 
246 
processes, and self psychology and other therapeutic traditions offer a means or better 
understanding the expericm;c of play. lndividua!ly, and in conjunction, these theories can only 
enrich our understanding of the dynamics of video gameplay. Indeed, if gameplay is about 
making choices, so too is cultural analysis. By taking advantage of seemingly disparate 
disciplines we may be inn better position to appreciate the complex choices that determine 
the meaning of human experience. 
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Ap(>Cndix One - Key Evenls in FI.")( 
The following is a list of the key scuings and events in FFX. Setting numbers match those in 
Squarcsofts's Final Fantasy X: The Official Strategy Gulde {2002). but the events {or scenes) 
identified are not exhaustive. The sheer length and breadth. of the game means that only key 
events nnd characters are referred to, in addition \O particular events mentioned in the body of 
the thesis. However. the setting numbers mnt<:h those listed in Chapter Three nnd Appendi� 
Two. 
s,uin faent 
L Z:ma,kond ,. Tille sequence. ,. A mys1eriou., ghost boy oppc"rs nnd dis:ippears ns Tidus meets his young 
fans. ,. Tidus walks the Causeway io the blilZboll game. p,ssing the image of his 
fo1hor. ' Sin nuncks the bli!Zboll game. ,. Tjdu.s mcel-' Auron, who lcsds him lhrough a series of running bottles to Sin. 
On the wayTidus 1alks to the ghost boy nnd lights BOSS: Sinspnwn Ammos ,. Tidu.s is tele=rtcd bu Sin. 
2. Submerged ,. Tidus explores lhc ruins. 
Ruins ,. BOSS: G<o,gaeno. ,. Tidus makes a fire and resl-'. ,. Tidus dreams. ,. BOSS: Click. • Tidus is he]-·". and then token. bv a mv.slerious irl and other stranocrs . 
l. Solvoge Ship ,. Tidus is taken aboard o solvagc ship and talks to lhe girl. ' Solvogc operation for the Airship. ' BOSS: Tros. ,. !look on 1he ship Tidus' talks to Rikku and learns that he hos been 
telcportcd 1000 years into the fu!urc. ,. Sina "and Tidus is tele0orted a0ain. 
�. Bcsaid ,. Tidus appears in lb ,·,.,c,by Besaid beach. He meeis Wakka,, member of 
the local blit?.0•11 team: the Bcsaid Aurochs. ,. Tidus follows Wakka ,u !lc,aid Village. He talks to the Crusaders then 
some of 1he monks at Iles,i'd Temple. ' Tidussl<eps and dreams. ,. Tidu., awa\en,. goes lo Bes, id Temple. ond enters lhe Hall of Trials. ' First Trial 1>flhc Fayth. ' Tjdu., colchos up with Wokko ond learns more aboul the Summoning. ,. Tidus watches Yuna summon the ,\con Valefor, and then rnr1, with her. " Tidus sleeps and dreams. ,. Tidu, awakens. talks to Wokka. and receive., Chappu's (Wnkka's brother's) 
Bro1herhood S>1or,J, "· Tidus and lhe olhers depart the sill age. f;ghting a Flan. ... Krnmhri Ronso altacks Tidus. but Yuna intervenes. " Tidus and the no hers reach lhe boat on lhc beach. 
5. S.S.Liki. ,. Tidus rnlks 10 Wakka and learn, 1he ,coson for Yuna•s ,oyngc. ,. TidU-s mool-' the trader O"ob.. ' Sin hoods lowwis Kiliko. and lhc crew of the S. S. Liki try to distract him. ' BOSS: Sin, ' I!OSS: Sinspown EchuHles. 
0. Sin �estro ., Kilika. 
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(,. Kilil.a ,. Yuna perfomts a Sending ceremony for the dead. ' The Guordions head for!he Temple. through 1he woods. 
3 BOSS: Lord Ochu. ' BOSS: Sinspawn Gencou�. ,. The Guordiar,s rcru:h lhe Kiliko Temple and meet the Summoner Dona. 
•• Second Trial of1he Foyth . ,. Tidus 10\ks to Lulu and Wokka. •• Yuno a ars. now able to summon the A<,on Jrrit. 
7. S.S.Winno ,. Tidus 1alks 10 O'ako. ,. TidlL< listens in on Lulu oud Wakka"s conversntion. 
3. Tidus sees 1hc bliuball ond tries to perform 1he Jccht Shot, blocking ou! Tid 
'ba d memories' of Jecht. ' Tidus talks to Yuno. 
S. Luco ,. Amval ot Luca. 
1. Seymour disembarks. ,. Tidus visiJ,; the lrn:ker room, of 1he Besa id Aurrn:hs. ,. Blitaball cu1orial. ' Tidus C>plores 1he city, looking for Au,on ond lhe others. 
•• Tidus see, Kinahri"s cnnfrontotion with his Ronso kin, Biron and Kenkc. ,. Tidu,; learns tlrnl 1he Al Bhed Sikes have kidnapl)Cd Yun., and are 
demanding that the Besoid Aurochs lose the gome. 
•• Wakko ploys in the bliuboll g,,mewhilcTidu.,ond the others try to save 
Yuna. ,. BOSS: Obliucrotor. 
rn. Afier rescuing Yuno, Tidu., return• to the locker room. 
11. The firs1 player-controlled blitab,U game. "· Tidus meet, up with Aumn. Fiends atto<:k the Luca S1adium and 1he 
Guardian"• auock them. " Seymour'; Aeon Anima apJICO<S and def"'LS the remaining Fiends. "· Aumn offers to become a Guordion for Yuna. 
15. Tidus talks to Yun., and they promise to keep their spirits up for the s:ike or 
1he others. 
9. Mi'ihen ,. Th� Guardians store ,cross the Mi"ihen highroad. 
High mad ,. Bolgemine challenges Yun, lo duol with her Aeons. ,. The Guardian., reoch and sleep ol Rin's Travel Agency. ,. Tidus interrupts Yuna"s relleclion and they talk. ' BOSS: Chocobo E:ucr. 
JO.Mn,hroom ' The Guardian, continue 1ill they reach the gate tD Mushroom Rock Road, 
Rock Road bul it is blocked. ' Seymour arrives and lel, the Guordion.s through. ,. The Guardians learn of "Operation Mi"ihen'. on ottcmp! !O defeat Sin 
using Mochina forbidden by the Laws of Yevon. ,. The Guardians enter the Headquarters and prepare for bat!le. ,. noss, Sinspawn GuL 
•• Yuno helps defeat another Sin,p,wn Gui. , . Sin auack.s. • Tidus wakes up and we, the dcvoslnlion. Sin pres,nts himself lo Tidus. 
who acknowledge, him as his fnl�er, Jecht. ' Tidus talks to Aumn and Kinoc. 
ll. Djose ,. The Guardians lrovcl the Djose l!ighroa d and eventually reach lhe Djose 
Temple, where they moot the Summoner lsaaru. ,. Third Trial of the Fayth. ,. Tidus talks to Aumn, lhen Yuna orrises, now able to cost the Aeon bion. ,. The party rcsLS at the hutel outside the Temple. ' T1dus hos le wake Yuna. then lhc 011·· tcnvcs. 
'" 
12. Muonllnw ,. The Guardians mecl Shchnda. ' Bi ran and Kclke make fun of Kimohri. ,. Belgcmino challenges Yuno again. ,. The characters take the Shoopuff across 1he MoonOow River. underneath 
which is a ruined cily. ,. The Al Bhcd lrY lo kidnap Yuno again. ,. DOSS: Elmoclor. ,. The Guardians reach the other side of the Mconaow aod see the pyre me.s. ,. Rikku ,0-,rs and is asked 10 "oin the nroun. 
13. G:o,dusalam ,. The Guardino., enler Guodosalnm. ,. The Gu,rdians enter Seymour·, mansion, and Seymour meets with Yuno. ,. Tidus arid the olhers (e,eepl Auron) enler !he Farplane. ,. The Farplone.Aeon or Lord Jyscal lhrows a recording Sphere 10 Yuna. ,. Tidus 1.alks m Yuna arid learns or Seymour's proposal. ,. Tidu., talks lO Shdinda. !hen enters lhe Thunder Plains. 
14. Thunder ,. Lightning Boll Dodging mini.game. 
Plains ,. ThG characters meel Shelinda again. ,. Rikku become, terrified of !he lightning storm. ,. The Guardians slay al Rin"s Travel Agency. ,. Yun, acl5 detached nnd denresscd. 
!5.La"' ,. Thechar.ctcrs walk lhrough Macalonio Woods. 
Macal,nio ,. Buttcrny Caiching minj.game. ' The charmers m .. t o·ab ngnin. ' Auron w,m, to show 1he group u magical spring. ,. BOSS: Spherlmorph, ,. The Guonlians reach another hDtel. ,. The Al B11ed kidnap Yuna. • BOSS: Crawler, Negator • ,. Charmers must continue on 10 Macalania Temple.'°· Beforcenlcring l heTemp!e. Yun, mu;t tolk 10 Seymour. "· Tidu., ,cos the me,soge on Lord Jyscal', Sphere and learns that Seymour 
killed hLs father. "· BOSS: Seymour, Seymour Guardians. "· Fourth Trial or the Foyth. "· Trommcl, Seymour's aide, accuses the Guardians of treachery for killing 
Seymour. "· Seymour·., guard.schasc the Guardian< fmm the Temple. " The Gu,rdians cs,:ope across Like Mocalonia. "· DOSS: Wendigo/Guado Guardian. ... Sia appears, and the Guardians foll beneath the ice of Like Maealania . "· The Guardians are tele=r(cd bv Sin. 
16. Sanuhjo ,. Tidus find, himselralone i111he desert A Zu aua,ks him, whereupon Lulu 
Desert and Aumn aprear and help him. ,. The Guardians e,plurc th,: desert and find Wakko, Kim•hri. and Ril:ku. ,. Rikku leads thechw•c�rs lo 1hc Al Bhcd home. 
:7.AIBhed ' The Al llhed home ;, attacked. 
Hume ,. The GuarJ,oos look for Yuna. They find Dona, nnd learn that the Al Bhod 
simply wanted !ll protect the Summoners. However, Seymour has 
reappeored and kjdn,ppcd Yun,. ,. The characler, climb on!<> !he now restored Airship 1ha! was salvaged 
earlier. The Airship carries them lo safety as lhe Al Bhcd home is 
desim,ed. 
18. Airship .. Tidu, tolks to Cid, the leader or lhe Al Bhcd (and Yuno's father). ond 
c,plmes 1he Airship. ,. Th< airship heads towards Bevelle. whore Yuoo is being held. ,. BOSS: faroe. ,. Th< Guordiansjump from the Airship to save Yuna, who isaboul lo be 
forcibl• married 10 Se•mnur. 
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19. Bevelle ,. Mullipteencounlers wilh warrior monies and robolS. ' Yunoe,capcs Seymour. ,. Tidus cnlm the fifth Tri,t of1he Foy1h. ,. Tidus meets up with lheothcrs. Yun, now is able to summon lhe Aeon 
Bohomu1. ,. The Guardians are orrested and taken before all the Maesters: Seymour. 
Kinoc, Mika, and Kelk Ron.so. 
•• While imprisoned. Auron tells Tidus of the Spiral of Death. in which the 
undead Maesters rule the living and preserve the l)OWOr of Sin. ,. The Guordjon, a,e scntenwl to the Via Purifico, n lobyrinthine dungeon. 
•• Yuna looks for, and fimls, her Guardian� In the v;, Purifico . ,. The Guardians arc confronted by ls.1nru. who obeys the Maeste.rs ond u;es 
to prevent them cscap;ng. 
rn. BOSS: l.saaru"s Aeons. 
n. BOSS: Evrae Altana. "· BOSS: Seymour Nntus, Mor1ibody. "· The Guordions esca=. 
20. Macalanio ,. The Guordians conlinuc Uicir journey through Maoalonjo Woods. 
weoo, ,. Tidus leaves the campsite to look for Ynna. The two e,prcss lheir !ove for 
each other. 
21.ColmLands ,. The Guardians entire the broad, gro,;sy expanse of Ilic Calm Lands. ' Maechen ond Rin can be reached ;n different nrcos of the Calm Lands. ' Chocobo Racing mini·games· Wobbly Chocobo, Dodger Chocobo. Hyper 
Dodger Chocobo. and Catcher Chocol>o. ,. The Guardians can now access the Monster Arena. ,. Bclgcmjne. who waits jn her Temple, offers a r..ul challenge to Yuna. •• The Guardians enter Uie Temple of lho Lost Foyth. Here Lulu lost her 
previous Summoner. Lady Oinnem. ,. BOSS: L1dy Ginnem. " After defeating Lady Ginnom, Ynn• is able to acquire ll,e Aeon Yojimbo. ,. A5 the Guardians leave the Calm Lnnds the come JlCross one of Seymour's 
guards. 
w. BOSS: Defender X. 
22. Mt. Gagazct ,. The Guardians meet the Ronso ond talk to the High Priest Kelk Ronso. ,. Biranand Yenke challenge Kimahri, who mustclefenc them alone. ' BOSS: Biron Ron.so, Yenke Ronso ,. The Guordians then mus,' make Uie long journey o!ong the snowy palhs of 
,. Mt. Go�a,et. At the summit. Seymour confronts !he party and reveals thot he has killed 
oil the Ronso. ' BOSS: Seymour Flu,. w·a, Mortiorchi s. ' Ul)On entering the ne>t mea. Tidus has a waking.dream in whkh he learns 
that he is merely on A<l'n, part of Uie Urea! Summoning that preserves 
.. the memory of long·�,acl 2:inarkond, ond all its citi,ens. The Guardians must pass lhrough lhe caves of Mt. Gaga>el and pass the 
Trial., within. ' BOSS: Sanctua-· Kee er. 
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23. Zunorbnd ' The Guardians camp on lhe outskirts or 2"narkand (lhis is where the litlc 
sequence began). ,. The Guardians cnlcr Zanarknnd city, walking along the old Highway. ,. Sin presents himself lo Tidus. ,. The Guardians em« 1he Yevon Dorne. Aeons r,11 the air. like ghosts. ,. The Guardians past a ghost-scene from Seyrnmrr's youth. ,. Tidus must complete the last Triol of the Fayth. ,. BOSS: Spectral Keeper, 
•• The characters me<! Yun,lesca, Yun.t's mother, and must choose which 
one of them will be sacrificed to become the ne�tFinal Aeon. Tidus realises 
that hi, Father made the lost sacrifice and hns become 1hc Final Aeon that 
must be killed if Sin is 10 be pennanendy vanquished. The charo,tern 
challenge Yunalesca. ,. BOSS: Yunolcsca. 
24. Air,hip ,. The Guardians ore picked up by the Air,hip. ,. Tidus tnll<s to Yuno ond lc;,rns that they have to try to tnlk co Macster Mika 
to discover how to defeat Sin. However. Mike dispcrSeS in!O nothingness 
upon lcaming of Yun alesca's defeat. ,. The player may choose lo revisit and e,;plore the earlier sections of the 
0ome, and ma'· lo oc0uire the other Aeons. Anlma ond !he Ma us Sisler,. 
25. Sin ,. Sin is ap proached vio the airship ond fought in several Singes: ,. BOSS: Sin's Fins. ,. BOSS: SinspawnGonois. ,. BOSS: Sin. ,. Once Sin is crippled the Guardians must ny inside him 10 battle Yu Yevon. 
They walk through 1he mist-like Soo. or Sorrow, where Seymour confronts 
them again. ,. BOSS; Seymour Omni,. ,. After dcfe:uing Seymour, the Guardians enter the City of Dying Dreams. 
At • tower in the middle of che city t� ,y nre teleported into a surreal 
landscape where Tidus must dodge icicles and eolloct ten items. Having 
eollect ed these, !he Guardians are telcported into 1he Ruins of the old 
Zanarkand hli1Zball s1,dium. 
•• After mo.king final preparations, Tidus is free to walk over and talk lo his 
fa1her. After the conversation. focht is drawn back until he falls over the 
edge or the stadium. He then reappears as Bra<ko', Final Aeon. ' BOSS: Braska's Fino! Aoon. '"· Arter �efeating Br:u;ko"s Final Aoon the characters arc tclcponcd onto the 
sword that Braska"> Final Aeon wielded, which floats in a sky or elemental 
abandon. Yu Yevon flies back and forth in the form of n fireball as Yuna 
summons her Aeons, which must be defeated Hoving done this, Yu Yevon 
app,cars in his true form. "· BOSS: Yu Yevon. "· After Yu Ycvon'• derea1. Auron and Tidus both disappear, along with oil 
the other Aeons chat were part or the Great Summoning. " There is a final cut·scenc in which Yuna addresses the ci1i.ens of Spira 
in 1he blitzb,U stadium at Luca. 
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AppendiK Two -Breakdown of Opening Sequences ofFFX 
The following is a breakdown or the title sequence and the opening sequences at Zanarkand 
and the Underwmcr Ruins. Scuing and scene leaers and numbers match those in Appendi� 
One, with aclditional numbers to nominate leKies that arc referred to in Chapter Three 
(hence I.I.I forZanarkand, opening sequence. opening shot). 
SE'ITING I -ZANARKAND 
Scene I -Title sequence 
I Close up of bladed swords and other weapons planted in a group against n ruined 
background. 
Z Pan across the characters (Tic!..ls, Rikku, Auron, Lulu, Kimahri and Yuna) camped 
llIOUnd a tire, seemingly eKhausted or sad. 
3 Tidus places a gloved (black) hand on Yuna, who seems to respond sympathetically. 
4 Tidus walks off alone, flashes of light in the background liko somo cosmic battle. 
5 Tidus' voice over: "Listen to my story. This may be our Inst chance" 
6 Title: "Final Fan!asy X." 
7 Fude to black. 
Scene Z- M11etil1g the Fans 
I Party scene and music by neon pillar. People run off screen. A boy appears from 
nowhere, like a ghost, and follows them. 
Z Tidus' (yellow) boots approach; he greets his fans. (fhe player briefly, and 
intenniucntly, takes over control of him, guiding him to particular fans.) 
3 Tidus signs n few blitzballs. 
4 Young boy: "Good luck tonight." 
Tidus: "Nothing to worry nbout." 
5 Tidus speaks casually to his fans ('"No prob!" "All right!"). He promises to make a 
sign when he scores to show the kids "it's for you." 
6 The children ask Tidus to tench them blitzball. He promises to do so but the ghost l>oy 
warns: '"Not tonight," and Tidus acqmesces: "You're right. Tomorrow. I promise." 
7 The children offer a solemn, blitzball bow, which Tidus returns, then departs. 
Scene 3-The Lonely Road of the Cclcbrily/Hero 
I Panoramic shot ofZanarkand: n futuristic city. 
Z Imago of Jccht on the side of one of the lurger buildings, looking down. 
3 Tidus walks down lhe road. 
4 A voice over reminisces ubout Jecht, who disappeared, then mentions the up.coming 
game und "Jechl's blood." 
5 The player guides Tidus along the Causeway. If he is directed to talk lo passers-by 
they variously say that they support him or that he better win. Tidus is guided over a 
rise in the road towards a spectacular background ofZanarkand 
Scene 4 -The Gnmefl'he Coming of Sin 
I High shot of Tidus walking through the crowd towards what appears to be an 
enormous mirror, force tield, or wall of water. 
Z Tidus lies in wait before the game in a lxuh, with water-reflected light playing over 
him. 
J He enter:: into the spectacle of the stadium (high, panning view). A rock and roll song 
plnys over the top: "Don't give up ... If you wam it! (etc)" 
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4 We sec Auron standing atop a high beam. A dome of water rises from the sea. Auron 
approaches. 
5 Two b!itzball players slap hands. Tidus lei,ps out of the top of the b!itzball dome, 
kicks a bull, then (upside down) sees the �,:proaching dome of water. Fireballs 
approach, then strike and create devastation. Tidus grabs an overhanging strut, looks 
at the chaos below, t11en falls. 
6 A ash to while. 
Scene 5 -Battle on the Ruined Road 
I Shot of the "broken mirror." 
2 Tidus approaches Auron, who waits to one side. 
Tidus: "What arc you doing hero?" 
Auron: "I was waiting for you." 
3 We sec the road in chaos; the city floods and bum; in the background, overwhelmed 
by the elements. Suddenly Tidus sees the ghost-boy. Tidus looks around and sees that 
time is frozen. 
Boy: "!t begins." 
Tidus: "WhnT' 
Boy: '"Don"t cry." 
Time returns to nonnal, the boy is gone. 
4 Tidus reaches Auron and sccs the globe of Sin suspended in the air. 
Auron: '"We called it 'Sin'," 
Sinscales strike the buildings; smaller ones land on the road in shells and then open up 
to reveal insect-like monsters. 
5 Auron: (gives Tidus a sword] "Take it. A gift from Jecht. l hope you know how to use 
it.'' 
6 Running battles with the Sinscales which only require selection of the '"Attack" menu 
option. 
7 Sinspawn Ammcs stands in the way like a giant crus!acean with glowing lights on its 
tentacles. During the battle, text infonnation for the player about Overdrives appears. 
The player's first use of Overdrive oer.urs in this battle. The player is likely to need to 
use a healing potion by accessing the "Item" menu option. Sinspawn Ammcs explodes 
when killed. Tidus then passes the first Save Point. 
8 Tidus passes the image of Jccht again. ("What arc you laughing at o!d man?") 
9 A forest ofSinscales lands around them. During the battle Auron says that they should 
attack a nearby machine. When it is destroyed there is an explosion, and the bridge 
collapses in flames, freeing them. 
10 Tidusjumps imo space and just catches on. As Tidus hands there, Auron looks down, 
with his greying hair, dark glasses, monkish robes, scarred eye. 
Auron: "This i� it. This is your story. It a!l begins here." 
11 Tidus is sucked inside of Sin. 
Scene 6-The Dream City 
I Whiteness. A voice: '"Hey!" 
2 Tidus floats in the night sky over Zanarkand. When the player moves the controls 
Tidus swim as if through water. The city is brightly lit but deserted. 
3 Tidus can only swim down towards a platform on which stands a figure. It turns out to 
he a young boy. 
4 Tidus: '"I fell light-headed, then sleepy. I think I had a dream. A c!.cam of being 
alone," 
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SETI'ING 2-THE UNDERWATER RUINS 
Scene 7- "Lost in the Ocean Ruins: Geosgaeno" 
1 Tidus is alone in the ruins, excepl for a bird. He calls oul and Che bird flies away. 
2 The player guides Tidus lhrough the underwater ruins. 
3 Tidus passes J pillar upon which is wriling thac he cannot read. 
4 The player i;uidcs Tidus along a long, narrow walkway over the water. To one side is 
a walkway that leads co a chest containing a Hi-Potion. 
5 Tidus spots somelhing moving underwater. The bridge collaps�s. Three weird, over­
sized fish mtack Tidus. 
6 After killing two of chese fish, Geosgeano appears. Tidus gets in two slrlkes before 
Gcosgaeno tries to swallow him, and Chen he escapes to !he ruins. 
7 Tidus walks inlo the ruins.("[ thought I was going co die in this place.") 
8 Light flashes, like lightning, revealinr. a stntuc of what seems a monster or god. The 
scene pans lo reveal an enormous cavern. 
9 Tidus: "Cold. Need fire." 
10 The player must control Tidus and find a way to make a fire. 
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Appendix Three - Hermeneutic Clmlers in FFX 
The following identifies dominant hermeneutic clusters llrnt span the length or the FFX's 
narrative. 
I. Tidus, 1he hero'! L Tidus speak; to us as o nnrralOr. (Likely hero). 
2. Tidus shares a look with an ouraclive female. (Whal rdotionship do they 
have? The convention of the hero as romomic le,d reinforces Tidus' role 
as the hero). 
3. Tidus is a showy but a=.,mmodating spons celebrity. (The hero displays 
his skill). 
4. Auron was "waiting" for him. (Why? What does Tidus not know about 
his own value?) 
5. He wields the sword. (Parallelism or celebrity ond hero, and movement 
from urban celebrity to heroic fantasy figure) 
6. He is "chosen" by Sin. (Why?) 
7. He helps the Al Bhed, accepts the role of "slave'" (unprelcnlious, willing 
lo make-do) and befriends one ofhi, captors (non-judgcmemoll. 
8. Al Besoid, his blitzball skill earns him respect. (His status os hero is 
recognised). 
9. He breaks low by entering (and completing) the Trio! of lhc Foy!h, in case 
anyone neat; help. (He is willing to break some laws for the ,ake of a 
higher moraU1y). 
!O. He is chosen as Yuna"s Guardian. (Why? He lakes on o typical heroic rol, 
'-' her proleclOr.) 
11. Tidus hates hi> folher, but Tidus" father is rcspecled in Spira. on� Yam, 
like,! him. {Was Jecht lhat bad? Ho., he chonge,17 Is Tidus a "cry baby"'1) 
12. Tidus remains optimistic in the foce of hopelessness: Yun, likes him for 
this. (Laughter as braecry). 
13. Tidus rescues Yuna from Al Ilhe,l. (Masculine role of protector) 
14. Tidus witnesses the political machinations or lhe Maeslers and the attack 
on Sin. (The hero witnesses the unhcroie activity ofpolilics, and is heroic 
for not taking the wrong action). 
15. Tidus leams that the Masters ore cornipt, and thal Seymour killed his 
father. He works wilh Yun, lo violate sacred tradi1ion by trying to kill 
Sin permonen11; (reconfirming his willingness lo break unjust lows for a 
higher purpose). 
16. Tidus discovers lhal he is on Aeon (a glmst), and that destroying Sin (and 
the GrJnd Summoning) will lead 10 the disoppearance ofZanarkond and 
himself. 
17. Tidus discovers that he must kill his own falher. (The hero confronts his 
potential un-heroic side, embodied by Seymour). 
18. Tidus confronts and kills his father, Sin. and Yu Yevon, then disappears 
(Tidus as ',ero through forgiving his father and ,ocrificing his love for 
Yuno, and existence. for thC �ood of othcrS). 
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11. Romoocc? ,. In the li!lo sequence, Tidus ,hares n glance with Yuna. (Friendship? Love' 
' Unrequited love'/) In Znnarkand we see that the litle sequence was in media rcs. (When wilt 
they me<t1) ,. Yuna shores o glonce with Yuna when first meet. ([s sho imerested1) ,. She selects Tidus as Guardian. (D<>es Yuno Uust him, need him, or love 
him?) ,. Yuna is loved by oil in Spira. (Low, as public versus love as private) 
•• Yuna and Tidus shorn n privme laugh. (Coping with lhe quest as mnsking 
real intimacy ond love?) ,. Tidus rescuos Yuna from the Al Bhed. (Tidus' role as male ,aviour 
confirmed, but distributed amongst other Guardians) • Tidus interrupls Yuna while alone. {Was she chinking about him1) ' Tidus objcc1> snonuously to the proposed marriage between Yuna nnd 
Seymour. (The choke of duty over romance? Is Tidus betraying o 
conviction about lhc importance of love in general or his own desire lO •
wilh Yuno?) '° Tidus soves Yuna from Seymour at Bevelle. (Aborted marriage, romance 
deferred by quest.) "· Yuna as focal point in Via Purifico. (She is copable of being 
indeponden!l. "· Tidus and Yuna embrace in Mocalonio woods. (Romance confo,med.) "· Yuna realises Tidus is nn Aeon and will disnppeo.r. (Tragic romonce1) ... Tidus disa n; on the Airshin. (Trn ic romance confirmed.) 
lll. Jccht? ,. We presume that Jecht died at sea; his face looks down from a building. 
(Absent father, absent leader/god?) ,. Auron suggests that Jccht slill may be alive. (Reversal of expeclotion.) 
3. Jc<lu came to Spira before Tidus. (Curiosity.) ,. Jccht is Sin, having become the monster Tidus thought he was. (Surprise, 
and curiosity at how this has oe<urn:d.) ,. Jecht sent Auron to summon Tidus to free him. (Jechf, character rovi;ed, 
did not abandon Tidus, but was forced lo leave,) • Jecht sacrificed himself to become the Finol Aeon so 1hot thc Groat Calm 
could come. (Rever,al of Jecht's character.) ' Jccht greets Tidus, and requests he be killod, so thnt Yu Yevon con be ,. challenged, (Jech! has chosen the common social good over filial good, bt 
acknowledge, regret.) ,. Tidus kills his father. (Tra ie reversal of ex-•ted reunion.) 
IV. Sin? ,. Sin is o monster 1ha1 destroys Znnorkand. (Where did ho come from and 
what is he?) ' Wol<kn states that Sin is o supernatural punishment for humanity's 
misdeeds. (Curiosity lcmporarily resolved). ,. Sin is Jecht. {Expectation subverted wllh SU!prise: curiosity rekindled). ,. Sin is Yu Yevon's armour. (Curiosity resolved with surprise), ,. Sin is the focus or the Final Summoning: dofcaling Sin ends the Final 
Summoning, and dispels the Aeons of Znnorkond {including Tidus). 
(Curiosity resolved with surprise. Curiosity ond suspense regarding lhc 
confrontation with lhe so for invisible agency of Yu Yevon.) • Jooht ;, inside Sito. (Expectation ,ubvorled with surprise: curiosity 
rekindled,) ,. Bovelle, not Sin, desuoyed Znnarkand. (Reversal of initial e,pectution 
!hrou h final sumrise.) 
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V. Ycv'1n'I J. Ycvon is the prophet or Spirn"s teachings. (SufPrisc and curiDsity ,s co 
why the blitzball gesture is now a religiou.s gesture.) 
2. Yevon"s tradition is sub,erted by Seymour•, youlh and casualness. (The 
tradition is unnecessarily rcprcssi•c.) 
3. Ycvon"s authority is questioned through Seymour•, and Kinoc', 
blasphemous use of Machina to anack Sin. (The sacred lows are, no 
longer held sacred.) 
4. Ycvon's validity is undermined by the corruption of Se your ond the 
other M,cs1ers. (Suspicion confirmed. Suspense at how Ycvon"s 
authority will be resisted by the Guor<lians.) 
�- Yu Ye,on WII.S the basis for Yevon', teachings. (Curiosity rekindled 
!hrough return 10 the origin of o previously established foe(.) 
6. Yu Ycvon is inside Sin: his feor at what Bevelle did lO Z.narkond hos 
made him preserve himself by using Sin co keep those in Spira afraid of
him. (Expectation sub,ened through sufPri,.e rc,ersol. Suspense m 
confronling the original ,u1horitylpower of Spira). 
7, Yu Ycvon is an elemental force/god. (SUfPrise that the prophet of the 
god is the god. ond that both 1he god and 1he gospel are the original cause 
of S ira"s suffcrin�). 
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